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ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



A HISTORY 



BY JOHN G. NICOLAY 
AND JOHN HAY 



VOLUME THREE 




NEW YORK 
THE CENTURY CO. 



Copyright, 1886 and 1890, 

by John G. Nicolay 

and John Hay. 

Copyright renewed, 1914, 
by Helen G. Nicolay. 



1 



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k1 <^535 



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PRINTED IN U. S. A. 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Vol. Ill 

Abraham Lincoln Frontispiece 

From a photograph in the possession of F. W. Ballard, from 
which was engraved the portrait of President Lincoln for the 
original ten-dollar greenback, and later for one of the issues of 
the 5-20 Bonds. 

PAGE 

Facsimile of Charleston " Mercury " Extra 14 

Robert C. Winthrop 16 

From a photograph by Brady. 
James M. Mason 32 

From a photograph. 
General John G. Foster 48 

From a photograph by Brady. 

James L. Orr 64 

From a photograph by Brady. 

Isaac Toucey 80 

From a daguerreotype. 
Jeremiah S. Black 96 

From a photograph by Brady. 
Francis W. Pickens 112 

From a photograph in the possession of Louis Manigault. 

General John B. Floyd 128 

From a photograph by E. Anthony. 

Joseph Holt 1"^^ 

From a photograph by Brady. 

Stephen R. Mallory 160 

From a photograph. 

Tii 



vm ILLUSTKATIONS 

General Howell Cobb 176 

From a photograph lent by General Marcus J. Wright. 

Jefferson Davis 192 

From a photograph by Brady. 

John Tyler 208 

From a photograph by Brady. 

House in which Lincoln Lived when he was Elected 

President 224 

Elihu B. Washburne 240 

Drawn by Wyatt Eaton from a photograph. 
Thurlow Weed 256 

From a photograph by Brady. 

Alexander H. Stephens 272 

From a photograph by Brady. 
N. B. Judd 288 

From a photograph by H. Rocher. 

Frederick W. Seward .■ 304 

From a photograph by Brady. 
Hannibal Hamlin 320 

From a photograph by Brady. 

Facsimile of Mr. Seward's Suggestion for the Close of 

the Inaugural Address 336 

From the original manuscript. 
Facsimile of the Closing Paragraph as Rewritten by 

Mr. Lincoln 336 

From the original proof-sheet and manuscript from which the 
address was delivered. 

Caleb B. Smith 352 

From a photograph by Brady. 
Montgomery Blair 368 

From a photograph by Brady. 
James Louis Petigru 384 

From a photograph of the bust by Albert C. Hamish. 
John Forsyth 400 

From a photograph by Brady. 

Martin J. Crawford 401 

From a photograph by Brady. 
John Letcher 416 

From a photograph by A. A. Turner. 

John Minor Botts 430 

From a photograph by Brady. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Vol. Ill 

Chapter I. South Carolina Secession 

The South CaroUna Convention. Governor Pickens. 
Letter to President Buchanan. Reply Prepared by the 
President. Trescott's Letter to Pickens. The Gov- 
ernor's Letter Withdrawn. Caleb Cushing's Mission. 
The Ordinance of Secession. The " Declaration of 
Causes." The Doctrine of States Rights . . . . 1 

Chapter II. Personal Liberty Bills 

Southern Accusations. Alexander H. Stephens's Criti- 
cism on the South CaroUna Declaration of Causes. 
Origin of Personal Liberty Bills. The Fugitive-Slave 
Law of 1793. The Case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania. 
The Fugitive-Slave Law of 1850. " The Era of Slave 
Hunting." Summary of Personal Liberty Acts. The 
Fugitive- Slave Law Declared Constitutional. Fugitive 
Slaves and the Census. Southern Infractions of the 
Constitution. Lincoln on the Fugitive-Slave Law . . 17 

Chapter III. The Surrender Programme 

Anderson's " Sand Hill" Instructions. A Comparison 
of Dates. President Buchanan IModifies the Buell 
Memorandum. A Programme of SuiTender. Floyd's 
" Satisfactoi-y " News. Governor Pickens's Inquiry. 
The Harbor Guard Steamers. Anderson's Resolve. 
The Christmas MeiTy-Making 35 



X TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chaptee IV. FoKT Sumter 

Anderson's Preparatory Orders. Fort Moultrie Aban- 
doned. The General Clinch. The Landing at Sumter. 
The Work of the Rear-Guard, Astonishment in 
Charleston, Governor Pickens's Demand, Secession- 
ists Occupy Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie, Seiz- 
ure of Government Buildings in Charleston .... 47 

Chapter V. A Blundering Commission 

The South CaroUna Commissioners. Appointed Inter- 
view with Mr. Buchanan, Effect of the News in 
Washington. Anderson's Reply to Floyd, The Cab- 
inet Discussion, Secretaries Floyd and Black, Floyd's 
Demand. General Scott's Reminder. Pressure on the 
President. Mr, Buchanan's Hesitation. The Commis- 
sioners' Demand 62 

Chapter YI. The Cabinet Regime 

A Cabinet Incident. Floyd's Resignation. Holt Sec- 
retary of War. Buchanan's Proposed Answer. A 
New Cabinet Crisis. The Regime of the Cabinet. The 
Message of January 8. The Leadership of Secretary 
Black, His Memorandum to the President. Buchan- 
an's Reply to the Commissioners. The Commissioners' 
Retort 73 

Chapter VII. The " Star of the West " 

General Scott's Suggestions. Holt in the War Depart- 
ment. General Scott on Duty. Plans to Reenforce 
Sumter. Secretary Thompson's Intrigue. Alann in 
Secession Councils. Orders for the BrooMyn. The 
Star of the West. Anderson's Report. The Star of the 
West at Charleston Bar. The Morris Island Battery. 
Failure of the Relief Expedition 87 

Chapter VIII. Anderson's Truce 

Newspaper Reports. The Watch in Sumter. Ander- 
son's Hesitation. A Council of War. Anderson's 
Notice to Governor Pickens. The Governor's Re- 



TABLE OF CONTENTS XI 

sponse. Anderson's Rejoinder. Messenj^'ers to Wash- 
ington. Anderson's Course Approved. The Governor's 
Demand on Anderson. A Military Council. Anderson 
Declines to Deliver Fort Sumter. The Question Re- 
ferred to Washington 102 

Chapter IX. The Military Situation at 
Charleston 

The Governor's Revolutionary Zeal. A Campaign 
against Sumter. Pickens as Dictator. General 
Simons's Report. The Weakness of Conspiracy. Gov- 
ernor Pickens's Bravado. The Star of the West Battery. 
The Siege of Fort Sumter \ 114 

Chapter X. The National Defense 

Buchanan's Reconstructed Cabinet. Secretary Joseph 
Holt. Interview with the President. Dix Secretary of 
the Treasury. Scott's Defensive Orders. The St. Louis 
Arsenal. The Defense of Washington. Stanton 
Attorney-General, A Congressional Investigation. 
The Plot to Seize Washington. The Presidential 
Count. Holt's Report. The 22d of Febi-uary . . .127 

Chapter XI. The Sumter and Pickens Truce 

Hayne's Intei-view with Buchanan. The Letter of 
Governor Pickens. Letter of Secession Senators. See- 
retai'y Black's Questions. Instructions to Anderson. 
Mr. Buchanan's Reply. Pensacola Harbor. Lieuten- 
ant Slemmer's Movement. The Errand of the Brooklyn. 
The Fort Pickens Truce. The Scott-Buchanan (con- 
troversy. Colonel Hayne's Demand. Holt's Instruction 
to Anderson 153 

Chapter XII. The Cotton "Republics" 

Secession Commissioners. The Senatorial Caucus. 
Yulee's Letter to Finegan. Oi'dinances of Secession. 
Florida Convention. Mississippi Convention. Ala- 
bama Convention. Geoi'gia Convention. Louisiana 
Convention. Texas Convention 175 



xii TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chaptek XIII. The Montgomery Confedeeacy 

Withdrawals from Congress. The Montgomery Gath- 
ering. The " Confederate States of America." Cobb, 
Davis, and Stephens. " EquaUty of States." Missis- 
sippi Declaration of Causes. Stephens's " Comer- 
stone " Speech. Southern Rivalries. Jefferson Davis 
and Abraham Lincoln Compared and Contrasted. 
Davis's Double Attitude. The Confederate Cabinet. 
Confederate Measures 195 

Chapter XIV. Failure of Compromise 

The House Committee of Thirty-Three. Propositions 
of Compromise. Corwin's Letter to Lincoln. The 
Senate Committee of Thirteen. Toombs's Plan. 
Jefferson Davis's Plan. Crittenden's Plan. Douglas's 
Plan. Seward's Plan. Bigler's Plan. Rice's Plan. 
Crittenden's Senate Propositions. Senator Clark's 
Amendment. The Peace Convention 214 

Chapter XV. The Constitutional Amendment 

Corwin's Constitutional Amendment. Mr. Lincoln's 
Comment. Recommendations of the Committee of 
Five. The Treasury Condition. Cobb's Financial 
Management. Secretary Phihp F. Thomas. The Pub- 
lic Credit. The Morrill Tariff. Bonds and Treasury 
Notes 234 

Chapter XVI. The President-Elect 

Lincoln at Home. Views on Secession. News from 
Fort Moultrie. General Scott's Correspondence with 
Lincoln. News from Washington. Thurlow Weed 
and Horace Greeley. Lincoln's Letter to Kellogg. 
Lincoln's Letter to Seward. Seward and the Com- 
mittee of Thu-teen. The Crisis at the Capital ... 245 

Chapter XVII. Stephens's Speech 

Speech-making at Milledgeville. Toombs's Speech. 
Stephens's Speech. His Conditional Unionism. The 
Georgia Platform. The Lincoln-Stephens Correspond- 
ence. A Conflict of Opinion 266 



TABLE OP CONTENTS Xlll 

Chapter XVIII. Questions and Answers 

Lincoln's Confidential Replies. Letter to Spccr. Letter 
to Prentice. Letter to Paschal. Interview with a 
New Englander. Letter to Raymond. Letter to Gil- 
mer. Letter to Duff Green. Letter to Trumbull. 
Letter to J. T. Hale 270 

Chapter XIX. Springfield to Washington 

Departure from Springfield. The Presidential Party. 
Lincoln's Farewell A ddress. The Journey to Washing- 
ton. Addresses at Indianapolis. Address at Columbus. 
Address at Steubenville. Addresses at Trenton. Ad- 
dress in Independence Hall. Address at Harrisburg. 289 

Chapter XX. Lincoln's Secret Night Journey 

Protection to Railroads. Reports of Detectives. Bal- 
timore Secessionists. The President in Philadelphia. 
Incidents of the Journey. Seward's Letter to Lincoln. 
Colonel Stone's Report. Observations of the New 
York Pohce. The Conference at Harrisburg. The 
Night Journey. Arrival in Washington 302 

Chapter XXI. Lincoln's Inauguration 

Calls on the President-Elect. Conference with Party 
Leaders. Preparation of the Inaugural Address. Mr. 
Seward's Amendments. The Closing Paragraph. Pre- 
cautions for the Inauguration. The Procession to the 
Capitol. The Group on the Portico. The Inaugural 
Address. Changes Suggested and Adopted. The 
Presidential Oath 317 

Chapter XXII. Lincoln's Cabinet 

Election Evening. An Editorial Question. Seward 
Accepts the State Department. The Choice of Bates 
and Smith. Letter to Schuyler Colfax. The Cameron 
Incidents. Conference with Chase. The South in the 
Cabinet. The Blair-Davis Contest. Seward Declines 
and Reconsiders. The Cabinet Nominated and Con- 
firmed ^^ 



XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter XXIII. The Question of Sumter 

Report from Anderson. Questions to General Scott. 
The First Cabinet Meeting. Scott Recommends the 
Evacuation of Sumter. The Plan of Captain Fox. 
Lincoln's Question to the Cabinet. The Cabinet Re- 
phes. Fox's Visit to Sumter. The Mission of Lamon 
and Hurlbut. Mr. Petigru's Opinion. Scott Recom- 
mends the Evacuation of Fort Pickens 375 

Chapter XXIV. The Rebel Game 

Beauregard Sent to Charleston. The Commissioners in 
Washington. The Senate Debate. Rumors in the 
Capital. Hunter's Interview with Seward. The Com- 
missioners Refused an Interview. Their Formal Note. 
Justice Campbell's Mediation. Seward's Prediction. 
Campbell's Report to Jefferson Davis. Davis's 
Acknowledgment of Campbell's Service. Toombs's 
Letter to the Commissioners 396 

Chapter XXV. Virginia 

Governor Wise's Preparation for War. The Virginia 
Vote. Wise's Speech. Governor Letcher's Message. 
The Interstate Slave-Trade. Fort Monroe. The Vir- 
ginia Convention. Baldwin's Interview with Lincoln. 415 

Chapter XXVI. Premier or President 

Cabinet Opinions of March 29. A Change of Vote. 
Captain Fox Prepares an Expedition for Sumter. Cap- 
tain Meigs Prepares an Expedition for Fort Pickens. 
The Orders for the Powhatan. Seward and Welles. 
The Situation During March. Secretary Seward's 
Memorandum. President Lincoln's Reply .... 429 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



CHAPTER I 

SOUTH CAROLINA SECESSION 



THE delegates to the South Carolina Convention chap, l 
were elected on the 6th of December, and as- iseo. 
sembled and organized at Columbia, the capital of 
the State, on the 17th of the same month ; on ac- 
count of a local epidemic, however, both the con- 
vention and the Legislature adjourned to Charleston, 
where the former reassembled on the following day 
and the latter two days afterwards. Elected under 
the prevailing secession furor which tolerated no 
opposition, and embracing the leading conspirators 
in its membership, the convention was practically 
unanimous. " There is no honor," said the chair- 
man on taking his seat, "I esteem more highly 
than to sign the ordinance of secession as a mem- 
ber of this body ; but I will regard it as the great- .. convei 

,.„ , . ., •!• tlon Jou 

est honor of my life to sign it as your presiding nai,- p. i 
officer." 

The Legislature of South Carolina had just 
elected a new governor, who was inaugurated on 
the same day on which the convention met. This 

Vol. III.~1 



I ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. I. was F. W. Pickens, a revolutionist of a yet more 
radical and energetic type than his predecessor Gist, 
and who, as we have seen, had been in close con- 
sultation with the Cabinet cabal at Washington, 
more than a month before. He was, of course, 
anxious to signalize his advent ; and to this end 
immediately dispatched to Washington a special 
messenger, bearing the following letter to Presi- 
dent Buchanan : 

(Strictly confidential.) 

Columbia, December 17, 1860. 

My Dear Sir : With a sincere desire to prevent a 
collision of force, I have thought proper to address you 
directly and truthfully on points of deep and immediate 
interest. 

I am authentically informed that the forts in Charles- 
ton harbor are now being thoroughly prepared to turn, 
with effect, their guns upon the interior and the city. 
Jurisdiction was ceded by this State expressly for the 
purpose of external defense from foreign invasion, and 
not with any view that they should be turned upon the 
State. 

In an ordinary case of mob rebellion, perhaps it might 
be proper to prepare them for sudden outbreak. But 
when the people of the State, in sovereign convention as- 
sembled, determine to resume their original powers of 
separate and independent sovereignty, the whole question 
is changed, and it is no longer an act of rebellion. I, 
therefore, most respectfully urge that all work on the 
forts be put a stop to for the present, and that no more 
force may be ordered there. 

The regular convention of the people of the State of 
South Carohna, legally and properly called, under our 
Constitution, is now in session, deliberating upon the 
gravest and most momentous questions, and the excite- 
ment of the great masses of the people is great, under a 
sense of deep wrongs, and a profound necessity of doing 
something to preserve the peace and safety of the State. 



SOUTH CAROLINA SECESSION 



To spare the effusion of blood, which no human power 
may be able to prevent, I earnestly beg your immediate 
consideration of all the points I call your attention to. 
It is not improbable that, under orders from the Com- 
mandant, or perhaps from the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, the alteration and defenses of those posts are 
progresshig without the knowledge of yourself or the 
Secretary of War. 

The arsenal, in the city of Charleston, with the public 
arms, I am informed, was turned over very properly to 
the keeping and defense of a State force, at the urgent 
request of the Governor of South Carolina. I would 
most respectfully, and from a sincere devotion to the 
public peace, request that you would allow me to send a 
small force, not exceeding twenty-five men and an ofiicer, 
to take possession of Fort Sumter, immediately, in order 
to give a feeling of safety to the community. There are no 
United States troops in that fort whatever, or perhaps 
only four or five, at present; besides some additional 
workmen or laborers, lately employed to put the guns in 
order. If Fort Sumter could be given to me, as Governor, 
under a permission similar to that by which the Gov- 
ernor was permitted to keep the arsenal with the United 
States arms in the city of Charleston, then I think the 
public mind would be (juieted under a feeling of safety ; 
and as the convention is now in full authority, it strikes 
me that could be done with perfect propriety. I need not 
go into particulars, for urgent reasons will force them- 
selves readily upon your consideration. 

If something of the kind be not done, I cannot answer 
for the consequences. 

I send this by a private and confidential gentleman, who 
is authorized to confer with Mr. Trescott fuUy, and to 
receive through him any answer you may think proper to 
give to this. 

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, 

Yours truly, F. W. Pickens. 

To the President of the United States. 



ClIAl". I. 



Pickens to 
Bucbanan, 
December 

17, 1860. 

" South 

Carolina 

House 
Journal," 

1861, pp. 

167, 168. 



Arrived in Washington, the special messenger 
who bore this document sought the active agent 



4 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. I. of the Central cabal/ Mr. Trescott, Assistant Secre- 
tary of State, and was by him on Thursday morn- 
ing, December 20, conducted to the White House 

M^emoran- ^^^^ prescutcd to Mr. Bucliauan, to whom he per- 

«s/'Life sonally delivered his communication. The Pres- 
*an." Vol idcut reccived the document and promised an an- 

■'384! ' swer to it on the following day. The temper and 
condition of his mind is plainly reflected in what 
he wrote. He seems to have realized no oifense in 
this insult to the sovereignty and dignity of the 
United States whose Constitution he had sworn to 
" preserve, protect, and defend " ; no patriotic re- 
sentment against the South Carolina conspirators 
who, as he knew by the telegraph, were assembling 
that same day in convention to inaugurate local 
rebellion; — his whole answer breathed a tone of 
apology that his oath and duties would not permit 
him to oblige the South Carolina Governor ; and 
he feebly groped for relief from his perplexities in 
the suggestion that Congress might perhaps some- 
how arrange the trouble. This was the answer 

prepared : 

Washington, December 20, 1860. 

My Dear Sir : I have received your favor of the 
17th inst. by Mr. Hamilton. From it I deeply regret to 
observe that you seem entirely to have misapprehended 
my position, which I supposed had been clearly stated in 
my message. I have incurred, and shall incur, any 
reasonable risk within the clearly prescribed line of my 
executive duties to prevent a colhsion between the army 

1 In his message of November distinguished citizen, appointed, 
5, 1861, Governor Pickens, of as I have since been informed 
South Carolina, refers to William by my predecessor, to remain 
H. Trescott, Esq., who was in at Washington as confidential 
December, 1860, Assistant Sec- representative of the State." 
retary of State of the United — "South Carolina House Jour- 
States, at Washington, as " a nal," 1861, p. 31. 



SOUTH CAEOLINA SECESSION i 

and navy of the United States and the citizens of South cuap. i. 
Carolina in defense of the forts within the harbor of 
Charleston. Hence I have declined for the present to 
reenforce these forts, relying upon the honor of South 
Carolinians that they will not be assaulted whilst they 
remain in their present condition ; but that commission- 
ers will be sent by the convention to treat with Congress 
on the subject. I say with Congress because, as I state in 
my message, ^' Apart from the execution of the laws so far 
as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority 
to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal 
Government and South Carolina. He has been invested 
with no such discretion. He possesses no power to 
change the relations heretofore existing between them, 
much less to acknowledge the independence of that State." 
This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the 
power of recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy 
among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no 
resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto gov- 
ernment, involving no such responsibility. Any at- 
tempt to do this would, on my part, be a naked act of 
usurpation. 

As an executive officer of the Government, I have no 
power to surrender, to any human authority. Fort Sumter 
or any of the other forts or public property in South 
Carolina. To do this would, on my part, as I have al- 
ready said, be a naked act of usurpation. It is for Con- 
gress to decide this question, and for me to preserve the 
status of the public property as I found it at the com- 
mencement of the troubles. 

If South Carolina should attack any of these forts, she 
will then become the assailant in a war against the United 
States. It will not then be a question of coercing a State 
to remain in the Union, to which I am utterly opposed, as 
my message proves, but it will be a question of volun- 
tarily precipitating a conflict of arms on her part, with- 
out even consulting the only authority which possesses 
the power to act upon the subject. Between independent 
governments, if one possesses a fortress within the limits 
of another, and the latter should seize it without calling 
upon the appropriate authorities of the power in posses- 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. I. 



Ciirtis, 

" Life of 

Buchanan." 

Vol. II., 

pp. 384, 385. 



sion to surrender it, this would not only be a just cause 
of war, but the actual commencement of hostilities. 

No authority was given, as you suppose, from myself 
or from the War Department, to Governor G-ist, to guard 
the United States Arsenal in Charleston by a company of 
South Carolina volunteers. In this respect you have 
been misinformed — I have, therefore, never been more 
astonished in my life, than to learn from you that unless 
Fort Sumter be delivered into your hands, you cannot be 
answerable for the consequences. 

It is easy to infer from results, that while Mr. 
Buchanan was laboring over this document the 
central cabal was busy. They saw that the rash 
zeal of Governor Pickens was endangering the web 
of conspiracy they had wound around the Presi- 
dent. He was committed to non-coercion; com- 
mitted to non-reenforcement ; committed to await 
the arrival of South Carolina commissioners. This 
new demand from a new authority not only indi- 
cated a division of sentiment and purpose in the 
insurrectionary councils in the Palmetto State, but 
created an opportunity through which Mr. Buch- 
anan under a possible healthier impulse of pa- 
triotism might repudiate the whole obligation of 
non-resistance to their schemes into which they 
had beguiled him. They clearly saw, as they them- 
Trescott to sclvcs explained, that though lie would not deliver 
Dec.21,1860. Sumter now, he might be willing to " approach such 
action " hereafter, " a possibility not at all improb- 
able, and which ought to be kept open." 

Mr. Trescott therefore hastened to take the advice 
of two of the South Carolina Congressmen, — Mc- 
Queen and Bonham, — and it is not a violent pre- 
sumption to assume, also of the chief Senatorial 
conspirators; for only six days had elapsed since 



' South 

Carolina 

House 

Journal," 

1861, p. 170 



SOUTH CAROLINA SECESSION 

the Congressioual circular was signed and pub- chap. i. 
lished, which called upon the Cotton States to pro- 
ceed with the plot of secession and the formation 
of a Southern Confederacy. A telegram was at 
once sent to Charleston, mildly explaining to Gov- 
ernor Pickens the blunder he was making and ask- 
ing his authority to withdraw his letter to Mr. 
Buchanan. Governor Pickens must be credited 
with astuteness enough to comprehend the situa- 
tion, for he gave the consent requested. On Friday 
morning Mr. Trescott waited upon Mr. Buchanan 
and informed him that he would not be required 
to answer as Governor Pickens had withdrawn his 
demand ; and Mr. Trescott records, with an evident 
appreciation of the affair as a successful stroke of 
policy, that "the withdrawal of the letter was a 
great relief to the President." To understand more 
fully the whole scope and spirit of the incident, 
we must read the report of it which he then trans- 
mitted to Charleston : 

Washestoton, December 21, 1860. 

To His Excellency F. W. Pickens, 

Governor of South Carolina. 

Sir: Your confidential letter to the President was 
duly delivered to him yesterday by D. H. Hamilton, Esq., 
according to your instructions. It was withdrawn (no 
copy having been taken) this morning by me, under the 
authority of your telegraphic dispatch. Its withdrawal 
was most opportune. It reached here under circum- 
stances which you could not have anticipated, and it pro- 
duced the effect upon the President. 

He had removed Colonel Gardiner from command at 
Fort Moultrie, for carrying ammunition from the arsenal 
at Charleston ; he had refused to send reenforcements to 
the garrison there ; he had accepted the resignation of 



] ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. I, the oldest, most eminent, and highest member of his Cab- 
inet, rather than consent to send additional force, and 
the night before your letter arrived, he,^ upon a telegraphic 
communication that arms had been removed from the 
arsenal to Fort Moultrie, the Department of War had 
issued prompt orders by telegraph to the officer removing 
them, to restore them immediately. He had done this 
upon his determination to avoid all risk of collision, and 
upon the written assurance of the majority of the Con- 
gressional Delegation from the State that they did not 
beheve there was any danger of an attack upon the forts 
before the passage of the Ordinance, and an expression of 
their trust and hope that there would be none after, until 
the State had sent commissioners here. His course had 
been violently denounced by the Northern press, and an 
effort was being made to ^ a Congressional investiga- 
tion. At that moment he could not have gone to the ex- 
tent of action you desired, and I felt confident that if 
forced to answer your letter then he would have taken 
such ground as would have prevented his ever approach- 
ing it hereafter, a possibility not at all improbable, and 
which ought to be kept open, I considered, also, that the 
chance of public investigation rendered the utmost caution 
necessary as to any communications from the State, and 
having presented the letter, and ascertained what the 
nature of the reply would be, you had all the advantage 
of knowing the truth, without the disadvantage of having 
it put on record. Besides this, the President seemed to 
think that your request was based upon the impossibility 
of your restraining the spirit of our people ; an interpre- 
tation which did you injustice, and the possibility of 
which I deemed it due to you to avoid. He also appeared 
to labor under the impression that the representations of 
the Members of Congress and your own differed essen- 
tially, and this, I thought, on account of both, should 
not be stated in any reply to you. I was also perfectly 
satisfied that the status of the garrisons would not be 
disturbed. 

Under these circumstances, if I had been acting under 

iThe blanks and rhetorical eonstruetion are copied exactly as the 
authors find them printed in the "South Carolina House Journal." 



SOUTH CAROLINA SECESSION 



formal credentials from you, and the letter had been 
unsealed, I would have delayed its presentation for some 
hours, until I could have telegraphed you, but that was 
impossible. As Mr. Hamilton, therefoi-e, had brought 
with him General McQueen and General Bonham, when 
he called on me and delivered the letter, and had even 
gone so far as to express the wish that they should bo 
present when he delivered it to the President, — a propo- 
sition which they declined, however, — I deemed it not 
indiscreet, nor in violation of the discretionary confidence 
which your letter implied, to take their counsel. We 
agreed perfectly, and the result was the telegraphic dis- 
patch of last night. The withdrawal of the letter was 
a gi-eat relief to the President, who is most earnestly 
anxious to avoid an issue with the State or its author- 
ities, and, I think, has encouraged his disposition to go as 
far as he can in this matter, and to treat those who may 
represent the State with perfect frankness. 

I have had this morning an interview with Governor 
Floyd, the Secretary of War. No order has been issued 
that will at all disturb the present condition of the gar- 
risons, and while I cannot even here venture into details, 
which are too confidential to be risked in any way, I am 
prepared to say, with a full sense of the responsibility, 
that nothing will be done which will either do you in- 
jury or properly create alarm. Of course when your 
commissioners have succeeded or failed to effect their 
negotiations, the whole issue is fairly before you, to be 
met as courage, honor, and wisdom may direct. 

My delay in answering your telegraph concerning Colo- 
nel Huger, was caused by his absence from this place. 
He came, in reply to my telegraph last night, and this 
morning I telegraphed upon his decision, which I pre- 
sume he has explained by a letter of this same date. As 
Dr. Hamilton leaves this evening, I have only time to 
write this hurried letter, and am, sir, 
Very respectfully, 

Wm. Henry Trescott. 

I inclose your confidential letter in this.^ 

lln Curtis's "Life of Buch- will be found the private memo- 
anan," Vol. U., pp. 383, 384, randum of President Buchanan 



CHAP. I. 



Trescott to 

Pickens, 

Dec. 21, I860. 

" South 

Carolina 

House 

Journal," 

1861, pp. 

169-71. 



10 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. I. We must now turn our attention from the ex- 
ecutive rooms of the Presidential mansion in Wash- 
ington to the executive rooms of South Carolina 
in Charleston, where on the same day a counter- 
part of the transaction we have described was going 
on. Since the beginning of these new troubles, 
especially since the discussion and issuing of his 
message. President Buchanan had been anxious 
and ill at ease. He could not shut his eyes to 
the fact that in South Carolina, at least, the tide 
of revolution was steadily rising. He appears 
to have dimly felt that his official responsibility 
and honor were somehow involved; and since 
he had reasoned the executive power into noth- 
ingness, the idea suggested itself to his mind 
that a little friendly expostulation at least was 
due from him. Under some such impulse he 



giving his statement of the in- 
cident : 

' ' On Thursday morning, De- 
cember 20, 1860, Hamilton, late 
marshal of South Carolina, sent 
especially for this purpose, pre- 
sented me a letter from Governor 
Pickens, in the presence of Mr. 
Trescott, dated at Columbia, 
South Carolina, 17th December 
(Monday). He was to wait until 
this day (Friday afternoon) for 
my answer. The character of 
the letter will appear from the 
answer to it which I had pre- 
pared. Thursday night, between 
9 and 10 o'clock, Mr. Trescott 
called upon me. He said that 
he had seen Messrs. Bonham 
and McQueen of the South Caro- 
lina delegation, that they all 
agreed that this letter of Gov- 
ernor Pickens was in violation 
of the pledge which had been 
given by themselves not to make 



an assault upon the forts, but to 
leave them in statu quo until the 
result of an application of com- 
missioners to be appointed by the 
State was known ; that Pickens, 
at Columbia, could not have 
known of the arrangements. 
They — to wit, Bonham, Mc- 
Queen, and Trescott — had tele- 
graphed to Pickens for authority 
to withdraw his letter. Friday 
morning, 10 o'clock, 21st De- 
cember, Mr. Trescott called upon 
me with a telegram of which the 
following is a copy from that 
which he delivered to me: 'De- 
cember 21, 1860. — You are 
authoT'ized and requested to 
withdraw my letter sent by Dr. 
Hamilton immediately. F. W. 
P.' Mr. Trescott read to me, 
from the same telegram, that 
Governor Pickens had seen Mr. 
dishing; the letter was accord- 
ingly withdrawn." 



SOUTH CAllOLINA SECESSION 



11 



wrote the following letter to Goveriioi- Pickens, 
and with it dispatched Caleb Gushing to Charles- 
ton, to see if he might not exert a personal in- 
fluence upon the malcontents, who paid no heed 
to any wishes or interests but their own: 

WAsmNGTON, December 18, 18G0. 
My Dear Sir: From common notoriety, I assume the 
fact that the State of South Carolina is now deliberating 
on the question of seceding from the Union. Whilst any 
hope remains that this may be prevented, or even retarded, 
so long as to allow the people of her sister States an op- 
portunity to manifest their opinions upon the causes which 
liave led to this proceeding, it is my duty to exert all the 
means in my power to avert so dread a catastrophe. I 
have, therefore, deemed it advisable to send to you the 
Hon. Caleb Cushing, in whose integrity, ability, and pru- 
dence I have full confidence, to hold communi(;atioiis with 
you on my behalf, for the purpose of changing or modi- 
fying the contemplated action of the State in the manner 
I have already suggested. Commending Mr. Cushing to 
your kind attention, for his own sake, as well as that of 
the cause, I remain. 

Very respectfully, your friend, 

James Buchanan. 
His Excellency Francis W, Pickens. 

Mr. Cushing was a man of great affability, and 
of prominence in the Democratic party. He had 
been Attorn ey-Greneral under President Pierce, and 
was called to preside over the Charleston Conven- 
tion, until the dissension in that body between 
Northern and Southern Democrats caused its dis- 
ruption and adjournment to Baltimore. In the 
second disruption at Baltimore, Mr. Cushing had 
followed the fortunes of the Southern leaders, and 
with them had seceded, and presided over that 
fraction of the original body which nominated 



Chap. I. 



Buclianan 

to Pickens. 

Dec. 18, 1860. 

"South 

Cnroliua 

House 

Journal," 

186), p. 171. 



12 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. I. Breckinridge. Though a Massachusetts man, he 
was thus affiliated in party principle, party organi- 
zation, and party action with the South, and Presi- 
dent Buchanan not unnaturally thought that he 
was personally an agreeable agent, and ought to 
be an influential party representative, capable, 
in behalf of the Administration, of dissuading the 
Charleston conspirators from their dangerous de- 
termination, or at least from their reckless pre- 
cipitancy. But the sequel shows that Buchanan 
both misunderstood the men he had to deal with, 
and was unequal in purpose and will to cope with 
their superior daring and resolution. 

Mr. Gushing arrived in Charleston on the day 
the South Carolina Convention passed its ordi- 
nance of secession. He obtained an interview 
with the G-overnor, and presented the President's 
letter. "I had but a short interview with him," 
said Governor Pickens in his message of Novem- 
ber 5, 1861, " and told him I would return no reply 
to the President's letter, except to say very can- 
didly that there was no hope for the Union, and 
that, so far as I was concerned, I intended to main- 
tain the separate independence of South Carolina, 
and from this purpose neither temptation nor dan- 
ger should for a moment deter me." There is 
a notable contrast in this haughty and defiant 
reception by a South Carolina governor of the 
messenger of the President of the United States, 
to the cringing and apologetic spirit in which the 
President had on that same morning received the 
messenger of the Governor and replied to his 
demand. Mr. Cushing's reply deserves special 
notice. "He said," continues Governor Pickens, 



SOUTH CAROLINA SECESSION 13 

" tluit lie could not say what changes circiim- ciur. i. 
stances might produce, but when he left Washing- 
ton, there was then no intention whatever to 
change the status of the forts in our liarbor in 
any way." By this language Mr. Gushing himself 
seems to have changed his errand from a patriotic 
mission of protest and warning to one conveying 
advantageous information to the conspirators. 

It could hardly have been without a sense of 
personal mortification to Mr. Gushing that the 
drama which he had been sent to avert, or at least 
to postpone, immediately unrolled itself under his 
very eyes, and his mortification must have risen to 
indignation when he was requested by his presence 
to grace the pageant. The South Garolina Gonven- 
tion, during the two days which had elapsed since 
its adjournment hither from Golumbia, had been 
deliberating in secret session. A little after midday 
of December 20, the streets of Gharleston were filled 
with placards (see page 14) giving the public the 
first notice of its action. 

The usual jubilations immediately followed — 
ringing of bells, salutes of cannon, and the noise 
and display of street parades. The convention 
resolved to celebrate the event further by a pub- 
lic ceremonial to which it invited the Governor, 
the Legislature, and other dignitaries; and both 
branches of the Legislature also sent a committee 
to Galeb Gushing to give him an official invitation 
to attend. At half-past six that evening the mem- 
bers of the convention marched in procession to 
Institute Hall, where the public signing of the 
ordinance of secession was performed with appro- 
priate solemnities, and at its close the presiding 



14 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. I. 



CHARLGSTOIV 

MERCURY 



EXTRA: 



Massed unanimously ai fl.15 oV7orA*, M .V., December 
seO/A, I860. 

AN ORDBI^AJWCE 

To dUaolve the Vnion betiteen the State of South Carolina and 
other States wiited with her under the compact entitled " The 
Constitution qf the Vnited States of Jimei^a,''^ 

We, tite Feople of the Slate of South Carolina, in Convention atscmbUd, do declare and ordain, an4 
a i» Kereby declared and ordained. 

That (he OrdioaDce adopted by ns in Onventios, on Ihe twenty -third day or May, in the 
yearof out Lord one thousand aevea hundred and eighty-eight, whereby tbo Constitution of the 
United States of America was nLti&ed, and alao, all Acta and parte of \cts of the Getierail 
Aasembty of this State, ratifyiog amendments of the naid Coootitution. are hereby repealed ; 
tad tfaat.the aaioo qow eubsiatiog bctw<eon South CsJoUaa and other States, under the name of 
'The DDited Stfttea of America," is hereby dissolved^ 



UNION 

DISSOLVED! 



SOUTH CAEOLINA SECESSION 15 

officer aunounced : " Tlio ordinance of secession cuai-. i. 
lias been signed and ratified, and I proclaim the 
State of South Carolina an Independent Common- 
wealth." 

The city and the State joined in general exulta- 
tion as if a great work had been accomplished, as 
if the efforts of a generation had been crowned 
with fulfillment, and nothing remained but to rest 
and enjoy the ripened fruit of independence. There 
seemed to be no dream amid all this rejoicing, that 
nothing definite had as yet been effected ; that the 
reckless day's act was but the prelude to the most 
terrible tragedy of the age, the unchaining of a 
storm which should shake the continent with terror 
and devastation, leaving every Southern State a 
wreck, and sweeping from the face of the earth the 
institution in whose behalf the fatal work was done. 

The secession ordinance having been passed, 
signed, and proclaimed, the convention busied it- 
self for the next few days in making up a public 
statement of its reasons for the anomalous pro- 
cedure. The discussion showed a wide divergence 
of opinion as to the causes which had produced 
the act. One ascribed it to the election of Lincoln, 
another to the failure of the Northern States to 
execute the fugitive-slave law, a third to the anti- 
slavery sentiment of the free States, a fourth to 
the tariff, a fifth to unconstitutional approj^riations 
by Congress, and so on. On the 24th of December 
the convention adopted a " Declaration of Causes," 
and an " Address to the Slave-holding States," the 
two papers together embracing the above and other 
specifications. Since neither the Constitution of the 
United States nor the laws of Congress contained 



16 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. I. any section, clause, word, or reasonable implication 
that authorized an act of secession, the " Declara- 
tion of Causes" formulated the doctrine of States 
rights in justification. That doctrine in substance 
was, that the several States entered the Union as 
sovereignties ; that in forming the Federal Govern- 
ment they delegated to it only specific powers for 
specific ends; that the Federal Government was 
not a sovereign over sovereignties, but was only 
an agent between them ; that there existed no 
common arbiter to adjudge differences; that each 
State or sovereignty might judge for itself any 
violation of the common agreement and choose its 
own mode of redress ; consequently that each State 
might adhere to or secede from the Union, at its 
own sovereign will and pleasm-e. 

This doctrine, springing from early differences 
of constitutional interi3retation, had not been pro- 
mulgated in its ultra form until South Carolina's 
nullification movement in 1832. It had been ac- 
cepted and sustained by only a small fraction of 
the American people. The whole current, action, 
and development of the government of the United 
States under the Constitution was based upon the 
opposite theory. Washington and the succeeding 
Presidents rejected it in their practical administra- 
tion ; Marshall and the Supreme Court condemned 
it in their judicial decisions; Webster refuted it 
in his highest constitutional arguments ; Congress 
repudiated it in its legislation ; Jackson denounced 
it in executive proclamation as treasonable and 
revolutionary; and the people of the Union at 
large regarded it as an absurd and dangerous 
political heresy. 




];<)BEi;t r. ^VI^'THR(^p. 



CHAPTER II 



PERSONAL LIBERTY BILLS 



T 



panying address which the South Carolina 
Convention put forth to justify secession, both 
deal in such ambiguous phrases and vague gen- 
eralities that in the main they betray their own 
weakness and insufficiency; and the critical stu- 
dent finds the same defect in the whole deluge of 
Southern rhetoric, spoken and written to defend 
the rebellion. If any denial or refutation of many 
of the allegations they contained were needed, it is 
conveniently furnished by an authority whose com- 
petency the Southern people themselves cannot 
deny. Alexander H. Stephens, who was soon after- 
wards elected Vice-President of the Confederate 
States, made the following frank criticism which 
is all the more valuable tha.t it was written in a 
confidential letter to his brother and remained 
unpublished till after the war: 

I have read the address put forth b}^ the Convention at 
Charleston to the Southern States, It has not impressed 
me favorably. In it South Carolina clearly shows that 
it is not her intention to be satisfied with any redress 
of grievances. Indeed, she hardly deigns to specify any. 
The slavery question is almost enthely ignored. Her 
greatest complaint seems to be the tariff, though there 
Vol. hi.— 2 n 



18 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. II. 



A. H. 

Stephens to 

Lintou 

StepheiiH, 

Jan. 1, 18G1. 

Johnston & 

Browne, 

" Life of 

A.H. 

Stephens," 

p. 375. 



is but little intelligent or intelligible thought on that sub- 
ject. Perhaps the less she said about it the better. For 
the present tariff from which she secedes is just what 
her own Senators and Members in Congress made it. 
There are general and vague charges about consolidation, 
despotism, etc., and the South having, under the opera- 
tion of the general Government, been reduced to a minor- 
ity incapable of protecting itseK, etc. This complaint 
I do not think well founded. It arises more from a 
spirit of peevishness or restless fretfulness than from 
calm and deliberate judgment. The truth is, the South, 
almost in mass, has voted I think for every measure of 
general legislation that has passed both Houses and be- 
come law for the last ten years. Indeed, with but few 
exceptions, the South has controlled the Government in 
its every important action from the beginning. The pro- 
tective policy was once, for a time, carried against the 
South; but that was subsequently completely changed. 
Our policy ultimately prevailed. The South put in power 

— or joined a united country in putting in power and 
sustaining the Administration of Washington for eight 
years. She put in and sustained Jefferson eight years, 
Madison eight years, Jackson eight years. Van Buren 
four years, Tyler four years, Polk four years, Pierce four 
years, and Buchanan four years. That is, they have aided 
in making and sustaining the administration for sixty 
years out of the seventy-two of the government's existence. 
Does this look like we were or are in an abject minority 
at the mercy of a despotic Northern majority, rapacious 
to rob and plunder us ? It is true we are in a minority, 
and have been a long time. It is true also that a party 
at the North advocate principles which would lead to a 
despotism, and they would rob us if they had the power 

— I have no doubt of that. But by the prudent and wise 
counsels of Southern statesmen this party has been kept 
in the minority in the past, and by the same prudent and 
wise statesmanship on our part I can but hope and think 
it can be so for many long years to come. 

On one point, however, the South Carolina 
" Declaration of Causes" attempted to be specific, 



PERSONAL LIBERTY BILLS 19 

saying that " fourteen of the States have delibev- chap, ii 
ately refused for years past to fulfill their constitu- 
tional obligations. . . The States of Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa have en- 
acted laws which either nullify the acts of Con- 
gress or render useless any attempt to execute 
them." These acts were popularly known as 
" Personal Liberty Bills " ; and since Mr. Stephens 
in the same letter we have quoted also declares 
that " they constitute the only cause in my opinion 
which can justify secession," the subject demands 
a careful examination. We shall see how, under 
analysis, the Personal Liberty Bills also dwindle 
into ridiculous insignificance as a motive for dis- 
union and war. 

It was a chronic evil in the system of slavery 
that slaves would run away from their masters. 
The liberty of which a hostile tribe robbed the an- 
cestor in Africa, the children would strive to regain 
to the latest generation, anywhere under the sun. 
The master was a perpetual jailer, but his single 
vigilance was not enough to hold his captive ; he 
requked the help of the entire community; even 
this was insufficient ; he needed also the assistance 
of bordering States. When the Constitution of the 
United States was formed, the movement towards 
the abolition of slavery in the Northern States 
was ah'eady in progress. The delegates from the 
South considered it a great gain that, instead of 
being obliged to depend upon the separate action 
of each Northern State for the recovery of their 
runaways under the mere obligation of interna- 



20 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. II. tional comity, they obtained an express provision 

in the Constitution guaranteeing the "delivery" of 

^A^ticfe"' their fugitive slaves from any State in the Union; 

ownership being thus acknowledged throughout the 

whole nation. 

But as yet no legal machinery existed to carry 
out this constitutional provision, and it is a curious 
historical fact that the first national fugitive-slave 
law grew, not out of the effort of a negro slave to 
obtain his freedom by flight, but out of the cir- 
" American cumstancc that three white Virginians kidnaped a 
voL^r^Mis- fi'ee colored man from Pennsylvania and sold him 
ceiianeoua, -^^^ slavery. And no less noteworthy is the ex- 
ample which the State of Virginia set, of fulfilling 
" constitutional obligations." The event happened 
in the year 1788; the offenders were in due time 
1791. indicted, and the Governor of Pennsylvania re- 
quested the Grovernor of Virginia to deliver them 
up for trial under another clause of the Constitu- 
tion. The Grovernor of Virginia refused to sur- 
render the kidnapers, returning for answer the 
opinion of his Attorney-Greneral, that there existed 
no laws to carry out the Constitution in this par- 
ticular, and also laying down the following broad 
legal principles : 

"Every free man in Virginia is entitled to the 

unmolested enjoyment of his liberty, unless it be 

taken away by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or by the Constitution or laws of 

"American Virginia. No molestation, seizure, or removal of 

state & ' ' . 

voh^Mis- liis person can take place, but under the authority 

ceUaneous, ^f ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^f them." 

President Washington appears to have transmit- 
ted the official correspondence about this affair to 



PERSONAL LIBEllTY BILLS 21 

Congress, which iu 1793 enacted a law, containing chap. ii. 
provisions and machinery for a twofold object : Act 
first, the surrender of criminals for trial ; second, Feb.12,1793 
the delivery of fugitives from service or labor. 
Thus at the very beginning the twin subjects 
of kidnaping and flight from slavery formed the 
double reason for, and incidentally the double sub- 
ject of, the first fugitive-slave law. 

The machinery of this law was very sim^jle. The 
owner, his agent or attorney, finding the slave in a 
free State, might seize or arrest him, take him be- 
fore a magistrate, and, having satisfactorily proved 
that the slave was his property, receive from the 
magistrate a certificate to that effect ; which cer- 
tificate authorized the owner to carry his slave to 
the State from which he escaped. Any one ob- 
structing or hindering the execution of the law or 
knowingly harboring or concealing such fugitive 
was punishable by a fine of $500. 

This law it will be perceived in its chief provi- 
sion violated a broad fundamental principle of 
both English and American liberty, in omitting 
to provide trial by jury in a question of right to 
personal freedom ; but as slavery was an anomaly 
in American government, so every slave law was 
necessarily an anomaly in American juiispru- 
dence. To repeat a definition we have before em- 
ployed, the system being barbarous it could only 
be maintained by barbarous safeguards. The diffi- 
culty of legislation arose from the fact that the 
slave had a double character. He was both a piece 
of property and a person. The law must be framed 
to counteract, not merely the intelligence of the 
human being seeking freedom, but it must also 



22 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



CHAP. II. 



counteract the sympathy of other human beings 
willing to lend him assistance. Hence summary 
process and the denial of the ordinary legal reme- 
dies. But the exceptional character of the law was 
probably little thought of. It was passed amid a 
public sentiment accepting such incongruities as 
necessary and therefore proper. Apparently it 
provoked little contest in Congress. The House of 
Representatives passed it by a vote of, yeas, forty- 
eight; nays, seven. 

It only needs the statement of the origin and 
provisions of this first fugitive-slave law to show 
that the slave system was a matter of grave con- 
cern, not merely to the States in which it existed, 
but also to every free State in the Union. To per- 
mit the owner to catch his absconding slave placed 
every free person of color in a certain jeopardy. 
It was a matter of common notoriety that profes- 
sional slave-traders and slave-catchers were, as 
a class, men of coarse, hardened, unscrupulous 
natures. In the South, in slave communities, they 
were the Pariahs of society. For such men, trained 
in the arts and wiles of their calling, it was a vastly 
easier and quicker stroke of business to kidnap an 
ignorant free negro, living in a lonely shanty on 
the outskirts of a quiet village, than to earn the 
price of their victim by honest work. It was thus 
an imperative duty of free communities and States 
to enact and maintain rigid laws for the protection 
of the personal liberty of such citizens ; and it was 
probably due to this class of laws in the free States 
that the evil did not become a crying public scandal. 
The fugitive-slave law of 1793 remained without 
notable incident in its administration for nearly 



PEESONAL LIBERTY BILLS 23 

half a eentury. As a rule, the free States passed chap. ii. 
laws on the one hand to assist in carrying out the 
act of Congress, and on the other hand providing 
certain precautionary regulations to prevent kid- 
naping. In the year 1842, however, there was 
announced a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States which radically changed public opin- 
ion and legislative action on this subject. In a 
case brought up by amicable proceedings between 
the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania, the 
Supreme Court decided that under the Constitu- 
tion there existed a positive unqualified right, on 
the part of the owner of the slave, w^hich no State 
law or regulation could in any way qualify, regu- 
late, control, or restrain. The owner of a slave was 
clothed with entire authority, in every State in the 
Union, to seize and recapture his slave whenever 
he could do it without any breach of the peace or 
illegal violence. In this sense, and to this extent, 
this clause of the Constitution might properly be 
said to execute itself, and required no aid from „ . 

' ^ Prigs vs. 

legislation, State or national; that the power of iJonw^eafth 
legislation on the subject was exclusive in Con- "vanla-'^'ie' 
gress, and by implication prohibited all State legis- ^^^^I'etsfi.' 
lation on the same subject. 

A result probably unexpected by the Supreme 
Court, and certainly not looked for by Southern 
States, followed the announcement of this remark- 
able decision. The Court had, by a breath, annulled 
aU State legislation either to restrain or to assist 
the owner in recovering his runaway. It had even 
superseded and declared useless the act of Congress 
of 1793. It sent forth the slave-owner with simply 
the letter of the Constitution for his warrant, to go 



24 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. II. into any free State, lay his hand upon whomsoever 
he might chiim and carry him away into bondage. 
He was to be his own officer, and his own judge 
and jury. 

It is painfully in evidence that at that day 
judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court was 
still under the influence of strong pro-slavery 
sentiment. In the long opinions of the court and 
individual judges, the master's right to slave 
property is continually treated as of higher consti- 
tutional concern than any black man's right to 
personal liberty. In declaring the owner's right to 
seize and remove his slave under the constitutional 
provision that persons held to service or labor 
" shall be delivered up," no mention is made of 
that other equally binding constitutional provision, 
that no person shall be deprived of liberty without 
due process of law. It is not surprising that this 
dictum created a profound reaction ; and a signifi- 
cant legislative movement followed in the free 
States. In varying forms, such laws as had to 
some extent been framed to aid the claimant were 
repealed, and others enacted having for their sole 
object the protection of free citizens of color, either 
by agency of the writ of habeas corpus or by pro- 
hibiting officers and citizens of the State from 
lending any assistance in the capture of fugitive 
slaves, either under the act of Congress or volun- 
tarily. But, in most instances, these laws in express 
terms disavowed any intention to impair or inter- 
fere with the owner's constitutional right of prop- 
erty ; they simply threw him back upon his Federal 
rights and resources. As the Virginia kidnapers 
were the cause of the first fugitive-slave law, so 



PERSONAL LIBERTY BILLS 25 

this Supreme Court decision was tlio cause of the chai-. ii. 
first personal liberty bills. 

Under this condition of affairs, there came on 
the gi'eat slavery agitation of 1850, and, as one 
phase of that controversy, the South demanded a 
new and more effective fugitive-slave law. Since 
1793 the difficulties were aggravated in all di- 
rections. Pro-slavery sentiment and antislavery 
sentiment were both more intense and more un- 
compromising. There were more slaves in the slave 
States to escape and more free blacks in the free 
States liable to unlawful seizure. The master's 
authority had been increased by the Supreme 
Court decision while his resources were diminished 
by State legislation. Upon the controverted ques- 
tion whether State authority or Federal authority 
ought to act, there were as sharp differences in the 
South as in the North. On the question of violat- 
ing or executing the Constitution, the debates 
showed that in the past one section had trans- 
gressed about as much and obeyed about as much 
as the other section. The fundamental question, 
however, remained. Should the person claimed be 
fairly tried! Mr. Webster proposed an amend- 
ment, that he should have a jury trial at the place « oiobe," 
where he was arrested. Mr. Clay reported in favor "^^p.^^mr^"' 
of a jury trial at the place he fled from. As be- Ma^sfisso, 
tween these two propositions the issue was tersely ^'' ^*^' 
summarized by Mr. Winthrop : " It must always 
be a question," said he, "whether such a person 
be your slave, or whether he be our freeman. 
Now, whether he be your slave might be a ques- 
tion very proper to be tried by a jury of the 
vicinage, and to be decided on the spot where 



26 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. II. the pi'ofessed owner resides; but whether he be 
our freemau would seem to be a question which, 
upon the very same principle, should be tried 
where he is seized, and where the immediate 
"Globe,"' liberty which he enjoys is about to be taken away 
p. 1585. ' from him." But Mr. Mason, representing the more 
ultra Southern view, opposed any jury trial and 
insisted on summary proceedings. This view pre- 
vailed, and the act which finally passed, besides 
denying jury trial, contained certain other harsh 
features that made it peculiarly obnoxious to anti- 
slavery citizens and communities; and while it 
increased the claimant's facilities for recapture, 
also greatly intensified the public opinion of the 
free States against the law. 

This new fugitive-slave act was mainly the work 
of Mr. Mason, of Virginia, — a man of intolerant 
pro-slavery views, and afterwards a conspicuous 
secession conspirator, — and appears to have been 
passed with but slight discussion, the attention of 
Congress being centered upon other, and at the 
moment more absorbing, features of the compro- 
mise measures of 1850. It passed the Senate, Au- 
gust 23, by a vote of 27 to 12, and the House, 
on the 12th of September, by a vote of 109 to 76 ; 
and was approved on the 18th of September by 
President Fillmore. 

The act provided that all United States com- 
missioners, concurrently with judges of United 
States courts, should have authority to issue war- 
rants for the arrest of fugitive slaves, which war- 
rants should be served by marshals or deputy 
marshals, or the commissioners might appoint 
suitable persons to execute the warrants or process 



PERSONAL LIBERTY BILLS 27 

issued by them ; to cause fugitives to bo arrested chap. ii. 
and brought before them; to hear and determine 
the case of the claimant in a summary manner, 
and upon satisfactory proof, by deposition and affi- 
davit of the identity of the fugitive and that the 
person arrested owed the service or labor alleged 
and had escaped, to make out and deliver to such 
claimant, his agent or attorney, a certificate of the 
facts. The fugitive might thereupon be taken 
back, or the commissioner might cause him to be 
taken back to the State or place whence he fled. 
The testimony of the alleged fugitive was not ad- 
mitted in evidence. Rescuing or concealing such 
fugitive, or hindering his capture, or aiding his 
escape, directly or indirectly, was punishable by a 
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and im- 
prisonment not exceeding six months, with civil 
damages to the party injured of one thousand dol- 
lars for each fugitive so lost ; and the officers were 
authorized " to summon and call to their aid the by- 
standers or posse comitatus of the proper county," 
who were "hereby commanded to aid and assist 
in the prompt and efficient execution of this law." 
The commissioner should receive a fee of ten dol- 
lars when he delivered the fugitive, and only five 
dollars " in case where the proof shall not, in the 
opinion of such commissioner, warrant such cer- 
tificate and delivery," and the certificate should 
prevent all molestation of persons removing the 
fugitive "by any process issued by any court, 
judge, magistrate, or other jierson whomsoever"; 
also that the claimant might seize and arrest a 
fugitive and take him before the commissioner or 
court without process. 



28 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. II. It was argued with much warmth that this act 
virtually offered the commissioner a bribe to return 
the fugitive. That it violated four different pro- 
visions of the Constitution of the United States, 
namely: The Vllth Amendment, which prescribes 
that in suits at common law, when the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved; the Vth Amend- 
ment, that no person shall be deprived of liberty 
without due process of law ; the IVth Amendment, 
that the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons against unreasonable seizure shall not be 
violated ; and Section IX. of Article I., that the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended unless when in case of rebellion and in- 
vasion the public safety may require it. 

Aside from the denial of trial by jury, the other 
feature of the fugitive-slave law of 1793 embodied 
only such legal principles as applied to the recovery 
of other property. The whole labor of the recov- 
ery was put upon the claimant or his hired or vol- 
untary help ; he was obliged himself to seize his 
runaway slave, just as he was obliged himself to 
seize his runaway horse. That law forced no one 
to assist him ; it only required that no one should 
hinder him. But the new law compelled every 
citizen of a free State, when summoned to do so, 
to become a slave-catcher for the claimant, under 
penalty of fine and imprisonment. No wonder that 
the dignity and humanity of respectable citizens 
of the North revolted at the idea of being forced 
to do what a judge of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, though himself a zealot in en- 
forcing the law, fitly chronicles as " a most danger- 



PERSONAL LIBERTY BILLS 29 

ous and disgusting duty," for the mero selfish and chap. ii. 
pecuniary advantage of a distant shiveholder ; while fiteeiey, 
to conscientious minds it was the commission of a t'onmct." 

\ ol. I., 

positive moral and religious transgression. i'- '^'^'^• 

The law was scarcely passed when there ensued, 
and for many years continued, an unwonted activity 
in the pursuit and capture of runaways in various 
parts of the North. From time to time the news- 
papers were full of sensational reports of the inci- 
dents and excitements attending such affairs. 
Persons in the free States were pursued, seized, 
handcuffed, gagged, bludgeoned, or shot ; free per- 
sons were sometimes carried away to slavery, and 
escaped slaves sometimes rescued by mobs. Once 
a slave mother, crazed by the agony of recapture, 
cut the throat of one of her children and attempted 
in the same way to kill three others to prevent 
their being carried back to bondage ; and once the 
city of Boston was put into ferment and riot, 
requiring a strong military guard to bring away 
the captured fugitive to a Federal revenue cutter, 
ordered by the President of the United States to 
convey him from Massachusetts Bay to Virginia. 
Newspapers criticized and lawyers debated the law 
and the proceedings ; judges delivered learned opin- 
ions and courts rendered varying decisions. 

Even under the provocation of these and other 
inflammatory incidents, eight to ten years elapsed 
before the public opinion of the North began to 
embody itself in hostile legislation. It was not till 
these slave-hunting disturbances, which began in 
1850, had been supj)lemented by the rising and 
culminating events of the great pro-slavery reac- 
tion — the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, the 



30 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. II. Kansas war, the Sumner assault, the Dred Scott 
decision, the demand for a Congressional slave 
code, and the raid of John Brown and his capture 
and execution — that the Legislatures of several 
free States remodeled their statutes and passed new 
and more stringent personal liberty bills, to better 
protect free colored persons against being kid- 
naped, or as far as possible to evade and counter- 
act the enforcement of the law. In most of these 
new statutes care was taken to shelter them under 
the theory of States rights, so tenaciously asserted 
and industriously propagated by the South, and to 
avoid the appearance at least of a direct conflict 
with Federal laws ; though it was doubtless the 
intention of the framers of some of them practi- 
cally to nullify the fugitive-slave act.^ 
But, with only occasional exceptions, the general 

1 The editors of the *' National Laws against 'kidnaping,' prop- 
Intelligencer," who certainly erly so-called, cannot be placed in 
could not be accused of a desire this category. Laws forbidding, 
to misrepresent either the North under this head, the use of State 
or the South, printed in their jails for Federal purposes, how- 
issue of December 11, 1860, a ever 'unfriendly' in motive, are 
careful analysis and review of not 'unconstitutional,' and find 
all Northern personal liberty parallels in other cases and in 
bills. They found much diffi- Southern States. Laws forbid- 
culty in arriving at the exact ding State officers to issue writs 
condition of these laws, and stated for the recapture of alleged fugi- 
that the "shifting legislation" tives are passed in conformity 
on this subject was sufficient ex- with the decision of the Supreme 
planation of the obscurity and Coui't of the United States in the 
inaccuracy of existing eompila- celebrated Prigg case. But all 
tions and summaries, and conse- laws interfering with the exercise 
quent erroneous opinions. Their of the powers conferred by Con- 
conclusion is specific and perti- gress on the commissioners ap- 
nent : pointed under the fugitive-slave 

"It will be seen from the re- law of 1850, as is the case with 

view through which we have gone the laws of Vermont, Massachu- 

that very few States have en- setts, Michigan, and Wisconsin, 

acted laws directly or avowedly are clearly unconstitutional, and, 

in opposition to the act of 1850. as such, are null and void." 



PERSONAL LIBERTY BILLS 31 

course in tlie free States was a practical enforce- chai-. ii. 
ment of the fugitive-slave law of 1850, despite the 
fact that its arbitrary features were odious to the 
moral and legal sense of public opinion. The de- 
cided preponderance of judicial decision sustained 
it ; and in 1858 the Supreme Court of the United 
vStates, by a unanimous judgment, declared that 
"the act of Congress, commonly called the fugi- 
tive-slave law, is, in all its provisions, fully author- ji!'B^th, 
ized by the Constitution of the United States." So, ^ p.^sle^^ 
also, the census of 1860 shows that while in that 
year the total number of fugitive slaves was 803, 
the total number ten years before, under the cen- 
sus of 1850, had been 1011, proving an actual 
decrease of escapes under what the South alleged conjpen. 
to have been an intentional legal increase of op- ^ocn?^"^ 
portunity and assistance through personal liberty 'andisT!' 
bills. 

It is interesting to note in this connection that, 
as a rule, the most violent outcry on this subject 
came from Southern States which lost the fewest 
slaves. South Carolina, which would not remain 
in the Union, lost in 1860 but 23 slaves, or an 
average of one out of 17,501; Kentucky, which 
would not be dragged out of the Union, lost 
119, or an average of one out of 1,895. Moreover, 
the total average loss was absurdly insignificant as 
compared with risks in other kinds of property (as, 
for example, of houses burned or crops destroyed 
by bad weather), such loss in slaves being only 
about one-fiftieth of one per cent, for the whole 
South, and only a little more than one two-hun- 
dredth of one per cent, for the complaining, nulli- 
fying, seceding State of South Carolina. 



32 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. II. But wliatever may have been the violations of 
the Constitution by free States through personal 
liberty bills, the slave States were not guiltless 
of similar infractions. It was notorious that pro- 
slavery sentiment rendered the constitutional right 
of " freedom of speech or of the press," and rights 
of domicile and of citizenship, practically a dead 
letter throughout the South, to all men of strong 
antislavery convictions. Nor did this violation 
manifest itself alone in the form of public opinion. 
Many of the slave States had penal statutes pro- 
hibiting what they chose to term "incendiary" 
publications, and some of them statutes of this 
character to punish incendiary expression. So, 
also, South Carolina and other sea-board slave 
States had laws to imprison free colored seamen 
for no crime whatever, but merely as a precaution 
against the possibility of their uttering "abolition" 
sentiment, or instigating servile insurrection. And, 
more flagrant still. South Carolina had a statute 
authorizing her Governor to expel a citizen of 
Massachusetts, who had come to that State by 
authority of his own Grovernor and Legislature 
for the purpose of beginning a suit to test the 
validity of the last-mentioned law. Finally, it 
was no secret that the law was violated every 
now and then by surreptitious instances of the 
slave trade. No principle of equity, therefore, 
could justify the South in secession and rebellion 
on account of Northern personal liberty bills. 

Especially was this true when secession and re- 
bellion seized upon the election of Mr. Lincoln as 
the occasion for such reprisal. A strong reaction 
in the North in favor of repealing the more ques- 




Illifflilllii '"vi 



■^"*-^' 



iiiililiiiiiiiwiiiiilniiiiiliiixHxs^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 



J.\.MI> \l. MASON. 



PERSONAL LIBERTY BILLS 



33 



OlIAl'. II. 



" Lincoln- 

Douf^las 

Debates," 

p. 89. 



tionable features of the personal liberty bills had 
set in ; and movements to that end were in pro- 
gress in the Legislatures of several Northern States. 
More important tlian all was the fact that Mr. Lin- 
coln himself held a proper fugitive-slave law to be 
constitutional. In the Freeport debate he thus 
answered Douglas's question on this point: "I 
have never hesitated to say, and I do not now 
hesitate to say, that I think, under the Consti- 
tution of the United States, the people of the 
Southern States are entitled to a Congressional 
fugitive-slave law; further than that, I think it 
should have been framed so as to be free from some 
of the objections that pertain to it, without lessening 
its efficiency." And the opinion was quite as dis- 
tinctly reiterated in his inaugural address. But 
while willing to accord to the South this constitu- 
tional right, he did not forget the rights due to all 
free citizens of the North ; for his inaugural addi^ess 
also said : " In any law upon this subject, ought not 
all the safeguards of hberty known in civilized 
and humane jui'isprudence to be introduced, so that 
a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a 
slave? And might it not be well at the same 
time to provide by law for the enforcement of 
that clause in the Constitution which guarantees 
that 'the citizen of each State shall be entitled Lincoln, 
to aU privileges and immunities of citizens in the Mar. I, isei. 
several States'?" 

Had the South been content to pursue legislative 
remedies instead of making war, it is quite possible 
that the questions about fugitive slaves could have 
been brought to some endurable compromise. Un- 
constitutional personal liberty bills, on the one 
Vol. III.— 3 



34 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. II. hand, might have been repealed by State Legisla- 
tures, and the unconstitutional provisions of the 
fugitive-slave law on the other, repealed by Con- 
gress. Both the Supreme Courts of States and the 
Supreme Court of the United States might have 
ultimately modified their decisions towards a better 
mutual accord. The runaway slave could have 
received a jury trial at the place of his capture, 
and the master been reimbursed in money damages 
in case of his unlawful rescue by mobs. But the 
predetermined action of the Southern conspirators 
made argument and compromise impossible. The 
proclamation of a Southern Confederacy by Jeffer- 
son Davis and his associate signers on the 14th of 
I860. December, and the secession of South Carolina on 
the 20th, were a practical bar to any adjustment 
through legislative channels. 



CHAPTER III 



THE SURRENDER PROGRAMME 



NOT alone in the affair of the forty muskets, chap, in, 
but in the decisions and instructions con- 
cerning almost every point of inquiry which was 
referred to Washington, did the Grovernment exert 
its discouraging and paralyzing influence upon the 
Union commander and his loyal officers and men 
at Charleston. Under his general instructions to 
initiate no collision. Major Anderson was con- 
stantly beset with perplexing questions upon minor 
details. Thus, for instance, he reported that within 
easy musket-shot of the eastern wall of Moultrie 
were several sand-hillocks, " which offer admirable 
cover to approaching parties, and would be formi- 
dable points for sharpshooters." Would levehng 
these sand-hills be construed into initiating a 
collision ? Again : "I would thank you also to 
inform me under what circumstances I would be 
justified in setting fire to or destroying the houses 
which afford dangerous shelter to an enemy, and 
whether I would be justified in firing upon an 
armed body which may be seen apj^roaching our Dec. g, iseo. 
works." And not only his own precautions, but i., p. 88, 
the aggressive preparations of the Charlestonians 
were from time to time thrusting upon his atten- 

35 



Anderson 
to Adju- 
tant-Gen- 
eral, Nov. 

23, 1860. 
W. K. Vol. 

I., p. 74. 



36 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. III. 



Anderson 
to Adju- 
tant-Gen- 
eral, Nov. 

28, 1860. 

W. R. Vol. 

I., p. 79. 



tion irritating conflicts of juiisdiction. " Captain 
Foster informs me," he wrote, " that an adjutant 
of a South Carolina regiment applied to him for 
his rolls [of workmen] stating that he wished to 
enroll the men for military duty. The captain told 
him that they had no right to do it, as the men 
were in the pay of the United States Grovernment." 
What should he do if the State authorities de- 
manded these men from Captain Foster? 

All these questions were duly considered by the 
War Department, and under date of December 
14th, Secretary Floyd (through Adjutant-General 
Samuel Cooper, afterwards of the rebel army) 
proceeded to answer them with a particularity, a 
gravity, and a show of reasoning which mark the 
communication as a piece of delicate irony. The 
sand-hills and houses were not to be touched, and 
the workmen were to be surrendered on demand.^ 

Different circumstances can be imagined which 
might have justified the passiveness which Ander- 



1 "If the State authorities de- 
mand any of Captain Fostei-'s 
workmen, on the ground of their 
being enrolled into the service of 
the State, and the subject is re- 
ferred to you, you will, after fully 
satisfying yourself that the men 
are subject to enrollment, and 
have been properly enrolled un- 
der the laws of the United States 
and of the State of South Caro- 
lina, cause them to be delivered 
up, or suffer them to depart. 

"If deemed essential to the 
more perfect defense of the 
work, the leveling of the sand- 
hills which command the fort 
would not, under ordinary cir- 
cumstances, be considered as 



initiating a collision. But the 
delicate question of its bearing 
on the popular mind, in its pres- 
ent excited state, demands the 
coolest and wisest judgment. 
The fact of the sand-hills being 
private proj)erty, and, as is under- 
stood, having private residences 
built upon them, decides the 
question in the negative. The 
houses which might afford dan- 
gerous shelter to an enemy, being 
chiefly frame, could be destroyed 
by the heavy guns of the fort at 
any moment, while the fact of 
their being leveled in anticipa- 
tion of an attack might betray 
distrust, and prematurely bring 
on a collision. Their destruc- 



THE SUKEENDER PROGRAMME 37 

son was here enjoiued to observe. Had his original chai-. in, 
discretion been left free and unhampered ; had he 
received a single word of loyal prompting or en- 
couragement ; had he been reenforced according to 
his urgent demand ; or had he possessed a sufficient 
garrison to work his guns, man his walls, and throw 
out skirmishers and picket-guards, these instruc- 
tions would perhaps have been no serious embar- 
rassment. But under the impending coup de main 
from Charleston, which if it came at all would 
come in overwhelming numbers, and with only 
60 men to guard 1500 feet of rampart, these 
restrictions from the Secretary were little less 
than a formal delivery of the work to the assail- 
ants. Before he could see the tiger's teeth he 
would be in the tiger's mouth.^ 

A remarkable coincidence of dates must at this 
point not be allowed to escape attention. The 
significant Buell order was given about the time 
of the President's truce with the South Carolina 



tion at the moment of being time that they are warned to keep 

used as a cover for an enemy off, and their failure to answer, 

would be more fatal to the at- and further advance, would 

tacking force than if swept away throw the responsibility upon 

before their approach. them." — Adjutant-General Sam- 

" An armed body, approaching uel Cooper to Major Anderson, 

for hostile purposes, would in all Dee. 14, 1860. W. R. Vol. I., 

probability either attempt a sur- pp. 92, 93. 

prise or send a summons to sur- l "This fort," wrote Anderson 
render. In the former case there on December 19th, "is a very 
can be no doubt as to the course weak one in its capacity of being 
to be pursued. In the latter case, defended ; it is surroimded by 
after refusal to surrender and a houses that I cannot burn or de- 
warning to keep off, a further stroy until I am certain that I 
advance by the armed body am to be attacked, and I shall 
would be initiating a collision not be certain of it till the South 
on their part. If no summons Carolinians are in possession." — 
be made by them, their purpose Crawford, '' The Story of Sum- 
should be demanded at the same tei'," p. 70. 



38 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. III. Members ; the " sand-hill " instructions were wi*it- 
ten on the day of General Cass's retirement from 
the Cabinet, and the issuing of the first rebel 
manifesto; and now on December 21st, the day 
after the adoption of the secession ordinance, 
Secretary Floyd signalized his official life by 
another effort to make the bloodless victory of the 
rebellion in South Carolina entirely easy and com- 
plete. Up to this point the secret intrigues of the 
conspiracy were carried on cautiously step by 
step, until peaceable secession under alleged State 
authority advanced from vague theory to accom- 
plished practical fact, so far as unopposed popular 
action could bring it about. They had not only 
kept the Grovernment on the defensive ; they had 
actually rendered it defenseless, and the logic of 
its attitude indicated a willingness to be forced by 
further pressure of necessity to rehnquish its hold 
upon the Charleston forts. By his rupture with 
General Cass, the President apparently conceded 
the proposition that the forts were simply " prop- 
erty" which South Carolina could bargain for 
without offense, and the United States sell with- 
out disgrace. 

But the conspirators were not satisfied with this 
hopeful prospect of bringing about the complete 
political disenthralment of the Palmetto State. 
They had boastfully announced their determination 
to have the forts after secession, and the zeal of 
their adherents would not suffer them to abate or 
delay the fulfillmeut of this promised conquest. 
Everything was ready to give South Carolina easy 
possession; coercion denied and reenforcements 
refused at Washington, secession proclaimed, vol- 



THE SUERENDEK PROGRAMME 39 

iiiiteer companies and scaling-ladders ready in chap. in. 
Charleston, Anderson fettered with secret instruc- 
tions in Moultrie, and in Sumter and Pinckuey 
each only a single ordnance sergeant, whose soli- 
tary musket had been angrily ordered back to the 
Charleston arsenal by Secretary Floyd, — leaving 
them armed with nothing but " worsted epaulets 
on their shoulders and stripes down their panta- 
loons" to represent the sovereignty and military 
power of the United States of America. The 
formal demand of the forts by the commission 
already dispatched to Washington by the Conven- 
tion would terminate the Presidential truce; and 
then half a night's campaign, and the lives of a 
score of the Charlestonians whose fingers were 
itching to plant scaling-ladders against the walls 
of Moultrie, would display the palmetto banner 
from every flag-staff in the harbor. Nevertheless, 
the more they prompted their newspaper scribblers 
and street-corner oracles to clamor for violence and 
bloodshed in public, the more the conspirators in 
secret feared and deprecated it, for they could not 
fail to see in it the reaction of the pubHc endurance, 
the arousing of the Government and the North, and 
the prematm*e and fatal destruction of their hith- 
erto successful intrigue. 

The correspondence discloses, quite incidentally, 
that on the 21st of December, the day after the im. 
adoption of the formal " Secession Ordinance " at 
Charleston, Secretary Floyd for the first time 
brought to the notice of President Buchanan the to'co^mmi^- 
secret order which he had sent by Major Buell DS^iIeo. 
to Anderson, on his own responsibility, ten days l, p. 117° ' 
before. 



40 



ABRAHAM LIXCOLX 



Chap. III. 



" Mr. Buch- 
anan's 
Adminis- 
tration," 

pp. 166, 167. 



Scott (by 
Lay) to 
Larz An- 
derson, 
Dec. 29, 1860. 
W. E. Vol. 
I., p. 114. 



Why did the Secretary on the 21st show the 
President a document which he ought to have 
submitted to him for approval on the 11th ? The 
inference is that it was for an object, and the ob- 
ject appears in the action taken by the President, 
which action he has recorded as follows : 

The President having observed that Major Bnell, in 
reducing to writing at Fort Moultrie the instructions he 
had verbally received, required Major Anderson, in case 
of attack, to defend himself to the last extremity, immedi- 
ately caused the Secretary of War to modifs^ this instruc- 
tion. This extreme was not required by any principle of 
military honor or by any ride of war. It was sufficient 
for him to defend himself until no reasonable hope should 
remain of sa\'ing the fort. The instructions were accord- 
ingly so modified, with the approbation of General Scott. 

If, as here alleged, General Scott gave his appro- 
bation, it must have been only to the general direc- 
tion and not to the specific language employed, for 
we have his recorded assertion that "the War 
Department has kept secret from the G-eneral the 
instructions sent to the Major." ^ The probabihty 
is, that Floyd did not further consult either the 
General or the President, for he personally wrote 
to Anderson as f oUows : 

Sir: In the verbal instructions communicated to you 
by Major Buell, 3'ou are directed to hold possession of the 
forts in the harbor of Charleston, and if attacked to 
defend yourself to the last extremity. Under these 
instructions you might infer that you are required to 
make a vain and useless sacrifice of your own life, and 
the lives of the men under your command, upon a mere 
point of honor. This is far from the President's inten- 

1 General Scott also makes the Twiggs, under date of December 
same assertion in a letter writ- 28, 1860. — W. R. Vol. I., p. 
ten by Ms direction to General 580. 



THE SURRENDER PROGRAMME 41 

tioiis. You are to exercise a sound military discretion cnw. in. 
on this subject. It is neither expected nor desired that 
you should expose your own life or that of your men, in 
a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts. If they are 
invested or attacked by a force so superior that resist- 
ance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, 
it will be your duty to yield to necessity, and make the 
best terms in your power. This will be the conduct of an 
honorable, brave, and humane officer, and you will be 
fully justified in such action. These orders are strictly Fioydto 
confidential, and not to be communicated even to the doc.2i,i86o. 
officers under your command without close necessity. ^i"^ p] 1^3"^" 

It is scarcely required to instruct an intelligent 
American officer in our day, that no professional 
duty requires him to sacrifice himself or his men 
upon any trifling point of honor. Self-respect and 
soldierly dignity, if not history and example, teach 
him the obvious truth. So far then from being a 
humanitarian precaution, the order seems plainly 
to have been worded to prepare the mind of Ander- 
son for that easy suiTender of his jDost which was 
now clearly the next step in the conspirators' pro- 
gramme. To them it doubtless appeared sure to 
follow as the natural and necessary sequence of 
their previous successes. At their bidding the 
President and Cabinet had created a fatal neces- 
sity ; and now came Floyd's order to the practical 
effect that after a threatened attack or investment 
by a South Carolina army which they would take 
due pains to make " superior and overwhelming," 
after a show of force, with stage parade and 
flourish of trumpets, Anderson should " yield to 
necessity," and make the best terms in his power, 
march out with military courtesies, and give to 
South Carolina, Moultrie, Pinckney, Sumter, 



42 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. Ill, Charleston Harbor, and de facto independence. 
Then under the same military necessity, aggravated 
and amplified by similar concerted seizures in other 
States, a yielding President, and a Cabinet domi- 
nated by treachery, could negotiate a settlement; 
Congress might ratify, and a distracted and de- 
spondent North accept the accomplished revolution. 
It was a brilliant plot, but with many flaws ; and 
one of the greatest was that they counted without 
Anderson. 

Or rather, let us do them the justice to say, their 
intrigue seemed to them so complete, their control 
of the President and the War Department so abso- 
lute, that there appeared no reasonable chance that 
Anderson could become a marplot. The situation 
required no complicity on his part. He had but to 
tread the path of professional duty as marked out 
by Floyd, who had told him in plain words that 
the avoidance of a hopeless conflict in defense of 
these forts was the duty of an honorable, brave, and 
humane officer. There remained, therefore, but 
one danger, — namely, that Anderson might transfer 
his force to Sumter. This point too they had 
effectually guarded. The Buell order was a virtual 
official prohibition until there should occur " an 

Doubieday, attack ou or attempt to take possession of either 
siSter one of them," and was so regarded by Anderson 

taie,"p!"8. himself; the workmen in the forts were openly 
in sympathy with the secessionists ; the forty mus- 
kets had been taken out of Foster's hands; and 
an espionage was kept up night and day as the 
critical time approached, by which the Charleston 
authorities were fully and credibly informed that 
not an additional man nor gun had been sent there. 



THE SURRENDEK TROGRAMME 43 

It was their false security on this hitter point chap. hi. 
which in the event made the transfer a success for 
Anderson, and a complete surprise and discom- 
fiture to the conspirators. On the very day when 
it occurred, Secretary Floyd himself, reading Fos- 
ter's report that rebel steamers were standing guard 
over Sumter, and that he was constructing traverses 
on the parapets of Moultrie, to intercept sharp- 
shooters' bullets from the sand-hills, the dissem- Wright, in- 
bhng Secretary pronounced the news " very satis- ?n Foster fo 
factory " and expressed his evidently genuine hope m%^^,Tmo. 
and belief that " we should get over these troubles ^l,^'. m^' 
without bloodshed." 

Anderson had been petted and lionized socially 
by the Charlestonians ; but his soldierly reserve 
and loyalty to his flag came through the blandish- 
ments of Southern hospitality without a taint or 
whisper of suspicion. He kept his own secrets, 
from his secession friends by choice and necessity, 
from his subordinates by the special injunction of 
Floyd; debating anxiously in his own mind how 
he might keep the peace and save his honor. He 
was familiar with the unvarying Charleston threat 
that they must have the forts after secession ; and 
now that the ordinance was duly passed and pro- 
claimed, the indications of their earnest pursuit of 
this scheme began to multiply. On the day of the 
passage of the ordinance Governor Pickens in- 
quired with gi'eat particularity and emphasis, 
through the medium of the ser\dceable military 
storekeeper, Humphreys, whether twenty enlisted 
men had not been sent from Moultrie to Sumter, ^e^^to" 
and desired an authoritative contradiction of the DeS^isW 
rumor by night. Foster replied, indignantly pro- ^li, p. loi!^' 



44 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. III. testing against the right to ask such a question by 
a State in avowed rebellion ; nevertheless gave the 
denial to Humphreys, still a brother officer, and of 
course the Governor received the coveted informa- 
tion. On December 22d Anderson wrote : 

I have heard from several sources, that last night, and 
the night before, a steamer was stationed between this 
island and Fort Sumter. That the authorities of South 
CaroUna are determined to prevent, if possible, any 
troops from being placed in that fort, and that they will 
seize upon that most important work, as soon as they 
think there is reasonable ground for a doubt whether it 
wiU be turned over to the State, I do not doubt. . . No 
one can teU what wiU be done. They may defer action 
untd their Commissioners return from Washington ; or 
if apprised by the nature of the debates in Congress that 
their demands will not probably be acceded to, they may 
act without waiting for them. I do not think that we can 
Anderson y^w uDon anv assuranccs, and wish to God I only had 

toAdju- "^ ^ ■, -, ^ on -noTi 

tant-Geu- men enough here to man f uUy my guns. . . r. S. — 1 have 
%t'iMT just heard that several of the men at work in Fort Sum- 
T, p'. 105?^" ter wear the blue cockade. 

Under the same date Foster reports the move- 
ments of the guard steamers in further detail, and 
says that when one of them was hailed by the 
Foster to uight-watch on Castle Pinckney as to what she 
Dec.fJ^iseo. wanted, some one replied, "You will know in a 

W. R. Vol. , „ 

I., p. 106. week." 

All Major Anderson's dispatches prove that he 
was from the very first keenly alive to his situa- 
tion and possible fate. He had now, for a whole 
month, been on the rack of doubt as to the pro- 
priety of every word and act ; of anxious expect- 
ancy concerning the final course of the Government 
and nature of the instructions that might come; 
and it is not too violent a presumption to add, 



THE SURRENDER PROGRAMME 45 

of despondency at the neglect with which he had chap. hi. 
been treated. He had, from the first, recognized 
that his handful of men ought for more success- 
ful resistance to be in Sumter. He had discussed 
the question with his officers, who also advocated Doubieday. 
the removal, intimating to them that only his re- smmer and 
straining orders kept him in Moultrie. Postpone 'p! Is.^' 
it, or decide against it as he might, the paramount 
necessity forced itself anew upon his attention with 
every day's developments, with every fresh menace. A^Q,ipi.„,n 
By a very pointed suggestion, Anderson asked on t^TiiuVen- 
December 22d for instructions from the War Depart- ^'22,^iw;o!"' 
ment for a movement from Moultrie to Sumter, but i'., p. 1015.* " 
found no response in the hopes and designs of Sec- 
retary Floyd. In spite of all question and resist- 
ance, however, the idea finally conquered him. In 
due time, doubt grew into conviction, and conviction 
into resolve. 

Meantime the officers in Moultrie freely visited 
the city, and occasionally exchanged social courtesies 
with leading secessionists with many mutual pro- 
testations of high regard. " We appreciate your 
position," said their entertainers. " It is a point of DouMetiay, 
honor with you to hold the fort, but a political suufterand 
necessity obliges us to take it." But after the pas- pp. n, U. 
sage of the ordinance of secession, Major Anderson "msTor^ai 
ceased his visits to Charleston. Christmas day, j'au., mi 

. , . ' p. 48, uote. 

however, was once more celebrated with such social 
amenities ; Major Anderson, his officers, and many 
Charleston secessionists being together present at 
a family party given by Captain Foster and his 
wife at their residence in Moultrieville, a small vil- 
lage on Sullivan's Island, conveniently near the 
fort, where husbands, wives, and children, forget- 



46 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. III. ting all thoughts of war, gave themselves to the 
unreserved enjoyment of the kindly festivities 
appropriate to the day of peace and good-will. 

To this temporary general happiness Major An- 
derson formed a notable exception. His mind was 
burdened with a heavy responsibility in the resolve 
which he had taken ten days before to transfer his 
garrison to Fort Sumter, and in the secret arrange- 
ments he had been making to carry out that inten- 
tion. " I promised to go to Captain Foster's for a 
little while to-night," he wrote to his wife on Christ- 
mas evening, " but have really no inclination what- 
ever to do so. I am sorry I have no Christmas gift 
to offer you. Never mind — the day may very soon 
come when I shall do something which will gratify 
you enough to make amends for all the anxiety 
you now feel on my account." Nevertheless, he 
went to the party in order to disarm suspicion of 
there being anything unusual in the air — to divert 
from himself the too close attention of his officers, 
lest they might discover signs of the preoccupation 
which filled his mind. When Anderson returned 
from that scene of merry-making to the suggestive 
contrast of his quarters in Fort Moultrie, it was to 
make a final study and review of his plans, and to 
calculate the chances, promising indeed, but by no 
means as assuring as he could have wished, that he 
and his whole command would spend the following 
night within the protecting walls of Fort Sumter. 



CHAPTER IV 



FORT SUMTER 



AS soon as Anderson had resolved to make the 
- transfer he planned the necessary details, and 
gave the orders for their execution with a discretion 
and skill, and at the same time with an energy and 
promptness, which mark the highest soldierly and 
administrative qualities.^ It does not appear that 



Chap. IV 



1 The account which Anderson 
wrote to his wife of his secret 
preparations to move his garrison 
from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sum- 
ter, and which is here printed for 
the first time, will be read with in- 
terest : 

" As I was preparing for it sev- 
eral days before it occurred, it will 
be impossible for me to give you 
all the details, which though small 
and trifling in themselves, all 
tended to prepare for it. For in- 
stance, some ten days or more 
prior to it, I gave out to the 
officers and to the command that 
as the period when we might 
expect an attack was approach- 
ing, I thought I would send the 
women and children to Fort 
Johnson. And about three days 
before I moved I requested Cap- 
tain Foster to discontinue mount- 
ing the guns on Fort Sumter, as I 
told him that they woiild certainly 
be turned against us. He as- 



sented to it, and on the 24th sent 
over to Fort Moultrie the elevat- 
ing screws and pintle bolts of 
these guns, so that if the South 
Carolinians should take Fort 
Sumter, as we knew they in- 
tended, it would embarrass them 
very much in getting ready this 
battery to fire iipon us. Both 
these measures were good blinds. 
On Christmas morning, the very 
day I designed moving, the ves- 
sels took the screws, etc., over to 
Fort Moultrie, and I, intending to 
go over that day, ordered those 
things to be put back into the 
vessels, on the plea that I had not 
room for them in my store-room 
then. I knew that of course the 
news of their removal and of the 
stoppage of the mounting of the 
guns had been communicated, 
and that both these measures 
would be regarded as conclusive 
that I had no idea of going over 
to Fort Sumter. I ordered the 



47 



48 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. TV. 



he made his determination known to any one until 
the afternoon or evening of the day after Christmas. 
Foster as the engineer of&cer, who had under his 



quartermaster to get transporta- 
tion immediately for the women 
and children, and issued an order 
for their removal on the ground 
of our anticipated attack. The 
day proved rainy, and the de- 
barkation did not take place until 
the next day, when, on the ground 
that we should not in all human 
probability be enabled to stand a 
siege in Fort Moultrie of longer 
than a month or six weeks, I 
directed the quai'term aster to 
send to Fort Johnson and to let 
Captain Foster have for his work- 
men (on the plea that as provisions 
were very scarce and high in the 
city, he would have to pay exor- 
bitant prices for them) all the 
commissary stores, except about 
one month's supply for us. I then 
advised the officers to send all 
their company property, and all 
their personal effects, except what 
the men could put in their knap- 
sacks and the officers could have 
conveniently packed in a small 
compass, with the women and 
childi-en ; where I argued they 
would be safe, whatever might 
occur to us. I stated that I did 
not want anything left at Fort 
Moultrie, for that I designed, if 
we were attacked, to fight to the 
last, and then as we left the fort 
with what we could take in our 
hand, to blow up the fort. In 
this way I got nearly everything, 
both public and private, on the 
three vessels which were to take 
the women and children to Fort 
Johnson. I placed the quarter- 
master on board, and gave him 
confidential orders to take them 
to Fort Johnson, and to pretend 



to be looking around for quarters 
there, but not to land anything 
until he should hear two guns 
fired from Fort Moultrie, when he 
was to order the vessels to Fort 
Sumter on the plea that he would 
have to go there and report to me 
that he could not find accommo- 
dations. Having thus got rid of 
my women and children, and my 
public and personal property, the 
task was an easy one to move my 
command. I then arranged with 
Captain Foster to have all his 
boats with ours ready between 5 
and 6. I did not select a later 
houi" because we were watched 
every night from about 9 o'clock, 
and I must be over before that 
time. Only one officer knew any- 
thing of it on the 26th, the day I 
intended moving, and the men 
had no suspicion of where they 
were to go. I ordered their knap- 
sacks to be packed that morning 
when I sent them to their posts 
at the battery, and gave a stand- 
ing order that it was always to be 
done. The first set of boats was 
reported at the proper time, and 
I ordered one of the captains, who 
was just then let into my confi- 
dence, to fonn a part of his com- 
pany with knapsacks on, and 
armed for secret service under 
me. I then marched out of the 
fort, went to the beach, and 
embarked. We reached the fort, 
very much to the astonishment 
of the 150 workmen who were 
in it, and I immediately took 
possession of the guard-room, 
had the muskets loaded, ordered 
the workmen in, and closed the 
gates." — MS. 




GENERAL JOHN G. FOSTKU 



FOKT SUMTER 49 

orders not only laborers, but boats and small vessels chap iv, 
heretofore used to carry men and materials needed 
in the various repairs he had been prosecuting, was 
probably informed among the first. That faithful 
officer entered heartily into the movement, and effi- 
ciently disposed of his facilities to accomplish the 
object. Excepting members of the staff, charged 
with indispensable preparations, all occupants of 
the garrison were kept in entire ignorance of the 
scheme until the moment of its consummation. 

The threatened night attack on Moultrie from 
the city had been the staple talk of the garrison 
for more than a month, and the various repairs 
and arrangements to repel it left no doubt of the 
genuineness of the apprehension. It was easy to 
give new point and currency to the rumor. On 
Christmas day an order had been issued to remove 
the soldiers' families, comprising about twenty 
women and twenty-five children, and all other 
non-combatants to Fort Johnson, an old and di- 
lapidated Grovernment work on the opposite side 
of the harbor, and three schooners were openly 
chartered for this alleged purpose. The embark- 
ation was postponed on account of rain ; but pro- 
ceeded on the 26th without concealment; and in Dec, isec 
so far as it provoked observation, it seemed but a 
natural and necessary precaution. It seemed, too, 
to excuse the removal not only of lighter personal 
baggage, but also of such substantial provisions as 
were essential to a prolonged stay of a considerable 
number of women and children. In due course of 
time the entire fighting force of the garrison was 
mustered, with cartridge-boxes filled and knap- 
sacks packed, and towards the critical hour held 

Vol. III.— 4 



50 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. TV. on parade to be ready to move on an instant's warn- 
ing. This again, being perhaps but the repetition 
of many similar occasions of special vigilance, ex- 
cited no unusual comment. 

The loading of one of the schooners with the 
soldiers' families finally completed during the after- 
noon, she set sail, under the orders of Lieutenant 
Hall, with her miscellaneous cargo of human freight, 
and still more miscellaneous lading of "camp plun- 
Dawson. dcr," comprlsiug almost everything in the household 

MaSue!" line, from boxes and barrels of provisions to cages 

^p.'^y! ' of canary birds. Lieutenant Hall had orders to sail 

to Fort Johnson, but more definite instructions, 

when he should hear the proper signal to come 

away and land promptly at Fort Sumter. 

At about sunset. Major Anderson stood on the 
parapet of Fort Moultrie, in the midst of a group 
of officers, to whom he had evidently made some 
serious communication. Just then Captain Abner 
Doubleday, the second in command, still with- 
out any knowledge of the movement, ascended 
the steps to invite the Major to tea. As he ap- 
proached, the Major said to him, "I have deter- 
mined to evacuate this post immediately, for the 
purpose of occupying Fort Sumter ; I can only 
allow you twenty minutes to form your company 
and be in readiness to start." The announcement, 
though a complete surprise, met a cordial reception 
and eager obedience from Captain Doubleday. In 

Doubleday, the allotted twenty minutes, he reported his men in 

Summer and rcadiucss to march, having in the meantime pro- 
vl^ei^i vided for the safety of his wife outside the walls. 

As the twilight deepened, Captain Foster, Assist- 
ant-Surgeon Crawford, and Mr. Edward Moall, 



FORT SUMTER 51 

aud a rear-guard of two sergeants and three pri- chap. iv. 
vates who were yet to remain in Moultrie, stationed 
themselves at the five heavy guns (columbiads), 
which had been loaded and brought to bear on the 
route of crossing,^ having orders from Anderson Foster, 
to fire on any vessel attempting to interfere with (Smmut^o 
the boats conveying the troops. Everything being of tbeVar. 
reported in readiness for the movement, the garri- 
son, under the personal command of Major Ander- 
son, passed out of the main gates of Fort Moultrie 
and marched to where Lieutenants Meade and 
Snyder, engineer assistants to Captain Foster, had 
brought several barges or large row-boats and con- 
cealed them and their crews, as well as might be, be- 
hind an irregular pile of rocks which once formed 
part of the sea-wall. Over this intervening space, — Douweday, 
about a quarter of a mile, — the command moved in sumter and 
discreet silence, with the good fortune to neither pp- 64, 65. 
meet nor be observed by any human being. 

The lieutenants were ready with the boats and 
crews, and the company of Captain Doubleday was 
embarked with all possible celerity, piling the mus- 
kets together on the thwarts next to the rowlocks, 
and presently the boats propelled by the oarsmen 
towards Sumter were rocking on the billows of the 
bay. Chance also favored this part of the move- 
ment, for even at this most critical juncture 
the enterprise was on the verge of discovery and 
possible interruption. Of the two rebel guard 
steamers which had for days been employed in 
regularly patrolling the harbor to intercept such a 
movement as this, the Nina was at the moment de- 

1 The naiTatives of the different officers vary in some of these minor 
details, but all agree in the main incidents of the crossing. 



02 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. IV. tained at the Charleston wharf. The other, how- 
ever, named the General Clinch in honor of the 
distinguished father of the wife of Major Anderson, 
was seen approaching, towing a vessel toward the 
bar. Captain Doubleday took off his military cap, 
threw back his uniform coat to conceal the buttons, 
made his men take off their coats to cover the 
muskets, and generally to assume un soldierly atti- 
tudes and dispositions. A wide circuit was taken 
to avoid the meeting, but without avail, and when 
the steamer stopped her paddle-wheels within 
the nearness of a hundred yards it seemed impos- 
sible to escape detection. But in the dimness of 
the twilight, the size of the boat, and the men in 
their shirt-sleeves, so much resembled parties of 
workmen who for weeks had been passing unmo- 
lested to and fro, that no further attention was paid 
to them, and, to the infinite relief of officers and 
men alike, the General Clinch once more started 
her engines and passed on her course. The officers 
left in Fort Moultrie also anxiously watched the 
incident, every detail of which they could distinctly 
see through a glass, the while they stood nervously 
by a loaded thirty-two pounder ready to fire on the 
Dawson, p. guard-boat had she undertaken to detain their com- 

52. Note by n 

Crawford. radCS. 

Relieved thus unexpectedly from their momen- 
tary but intense anxiety, the boats passed without 
further encounter to the wharf at Fort Sumter. 
Here a new but happily transient excitement 
awaited them. It will be remembered that Foster 
had a party of over one hundred workmen in 
Sumter, engaged under his direction in repairing 
the fort. Their political sentiments had proved 



FOET SUMTER 53 

to be changeable, but for some days they had chap. iv. 
strongly manifested secession feelings. It being 
past the working hours and not yet bedtime, they 
were loitering idly about the works ; the approach- 
ing boats attracted their attention, and they rushed 
in crowds down to the wharf as the landing troops 
began to mount the steps. As the situation ex- 
plained itself to their astonished eyes, a feeble 
cheer or two from the few sincere Union men 
among their number was quickly di'owned by the 
angry expressions of discontent from the great 
majority, some of whom wore secession cockades. 
" What are those soldiers doing here ? " they asked 
in tones of ill-natured protest. Captain Double- 
day, however, gave them no time to organize any 
movement of resistance. Forming his men in com- 
pany, they leveled their bayonets, before which the 
crowd hastily gave way as the soldiers advanced to 
the main entrance, and occupied the guard-room Douweiiay, 
which commanded it, and placing sentinels, the snni^erand 
captain, in a very few minutes, had the fort under ' "p. ei^' 
military control. 

The empty boats were now sent back to Moul- 
trie to bring Captain Seymour's company, which 
service they also accomplished without delay or 
interference. Anderson himself had in the mean- 
while arrived in company with the engineer lieu- 
tenants; the concerted signal being given to 
Lieutenant Hall, the schooner stood for the 
Sumter wharf and unloaded the women, childi'en, 
and camp baggage. With the exception of the ^n^ei-gon 
little rear-guard which yet remained in Moul- tlw^Gen- 
trie, the whole force arrived before 8 o'clock at ^'se.^'isea' 
night. Major Anderson was able to tender his i.,p. 2.''' 



54 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. IV. 



Dawson, 
p. 52. 



congratulations to the assembled officers on the 
successful accomplishment of a movement which 
the best informed conspirators would three days 
before have pronounced impossible, and which 
they could scarcely believe even when their own 
eyes had proof of it next morning. 

Having written a dispatch which briefly reported 
his movement to the authorities at Washington, the 
first question Major Anderson had to deal with was 
the presence of the mutinous engineer workmen. 
The probability of an attack from Charleston under 
the new condition of things rendered Fort Sumter 
a place of danger from which they were anxious to 
escape; their secession sympathies rendered any 
forced service in behalf of the Union especially 
odious. Without delay they asked to be discharged 
with permission to dejDart at once ; and under An- 
derson's consent and orders the schooner which 
had brought the soldiers' families carried the dis- 
affected workmen away from Sumter back to Moul- 
trie, leaving only the most trusty and loyal. A 
row-boat, manned by volunteers, also went back 
to Moultrie, and brought to Sumter Mrs. Rippit, 
the housekeeper of the officers' mess, who, with 
her ready-prepared tea-tables to which no guests 
appeared, had been left behind; this enterprise, 
too, was successful, and the officers' evening meal 
prepared in Moultrie was eaten cold in Sumter. 

The whole expedition had been carried on with 
such alacrity, secrecy, and concurrence of happy 
accident that even the denizens of the neighboring 
village of Moultrieville, a quarter of a mile distant, 
remained in ignorance of it that night ; and no ces- 
sation or interruption of the peaceful occupation 



FORT SUMTER 55 

of Moultrie by those remaining in it occurred cuaimv. 
until about 4 o'clock the next afternoon. Captain 
Foster, his clerk, a few soldiers, and his engineer Foster, 
workmen remained overnight in Moultrie, engaged Smittee 
in carrying out the remainder of Anderson's verbal of tiufwar. 
instructions. With the help of the engineer work- 
men, the empty schooners which yet lay at the 
wharf of Moultrie were loaded during the night 
with the various articles left behind in the haste 
of departure — the instruments of the regimental 
band, soldiers' clothing and private property, en- 
gineer implements and materials, ammunition, and 
stores — and dispatched under sail to Sumter in the Dawson, 

DO 52 53 

early dawn. All Moultrie's guns were spiked dur- U2, and lA 
ing the night, its flag-staff was cut down before 
sunrise next morning, and all its guns bearing on 
Sumter disabled by burning the carriages, the rising 
smoke from these fires giving the Charlestonians 
their first evidence of the abandonment of the 
fort. 

During the morning, and while this work of re- 
moval and destruction was yet in progress under 
the direction of Lieutenant Davis, who had come 
to his assistance with an armed guard from Sumter, 
Foster went to the city in his row-boat to close his 
bank accounts and secui"e the public money in his 
charge. With his own lips, he confirmed the news of 
the transfer to Sumter which had by this time begun 
to circulate, and witnessed the first manifestations 
of the storm of excitement and indignation which 
now broke out among the populace. No personal 
indignity was offered him, however, and he returned 
safely to Moultrie, leisurely paid off and discharged 
his workmen there, and, near 4 o'clock in the after- 



56 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. IV. noon of the 27tli, Captain Foster, Lieutenant Davis, 
Anderson and the guard, under orders from Anderson, finally 
taVoen- withdrew from Moultrie. The charge and custody 

eral, Dec. ° 

w^ r!^ Vol. of t^6 f^^i't ^^^ turned over to the overseer of the en- 
i., p. 3. gineer workmen, and thus this disputed stronghold 
of the great American Republic was left without 
flag, officer, soldier, or serviceable gun — without 
even the regulation ordnance-sergeant, the all-suf- 
ficient Floyd formula for maintaining the property 
claim and right of the United States. And yet the 
conspirators vehemently insisted that this was an 
act of aggressive war on the independent State 
of South Carolina. 

As already said, the rising smoke from the burn- 
ing gun-carriages gave notice to the Charlestonians 
that unusual proceedings of some kind were going 
on in Moultrie, and as early as 8 o'clock in the morn- 
chariestou iug rumors of the withdrawal began to circulate 
Dec?2S6o. through the city, which were confirmed by the first 
arrivals from Moultrieville. Previous events had 
prepared the public mind for sudden excitements, 
and it was not long before the signs of a popular 
ferment became visible — a rush to the newspaper 
offices for information, impromptu gatherings of 
street-corner politicians, and loud and indignant 
talk everywhere of the alleged perfidy of the Admin- 
istration in general and of Major Anderson in par- 
ticular. While the reporters hurried off to Moultrie 
to witness the final work of demolition and trans- 
fer still going on, the appearance of the militia 
uniforms on the streets satisfied the citizens that 
the authorities were not idle. Indeed, after the 
continual threats universally indulged in during 
the preceding weeks, a failure to take aggressive 



FORT SUMTER 



57 



measures under the circumstances would have seri- 
ously demoralized the insurrection. The real popu- 
lar excitement which now for a day prevailed would 
not brook this, nor would it have been permitted 
by Governor Pickens. All his actions demonstrate 
that both in purpose and temper he was a revolu- 
tionist of a genuine and radical type, bold, unyield- 
ing, and without serious scruples as to questions of 
law and authority. Beyond his qualified control 
of the volunteer companies as commander-in-chief 
of the State militia under the Constitution of South 
Carolina, he had no military power of any kind, 
neither the Legislature nor the convention, al- 
though both were in session, having made as yet 
any law, order, or direction in anticipation of the 
emergency. 

But all this was a matter of small moment to the 
impetuous and determined Governor. He was no 
sooner apprised of the transfer to Sumter than he 
sent an aide to Major Anderson demanding to know 
by what authority he had acted, and insisting, 
"courteously but peremptorily," that he should 
immediately return to Moultrie, reciting the al- 
leged pledge of the President that the forts should 
not be reenforced. Anderson's reply was in good 
temper, and based upon a proper and manly state- 
ment of his rights. He said that he could not and 
would not return, that he had not reenforced the 
command, but merely transferred his garrison from 
one fort to another, and that as commander of the 
harbor he had a right to place his men in any fort 
he deemed proper ; that his removal had been on 
his own responsibility, as the best means of pre- 
venting bloodshed. 



Chat. IV. 



Anderson 
to Adju- 
tant Gen- 
eral, Dec. 

27, 1860. 

W. R. Vol. 

I., p. 3. 



58 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. IV. This discussioii exhausted the subject and was 
continued no further, both parties turning their 
attention, not so much to what either might desire 
to do, but what at the moment it was possible to 
accomplish. The much talked-of and dreaded col- 
lision was plainly impracticable. Without as yet 
a single gun mounted for efficient service, and 
many of the embrasures simply closed with light 
boards, Sumter was in no condition to invite at- 

^p^iu? tack; with only a few improvised companies of 
volunteers, and these badly equipped and supplied, 
Charleston could not afford to risk an assault. A 
mob might have run over the Moultrie sand-banks; 
but it had no adequate preparations with which 
to overwhelm Sumter. With all his stubbornness 
of will Governor Pickens combined an under- 
current of conservative prudence, which took dis- 
criminating note of the probabilities of success or 
failure. 

For the present, therefore, he confined his enter- 
prise to such measures as would meet no opposi- 
tion. Before a single soldier moved from the city, 
the Grovernor had ample means of knowing, from 
both the personal observation of newspaper re- 
porters and the statements of Captain Foster while 
on his business visit to Charleston, that Moultrie 
had been permanently abandoned, with no thought 
whatever of immediate defense, and also that no 
troops had been sent to Castle Pinckney. He 
doubtless had this specific information, and acting 
upon it he could with impunity seize both these 
places. He now issued written orders to have this 
done ; once more, and for the last time, employing 
the pretext "that these occupations were made 



FORT SUMTER 



59 



Chap. IV. 



Gov. Pick- 

eiiH, Mes- 
euKf, Jan. 

3, 1861. 

"Hiiutli 
Carolina 

HoiiHO 
Journal," 

1860-61, 

p. 270. 



with a view to prevent the further destruction of 
public property and to secure the public safety." 

While the volunteers, some eight or nine com- 
panies, were ordered to meet at their armories in 
the early afternoon, and the Governor was dispatch- 
ing excited telegrams to the minute-men in different 
parts of the State, a company or two of already as- 
sembled soldiers proceeded during the morning to 
business which had no need of special preparation. 
A cordon of troops was stationed around the United 
States Arsenal, not indeed invading it, but quite 
as effectually taking possession of it by plac- 
ing it under surveillance and guard. The other 
Government property in the city was treated with 
less delicacy: the custom-house, the post-office, 
and the branch United States Treasury were taken 
into military possession and control. A week 
later, in a special message to the Legislature, Gov- 
ernor Pickens placed on record his defense of these 
acts of war. " All the steps that have been taken 
have been from necessity, and with a view to en- 
deavor to give security and safety in the present 
state of the country. The convention has by ordi- 
nance withdrawn the State from the Federal Union, 
and by consequence imposed upon the Executive 
the duty of endeavoring to sustain her dignity and 
her rights; and in this emergency I confidently 
rely upon the Legislature to sustain the Executive 
in all proper measures." What a piece of involun- 
tary satire this language of a revolutionary chief pp.^27o,"27i 
of a petty commonwealth becomes in comparison 
with the halting and negligent course of the Presi- 
dent to whom had been confided the " dignity and 
rights " of a powerful nation. 



Ibid., 



60 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. IV. 



Doubleday, 
" Forts 
Sumter 
and Moul- 
trie," p. 71. 



Dawson, 
pp. 152, 153. 



To make his advent into Sumter impressive, 
Anderson had ordered the solemnities of a formal 
noonday flag raising, with parade, military music, 
and appropriate religious exercises at the foot of 
the flag-staff by the army chaplain of the post. 
That afternoon, about 4 o'clock, he and some of 
his officers from the parapet of Sumter, and the 
excited Charlestonians from favorable lookouts in 
the city, witnessed the hostile occupation of Castle 
Pinckney. As a piece of theatrical soldiering this 
was the principal insurrectionary exploit of the 
day. One hundred and fifty volunteers with their 
brand-new equipments were put upon the guard- 
boat Nina which steamed away for the Castle, only 
three-quarters of a mile from Charleston. The 
curious crowd at the wharf watched them with 
eager interest until the steamer reached the land- 
ing, and the excited militiamen rushed valiantly 
down the gang-plank of the vessel with fixed bay- 
onets and around the cii^cular brick walls of the 
work to its main entrance. The remainder of the 
spectacular performance not in view to the Charles- 
tonians could be plainly seen by the observers on 
Sumter. They halloed and hammered without 
effect at the great gates which were closed and 
barred. Finally the long-prepared scaling-ladders, 
which now at length found occasion for service, 
were brought and planted, and re-assured by the 
cover of leveled rifles a dozen or two men scram- 
bled over the walls, and unbarred and opened the 
gates. The command entered and hauled up a red 
flag with a single white star, borrowed from the 
Nina^ and the expedition had concluded its work 
of storming an undefended fort, there being only 



FORT SUMTER 



61 



the engineer officer, Lieutenant Meade, the ord- 
nance-sergeant, and perhaps a dozen laborers in 
the work, who made no resistance. 

The occupation of Fort Moultrie was the con- 
eluding affau- of the day. Governor Pickens had 
no idea whatever of hurling his awkward squads 
against even its deserted walls. His order was to 
take possession of Sullivan's Island, "and if it 
could be done without too great loss, after pre- 
cautionary examination as to mines, etc., then Fort 
Moultrie itself should be occupied." The final 
abandonment took place about four in the after- 
noon, and the expedition to seize it did not leave 
Charleston wharf until seven in the evening. 
Neither difficulty nor delay was encountered in 
the examination, and in the course of an hour the 
preconcerted signal of three rockets announced to 
the city both arrival and possession. 



Chap. IV. 



Gov. Pick- 
ens, Mes- 
sage, Jan. 

3, 1861. 
"South 
Carolina 

House 
Journal," 

1860-61, 

p. 270. 



N. Y. 

"World," 
Jan. 2, 1861. 



CHAPTER V 



A BLUNDERING COMMISSION 



Chap. V. 

I860. 



Commis- 
sioners to 
the Presi- 
dent, Jan. 

1, 1861. 
W. R. Vol. 

I., p. 122. 



o 



W. R. Vol. 
I., p. 111. 



N Wednesday, December 26, at 3 o'clock 
p. M., it being about the same time of the 
same day that Anderson was completing his 
preparations to leave Moultrie, Messrs. Barnwell, 
Adams, and Orr, the three commissioners from 
South Carolina, reached Washington. They were 
by authority of the convention empowered to 
negotiate a treaty of peace and friendship between 
the embryo republic and the United States; to 
secure the delivery of the forts, arsenal, and light- 
houses ; to divide the public property and appor- 
tion the public debt, and generally to settle all 
pending questions, upon the assumption that 
South Carolina was no longer a member of the 
Union, but an independent foreign State. 

Arrived at Washington they found their friends 
no less hopeful that some at least of these impor- 
tant negotiations could be without delay conducted 
to a successful issue. Six days had elapsed since 
the passage of the ordinance of secession, and 
that revolutionary declaration had been, to say 
the least, tolerated as an act of the people, without 
a word of official criticism, dissent, or even defini- 
tion. Four days had passed since the convention 

62 



A BLUNDERING COMMISSION 



63 



had given the commissioners their credentials, and chap. v. 

yet the hourly communications of the telegraph 

had brought them no word of discoui'agement. 

On the contrary, their coming was expected, and 

the course of action to be pursued towards them 

had been officially deliberated upon and settled. 

President Buchanan had determined to assure 
them that he had "no authority to decide what 
shall be the relations between the Federal Grovern- 
ment and South Carolina," — thus conveniently 
shirking his sworn duty to assert and maintain 
existing relations as defined by the Constitution 
and laws, and thereby officially raising a presump- 
tion that they had been or might be changed by 
the action of South Carolina. Shrinking from the 
doctrine of his message that " secession is revolu- 
tion," he now, instead of enforcing the penalties of 
treason against these avowed revolutionists, under 
the Constitution and law of nations, proposed to to coS^t 
receive them as " private gentlemen of the highest DecTitiseo. 
character," and communicate to Congress any prop- l, p. 115" ' 
osition they might have to make. 

This was certainly strewing the pathway of rev- 
olution with roses. The Executive of the nation 
assaulted, not only foregoes his power and duty of 
defense, but complacently volunteers to become the 
intermediary of the assailants for acknowledgment 
and recognition. There being no concealment about 
the temper and purpose of Mr. Buchanan, the 
arrival of the commissioners was promptly com- 
municated to him, and he with an equal prompt- 
ness appointed an interview with them at 1 o'clock 
of the next day, Thursday, December 27. On 
their part, the commissioners deliberately settled 



G4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

chap.v. themselves for business by taking a house and 
appointing a secretary. But at sunrise on Thurs- 
day things were no longer as they had been at the 
previous sunset. Anderson's move on the military 
chess-board had changed not only the game of war, 
but yet more radically the game of politics. The 
Charleston authorities, bewildered by the event, 
probably suspected treachery from the Administra- 
tion, and, under this impulse, delayed the transmis- 
sion of the news northward. They, however, sent 
'L^an'f Ad" the information to the commissioners at Washing- 
tiM?"So. ton, who communicated it to Mr. Buchanan. 

If the President had any intelligible theory of 
the future, it was that he should be permitted to 
end his official term without war ; that the Charles- 
tonians would respect their promise not to attack 
Anderson ; that Congi'ess would tolerate the seces- 
sion of South Carolina as a transient necessity, 
and hold the other threatening States with some 
tempting compromise. This comforting dream 
was rudely dispelled by the news, and, instead of 
enjoying quiet repose in a secure anchorage, he 
found himself adrift on a dreaded sea of troubles. 
President Catchiug at straws, Buchanan's first impulse was 
*"sfonere,'^' to assumc that Anderson had abandoned Moultrie 
^f^ ' Vol', in a panic, and to restore the status quo by order- 
I., pp^ ii7» ^j^g j^^^ back into that fort. He had the distinct 
impression that his orders did not contemplate or 
permit the change, showing either how ignorant he 
was of the Buell memorandum, which had passed 
under his personal notice only six days before, or 
how thoroughly that contradictory document had 
mystified him as well as others. Had the influ- 
ences which were theretofore paramount in Wash- 




JAMES L. ORR. 



A BLUNDERING COMMISSION 65 

ington yet remained, it is more thau likely that chap.v 
this first impulse of the President would have been 
carried out. But things were changed at the capital 
as well as in Charleston. An embezzlement of near 
a million dollars' worth of Indian Trust Bonds had 
come to light, and kept the Federal city and the 
whole country in a ferment for nearly a week. A 
Department clerk and a New York contractor were 
in prison, but the responsibility of the affair was 
brought home to Secretary Floyd so pointedly that ^j^^^^^ 
the President had, three days before, requested his tioA"'p.i85. 
resignation. Floyd was in no haste to comply, and 
Mr. Buchanan was too timid to summarily dismiss 
his disgraced minister, who still exercised the func- 
tions of Secretary of War. 

Anderson's report written at 8 p. m. on December 
26th, and sent by mail, had not yet reached Wash- 
ington. Floyd was therefore incredulous about 
what the commissioners told him, but took imme- 
diate steps to verify the rumor. " Intelligence has 
reached here this morning," he telegraphed to An- 
derson on the morning of the 27th, " that you have 
abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned 
the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not ^loyd to 
believed because there is no order for any such Dec.lSo. 

--,,., 1 • P ,T • J. « ^^'- K. Vol. 

movement. Explain the meaning oi this report." i., p. 3. 

" The telegram is correct," replied Anderson. " I 
abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain 
that if attacked my men must have been sacrificed, 
and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the 
guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the guns Anderson 
from being used against us." And he added, " If at- p\?c!27?r8^6b. 
tacked, the garrison would never have surrendered i., p. 3."* " 
without a fight." 
Vol. III.— 5 



66 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. V. Meaiiwliile, the Cabinet was called together to 
deliberate on the unwelcome news. During the 
two weeks which had elapsed since the retirement 
of Cass and Cobb, a profound change had occurred 
among the President's advisers. Philip F. Thomas, 
of Maryland, also a secessionist, was made Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, a substitution which brought 
no reform ; but on the other hand Jeremiah S. Black 
had been made Secretary of State, and greatly trans- 
formed in his political sentiments and acts, and 
Edwin M. Stanton, a man of iron will and hearty 
Union sentiment, nominated to succeed him as 
Attorney-Greneral. A new and healthier atmosphere 
pervaded the Executive council-chamber in the dis- 
cussion of the crisis. A session of an hour ought 
to have sufficed to dispose of it, but the political 
condition of the nation was so abnormal, the public 
service so disorganized, and the Executive so timid, 

c. F. Black, that for three days and four nights, from the evening 
"InT' ' of the 27th to the morning of the 31st, Anderson 

ofSiidah hung doubtfully in the balance between honorable 

S. Black," T , , . ^ -, 

pp. 11, 12. approval and disgraceiui censure. 

Though under the accusation of theft and the 

intimation of dismissal. Secretary Floyd came up 

"Mr.Bncii- to thc help of the imperiled conspiracy with vigor 

tion""''*?B7 ^^^^ audacity. Dropping the cloak of Unionism 

^Hou,'' under which he had been hiding his misdeeds for 

^BanqiK^t" a month, he maintained with vehemence the exist- 

_ SwHa^ ence of a mutual pledge created by the President's 

"oct.!i8m" truce of the 10th, and claimed that Anderson had 

violated this pledge, alleging there was nothing in 

his instructions which could in any wise justify his 

removal to Sumter. Against this assumption Mr. 

Black, the new Secretary of State, took much more 



A BLUNDERING COMMISSION 



67 



radical ground than he had hitherto occupied. He 
insisted that Anderson's transfer was in perfect 
accordance with his orders, announced his unqual- 
ified approval of it, and asserted the duty of the 
Administration to sustain it. In regard to the 
issue thus raised, the President exhibited his usual 
irresolution. He denied the technical existence of 
a pledge, but could not of coui'se deny its spirit, 
and sided with Floyd in the belief that Anderson's 
zeal had outrun the limit of his instructions. The 
Buell memorandum and the modifying order were 
sent for, and now for the first time underwent 
Cabinet criticism. The studied ambiguity of these 
papers furnished arguments for both sides, the 
entire question turning upon the point whether 
Anderson had "tangible evidence of a design to 
proceed to a hostile act." The passion of the Cab- 
inet members rose with their war of words. Floyd 
became more aggressive, and submitted a wi'itten 
demand that he should be allowed at once to order 
the garrison to be withdrawn entirely from the 
harbor of Charleston, alleging that the Govern- 
ment was dishonored in the violation of its most 
solemn pledges. 

Pending the discussion the Cabinet adjourned 
until evening. The President's audience to the 
commissioners had been postponed until the next 
day; but they were not idle. All that day and 
until midnight they were the center of the conster- 
nation, the hopes, and the counsels of the conspir- 
ators. Meanwhile the official leakage, the Baltimore 
dispatches, and finally the issue of the afternoon 
newspapers had communicated Anderson's coup to 
the whole Federal city. General Scott, confined to 



Chap. V. 



Black, 

" KHHiiys 

jiiid 

Speeches," 

p. 12. 



Floyd to 

Buchanan, 

Dec. 29. 1860. 

Frank 

Moore, 

" Rebellion 

Record," 
Vol. I., Doc- 
uments, 
p. 10. 



" Charles- 
ton Cour- 
ier," Dec. 

28, 1860, 
Washing- 
ton dis- 
patch of 
27th. 



G8 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. V. his sick-room, and writhing under the persistent dis- 
regard of his advice by the Executive and his studied 
exclusion by the Secretary of War, sent his aide-de- 
camp to remind the President of the existence of 
such an officer as the General-in-Chief of the Amer- 
ican armies. "Since the formal order, unaccompanied 
by special instructions, assigning Major Anderson 
to the command of Fort Moultrie, no order, inti- 
mation, suggestion, or communication, for his gov- 
ernment and guidance, has gone to that officer, or 
any of his subordinates, from the headquarters of 
the army, nor have any reports or communications 
been addressed to the General-in-Chief from Fort 
Gen'^lfott Moultrie later than a letter written by Major An- 
^w^ntfaT derson almost immediately after his arrival in 
^tIIs^o."' Charleston harbor, reporting the then state of the 

W. R. Vol. 1 „ 

I., p. 111. work." 

So ran the message delivered to the President, 
giving him substantial food for reflection upon 
the methods of his Secretary of War. The spokes- 
men of the political factions also thronged to the 
White House with argument and counsel. The 
Eepublicans, of course, were obliged to remain 
aloof, as were also Mr. Douglas and his adherents ; 
but the secession Democrats from the South were 
persistent in their appeals to have Anderson re- 
manded to Moultrie, or entirely withdrawn ; while 
on the other hand the Administration Democrats 
from the Northern States, though few in number, 
were urgent that he should be approved and sus- 
tained in his courageous step. 

In the evening the adjourned Cabinet meeting 
resumed its deliberations, and continued the session 
to a late hour. Reports went forth to the Northern 



A BLUNDEKING COMMISSION 69 

newspapers that night that before its close a vote of chap. v. 
four to three had decided against ordering the troops 
back to Moultrie. This, however, was premature. 
Whether a vote was taken or not, the question did 
not reach a decision. What was done is described 
in the language of Mr. Buchanan. " In this state 
of suspense, the President determined to await 
official information from Major Anderson himself. 
After its receipt, should he be convinced upon full 
examination that the Major, on a false alarm, had 
violated his instructions, he might then think 'iinan> Td-' 

1 n J • If Ai j^ji/> minlstra- 

senously oi restormg tor the present the former tion,"p.i8i. 
status quo of the forts." 

But the aggressive acts of the insurgents were 
continually outrunning the vacillating decisions of 
the President. During the afternoon and evening 
of Thursday, while the Cabinet meetings and con- 
spirators' caucuses were in session, and while Mr. 
Buchanan's irresolution was being tortured by the 
entreaties of Southern radicals and the remon- 
strances from his conservative friends of the North, 
active war, bloodless as yet, but active war no 
less, was being waged by Governor Pickens against 
the national sovereignty ; and Fort Moultrie, Castle 
Pinckney, the arsenal, post-office, and custom-house 
at Charleston, for want of rightful assertion and 
protection, passed into the hands of the insm'rection 
as already stated. Like the news of Anderson's 
transfer the day before, the information of this out- 
rage upon the flag was suppressed by the Charleston 
authorities. Beyond its transmission perhaps to 
their friends in Washington, none of the transac- 
tions at Charleston on Thursday afternoon and night 
were permitted to be telegi*aphed to the North 



70 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



CHAP. V. 

Dec, 1860. 



See Daw- 
son, p. 155. 



Ibid., p. 159, 

and note 

p. 160. 



Commis- 
sioners to 
President, 
Jan. 1, 1861. 
W. R. Vol. 
I., p. 22. 



Mr. Buch- 
anan's Ad- 
ministra- 
tion, p. 181. 



until about 10 o'clock on Friday morning, the 28th, 
probably in the hope that the order for Anderson's 
return could be extorted from the President before 
he should be stung to resistance. 

The seizures at Charleston, made on the per- 
sonal judgment of Governor Pickens, and against 
at least the impKed consent of the convention, 
were of doubtful expediency for them. The " Rich- 
mond Whig" denounced them as a "shameful 
outrage," and soundly berated South Carolina for 
not being content to go out of the Union peacefully. 
These, however, might still have been turned to ad- 
vantage, but for the more serious blunder now 
committed by the commissioners themselves. 

Their promised interview with Mr. Buchanan, 
postponed from 1 o'clock on Thursday, on account 
of the Anderson news, was held at half -past two on 
Friday the 28th. The President had that forenoon 
heard of the Charleston outrages, and knew that 
from being the agents of a conspiracy they had now 
become the emissaries of an insurrection. But he 
failed to note the declaration of the Constitution 
that treason against the United States consists in 
levying war against them, or in adhering to their 
enemies, giving them aid and comfort. " He deter- 
mined to listen with patience to what they had to 
communicate. . . On their introduction he stated 
that he could recognize them only as private gentle- 
men, and not as commissioners from a sovereign 
State ; that it was to Congress, and Congress alone, 
they must appeal. He nevertheless expressed his 
willingness to communicate to that body, as the 
only competent tribunal, any propositions they 
might have to offer." 



A BLUNDEKING COMMISSION 



71 



It is difficult to imagine the feeling of the com- chap. v. 
missiouers under this treatment, whether it was 
one of grateful relief or profound contempt. In- 
stead of being cast into prison, they were admitted 
to a considerate social conference with this Exec- 
utive of a " foreign nation," and treated to friendly- 
private advice, how best to accomplish the objects 
of their mission. According to his explanations 
the Constitution indeed forbade his recognizing 
their authority, or deciding their claim; but he 
would give this claim point and dignity by refer- 
ring it officially to Congress, with the sanction of 
a Presidential message. 

Had sound judgment guided them they would 
have seized eagerly upon this quasi acceptance of 
their mission, — which virtually gave them the 
President as an ally, — divided and paralyzed Con- 
gress by an active and concerted intrigue, and made 
a conciliatory appeal to the commercial apprehen- 
sions of the Northern cities and manufacturing dis- 
tricts. But instead they now ventured their whole 
success upon a single desperate chance. Assuming 
a tone of anger and accusation, they impugned the 
honor of the Grovernment and asked explanations 
of Anderson's conduct under the childish threat of 
suspending negotiations which were not yet begun. 
" And in conclusion," they added, " we would urge 
upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops 
from the harbor of Charleston. Under present cir- 
cumstances they are a standing menace which ren- 
ders negotiation impossible, and as our recent 
experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a e?o™™'to 
bloody issue questions which ought to be settled Dec.*2M866. 
with temperance and judgment." The adoption of l,p.iio!' 



72 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cuAP V. this ultimatum by the conspirators shows the strong 
confidence they had in their complete domination 
over the will of Mr. Buchanan. Unprepared for 
war, they abruptly closed their only avenue to 
successful intrigue ; feeling assured that all resist- 
ance from the President would break down, and 
that his infirm purpose would unconditionally jdeld 
their demand. But under wiser advice Mr. Buch- 
anan's hesitating decision finally went against 
them ; and in that failure terminated the last and 
only hope of accomplishing peaceable secession. 



CHAPTER VI 



THE CABINET REGIME 



THE ultimatum presented by the commission- chap. vi. 
ers was at once made the subject of a Cabinet 
discussion, continued in the evening of the same 
day. No decision was arrived at, and the meetings 
would be without special interest, were it not for 
the report of one of the incidents that shows the 
feeling which divided the members into two ir- 
reconcilable factions. The scene is given in the 
language of one of the participants in the evening 
session of Friday, December 28th, who afterwards 
recounted the event in the council-room of the 
White House. Secretary Stanton said : 

The last I saw of Floyd was in this room, lying on 
the sofa which then stood between the windows yonder. 
I remember it well — it was on the night of the 28th of 
December, 1860. We had had high words, and had 
almost come to blows, in our discussion over Fort Sum- 
ter. Thompson was here — Thompson was a plausible 
talker — and as a last resort, having been driven from 
every other argument, advocated the evacuation of the 
fort on the plea of generosity. South Carolina, he said, 
was but a small State with a sparse white population 
— we were a great and powerful people, and a strong 
vigorous government. We could afford to say to South 
Carolina, "See, we will withdraw our garrison as an 
evidence that we mean you no harm." 

73 



74 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. VI. 



Stanton 
conversa- 
tion, 
J. G. N., 
Personal 
Memoran- 
da. M8. 



Moore, 
" Rebellion 
Record," 
VoL I. Doc- 
uments, 
p. 10. 



Stanton replied to him, " Mr. President, the proposal 
to be generous implies that the Government is strong, 
and that we, as the public servants, have the confidence 
of the people. I think that is a mistake. No adminis- 
tration has ever suffered the loss of public confidence and 
support as this has done. Only the other day it was 
announced that a million of dollars had been stolen from 
Mr. Thompson's department. The bonds were found to 
have been taken from the vault where they should have 
been kept, and the notes of Mr. Floyd were substituted 
for them. Now it is proposed to give up Sumter. All I 
have to say is, that no administration, much less this one, 
can afford to lose a million of money and a fort in the 
same week." Floyd remained silent and did not reappear 
in that chamber. 

The Cabinet was again convened on the evening 
of Saturday, December 29th; but when it met, 
there was one vacant seat at the council-board.^ 
Duiing that day, Floyd sent in Ms formal resigna- 
tion, complaining that he had been subjected "to 
a violation of solemn pledges and plighted faith." 
The resignation was accepted on the following 
Monday, and the War Department placed pro- 
visionally under the charge of Postmaster-General 
Holt. To the six assembled councilors, Mr. Buch- 
anan now submitted the draft of his reply to the 
commissioners. The precise terms and substance 
of this document remain unpublished, and we are 
compelled to gather its import from a rather elabo- 
rate written criticism of it by a member of the 
Cabinet. This indicates, however, with sufficient 
clearness, that the paper, like all Mr. Buchanan's 
writings and conversations of that period, was con- 
tradictory, loose in expression, and entirely lacking 

1 Floyd's resignation is dated Dee. 29th (Saturday), and the Presi- 
dent's acceptance Dec. 31st (Monday), 1860. 



THE CABINET REGIME 75 

in any clear presentation of issues, or straightfor- chap. vi. 
ward decision of pending questions ; a half -defense 
and half-apology, seeking simply to evade and 
shift just official responsibility. Of all the Cabinet 
members, Mr. Toucey alone approved the reply; 
Thompson and Thomas, with active sympathies in 
behalf of secession, assailed it as being hostile to 
South Carolina and calculated to provoke a conflict ; 
while Black, Stanton, and Holt insisted that it igno- 
bly yielded the rights and honor of the Government ^Jtys'and^ 
to the rebellion which had assailed its flag and ^ppfift. 
property. 

To all appearance unmoved by these searching 
and acrimonious discussions, the President seemed 
to adhere inflexibly both to the form and sub- 
stance of the reply he had sketched, and the 
conference ended with every indication of a new, 
and this time radical. Cabinet crisis. It is not 
probable that either the Chief Magistrate or any or 
all of his constitutional advisers comprehended the 
novel relations and changing aspects of national 
politics. The heat of theii- daily strife warped their 
judgment, and the rancor of their discords obscured 
their vision too much for correct analysis. Upon a 
more remote and dispassionate study of these men, 
it comes out that President Buchanan's was a cold, 
secretive, rigid, unsympathetic character, in which 
the two opposing qualities of stubbornness and 
timidity met and neutralized each other ; leaving a 
colorless personality peculiarly subject to be moved 
by political drifts, which he lacked the insight to 
perceive and the courage to resist. Two opposing 
currents in the Cabinet, one towards active dis- 
union, represented by Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd, 



76 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

cuAP. VI. and recently Thomas, and the other towards a con- 
servative unionism, represented by Cass, Black, 
Holt, and recently Stanton, had kept the President 
in an eddy, with his darling political paradoxes 
about secession and coercion, enforcement and vio- 
lence, executive duty and Congressional power, 
revolution and compromise forever on his lips, and 
the ghastly and overwhelming phantom of civil 
war forever before his eyes. The end of December, 
therefore, when he was called upon to decide the fate 
of Anderson and Sumter, found him no f ui'ther ad- 
vanced than when, at the beginning of the month, 
he was writing his message. All the great political 
events which had happened — the significant Con- 
gressional debates, his truce with rebellion, the 
rupture of his Cabinet, proclamation of the insur- 
rection. South Carolina secession, Anderson's move- 
ment, the Charleston seizures, and the actual 
presence of the insurrection in the Executive Man- 
sion in the persons of the three commissioners — 
had swept by him, not indeed unnoted, but utterly 
uncomprehended. Though seized by friend and foe 
alike, and dragged time and again into the broad 
light of his state duties and responsibilities, he as 
constantly shrank back into the obscurity of his 
personal fears, refusing to exercise his executive 
functions. 

The wide drift in politics, however, now sweep- 
ing unresisted and with a rising current, not only 
in South Carolina, but in other Cotton States as 
well, from discontent to conspiracy and from con- 
spiracy to insurrection, while it left the President 
stationary in attitude and resolve, had quite a dif- 
ferent effect upon the members of his Cabinet. We 



THE CABINET REGIME 77 

have already seen how it drew out Cobb to personal chap. vi. 
service in rebellion, and drove out Cass as a protest 
against Executive indifference and neglect. The 
same influence had now forced out Floyd, much 
against the inclination of that double-dealing poli- 
tician. Nor did the influence end here. Though 
the king be dead, the king must live. A nation 
of thirty millions is a daily force wdth daily needs, 
and if the President refuse his office, the next 
in authority must take up the task. With all 
Buchanan's protests that it was not his work, the 
national questions grew daily in magnitude and 
portent. On the 26th it was the query of receiving 
the commissioners ; on the 27th, the question of re- Dec, iseo. 
manding Anderson to Moultrie; on the 28th, the 
demand to withdraw the garrison altogether. In a 
week it might be civil war ; and in a month an army 
at the gates of the capital. Though the President 
might shirk the pressing issues. South Carolina and 
the Union assuredly would not. 

From the Presidential election to the evacuation 
of Moultrie, Mr. Buchanan's policy had been, in 
substance, an effort to abstain as far as possible 
from affairs of state ; and his written reply to the 
commissioners was a simple continuation of that 
policy. But this was now approved by only one 
member of his Cabinet; the other five condemn- 
ing it, though from motives radically unlike. 
Thompson and Thomas, importuned by their 
friends, could no longer postpone decisive action 
to favor the conspiracy; while Black, Holt, and 
Stanton dared no longer defer energetic efforts 
to maintain the Grovernment. With the adjourn- 
ment of that Cabinet meeting on Saturday night. 



/» ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. VI. December 29th, therefore (it is scarcely too strong 
to say), terminated the real Administration of James 
Buchanan, and began what may be appropriately 
called the regime of the Cabinet. 

It is true that he still continued to affix his 
official signature and di'aw his official salary ; but 
the most that can be claimed for his rulership is 
that he performed the function defined by the 
French historian Thiers in his famous constitu- 
tional maxim of European monarchies : " The king 
reigns; he does not govern." We look in vain 
through the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's term for 
positive affirmative Executive acts. He simply 
assents to or refuses what is proposed by his min- 
isters, and every strong manifestation of national 
authority seems to have been one which they did 
not permit him to prevent. The temper of his 
mind and purpose is accurately outlined in his 
own language in a special message which he trans- 
1861. mitted to Congress on the 8th of January, and 
which was in its entirety little else than a lamenta- 
tion over the woes and dangers of the country, and 
a despairing cry, exhorting Congress to call upon 
the people to preserve the Union, apparently for- 
getting that that was the precise duty for which 
the people had elected him President, and which 
duty he had specifically sworn to perform : 

The dangerous and hostile attitude of the States 
towards each other has already far transcended and cast 
in the shade the ordinary Executive duties already pro- 
vided for by law, and has assumed such vast and alarm- 
ing proportions as to place the subject entirely above 
and beyond Executive control. The fact cannot be dis- 
guised that we are in the midst of a great revolution. In 
all its various bearings, therefore, I commend the question 



THE CABINET REGIME 



79 



to Congress, as the only human tribunal, under Providence, 
possessing the power to meet the existing emergency. To 
them, exclusively, belongs the power to declare war, or 
to authorize the employment of military force in all 
cases contemplated by the Constitution ; and they alone 
possess the power to remove grievances which might 
lead to war, and to secure peace and union to this dis- 
tracted country. On them, and on them alone, rests the 
responsibility. . . I therefore appeal through you to 
the people of the country to declare in their might that 
the Union must and shall be preserved by all constitu- 
tional means. . , In conclusion it may be permitted to 
me to remark that I have often warned my coimtrymen 
of the dangers which now surround us. This may be the 
last time I shall refer to the subject officially. 

This is no longer the potential voice of a Presi- 
dent of the United States administering govern- 
ment, but the cry of a bewildered functionary who 
has lost command, confidence, com'age, and is even 
almost deserted by hope. 

Most radical of all the changes effected by these 
developments was that wi'ought in Jeremiah S. 
Black, Secretary of State. No one can read his 
famous opinion on coercion, given to sustain the 
President's annual message, without realizing the 
profound influence under which the conspirators 
controlled his legal reasoning and his official utter- 
ance at the date of November 20, 1860. But 
on the retirement of Mr. Cass, his elevation to 
the Secretaryship of State appears to have given 
him wider and truer views. Growing with his 
increasing national responsibilities he now, in 
the Sumter crisis, seems to have risen to genuine 
leadership. 

On Sunday morning, December 30, convinced of 
the President's intention to adhere to his submitted 



Chap. VI. 



Buchanan, 
Message, 

Jan. 8, 1861. 
" Globe," 

Jan. 9, 1861, 
p. 295. 



" Opinions 

of the 
Attorneys- 
General." 
Vol. IX., 
pp. 517 et 



80 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Ibid., pp. 
14 and 17. 



CHAP. VI. reply to the commissioners, Mr. Black convened the 
Black, "Es- Union section of the Cabinet, and announcing to 
Speeches," thcm liis inability to sustain further the President's 
contemplated action, declared his intention to re- 
sign, in which resolve he was also joined by Mr. 
Stanton. After due discussion and reflection, 
Mr. Toucey carried the information of this threat- 
ened defection to the President. Mr. Buchanan's 
courage utterly broke down before the prospect of 
finding himself alone in face of the political com- 
plications which came crowding upon him. He at 
once sent for Mr. Black ; and after a confidential 
interview, the details of which have never been 
revealed, he gave the objectionable draft of his 
reply to the Secretary of State, with liberty to 
make all changes and amendments which in his 
opinion might be necessary. It was the Presi- 
dent's virtual abdication. 

Mr. Black hurried to the office of the Attorney- 
General, and there in the presence of Mr. Stanton, 
and doubtless with his advice and suggestion, wrote 
out a detailed and methodical memorandum, cov- 
ering the points at variance. It is a strong and 
patriotic paper, and had it been adopted by the 
Executive as the key-note of his annual message, 
and enforced promptly by the army and navy, 
the rebellion might never have reached its final 
proportions. 

It not only deprecated any expression of regret 
that the commissioners should suspend negotia- 
tions, but roundly denied the right of South Caro- 
lina to send any such officials or agents. It 
stated that the Charleston forts belonged to the 
Government, and could not be made the subject 




ISAAC T()U< EY. 



THE CABINET REGIME 81 

of any adjustment or arrangement, but must be cuap. vi. 
Tnaintaiued by the power of the nation. On the 
subject of the President's pledge it asserted with 
vigor that, "it deeply concerns the President's 
reputation that he should contradict this state- 
ment, since if it be undeuied it puts him in the 
attitude of an executive officer who voluntarily 
disarms himself of the power to perform his duty, 
and ties up his hands so that he cannot, without 
breaking his word, 'preserve, protect, and defend 
the Constitution and see the laws faithfully exe- 
cuted.'" The definition of "coercion" contained 
in this memorandum, when compared with the 
same writer's employment of the word in his 
famous opinion of November 20 1860, is a burst 
of patriotic sunlight: 

The words " coercing a State by force of arms to remain 
in the confederacy — a power which I do not beheve the 
Constitution has conferred on Congress" — ought certainly 
not to be retained. They are too vague, and might have the 
effect (which I am sure the President does not intend) to 
mislead the commissioners concerning his sentiments. 
The power to defend the public property, to resist an 
assailing force which unlawfully attempts to drive out 
the troops of the United States from one of the fortifica- 
tions, and to use the military and naval forces for the pur- "Memoran- 
pose of aiding the proper officers of the United States in fj^fot^ji"in 
the execution of the laws — this, as far as it goes, is coer- ^^iack/'Es- 
cion, and may very well be called " coercmg a State by speeches," 
force of arms to remain in the Union." 

Contrasting the language of Mr. Black, Secretary 
of State, indorsed and sustained by a mutinous 
Cabinet majority, with the words of Mr. Black, 
Attorney-General, acquiesced in by the tolerant 
Cabinet majority of six weeks previous, we are able 

Vol. III.— 6 



82 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. VI. to measui'G accurately the immense change in the 
theory and purpose of the Administration, which 
was now intended to be announced. But the re- 
form did not stop even here. From a hearty and 
outspoken eulogy of Anderson, the memorandum 
proceeded to a vigorous recommendation of defen- 
sive measures : 

He has saved the country, I solemnly believe, when its 
day was darkest, and its perils most extreme. He has 
done everything that mortal man could do to repair the 
fatal error which the Administration have committed in 
not sending down troops enough to hold aU the forts. 
He has kept the strongest one. He still commands the 
harbor. We may still execute the laws if we try. . . I 
entreat the President to order the Brooklyn and the Mace- 
donian to Charleston without the least delay, and in the 
meantime send a trusty messenger to Major Anderson to 
let him know that his Grovernment will not desert him. 
The reenforcement of troops from New York or Old Point 
Comfort should follow immediately. If this be done at 
once, all may yet be not well, but comparatively safe. If 
says'anci not, I can sce nothing before us but disaster and ruin to 

Speeches," ,-, , 

pp. u-17. the country. 

Sheet by sheet, as rapidly as Mr. Black wrote 
this long memorandum, Mr. Stanton made a copy 
of it, and the original was sent to the President. 
Mr. Holt saw it later in the day, and also gave it 
Ibid. his unqualified approval. Mr. Buchanan amended 
his reply, embodying in it many parts of this docu- 
ment. But with a lingering pride of opinion, or 
perhaps deference to the haughty assumptions of 
the commissioners, he chose and used only the 
mildest and weakest phi*ases. Despite traceable 
infusion from Mr. Black's memorandum, his letter 
remained an humble, apologetic argument, and not 
a manly and confident assertion of right, duty, and 



THE CABINET REGIME 83 

power. It still reiterated his purely defensive in- cuap. vi. 
structions, his anxiety to refer their propositions 
to Congress, his first prompting to remand Ander- 
son to Moultrie, his deep regret that they deemed 
negotiations impossible. Yet it at least mentioned 
the insurrectionary seizure of forts and arsenal; it 
promised that Anderson should not be condemned 
without a fair hearing; that he would not withdi^aw 
the troops ; and that it was his duty " to defend 
Fort Sumter as a portion of the public property of to^commia- 

sioDcrs 

the United States against hostile attacks from what- Dec.ai.iseo 

^ . W. R. Vol 

ever quarter they may come." By these narrow dis- i-' p- ^s. 
tinctions, a President of the United States escaped 
the impending disgi'ace of lowering the flag of the 
Union with not a hostile soldier in arms before it. 

When the commissioners, on Monday, the last 
day of December, received this reply of the Cabinet iseo. 
over the signature of the President, they saw that 
their mission was ended, and yet they were with- 
out results, without promises, without prospects. 
They had rejected the proffered negotiations with 
Congress, and sacrificed their visiting relations with 
the President. Worse than all, the letter indicated 
the advent of a new authority which had the cour- 
age to say " No." It was the first fresh breeze of 
a Northern reaction which might rise to a storm. 
Under the circumstances there was nothing to do 
but to pocket their credentials and go home. To 
this they added the only other expedient the situa- 
tion permitted — a bitter and insulting rejoinder to 
" fire the Southern heart." 

Upon this second letter to the President they 
apparently expended their united skill and emptied 
their accumulated indignation. They drew up a 



84 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. VI. sententious arraignment of his official neglect of 
duty, and alleged his passive complicity with the 
South Carolina revolt. They charged distinctly 
that in his interview with them his words had in- 
dicated a willingness to withdraw the troops and 
deliver them the forts and the harbor. Their alle- 
gations were only partly true, for the dissembling 
Floyd was responsible for the Buell memorandum 
and the surrender instructions. They evidently 
thought Mr. Buchanan capable of treason, when 
his offense was personal timidity and consequent 
neglect of duty. As a succinct summary of events, 
no less than as the analysis of their complete web 
of intrigue and outline of expected successes, the 
following portion merits quotation : 

Some weeks ago the State of South Cai'olina declared 
her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, 
to secede from the United States. She called a conven- 
tion of her people to put her declaration in force. The 
convention met and passed the ordinance of secession. 
All this you anticipated and your course of action was 
thoroughly considered. In your annual message you de- 
clared you had no right, and would not attempt to coerce 
a seceding State, but that you were bound by your con- 
stitutional oath and would defend the property of the 
United States within the borders of South Carolina, if an 
attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early 
that this question of property was a difficult and delicate 
one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. 
You did not reenforce the garrison in the harbor of 
Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran 
officer from the command of Fort Moultrie because he 
attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You 
refused to send additional troops to the same garrison 
when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. 
You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most emi- 
nent member of your Cabinet rather than allow the 
garrison to be strengthened. You compelled an officer 



THE CABINET KEGIME 85 

stationed at Fort Sumter to return immediately to the chap, vie 
Arsenal forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. 
You expressed, not to one but to many of the most dis- 
tinguished of our public characters, whose testimony will 
be placed upon the record whenever it is necessary, your 
anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, 
and your willingness not to disturb the military status of 
the forts, if commissioners should be sent to the Govern- 
ment, whose communications you promised to submit to 
Congress. You received and acted on assurances from 
the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no 
attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the 
forts and property of the United States, if you would not 
disturb their existing condition until the commissioners 
had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. 
You took from the Members of the House of Represent- 
atives a written memorandum that no such attempt 
should be made. . . You sent orders to your officers 
commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in 
conformity with such an understanding. . . You knew 
the implied condition under which we came ; our arrival 
was notified to you and an hour appointed for an inter- 
view. . . With the facts we have stated, and in face of 
the crowning and conclusive fact that your Secretary of 
War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet upon the pub- 
licly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson 
had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and 
that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed he was 
dishonored, denial was impossible ; you did not deny it. 
You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from 
its obligation. . . You have decided, you have resolved 
to hold by force, what you have obtained through our ^ommis- 

,,„, TT . ° SI oners to 

misplaced confadence ; and by refusing to disavow the Buchanan, 

action of Major Anderson, have converted his viola- w\.' vol 

tion of orders into a legitimate act of your executive ^" ^m.^^^' 
authority. 

This humiliating reminder the commissioners 
sent to the President as a Parthian arrow, while 
they sped by rail back to Charleston to report their 
discomfiture. Too accurate in many points, both 



86 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP.vr. in statement and logic, to be completely refuted, 
and too offensive in language and intent to be 
either answered or tolerated, Mr. Buchanan took 
his only alternative by writing upon it the indorse- 
ment, " This paper just presented to the President 
is of such a character that he declines to receive 
it," and returning it to the signers. The central 
cabal, however, was unwilling to lose the effect of 
the forcible indictment on public opinion, and 
Jefferson Davis seized an early occasion to incor- 
porate the commissioners' rejoinder at full length 
in a Senate speech, thus giving it ample circula- 
" Globe." tion in print in the " Congressional Globe" and the 
p'^^sii^sg.' newspaper reports of Senate proceedings. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE ''star op the WEST" 

AS we have seen, the fate of Sumter hung in chap. vii. 
- doubt from the evening of December 27, 
1860, the day on which the President first received 
news of Anderson's transfer, until the afternoon of 
December 31, when he finally sent to the commis- 
sioners, in modified form, the answer dictated by 
Black and his Union colleagues, refusing to with- 
draw the troops. During these intervening three 
days, public rumor was possessed but vaguely of 
the information of passing events — of the com- 
missioners' demand, of the Cabinet struggle, of 
Floyd's retirement, and of the final victory of 
the Union section of the Cabinet. General Scott, 
excited like all others by these rumors, made an 
appeal to Floyd on December 28, apparently still 
not fully realizing that Secretary's treachery. He 
wi"ote to him begging to express the hope that 
Sumter might not be evacuated, but that on the 
contrary troops, supplies, and ships of war might 
be sent to its support, repeating at the same time ^trselre" 
his former recommendations to garrison further Dec.osjseo! 
the other Southern forts. Everybody's blood was T.,^'. S^" 
astir with the Charleston news ; and on the suppo- 
sition that the Secretary of War was a loyal man, 
it was natural to expect that he too would catch 

87 



88 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. VII. the patriotic contagion, and, in an impulse of 

national pride, applaud and support Anderson. 

Waiting impatiently, through all of Saturday, 

without response, the general was reluctantly 

forced to doubt, and wrote to Larz Anderson, the 

major's brother, at Cincinnati, assuring him of his 

admiration of the major's "masterly transfer of 

the garrison," — that he had urged reenforcements 

Gen Scott witMu the last twenty-four hours — but, he added 

A*nderaon, dubiously, " with what effect remains to be seen," — 

Dec^9,i86o. g^^^Q ^j^Q ^g^P Department had kept secret from 

■' m. ' the general its instructions to the major. 
Gen. Scott. ^Y Suuday morning, December 30, General 
"raphy!"^ Scott morc accuratcly comprehended the situa- 
^p^^e"" tion. He realized that treason was doing its work 
in official circles, and that the regular channels and 
agencies of the Government could no longer be 
trusted. Considering the step justified by the 
emergency, routine having become useless and 
discipline dangerous, he wrote directly and con- 
fidentially to the President himself, urging that 
"matters of the highest national importance seem 
to forbid a moment's delay, and if misled by zeal 
he hopes for the President's forgiveness. Will the 
President permit General Scott, without reference 
to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly 
as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits 
from New York harbor to reenforce Fort Sumter, 
together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammu- 
tothe^pres- nitiou, and subsistence stores? It is hoped that 
^*^3o!*i86o!''" a sloop-of-war and cutter may be ordered for the 
I.', p! 114° ■ same purpose as early as to-morrow." 

Again the lapse of another long day without any 
Presidential order or indication of decision upon 



THE "star of the WEST " 89 

these momentous questions. But finally, on Mon- chai-. vii. 
day morning, the general was reassured by a sign 
of military promise. The rumor of Floyd's resig- 
nation grew into an accepted fact. Upon this 
cheering news he ventured once more to " trespass 
for a moment on the indulgence of the President 
of the United States," with suggestions about a 
successor, about a system of communication with 
Anderson, and more especially about a proffer of ^ tbo p'res- 
assistance and facilities in reenforcing Sumter and '^31! i'sgo!* " 
providing other defensive aid, coming from patriotic i'., p". no. ' 
citizens of New York. 

It was under these circumstances as well as the 
self-assertion and triumph of the Union elements 
of the Cabinet that on Monday morning, December 
31, Postmaster-Greneral Joseph Holt became Floyd's 
successor.^ This choice, too, was dictated by the 
new powers at the helm — Mr. Stanton himself hav- 
ing gone to Mr. Holt's residence near midnight 
to urge upon him the acceptance of the post, 
to impress upon him the grave nature of the 
exigency, and the need of a man in that place 
whose sentiments they knew. Fortunately for 
the country, their choice was in every way jus- 
tified. In the prime of life, with even, moderate 
temperament, with well-balanced judgment, and 
with tenacious patriotism, the new war minister 

lOn Monday, December 31, Department, MS.]. On the follow- 
1860, President Buchanan au- ingday(Jamiaryl,18Gl),hemore 
thorized Postmaster-General formally appointed Mr. Holt See- 
Holt "to perform tlie duties of retavy of W{iv ad niterim [Senate 
the office of the Secretary of War, Journal, pp. 101, 102]. Finally, 
now vacant by the resignation of on the 18th of January, he regu- 
John B. Floyd, until a successor larly nominated Mr. Holt Secre- 
shall be appointed and the va- tary of War, wliich nomination 
cancy filled" [Records of the War the Senate duly confirmed. 



90 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. VII. was in almost every particular the opposite of his 
predecessor. 

The newspaper dispatches of the day inform us 
that Mr. Holt had not been in the War Department 
five minutes when he sent for General Scott. It is 
certain that he promptly called the General-in-Chief 
to his aid, and he who had for six weeks been ex- 
cluded from all duty and authority went eagerly to 
the service of the imperiled Union. The situation 
was hastily examined, the military resources calcu- 
lated, and measures devised, somewhat too hastily 
as the result proved, to send relief and support to 
Anderson. The expediency and possibility of such 
an expedition had been long pondered and dis- 
cussed, but hitherto without the professional advice 
of the General-in-Chief. 

In the contingency only three plans seemed fea • 
sible ; these had already been more or less consid- 
ered, and each found liable to serious objection. 
The first was to send the BrooMt/n with three hun- 
dred drilled men from Fort Monroe. Not only 
would an armed ship with disciplined troops afi:ord 
greater probability of success in reaching Sumter 
against resistance, but once there the Brooliyn 
could be utilized as a floating custom-house, to en- 
force a collection of the import duties in default of 
officials or facilities in the city of Charleston. The 
President and Cabinet favored this plan, and not- 
withstanding its grave defects, of which General 

sayfi'and''" Scott was wcll awarc, in his great anxiety to have 

Speeches," . , , . , . ^y,-, 

p. 19. somethmg done, he acquiesced m its adoption. I he 
President permitting, and a zealous Cabinet major- 
ity and General-in-Chief cooperating, all delay was 
set asidCj and Monday evening General Scott called 



THE "star of the WEST" 91 

in person to congratulate Mr. Buchanan that relief chap. vii. 
to Anderson was at length to go, and to inform him 
that he had at that moment in his pocket the nec- 
essary orders from the War and Navy Departments Imui-H Td- 
for the prompt manning and sailing of the Brooklyn. tion/'pAto. 

But at this junctm*e an unexpected postponement 
grew out of the President's hesitation. Having re- 
mained, during this eventful Monday, subjected to 
the visits, solicitations, and importunings of the 
conspiring Senators and Representatives, he was 
b}^ the weakness of his natui*e unable to emancipate 
himself abruptly from their habitual domination. 
It must have cost him a struggle to adhere to his 
official decision not to withdraw the garrison from 
Sumter, but he remained true to the newly adopted 
counsels of Black, Holt, and Stanton. That crisis 
was over; he had received the ultimatum of the 
commissioners, and on that afternoon had sent his 
own in reply. But with the argument closed and 
negotiation ended on that head, his fortitude again 
broke down. Under a frivolous pretext of social 
and friendly courtesy, and explicitly recognizing 
the absence of any official obligation, he suspended 
the orders for the relief expedition. To General 
Scott he explained that it was for the purpose of 
giving the commissioners time to make a reply, 
and that the delay for this purpose could not in 
his opinion exceed forty-eight hours. The general, 
with his hal)its of discipline, and schooled in old- 
time politeness, accepted the disappointment with 
becoming grace. To Thompson, however, still ibid.,p.i9a 
Secretary of the Interior and active conspirator, 
Mr. Buchanan, at a later hour that same evening, 
upon request gave the additional pledge that " the 



92 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. vii. orders should not be renewed without being pre- 
Buchanan viouslv Considered and decided in Cabinet." That 

to Thomp- '' 

1*861 "^ ciii- ^^® Executive consent and orders for this pressing 

of'BiK'i> reenforcement given to his four loyal ministers 

^lui^ii' should at the last moment be virtually abrogated 

at the demand of one Cabinet traitor exhibits an 

almost hopeless irresolution and irresponsibility. 

Meanwhile, that was a gloomy Monday afternoon 
for the conspirators. The commissioners had re- 
ceived the President's reply and found their mis- 
sion at an end. Their elegant house in Franklin 
Row, hired for a month's diplomatic campaign, 
must needs be closed after a brief occupation of 
five days. The ambassadorial dignity of South 
Carolina, which grew in the hot-house atmosphere 
of Washington politics like Jonah's gourd and 
had become the shelter of calls, receptions, and 
caucuses, was doomed to wilt ignobly and disap- 
pear. Congressional conspirators saw their friends 
depart from the Cabinet, and found the familiar 
doors of the departments shut to their industrious 
visits. There were rumors of new combinations, 
of sudden resolves, of significant orders. There 
was danger in the air, and they sounded the alarm 
to their respective States. The commissioners 
themselves were not free from the prevailing panic. 
In a dispatch to the President of the South Caro- 
lina Convention they telegraphed : " Holt has been 
appointed Secretary of War. He is for coercion, 
and war is inevitable. We believe reenforcements 
in^emgen- ^^'^ ^^ their way. Prevent their entrance into the 
*^*7?i86iT' harbor at every hazard." 

As it turned out their warning was premature, 
but nevertheless received early fulfillment. The 



THE "STAK OF THE WEST" 93 

Union members of the Cabinet were not men cuap. vir. 
to submit quietly to have victory thus rudely 
snatched from their gi-asp. The customary official 
receptions on New Year's Day precluded all public 
business. Before the expiration of the forty-eight 
hours' grace, however, on Wednesday, the 2d of 
January, the Cabinet was once more con\^ilsed in isei. 
discussing the paramount question of reenforce- 
ments. The traitor Thompson was there as a for- 
lorn hope, making a most spirited opposition to 
sending troops. It proved of no avail. The argu- 
ments of Holt, the mingled eloquence and cynical 
invective of Black, and the impetuous denuncia- 
tions of Stanton held the President to their view 
and purpose. Before the conclusion of the debate 
the ill-tempered reply of the commissioners, de- 
scribed in the last chapter, was brought and read to 
the council. If the resolute and impressive delib- 
eration had already made the decision sure, the 
general indignation over this missive made its 
announcement dramatic. " After this letter," said 
Secretary Black in a tone of confident triumph, 
" the Cabinet will be unanimous " ; while the Pres- ^^^Ifjj^"'^^ 
ident, with the courage of desperation, and his ^l'^l[^''l};J: 
mind fiUed with bloody visions of the immediate ^J;,' ^^l^ 
storming of Sumter, added, " It is now all over, "ff^^ii; Zt' 
and reenforcements must be sent." 

Probably dreading the intervention of some new 
obstacle, the Union members of the Cabinet ad- 
dressed themselves immediately to the task of 
getting off the relief expedition, without further 
specific orders from the President. During the 
delay which had occurred its proposed details had 
been more carefully examined and considered. 



94 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. vit. General Scott had never favored the plan of send- 
ing the Brooklyn. Two insuperable objections to 
it appeared to his professional judgment. It was 
affirmed that the vessel by reason of her deep 
draught could not cross the Charleston bar, unless 
under circumstances exceptionally favorable. Her 
arrival at low tide, or during a storm, would delay 
and most likely defeat her entrance by giving 
notice of approach and time to organize resistance. 
But the second objection was even more impera- 
tive. Fort Monroe was one of the two most 
important national strongholds on the whole At- 
lantic coast. As a guard to the entrance of Chesa- 
peake Bay, and as a base for both seaboard and 
inland operations, its possession outweighed that 
of other harbor defenses, excepting, perhaps, only 
the Tortugas forts off the Florida headland. 
Both for its immediate and practical utility in a 
campaign, and its international importance as an 
indication of power and symbol of sovereignty, it 
dwarfed Sumter to insignificance. This great 
fortress was manned by a slender and altogether 
insufficient garrison. To strip it of two hundred 
men for the needed reenforcement w^ould be to 
place it in extreme jeopardy. Doubtless this 
was the general's chief reason for rejecting the 
plan of sending the Brooliyn. Subsequent events 
abundantly \dndicated his judgment. Within a 
week from that time the conspiring Governor of 
Virginia made an official examination into the 
feasibility of capturing Fort Monroe, and found 
peremptory discouragement in the professional ad- 
vice that with the troops then in that stronghold it 
would be useless to make such an attempt " with- 



THE "STAR OF THE WEST" 95 

out a large force thoroughly equipped and well chai-. vir. 
appointed," and w^hich was not at the command of jj,l^^;^j. 
the State of Virginia. DSrEi. 

Wisely preferring that all the regulars in Fort 
Monroe should be left there to place its security be- 
yond the shadow of a doubt, General Scott desired 
that the reenforcement should consist of recruits 
which could without danger be spared from Gov- 
ernor's Island in New York harbor. The question 
of a suitable transport had been the chief difficulty 
in this plan, for which there now seemed to come 
an opportune solution. Three patriotic citizens of 
New York had made a tender of immediate military a. namii- 

•^ ton, Mosos 

assistance to the Government, offering at their own ^;iVa joTn' 
expense to throw a garrison of four hundred artil- ^DawBonT' 
lerymen, to be selected from among the drilled New s?e aiso 

Gen Scott 

York military companies, as a special volunteer tothePreH- 

V, T, r 1 • 1 1 T 1 • ^ ident, Dec. 

garrison into Fort Moultrie, to hold that particular „3i, iseo 

^ ' -^^ W. R. Vol. 

post. It was a serious offer from responsible men, i- »• i^^- 
and planned by adequate professional skill. But as 
the emergency seemed scarcely to demand so ex- 
traordinary a step, and as it involved grave politi- 
cal questions and was liable to produce troublesome 
legal embarrassments, General Scott did not advise 
the President to accept it. 

The details and discussions of this proffered 
citizens' expedition disclosed to General Scott the 
means of securing his needed transport. The 
orders concerning the Brooldyn were therefore on 
this same Wednesday, January 2, rescinded, and a isei. 
plan substituted to send the reenforcements from 
New York in a swift merchant steamer. The plan 
was believed to combine secrecy, celerity of move- 
ment, certainty of crossing the bar, the avoidance 



96 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. VII. of any apparent purpose of "coercion," and the 
vital security of Fort Monroe. In conformity 
with this decision a telegram was dispatched to 
Gen. Scott, Ncw York acccptiug the ser\^ces of the steamer, 
dum,"jau! and the Assistant Adjutant-General of the army 
w!^R.^'voi. was sent on the day following to organize and 

T »»ij 128 

" 129. ' forward the expedition with all possible haste. 

It is the almost universal fate of such enterprises 
to encounter unforeseen difficulties and vexatious 
delays. In spite of these, at 9 o'clock on Sat- 
urday evening, January 5, 1861, the relief expedi- 
tion sailed from the harbor of New York. In the 
substance of the orders which the commanding 
officer bore to Anderson, we learn its definite 
strength and plan. The chartered side-wheel mer- 
chant steamship Star of the West, running hereto- 
fore on regular coast service to New Orleans, now 
bore two hundred well-instructed recruits from Fort 
Columbus, with arms, ammunition, and subsistence 
for three months, to reenforce the garrison. An- 
derson was directed with these to fill up his two 
companies, to muster the residue as a detachment, 
and was promised further reenforcements, if nec- 
essary. He was warned against false telegi'ams, 
and told that measures would soon be taken to 
enable him to correspond with the Government 
by sea. He was assured of the approbation of 
his conduct by the "highest in authority." Fi- 
nally he was directed to repel and silence with 
Thomas to his guus any fire upon Sumter or upon any ves- 
jinl^srisei. sels or tow-boats bringing him reenforcements or 

W. R. Vol. - , 

I., p. 132. supplies. 

If instructions of this tenor had been given An- 
derson during the weary time he had waited for 




JF.RKMIAH S. BT.ACK. 



THE "STAE OF THE WERT" 97 

and almost implored them, they would have served chap, vn 
a needful purpose. That very afternoon the War 
Department received a dispatch from him giving 
notice that six days previously the insurrectionists 
had among other offensive preparations begun the 
erection of a battery on Morris Island, which it 
was well known would command the main ship 
channel, and that they had extinguished all the 
harbor lights except the one on Sumter itself. 
Considering the time which had elapsed, there re- 
mained no reasonable doubt that the vessel would 
encounter a dangerous fire. But coupled with this 
intelligence was also the expression of Anderson's 
confidence that he and his command were safe: 
"Thank God, we are now where the Government Anderson 
may send us additional troops at its leisure. . . tluMien- 
We can command this harbor as long as our Gov- %i, iseo.*'' 

. . . W. R. Vol 

ernment wishes to keep it." As communicating his i., v. 120. 
gratitude at the improved defensive situation, and 
as an opinion arising out of the President's long- 
standing policy of non-reenforcement, the language 
is natural and proper. But the new and radical 
measures at Washington put Anderson at cross- 
purpose with the Cabinet regime, and to their 
sanguine hopes his words implied more than he 
perhaps intended to convey. The President had 
consented to the relief expedition, and General 
Scott and the Cabinet had hastened its departure, 
under the apprehension of an immediate assault on 
the fort. This news seemed to change the situa- 
tion, and in consequence orders went from Wash- 
ington to New York to countermand the sailing of 
the ship. It was too late, however ; the Star of the 
West was already on her voyage. 
Vol. III.— 7 



98 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. VII. EvGi' siiiCG tlieii" I'evolutiouary seizure of the forts 
and other Government property, the Charlestouians 
had vibrated with anxious uncertainty between the 
extremes of exultant enthusiasm and depressing 
panic. The telegraph was busy with almost unin- 
termitted dispatches, but from the best sources the 
news was untrustworthy and contradictory. The 
reports and advices of their own commissioners 
did not seem to hold good for even twenty-four 
hours. Under the influence of these recurring 
doubts and dangers, both Governor and people 
had labored to make the best of their very slender 
military resources. With the departure of their 
commissioners from Washington, the hope of im- 
mediate peaceful adjustment faded away. Dis- 
patches of warning, though often denied and 
explained, continued to reappear and multiply. 
While some pains at concealment had been taken, 
the half-public preparations of the expedition in 
New York afforded unmistakable notice to all who 
chose to inform themselves. Though the Star of 
the West was cleared for her regular trip to New 
Orleans via Havana, it was asserted that telegrams 
were sent based upon visible details of preparation, 
New York which Carried to Charleston the correct notice of 
jau?io""l6i. her destination. But the insurrectionists had an 
efficient sentinel on watch in the person of Secre- 
tary Thompson. He appears to have kept them 
fully advised of the changing moods of the Presi- 
dent, so far as his vigilance could keep pace with 
them. With all his care, he was for a while de- 
ceived, and narrowly escaped leading his friends 
into a false security. He publicly alleges that no 
decision was reached in the Cabinet meeting of 



THE "STAE OF THE WEST" 99 

January 2. The allegation is, however, distinctly ciiap.vii. 

denied by both the President and his colleagues. ThompRon 

Suspected and shunned, he was kept in ignorance '^V^j^'Tol*' 

of the expedition, and continued to assure the ,ul;'''voi. 

Charleston conspirators of the absence of danger "•'P-**'^- 

almost until its actual arrival. The day before ^"'^>«''^°'i„ 

•' _ Speeches," 

that event he first learned, to his extreme mortifi- p- ^^• 
cation, that the reenforcements were at sea. Ho 
lost no time in sending a warning dispatch. As 
illustrating the uncertainty of this class of news, 
it is interesting to note that his first telegram 
was actually withheld and suppressed by the de- 
partment messenger to whom it was intrusted. 
A second one was more successful, and about 5 
o'clock on the evening of the 8th gave the Charles- 
ton authorities reliable information of the expedi- 
tion, if, indeed, any doubt remained in their minds pp- 2o,"2i. 
on that point. 

At half -past one o'clock on the morning of Janu- 
ary 9, 1861, the Star of the West reached the vicin- 
ity of Charleston bar. The harbor lights being out, 
and the buoy removed, the captain deemed it un- 
safe to attempt an entrance. It was near daylight 
before he could ascertain his exact position, and 
make out the light on Fort Sumter. But by this 
time the presence of the vessel was discovered by 
the rebel guard-boat stationed at the bar, which 
rapidly steamed away towards the city, burning 
rockets and blue-lights to signal to the rebel bat- 
teries and forts the arrival of the expected expedi- 
tion. 

With the American ensign hoisted, and the troops 
all sent below, leaving only the crew of the vessel 
on deck, the Star of the West, as rapidly as she 



100 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. VII. 

Capt. Mc- 

Gowan, 

Report, 

Jau.l2, 1861. 

Moore, 

" Rebellion 

Record," 

Vol.L.Doc- 

umente, 

p. 21. 



Pickens to 

Schnierle, 

Dec.31,1860. 

" South 

Carolina 

House 
Joui'ual," 
1801, p. 175. 



could, followed the retreating guard-boat up the 
channel. The course was directly towards Fort 
Sumter, Fort Moultrie being about the same dis- 
tance off and somewhat to the right. Morris Island, 
however, lay comparatively near and parallel to the 
channel, to the left of the ship's course. Near the 
northern end of this island, the officers discovered 
a red palmetto flag which marked the site of a 
battery of two 24-pound guns (though it could not 
be seen from the ship), the erection of which was 
begun nine days previously. When the vessel was 
within five-eighths of a mile of this flag, and keep- 
ing as near it as the channel permitted, in order to 
avoid the fire from Fort Moultrie, the officers were 
unpleasantly notified of the existence of the masked 
battery by a shot across the bows of the steamer. 
The captain, according to orders, thereupon dis- 
played from the fore a large army garrison flag 
which it was hoped Anderson would recognize as a 
signal of succor, and that he would promptly bring 
his own guns into service to protect the approach- 
ing ship. The speed of the ship was increased to 
its full extent, while the battery continued its fire 
as rapidly as possible, the gunners gradually ob- 
taining the range of the vessel. 

Notwithstanding the fire the steamer stood on- 
ward, and though the machinery and rudder 
narrowly escaped several balls, and a ricochet shot 
struck in the fore-chains, she had passed the 
battery without substantial injury when a new 
danger presented itself. The channel now obliged 
her to proceed for some distance in a direct line 
towards Moultrie before she could bear away for 
Sumter. In addition to this, two steamers were 



THE "star of the WEST" 



101 



seen to start towards her from near Fort Moul- 
trie, one of them towing w^hat was supposed to be 
the lately surrendered armed revenue cutter Will- 
iam Aiken. This new risk of attack, coupled with 
the fact that the guns of Sumter gave them no 
voice of welcome or assistance, shook the courage 
of the captain of the vessel and the lieutenant com- 
manding the troops, and decided them to abandon 
their attempt. 

It seems to be conceded upon the judgment of 
competent military authority that this decision was 
a grave error, and that the remaining chances were 
as favorable as those under which many a dubious 
military enterprise has won success. A trifle more 
of daring might have insured preeminent historic 
fame to Captain McGrowan and Lieutenant Woods ; 
but under a higher guidance than individual or 
even national wisdom, the Star of the West turned 
upon her course, and once more repassing the Mor- 
ris Island battery in safety, grated her retreating 
keel over Charleston bar with the falling tides on 
that memorable morning of January 9, 1861. 



CIIAI'.VII. 

MoGowan, 
Re I to it, 

.l!ni.l2,18(il. 
IMooro, 

" Ucbcilion 

lil'<'01(i." 

Vol. I.,Doc- 

miicntfi, 
p. 21. Also 
Mciitenaiit 
Woods, Re- 
port, Jau. 

lU, 1861. 
W. R. Vol. 

I., p. 10. 
Gen. Scott, 
" Autobiog- 
raphy." 
Vol. II., 
p. 621. 



CHAPTER VIII 

ANDERSON'S TRUCE 

Chap. VIII. rpHE general public had no means of knowing 
X anything about the fitting out and sailing 
of the Star of the West until Monday morning, 
thirty-six hours after her departure. The first 
announcement of the fact was in the shipping news 
of the " Sunday Herald," in small type at the bot- 
tom of the column : " Cleared — steamship Star of 
the West, McGowan, Havana and New Orleans." 
The " Tribune " of Monday morning gave the cur- 
rent reports : " This steamer cleared on Saturday 
for Havana and New Orleans. Eumors were rife 
that she was to convey troops to Charleston, but 
the story was ridiculed at the office of the owners, 
and they requested its contradiction. Several be- 
longing to the vessel said that she was going to 
Charleston, and would take on troops in the stream 
New York duriug the night. The freight taken was nearly all 
ja^n.' 7" w. pork, beef, and pilot bread." Between the publication 
of this news in New York on Monday morning and 
the actual arrival of the ship in Charleston harbor 
at daylight on Wednesday, there was not sufficient 
time for the mails to carry the newspapers to the 
garrison in Sumter. Something of a panic had 

102 



andekson's truce 103 

prevailed, however, in Charleston, for several days cnAr. viii. 
previous, crrowins: out of the commissioners' warn- 

f ' ^ ° Now York 

msr ot the 28th that troops were on the way — some- "k veiling 

'-' J. ./ PoHt," Jan. 

times it was said in the Harriet Lane, sometimes in 5an(i7,i86i. 
the Brooklyn; and doubtless these rumors found 
their way to Sumter, and had put the garrison and 
officers on the qui vive. But of the intended or 
actual sailing of the Star of the West, neither 
Anderson nor his subordinates had any notice or 
suspicion beyond the general hope and possibility 
that relief might be attempted by the Govern- 
ment.^ 

The meagerness of the garrison compelled the Douweday, 
few officers to remain on watch throughout the ^j^J^J^^^^j'^^^* 
whole of each alternate night, and at about day- p-^^- 
light on the 9th Captain Doubleday had his flag- 
ging energies aroused by discovering from the 
parapet that a large steamer was actually entering 
the harbor. He watched her with increasing inter- 
est as she steamed up the channel, and when at 
length the rebel battery opened its fire upon her, 
all doubt vanished that this must be an expedition 
of relief. Anderson being still in bed, Doubleday 
hurried down to his room to impart the stirring 
news. Quickly taking the commandant's orders, 
he ran out, called the drummers, had the long roll 
beaten, and in a few minutes both men and officers 
were stationed at the guns. Some forty of these rp- 102; 103. 
were by this time mounted, — " twenty-nine on the 

1 Doubleday's statement in to Marshall O. Roberts, was to 

" Forts Sumter and Moultrie," be sent to us, under command of 

p. 101, must be an eiTor of Captain John McGowan, with a 

memory. He says: "We had reenforeement of several him- 

seen a statement in a Northern dred men and supplies of food 

paper that a steamer named the and ammunition ; but we could 

Star of the West, which belonged not credit the rumor." 



104 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. VIII. first tier, and eleven on the barbette tier," — and 
the garrison had therefore the means of opening a 
lively cannonade. It was an anxious moment, and 
could Anderson have had General Scott's orders, 
which the Star of the West was at that moment 
bringing, or had he even given the Buell memoran- 
dum a liberal construction, the drama of war 
might have opened with a different scene. As it 
was, overprudence lost him the occasion to do a 
memorable and decisive act. In the uncertainty 
as to what the character and purpose of the vessel 
might be, he restrained the eagerness of some of 
his officers to fire ; and while they waited in 
breathless anxiety for the further development 
of the conflict, the Star of the West suddenly put 
about and retreated to sea. Had she continued to 
approach, there is scarcely a doubt that Anderson 
would have aided her with his guns. Though the 
Morris Island battery was out of his reach, he 
could have replied effectually to the fire of Moul- 
trie; and as the vessel had already passed the 
former, this diversion would have vastly increased 
her chances of a safe landing. But it is also pi'ob- 
able that the captain of the ship and lieutenant 
commanding the troops were hastened in their 
flight by the failure of any sign of recognition or 
succor from Sumter. The blame of the fiasco, 
therefore, must be divided between the two com- 
manders : for a lack of faith and daring in one and 
a want of quick resolution and prompt action in 
the other. 

The emergency had come upon Major Anderson, 
his officers and men so suddenly, and the whole 
transaction was of such short duration, that most 



ANDERSON'S TRUCE 105 

probably their indignation was much more intense cuAr.viii. 
after the departure of the steamer than during the 
event itself. The vessel had only been under fire 
some ten or fifteen minutes ; and taking out of 
that the summons to arms and the assembling, 
there remained but little time to deliberate upon 
and decide a course of conduct which would in 
either case bear such weighty consequences in its 
train. 

Major Anderson immediately called a council of 
war to consider the action to be taken. No pallia- 
tion could be urged in extenuation of studied in- 
sult and deliberate assault on the flag of the Union, 
and many of the officers were eloquent in their 
advice of instant retaliation. It was conceded 
that this might with propriety have been done 
while the fire was in progress, but the opportune 
moment had been lost. Anderson himself seems 
to have felt that his hesitation to return the rebel 
fire was hardly what the country, his officers, and 
even his own sense of honor demanded in such a 
trial, and proceeded to justify himself by produc- 
ing his secret instructions, and explaining how he port to tht 
felt himseK bound by these repeated and impera- on the con- 

■^ ^ . T n ,1 duct of the 

tive orders not to begin hostilities; and how the war. 
tenor of all the promptings of the Government 
since his first arrival had been uniformly to the 
effect that he should suffer rather than repel 
indignities. 

Upon apparently a full discussion a final vote 
was taken. " Five officers were for opening fire. 
These contended that the fiag of the United States 
was fired on by hostile batteries, and that their 
simple duty as soldiers sworn to defend the Ameri- 



106 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. VIII. can flag and the honor of their country, was to 
revenge this insult to both. The others, five in 
number, deprecated precipitate measm-es as clos- 
ing the door to any further compromise by which 
portTofhe the threatening civil war could be averted, and 
^n the co^n- referred to the orders of the War Department for 

duct of the , , . , „ 

War. authority." 

Nevertheless, this was such a flagrant outrage, 
that it could not be passed over in silence. Since 
the council had rejected instant retaliation, there 
remained only the expedient of demanding an 
explanation of the offense. Anderson therefore 
wi'ote as follows to the Governor: 

Two of your batteries fired this morning upon an 
unarmed vessel bearing the flag of my Government. As 
I have not been notified that war has been declared by 
South Carolina against the Government of the United 
States, I cannot but think that this hostile act was com- 
mitted without your sanction or authority. Under that 
hope, and that alone, did I refrain from opening fire upon 
your batteries. I have the honor, therefore, respectfuUy 
to ask whether the above-mentioned act — one, I believe, 
without a parallel in the history of our country or of any 
other civilized government — was committed in obedience 
to your instructions, and to notify you, if it be not dis- 
claimed, that I must regard it as an act of war, and that 
I shall not, after a reasonable time for the return of my 
messenger, permit any vessels to pass within range of 
the guns of my fort. In order to save, as far as in my 
to pfcken" power, the shedding of blood, I beg that you will have 
Jan. 9, 1861'. fi^ie notification of this my decision given to all con- 

W. R. Vol. *' ° 

I., p. 134. cerned. 

This letter reveals only too plainly the struggle 
which was going on in the mind of the com- 
mandant. He clearly felt that the case demanded, 
if not punishment, at least reparation, and that 



ANDERSON'S TRUCE 107 

in asking for an apology he was making tlio nt- chai'.viii 
most concession that was possible under the cir- 
cumstances, and that upon this, at least, he must 
insist. The language shows an absence of all haste 
and the indulgence of all charity which might 
excuse the offense, and the calm and final asser- 
tion of a course of action from which in the future 
he could not swerve. It proves conclusively that 
he appreciated how he was being pushed to the 
wall and that at some point he must assert his 
official honor. 

Perhaps what had hitherto passed between him- 
self and the Charleston magnates in their social 
relations led him to expect a disavowal and apol- 
ogy. If so he was disappointed. Governor Pick- 
ens returned an elaborate reply, reciting the seces- 
sion of the State, the alleged agreement with the 
President, Anderson's transfer to Sumter, and 
the attempts to reeuforce the troops, and defi- 
antly assumed the responsibility of the attack. 
" Under these cii'cumstances," he wrote, " the Star 
of the West, it is understood, this morning at- 
tempted to enter this harbor with troops on board, 
and having been notified that she could not enter, 
she was fired into. The act is perfectly justified 
by me. In regard to yom- threat in regard to 

. , Pickens to 

vessels m the harbor, it is only necessary to say /^'^^'^o?,' 

' -^ J J j.^n. 9^ X861. 

that you must judge of your own responsibili- ^i;^ p-. jsg"^' 
ties." 

The answer was laid before the council of war 
called together to hear and consider it. It would Douweday, 
appear, however, that though this council delib- Bumterand 
erated, Anderson decided. Perhaps he had in the p- 105. ' 
meantime once more conned that fatal Buell mem- 



108 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. VIII. 



Anderson 

to Gov. 

Pickeus, 

Jan. 9, 1861. 

" South 

Carolina 

House 

Jourual," 

1860-61, 

p. 311. 



orandum and Floyd's surrender instructions. Un- 
like the Governor, he determined that he would 
not take the responsibility, and the same afternoon 
wrote the following rejoinder : 

" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your communication of to-day, and to say that, 
under the circumstances, I have deemed it proper 
to refer the whole matter to my Government, and 
that I intend deferring the course indicated in my 
note of this morning until the arrival from Wash- 
ington of the instructions I may receive." 

Governor Pickens had communicated the trans- 
actions of the day to the Legislature which was in 
session, and which promptly voted him resolutions 
of approval and support. When he also reported 
to them this final decision of Anderson, both he 
and they were no doubt highly elated at the moral 
victory which had again very unexpectedly fallen 
to their lot. They had accepted the gage and risk 
of battle ; but instead of the shot and shell they 
anticipated, came the notice of a welcome delay 
which for some days at least would prolong the 
period of their uninterrupted preparation, and to 
the same extent diminish the time during which 
Sumter could be made to hold out. The Governor 
was not slow to accord the requested permission to 
send a bearer of dispatches, who was on his way 
that same evening to carry the new aspects of the 
controversy to Washington. The feelings of the 
garrison, thus hanging in perpetual balance be- 
tween peace and war, duty and expediency, dis- 
grace and honor, perplexity and indignation, are 
indicated in a note from Foster : " The firing upon 
the Star of the West this morning by the batteries 



andeeson's truce 109 

on Morris Island opened the war, but Major An- cuAP.vni. 
derson hopes that the delay of sending to Wash- 
ington may possibly prevent civil war. The hope, 
although a small one, may be the thread that pre- Foster to 
vents the sundering of the Union. We are none jiiu""*i86i. 
the less determined to defend ourselves to the last i'., p. lac! " 
extremity." 

In justice, to Anderson, criticism of his conduct 
in this affair must be definitely stated. His neg- 
lect to reply to the batteries when they fired on 
the Star of the West can readily be excused on the 
ground of the suddenness of the issue and short 
duration of the opportunity. Whether that offense 
demanded subsequent retaliation at his hands was 
again a question which, considering the peculiar 
attitude the Government had placed him in, he 
might properly enough refuse to decide, and refer 
to his superiors. 

Whatever doubt existed in his mind was soon 
removed by the answer he received from, the War 
Department. On the 16th of January, Secretary 
Holt wrote to him : " You rightly designate the 
firing into the Star of the West as ' an act of war,' 
and one which was actually committed without the 
slightest provocation. Had their act been per- 
petrated by a foreign nation it wonld have been 
your imperative duty to have resented it with the 
whole force of your batteries. As, however, it 
was the work of the government of South Caro- 
lina, which is a member of this Confederacy, and 
was prompted by the passions of a highly inflamed ^^^^ ^^ 
population of citizens of the United States, your jaJJ'l'ofisei. 
forbearance to return the fire is fully approved ^i;,p:i«)!^" 
by the President." 



110 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

chap.viti. From a careful analysis of the long and compli- 
cated affair Anderson was required to deal with in 
Charleston harbor, the conclusion is irresistible 
that the conspirators expected him finally to fall a 
prey to their influence and wiles. They now in- 
terpreted this incident as a significant symptom that 
he was at least preparing to yield to that " neces- 
sity" so invitingly set forth in the surrender in- 
structions of Floyd. They lost no time, therefore, 
in attempting to seize this important advantage. 
On the 11th of January, two days after the Star of 
the West affair, Grovernor Pickens sent a formal 
commission to Fort Sumter under a flag of truce. 
To give it dignity and moral force, he composed it 
of two of his principal State functionaries, the late 
Federal judge, A. Gr. Magrath, now calling himself 
Secretary of State, and General D. F. Jamison, 
Doubieday, recently president of the convention which had 
Sumter and adjoumcd, assumlug to be Secretary of War of 
p^08.' the new Republic of South Carolina. In his com- 
munication to Anderson, the Governor did not 
omit to impress upon him the exalted rank of 
these envoys whom he represented as " both mem- 
a^an'^Ad-' bcrs of the Executive Council and of the highest 
ti^i/'p.m. position in the State." Wlien the commandant 
had formally convened his council of officers, to 
receive and hear these distinguished messengers, 
he found that they bore him a written demand for 
the surrender of the fort, but delicately worded to 
avoid irritating his military susceptibilities. A sim- 
ple rough order which would wound a soldier's heart 
had been by careful diplomatic phraseology soft- 
ened until it became an instruction to urge upon 
Major Anderson "considerations of the gravest 



ANDEESON'S TRUCE 111 

public character, and of the deepest interest to all chai-.vhi. 
who deprecate the improper waste of life, to induce 
the delivery of Fort Sumter to the constituted au- 
thorities of the State of South Carolina with a 
pledge on its part to account for such public prop- ufi^m-H Ad-' 
erty as may be m your charge." in support oi tion/'p.ioa. 
this summons, Judge Magrath addressed the im- 
provised military council — one major, three cap- ^^"''Flfrts^' 
tains, one first and four second lieutenants, and Mllliuril"" 
an assistant surgeon. He conjured Major An- i>. itd. ' 
dersou "to listen to the refined dictates of humanity 
and avoid the shedding of blood, for, if not, thou- portlotife 
sands will howl around these walls, and pull out oirthccon- 
the bricks with their fingers." He represented war. 
" that President Buchanan was in his dotage ; that 
the Government in Washington was breaking up ; 
that all was confusion, despair, and disorder there ; 
and that it was full time for us to look out for our 
own safety ; for if we refused to give up the fort, 
nothing could prevent the Southern troops from DouWeday, 
exterminating us. He ended this tragical state- smnterand 

• ^Tiir /->ii*i-i 11 Moultrie," 

ment by saying, 'May Grod Almighty enable you p-ios. 
to come to a just decision.' " 

The direct statecraft of these simple soldiers eas- f,^^.l\^^ ^®" 
ily detected the judge's sophistry. Disloyalty was ,S"th?clfn- 
treason. Surrender was dishonor. And so they all war-* also 
voted, with manly and honorable constancy. p. 192. 

Though Anderson felt a just indignation at the 
Charleston aggressions, he had constantly expressed 
his heartfelt desire for peace. His patriotism is the 
more admirable in that it sprung not from any per- 
sonal combativeness, but from a deep conviction 
of a soldier's and citizen's obligation to his flag 
and country. Strong ties of kindred and society 



112 



AEEAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. VIII. 



Doubleday, 

" Forts 
Svimter and 
Moultrie," 
pp. 108, 109. 



Foster, Re- 
port to the 
Committee 
on the Con- 
duct of the 
War. 



weighed not a feather agaiust the requirements of 
law and disci^Dline. His sword stood as a stubborn 
barrier at the gate of Sumter, but his sympathies 
overleaped it and went out to his countrymen in 
an earnest wish for the restoration of harmony. 
History may deplore his error of judgment, but it 
cannot refuse him the meed of a humane patriotism 
in the step he now took. 

Refusing very properly to entertain the proposi- 
tion that Sumter was a piece of property which 
could be " delivered," he wisely treated the Govern- 
or's letter as a simple demand for military surren- 
der. With this demand he told the commissioners 
he could not comply. Anxious, nevertheless, to do 
something on his own part to avert hostilities, " he 
asked them why they did not first attempt diplo- 
macy instead of war. He said if they would send a 
commission to lay their claims before the authori- 
ties at Washington, he would send another to 
represent the condition of the fort, and the Gov- 
ernment could then form its own judgment, and 
come to some decision." The commissioners could 
of course say nothing else than that they would 
submit the proposition to the Governor. Foster's 
recollection of the incident is slightly different; he 
says the commissioners' " demand was mitigated 
to a proposal to send a joint commission to Wash- 
ington, which was agreed to by Major Anderson." 
Bringing their interview to a close, they bore to the 
city the following written reply from Anderson : 

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
youi' demand for the surrender of this fort to the author- 
ities of South Carolina, and to say in reply that the de- 
mand is one with which I cannot comply. Your Excel- 




FRANCIS W. PICKKNS. 



andekson's truce 113 

leiifiy knows that I have recently sent a messenger to ciiap.viii. 
Washington, and that it will be ini])ossible for me to re- 
ceive an answer to my dispatches, forwarded by him, at 

an earlier date than next Monday. What the character Andin-son 

of my instrnctions may be I cannot foresee. .lau.'ii.iHGi', 

Should your Excellency deem fit, prior to a resort to "Tiistory 

arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford „,''[,j[ern 

me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my officers to ^^^'^',''}'^°'' 

accompany any messenger you may deem proper to be 2W.' 
the bearer of your demand. 

This suggestion of Major Anderson was prac- 
tically the tender of an armistice for the period of 
about two days, the time necessary to travel to 
Washington, with contingent results impossible to 
calculate. Having already, two days previously, 
decided against retaliation, it involved him in no 
additional restraint, but it placed the Grovernment 
at Washington in the awkward predicament of 
being compelled to give virtual notice of future 
relief expeditions during its continuance. Whether 
or not this point of advantage was perceived by 
the insurgents, it gave them such manifest oppor- 
tunities for delay that Major Anderson's truce was 
eagerly accepted by Governor Pickens ; and Attor- 
ney-Greneral Hayne, on the part of South Carolina, 
and Lieutenant Hall, on behalf of the garrison, 
were forthwith dispatched to Washington almost 
on the heels of the former messenger from the fort. 



Vol. III.— 8 



CHAPTER IX 

THE MILITARY SITUATION AT CHARLESTON 

Chap. IX. X TP to Christmas, squad drill and the maniif ac- 
U ture of scaling-ladders had constituted the 
principal military preparation of the Charlesto- 
nians. They had provided by intrigue for the 
" delivery " of the arsenal, which would supply 
them with muskets and cartridges ; of Sumter 
and Pinckney, where they would find an abun- 
dance of heavy guns. They did not think it possi- 
ble that these intrigues could be thwarted, or these 
supplies diverted from their possession and use. 
When, therefore, Anderson's transfer to Sumter 
came upon them so unexpectedly, they were for 
the moment helpless and defenseless. Hence their 
haste to secui-e the muskets in the arsenal and 
the remaining guns in Pinckney and Moultrie ; but 
even possessed of these, their occupancy was only 
possible through Anderson's forbearance, and the 
harbor was open to the entrance of any ship. 

It was, therefore, with consternation that they 
received notice on December 31 of the change of 
regime and policy at Washington, of the commis- 
sioners' blunder and failure, of Holt's accession to 
the War Department, of his coercive purposes, and 
the alarming information, " We believe reenforce- 

lU 



THE MILITARY SITUATION AT CHARLESTON 



ments are on the way." It is scarcely to be sup- 
posed that Grovernor Pickens at Charleston, though 
leader of an insurrection now five days old, and 
a military dictator, as no other authority had up 
to this time ratified his acts, received the news 
with complacency. He was, as has already been 
said, a revolutionist of the true type — an un- 
hesitating, unyielding, radical leader. Inaugu- 
rated on the 17th of December, he had signalized 
almost every day of his incumbency by some act 
of revolutionary hardihood. With the ink of his 
official oath as Grovernor of South Carolina and a 
citizen of the United States scarcely dry, he had, 
on the 17tli, written his letter demanding Fort 
Sumter of President Buchanan ; on the 18th, 
ordered and equipped the harbor guard-boat; on 
the 20th, officially told Caleb Cushing there was 
no hope for the Union ; on the 27th, occupied 
Moultrie and Pinckney ; and on the 30tli, taken 
possession of the arsenal. 

The other leaders of the insurrection were equally 
profuse of words, but much more cautious and tardy 
in acts. The chairman, calling the convention to 
order, had indeed said, " In the outset of this move- 
ment I can offer you no better motto than Dan ton's 
at the commencement of the French revolution, ' To 
dare ! and again to dare ! and without end to dare !'" 
But with such dramatic quotations on their lips, 
they were not in headlong haste to thrust their 
necks into the halter. They coolly tabled a number 
of belligerent resolutions, including even the Gov- 
ernor's letter notifying them that he had occupied 
the abandoned forts, perhaps justifying themselves 
in this latter instance by his reassm'ing phrase. 



Chap. IX. 



1860. 



Gov. Pick- 
ens, Mes- 
sage, Nov. 
5, 1861. 
" South 
Carolina 
House 
Journal," 
pp. 31, 32. 



116 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. IX. 

Plctens to 
Jamison, 

Dec. 28, 1860. 

W. K. Vol. 
I., p. 252. 



Simons to 
Pickens, 
" South 
Carolina 

House 
Journal," 
1861, pp. 
174-77. Com- 
pare, also, 
pp. 198, 222, 
and 250 in 
explana- 
tion of cer- 
tain errors 
of date. 



" I hope there is no immediate danger of further 
aggression for the present." The Legislature, in 
still greater apparent confidence, had taken a holi- 
day adjournment. 

The threatening news came to the Governor by 
telegraph late at night December 31, 1860. They 
relied so confidently upon intrigue, upon the 
" negotiation " which the commissioners had gone 
to Washington to conduct, and especially upon the 
President's doctrine of non-coercion and policy of 
non-action, that this new turn of affairs took them 
as much by surprise as Anderson's movement a 
few days previous. There was an instantaneous 
flutter in the military dove-cote. The Governor 
was ignorant of war, but equally a stranger to fear. 
At midnight of the expiring year he was busy giv- 
ing orders about troops, supplies, batteries, bridges, 
guns. Pinckney and Moultrie were to be defended, 
merlons raised to protect five heavy guns bearing 
on Maffitt's channel, temporary bridges constructed 
to secure a retreat, if necessary, from Sullivan's 
Island. A battery was as soon as possible to be 
raised on Sullivan's Island beyond Fort Moultrie, 
out of the range of the guns of Sumter ; and 
another battery on Morris Island, also beyond the 
guns of Sumter, was to be erected immediately by 
Major Stevens of the Citadel Academy, with a 
detachment of forty cadets. Fort Johnson was 
to be occupied, and all communication with Sum- 
ter, except mails, to be cut off. Major-General 
Schnierle was directed to carry out these details, 
and to call into requisition and counsel the valu- 
able aid and cooperation of Brigadier-General 
Simons. 



THE MILITARY SITUATION AT CHARLESTON 117 

lu tlie excitement and panic which followed chap. rx. 
next day, even the convention was made to realize 
the necessity for prompt action. That body spent ^PTOceed^° 
New Year's Day, from 10 A. m. to 4 p. m., in secret ciiiS'ton 
debate. The principal result of this long session Jau. 3, isei. 
was to confirm the dictatorship the Governor had 
now for five days been exercising without law. 
The ambitious republic, which professed itself so 
jealous of State and individual rights that it could 
not endui-e the grinding Federal despotism, was 
only eleven days old ; and yet it was akeady driven 
to this melancholy makeshift : 

Resolved, That whenever in the course of the struggle 
into which the State now seems likely to he di-awn, hos- 
tilities may be waged or threatened against the city of 
Charleston or its neighborhood, and the Grovernor (upon 
consultation with the Executive Council) may deem the 
measure necessary, the Governor is hereby authorized to 
declare and enforce martial law, in whole or in part, in and 
over Charleston, its harbor, and neighboring villages ; all 
the adjacent islands, including Morris Island, and all other 
places within five miles of the court-house; to remove 
thence all persons whose presence he shall consider 
detrimental to the public service ; to prevent the ingress 
of such persons ; to regulate, at discretion, all travel to 
and forth, and otherwise to govern as in a camp : Pro- ., 
vided, that such authority shall be at all times subject to of the con- 
be limited, controlled, or revoked by this convention, or p. 154.' 
by the G-eneral Assembly. 

Brigadier-G-eneral James Simons, upon whom a 
share of the responsibility of the military defense 
was thrust in so unlooked for and sudden a man- 
ner, was a man of candor and courage. Nothing 
short of these qualities could have induced him, in 
that hour of shams and atmosphere of bravado, 
bluntly to tell the Governor unpalatable truths, 



118 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. IX. which he laid before him forthwith, in all their 
startling significance. Late in the evening of Jan- 
uary 1, he wrote him the following report : 

Governor : I have carefully considered the orders ex- 
tended to me by the major-general, which emanated from 
your headquarters yesterday, and the plan of military 
operations and line of defense therein set forth. I cannot 
sacrifice, to matter of etiquette, questions and issues of 
such momentous importance as now surround us. I feel 
it to be my duty to report to you my opinion of the mih- 
tary movements which have been initiated. 

First. The hne of operations embraces four points : 

1. Fort Moultrie. 

2. Castle Pinckney. 

3. Fort Johnson. 

4. Morris Island. 

By the map which accompanies these papers it will 
appear that your lines of communication with these, as 
at present estabhshed, are directly within the range and 
effective power of Fort Sumter — the citadel of the har- 
bor — controlling every point. At the first return fire 
from Fort Sumter your lines of communication are 
utterly cut off with every single post, except, perhaps, 
Castle Pinckney. Let me simply observe, that you are 
indebted to the forbearance of the enemy for the liberty 
of transporting the reenforcements and supplies, which 
you ordered at midnight, and which are to be sent this 
day at 2 o'clock to your battery, now in course of erec- 
tion on Morris Island. A single gun from Fort Sumter 
would sink your transport and destroy your troops and 
supplies. These hues of communication are the prime 
consideration of a general. It is vain to say others will 
be adopted. It is enough that they do not exist now ; 
and, when the present resources fail, your troops will be 
whoUy isolated, and cut off from each other and the main. 

Second. Fort Moultrie : 

This post is wholly untenable. Lieutenant-Colonel De 
Saussure, a brave officer, gave you prompt notice of this 



THE MILITARY SITUATION AT CHARLESTON 119 

fact on the morniug after liis occupation. His report, chap. ix. 
this morning, shows yon tlio irrefragable proof of liis 
first report, after nearly a week's occnpation of the post. 
Moreover, he asks for supplies, which lie applied to you 
for on the 30th ultimo. He urges me to supply these 
wants at the earliest practicable moment. Suppose he 
has them, however, there is probably not a single man 
out of the whole force which he carried down who ever 
loaded a siege gun, or, perhaps, ever handled a single gun 
of heavy caliber, munition, or implement mentioned in the 
report. I know, and state as a fact, that there is no ord- 
nance force in his whole command. His post must, even 
under the most favorable circumstances, fall to the enemy 
after a very short and bloody contest. 

Suppose they evacuate the post, where will they in- 
trench themselves ? Shall they resort to the sand-hills ? If 
the enemy be reenforced by 250 United States artillery, 
as is reported, he can land 200 men under the guns of 
Fort Moultrie, and attack Lieutenant-Colonel De Saus- 
sure's command — an unequal contest between disciplined 
veteran troops, commanded by educated and experienced 
officers, and raw militia who never saw battle. 

In the event of discomfiture to these brave young men, 
how can they make good their retreat from these sand- 
hills ? Will it be said. There will be a causeway to the 
mainland, or other communication ? The answer is : The 
communication does not exist now, and the issue will be 
upon us in less than thirty hours. 

Third. Fort Johnson : 

This post is garrisoned by light infantry or rifles, who 
never handled a heavy gun, if there be such gun, or any 
munitions in the dilapidated post they now occupy. At 
any rate, a few shells from the enemy at Fort Sumter will 
compel them to retire from their position. 

Fourth. Morris Island Battery : 

Suppose it completed, which it is not, nor wiU be in 
thirty hours. The armament is three 24-pounders. The 
force is the corps of cadets from the citadel, and a corps 
of rifles ; and these to be reenforced by two more corps of 



120 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CuAP. IX. rifles, not one man of whom, probably, ever saw a 24- 
pouuder manipulated or fired. 

When the Harriet Lane approaches, bows on, the bat- 
tery may fire a shot or two; never having been tried — 
the powder, the guns, or the range — it is not even prob- 
lematical whether they will strike the enemy. She will 
steam by at fourteen knots per hour, and in fifteen min- 
utes the reenforcements will be landed under the cannon 
of Fort Sumter. 

Why, then, all this preparation and expense, if the work 
cannot but terminate in disastrous failure I 

Suppose, however, the euemy be reeuforced, and not fire 
a gun in reply to the Morris Island battery. He can de- 
molish our other posts when he pleases from one of the 
most impregnable fortresses in the world, and so our 
posts live at his will, and remain in our possession at his 
sufferance. 

Suppose, however, we succeed in preventing reenforce- 
ments from entering our harbor. This will not prevent 
the United States Government from enforcing their reve- 
nue, for this can be done outside the bar, by a war steamer, 
as well as inside by the Harriet Lane. 

Suppose, however, all your plans succeed, and Fort 
Sumter were in our possession, how would we raise the 
blockade of the war steamers outside 1 

If the Harriet Lane is not fired into the preparations 
are unnecessary j and if she is fired iuto we have com- 
menced open war. 

I ask your perusal of the report of Colonel Gwynn to 
me, this morning. I have no transport at hand to send 
him, and have so notified him. 

I feel it to be my duty, under all the circumstances 
above mentioned, to express my conviction of the inexpe- 
diency of commencing actual hostilities, on our side, in 
our present wholly unprepared state, with raw, undis- 
ciplined troops, without equipments, munitions, or proper 
arms required to work armaments that need the highest 
skill and training; nothing but bloody discomfiture must 
attend the opening campaign. 

You will now require me, after this review, to offer a 
better plan. 



THE MILITARY SITUATION AT CHARLESTON 



121 



Deferentially and with j^reat diffidence, I recommend 
that a skilled and educated military man be selected for 
Major-General-in-Chief, to command all the troops, and 
that he shonld establish a plan of operations. Meanwhile 
I would recommend that amplification of the Ordnance 
and En<2^ineer departments be ordered, and the more 
effective orj^anization of the Commissariat and Quarter- 
masters' departments. 

With great respect, I pray your Excellency, at this 
moment of great peril, to take into consideration what 
has been herein submitted, and to lay the matter speedily 
before a council of war, in accordance with the custom 
of armies engaged in active operations. 

No commeDt could add to the force and point of 
the report of General Simons, which showed that on 
January 1, 1861, the Charleston insurrection was 
as weak and defenseless as a new-born infant. 
Officially announced two mouths before, it had 
dui-ing that whole time consisted of little else than 
bluster and intrigue. Governor Pickens was stung 
to the quick by this covert reflection on his own 
rashness, and replied in a letter next day, defend- 
ing his course with such excuses as were a virtual 
acknowledgment of the truths which had been told. 

Your extraordinary report I received last night, and 
have only to say that I do not pretend that the orders 
and disposition of forces in Charleston harbor are at aU 
perfect or beyond the criticism of miUtary rule. . . It 
was well known, and sadly felt, as you state, that our 
troops were raw and inexperienced; but under all the 
circumstances I had no alternative left but to do what 
has been done. And if we are to occupy no place because 
our troops are raw and inexperienced, then we will have 
to abandon the State, for the same reason, if forces that 
are regular are ordered to invade it. We calculated that 
if we were weak, so were our enemies to a certain extent. 
Their regular force is not strong enough to admit of im- 



Chap. IX. 



Simona to 

Pickens, 

Jan. 1, 1861. 

"South 

Carolina 

House 

Journal," 

18G1, pp. 

177-79. 



122 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. IX. 



Pickens to 

Simons, 

Jan. 2, 18()1. 

" South 

Carolina 

House 

Journal," 

1861, pp. 

180, 182. 



mediate division or transfer. They would be compelled 
to call for volunteers also, in the progress of events, and, 
with the feeling in the country, there would be great dif- 
ficulty in this operation. The question was, not whether 
we could maintain our position in Charleston harbor, with 
the certainty of assistance and reenforcements being 
thrown in immediately, but whether, in the present pecu- 
liar state of the country, and with a weak garrison as to 
numbers, who are incapable of being divided, or any detach- 
ment being sent out from it to occupy any post their guns 
might drive us from — whether under all these circum- 
stances we were capable of maintaining our position for 
the present, so as to prevent reenforcements, and to sus- 
tain the direct and urgent request from our commis- 
sioners at Washington, hoping that every day might 
change events, so as to enable us to protect the State in 
the attitude she has assumed of immediate independence. 

Notwithstanding this protest, General Simons 
found his immediate jnstification for having bluntly 
told the truth. An ordnance board to whom the 
report was submitted " concurred in the positions 
assumed, together with the conclusion thence de- 
duced," and General Schnierle having suddenly 
fallen ill, the Governor was compelled to order 
General Simons to assume command of all the 
forces and defenses of the harbor. 

Nevertheless the Governor maintained his stub- 
bornness in appearance if not in reality. The ex- 
pected expedition did not come as first announced, 
and Secretary Thompson had notified him of its 
permanent postponement. Under this inspiriting 
"change of events" Governor Pickens made the 
following indorsement on the report of the ord- 
nance board January 3, 1861 : " The board concur 
in the military positions assumed by General 
Simons, together with the conclusions thence de- 



THE MILITARY SITUATION AT CHARLESTON 123 

duced, but leave the council of war to the discre- chap. ix. 
tioD. of myself. ' The conclusions ' of that report I 
consider would be to order troops from Fort Moul- 
trie and Sullivan's Island and Pinckney, and so 
abandon the attempt to keep out reenforcements, 
and, in fact, to yield without a struggle every 
point, and thus break down the spirit of our peo- Slmen^i 
pie, and cover our cause with imbecility and prob- "^''^'soiitiT^' 
able ruin. I shall do no such thing, nor shall I yi(4d iioui"'^^ 
to any council of war that may drive me to such iVoi, p. iW 
' conclusions.' " 

Such was the self-confessed weakness of the 
conspiracy at this juncture, which a few months 
later grew to a continental war. A single armed 
ship and five hundred recruits, backed by a Presi- 
dential will, would manifestly have seriously crip- 
pled and might perhaps have effectually crushed 
this local insurrection. 

Major Anderson had not failed to report the 
movement of the insurgents to construct the bat- 
tery on Morris Island. " Several steamers have 
been running to and fro," he wrote, " and this af- 
ternoon about eighty soldiers with wheelbarrows, 
barrels, etc., and some draught horses were landed Anderson 
on Morris Island. They are evidently construct- ta^itoen- 
ing a battery or batteries there. The lights in the ^si.iseo.''' 
harbor were put out last night." But under the i.', p. 120. 
President's conciliation policy he did not feel him- 
self at liberty to interfere with these offensive 
preparations. Pushed ahead by the unresting wiU 
of Governor Pickens, built by the superabundant 
supply of slave labor, and superintended by the 
bookish science of Major Stevens and his forty 
boyish Citadel Academy cadets, this battery was 



124 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. IX. 



Picbena 

to Col. 

Gwynn, 
Col. White, 

and Col. 

Trapier, 
Jau. 9, 1861. 

" South 

Carolina 

House 

Journal," 

1861, p. 208. 



able, on January 9, to give the Star of the West 
the warm reception she encountered and to thwart 
the expedition of relief. 

That the insurgent victory was due rather to 
accident than to juvenile gunnery mattered little to 
the jubilant conspirators. The daring of Governor 
Pickens was justified, the spirit of the people was 
roused, the opening campaign a success, and the 
cause generally enveloped in a halo of cheap glory. 
If a detachment of boys could work this wonder in 
nine days, might not a united and continued effort 
capture Sumter ? No doubt reasoning of this kind 
dictated Governor Pickens's defiant reply to An- 
derson; but it also did more. The Star of the 
West had scarcely shown her heels to the Citadel 
Academy cadets, when the Governor sat down 
and wrote the following order to his best three en- 
gineer officers : " You are ordered to come together 
immediately, and consider and report the most 
favorable plan for operating upon Fort Sumter, so 
as to reduce that fortress, by batteries or other 
means in our possession ; and for this consultation 
you are authorized to have with you Colonel 
Manigault, the State ordnance officer." 

The engineer board entered with alacrity into 
the Governor's views, and on the following day 
(January 10, 1861) presented him their report, and 
submitted a plan which they pronounced feasible. 
The details of that plan with its mortar batteries 
on Sullivan's Island, at Fort Johnson, at Cummings 
Point; its heavy gun batteries on Moultrie; the 
blocking of all entrances to the harbor except Maf- 
fitt's channel, and the protection of that entrance 
by a heavy gun battery, so as to secure as a final 



THE MILITARY SITUATION AT CHARLESTON 



125 



and crowning agency " tlie slow (but sure) process 
of starvation," have but little interest for the gen- 
eral reader. It is enough that they considered the 
plan effective. " We are unanimously and decidedly 
of the opinion that — discarding all other methods 
of attack upon that fortress (whether by surprise, 
by open assault, or by stratagem) as uncertain in 
theh- results, and as, even if successful, involving 
probably much sacrifice of life — our dependence 
and sole reliance must be upon batteries of heavy 
ordnance, at least until a deep impression has been 
made upon the garrison, in its morale as well as in 
its physique, by an incessant bombardment and 
cannonade of many hours' duration. When this 
impression shall have been made, and a demand 
for a surrender refused, we are of opinion that, 
with its battlements mutilated, its embrasures 
beaten in, and its garrison weakened by casualties 
and disheartened by surrounding circumstances, 
this strong fortress would fall, with comparative 
ease, before an assaulting party." 

There can be no doubt that the Grovernor was 
highly pleased with the report. In the following 
autumn, he had the perhaps pardonable vanity to 
inform the Legislature, in an opening message, that 
his order originated it, and that " upon that plan 
the batteries were erected which finally did reduce " 
Sumter. If any doubt arose in his own mind as 
to the efficacy of this plan it sprung from the ques- 
tion of a single but vital element of success — time. 
These batteries, these heavy guns, these ponderous 
mortars, these immense stores of shot and shell, 
could not be called up by a magician's wand. This 
patient drill, this long cannonade, and perhaps 



Chap. IX. 



Engineers' 

Report, 

Jan. 10, 1861. 

" South 

Carolina 

House 

Journal," 

1861, pp. 182, 

183. 



Pickens, 
Message. 
" South 
Carolina 

House 
Journal," 
1861, pp. 

32, 33. 



126 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. IX. this tedious process of starvation — would nothing 
occur during its slow lapse ? 

At the opportune moment, the very day follow- 
ing this report, came, as the result of the Magrath 
and Jamison mission to the fort, already recited in 
the last chapter, the proposal of the commandant 
" to refer this matter to Washington." In full view 
of the military situation as Governor Pickens then 
clearly understood it, and the need of time to per- 
fect arrangements, it is no wonder he eagerly ac- 
cepted Major Anderson's truce, or that in ten days 
from that time both the major and Captain Fos- 
ter reported to the War Department the blocking 
of the main ship channel by hulks, the erection 
of extensive batteries, the increased energy and 
superior work of the insurgents, and, in short, the 
practical isolation and siege of Fort Sumter.^ 

1 Anderson to Holt, Jan. 21, W. R. Vol. I., pp. 138, 139; 
1861. W. R. Vol. L, p. 143. also Jan. 21, 1861. Ibid., pp. 
Foster to Totten, Jan. 1-4, 1861. 146-48. 



CHAPTER X 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 



THE conspirators had good reason to sound the chap. x. 
note of alarm and show symptoms of dismay 
at the beginning of the Cabinet regime on December 
31, 1860. Henceforth the sway they had exercised 
over President Buchanan would be to a great extent 
lost to them. Hitherto, not alone in shaping a pol- 
icy of non-coercion, and preventing reenforcements, 
but in numerous minor matters as well, the com- 
plicity of Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson had enabled 
them to turn the varied agencies of the Govern- 
ment against its own life; while active caucuses 
to inaugurate rebellion had been going on in 
at least three of the executive departments at 
Washington. 

Floyd, especially, lost no opportunity to favor 
the conspirators. He sold the Virginia Board of 
Army Commissioners 5000 muskets ; delivered 
10,000 others from the Watervliet arsenal, New 
York, to an agent of South Carolina ; and still 
5000 others from the Baton Rouge arsenal to 
the Governor of Alabama. He ordered advanced 
quotas of arms to a number of Southern States. 
He sent a Government inspector to inspect a pur- 
chase of arms for the Governor of Mississippi. He 

127 



128 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cuAP. X. allowed Virginia to have a model musket made at 
the Springfield armory ; to use and take copies of 
Government patterns, drawings, machines, tools, 
etc., at Springfield and Harper's Ferry; and ar- 
ranged to have the Washington navy yard manu- 
facture a battery of howitzers and a lot of fuses 
for the same State. He furnished Senator Yulee 
a list of army appointees from Florida. He sent 
Colonel Hardee to drill and review a camp of in- 
struction for Governor Letcher, of Virginia, and a 
little later gave him leave of absence practically to 
go into the service of the rebellion under the State 
of Georgia. He acquiesced in the acceptance of a 
militia volunteer guard to surround and ostensibly 
protect the Charleston arsenal, which guard, acting, 
doubtless, upon the original design, soon seized 
and held it for South Carolina. On the day of 
the Charleston secession ordinance (December 20), 
without the knowledge of the President, he or- 
dered the transfer from the Pittsburgh arsenal to 
the Southern coast, where they might be readily 
seized, of 123 cannon — this on the pretense of 
arming the fort at Ship Island, not yet completed, 
and the fort at Galveston, not yet begun. In 
this latter enterprise, however, he overshot his 
mark. Columbiads and 32-pounders cannot be 
secretly moved, and before the order was many 
days old the President received emphatic tele- 
graphic protests against it from prominent Pitts- 
burgh citizens — a warning from his own State he 
did not feel at liberty to disregard. 

While Floyd, openly professing loyalty, was thus 
covertly playing into the hands of secession, his 
two colleagues were similarly busy. Thompson 




CKNKRAI, JOHN ]!. FLOYD 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 129 

deemed it consistent with his government duties to chai-. x. 
go personally to Raleigh as a commissioner of the 
State of Mississippi to induce the State of North 
Carolina to secede, and a few days later to publish 
an open letter in the same behalf. Cobb had like- 
wise employed his official time in writing a six-col- j^^^ g jgg^, 
umn secession address, finished and dated two days ^'o^'i^'J^d'AsS- 
before his resignation, and printed a few days after. Dec.i"!i86o. 

Under the new dispensation these practices in- 
stantly came to an end. For the moment Mr. 
Buchanan was in a patriotic mood, and, under the 
urgent solicitations of Black, Holt, and Stanton, 
yielded consent to a number of measures he had 
for two months obstinately resisted. For the first 
time since his arrival in Washington, General Scott 
was permitted to notify commanders of forts and 
garrisons to be on the alert against surprise ; and 
though this admonition came too late to inspiiit and 
reassure many a wavering officer, it had the direct 
effect of saving one of the most important military 
posts in the Gulf. Reenforcements were resolved 
upon. The policy of defending the national capital 
was, on Holt's proposal, discussed and adopted. 
At least one member of the Cabinet placed himself 
in confidential communication with the leading 
Republicans and Unionists in Congress, and coun- 
sel and warning in behalf of the Government were 
freely interchanged and faithfully observed. Se- 
cessionists began to leave the departments, and 
conspirators no longer exclusively patrolled the 
corridors and antechambers of the Executive Man- 
sion. Loyal men might again grasp the President's 
hand, and by cheering words nerve his feeble cour- 
age and despau'ing faith. 
Vol. ni.— 9 



130 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. X. Preeminent in Ms opportunities and services at 
this critical juncture was the new Secretary of War 
ad interim^ Joseph Holt, of Kentucky. He had been 
a lifelong Democrat and a stubborn partisan. As 
Postmaster-General, and in the earlier phases of 
the disaffection, he had perhaps been negligent in 
submitting without more active protest to the ab- 
surd doctrine of non-coercion ; but now, placed at 
the head of the War Department, and fully roused 
to the designs of the conspiracy, he made the most 
of the remaining opportunities for defense. Under 
his administration, the War Department was no 
longer a bureau of insurrection. Plots and plans 
of arsenals and forts, and reports of their armament 
and supplies, were refused to conspiring Members 
and Senators. The issue of advance quotas of arms 
to disloyal governors was discontinued. The prac- 
tice of selling Government arms was abandoned. 
Floyd's order to send the Pittsburgh cannon south 
was promptly countermanded. The military pre- 
cautions of General Scott were adopted, and as 
rapidly as possible carried out. Above all, his 
moderate firmness in guiding the weak and vacil- 
lating will of President Buchanan was most oppor- 
tune. It was soon put to the test. One of Mr. 
Holt's first acts was to revoke a piece of gross 
favoritism which Floyd had ordered to please a 
prominent secession Senator. The Senator flew 
into a rage, and wrote a curt note to the President 
asking if this was with his approbation. 

The President, undecided as usual, sent for Mr. 
Holt, and on his entering the Executive chamber 
handed him the note. Holt read it in his presence, 
and immediately said : " Mr. President, I think we 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 



131 



have had enough of this sort of thing. This sounds chap. x. 
altogether too much like the crack of the slave- 
driver's whip. It is a piece of absolute insolence 
in him to ask such a question. Of coui-se, I under- 
stand that everything I do is by your authority — 
every act I do and every order I give is for you 
alone and not for myself. I am but your agent 
and officer, and exercise no power or authority of 
my own whatever. This is a note which he had no 
right to address to you." 

" Certainly," said Mr. Buchanan, " I think so too, 
and I will say so to him." 

" Mr. President," replied Holt, " I must ask you 
to do more. I must ask you to address him a note 
saying without explanation that this is your own 
order. For, Mr. President, you know it is that or 
it is nothing." 

Mr. Buchanan did it ; ^ and thereafter there was 
one fire-eater less haunting the Presidential ante- 
chambers. 

Braced up by such resolute advice, the President 
held tolerably firm, and the Cabinet regime was 
gradually consolidated. It formed originally only 
a minority of the Cabinet, Black, Holt, and Stan- 
ton ; Toucey, though loyal, being scarcely a positive 
factor in such emergencies. The affair of the Star 
of the West disclosed the active treachery of Thomp- 
son, and drove him out (January 8), no successor issi. 
being nominated for the Interior Department to 



Holt, Con- 
versation, 
J. G. N. 
Personal 
Memoran- 
da. MS. 



i"With every sentiment of 
personal friendship and regard, I 
am obliged to say, in answer to 
your note of Sunday, that I have 
full confidence in the Secretary 
of War ; and his acts, in the line 



of his duty, are my own acts, 
for which I am responsible." — 
President Buchanan to Slidell, 
January 29,1861. Curtis, "Life 
of Buchanan," Vol. 11., p. 445, 
note. 



132 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. X. 



1861. 



1860. 



the end of the Presidential term. The imper- 
ative representations of New York capitalists to 
Mr. Buchanan, that they would furnish the Gov- 
ernment no more money unless he would consent 
to put a loyal Secretary in the Treasury Depart- 
ment,^ also brought about the resignation (on 
January 9) of Philip F. Thomas, Cobb's succes- 
sor, a decided, though more quiet, secessionist. On 
January 11 the Union element received a strong 
and valuable accession in the appointment of John 
A. Dix, of New York, as Secretary of the Treasury. 
He had been a reactionary Democrat, and had pub- 
licly justified the discontent of the South as late 
as December 15.^ Since that date, however, the 



1 " At length the President was 
given to understand distinctly 
that not one dollar would be 
forthcoming from the banks and 
financial institutions of the me- 
tropolis until he should have 
placed in his Cabinet men on 
whom the friends of the Govern- 
ment and the Union could de- 
pend. The argument is one to 
which administrations are com- 
pelled to yield. The President 
asked what would satisfy them; 
and at a meeting of our leading 
men, held at the Bank of Com- 
merce, it was decided to require 
of him, as a condition to their 
support, the appointment of Gen- 
eral Dix to a Cabinet position. 
The understanding among the 
gentlemen present was that the 
position should be that of Secre- 
tary of the Treasury. . . On the 
evening of Tuesday, January 
8, my father received a dispatch 
from the President, asking him 
to come at once to the White 
House. He went immediately, 



and was offered the War Depart- 
ment. This he declined, inform- 
ing Mr. Buchanan, as had been 
agreed upon, that at that moment 
he could be of no service to him 
in any position except that of 
the Treasury Department, and 
that he would accept no other 
post. The President asked for 
time. The following day he had 
Mr. Thomas's resignation in his 
hands, and sent General Dix's 
name to the Senate ; it was in- 
stantly eonfii-med."— Morgan Dix, 
" Memoirs of John A. Dix," Vol. 
L, p. 362. 

2 "Resolved, That while we 
deplore the existing excitement 
in the Southern States, we do 
not hesitate to say that there is 
just ground for it. But we ear- 
nestly entreat our Southern breth- 
ren to abstain from hasty and 
inconsiderate action," etc., etc. 
— Resolutions of a public meet- 
ing signed by John A. Dix and 
many others. Morgan Dix, Vol. 
I., p. 360. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 



133 



Charleston secession ordinance, the Sumter inci- 
dent, and the firing on the Star of the West had 
awakened him to a truer perception of the crisis. 
Henceforth he knew but one duty, — to oppose re- 
beUiou, — and as Secretary of the Treasury he lent 
Ms earnest zeal to the service of the Union. A few 
weeks later he gave utterance to the most stirring 
battle-cry of this exciting period, telegraphing to 
one of his revenue officials : " If any one attempts 
to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the 
spot." ^ 

We have already seen how the Cabinet regime 
planned and dispatched the expedition in the Star 
of the West. Acting under the assumption of suc- 
cess, the President had, on January 3, nominated 
a new collector for Charleston harbor, a citizen of 



Chap. X. 



1 " I decided when I wrote the 
order to say nothing to the Presi- 
dent about it. I was satisfied 
that, if he was consulted, he 
would not permit it to be sent. 
Though indignant at the eom-se 
of the Southern States and the 
men about him who had betrayed 
his confidence,— Cobb, Floyd, 
and others, — one leading idea 
had taken possession of his mind, 
that in the ei\il contest which 
threatened to break out, the 
North must not shed the first 
di-op of blood. This idea is the 
key to his submission to much 
which should have been met with 
prompt and vigorous resistance. 
... I said nothing to the Presi- 
dent in regard to it, though he 
was with me every evening, until 
Friday, when the members of the 
Cabinet were all assembled, and 
the President was about to call 
our attention to the business of 
the day. I said to him, ' Mr. 



President, I fear we have lost 
some more of oiir revenue-cut- 
ters.' 'Ah!' said he, 'how is 
that ? ' I then told him what had 
occurred down to the receipt of 
the dispatch fi'om Mr. Jones in- 
forming me that Captain Bresh- 
wood refused to obey my order. 
'Well,' said he, 'what did you 
do?' I then repeated to him, 
slowly and distinctly, the order 
I had sent. Wlien I came to the 
words ' Shoot him on the spot,' 
he started suddenly, and said, 
with a good deal of emotion, 
' Did you wi-ite that ? ' ' No, sir,' 
I said, ' I did not write it, but I 
telegraphed it.' He made no an- 
swer ; nor do I remember that he 
ever referred to it afterward. It 
was manifest, as I had pre-sup- 
posed, that the order would never 
have been given if I had con- 
sulted him."- — John A. Dix to 
Mrs. Blodgett, March 31, 1865. 
Morgan Dix, Vol. I., pp. 372-3. 



Dix to 

Hemphill 

Jones, .Ian. 

29, 1861. 



1861. 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



CHAP. X. 



Ex-Secre- 
tary 
Toueey, 
Testimony 
befor<! the 
Hale Com- 
mittee, 
Nov.18,1861. 



Gen. Scott 

to Floyd, 

Dec. 28, 1800. 

W. R. Vol. 

I., p. 112. 



1861. 



Pennsylvania, " prepared at every personal risk to 
do his duty." It was a praiseworthy assertion 
of authority, and remains a valuable precedent, 
though by the failure of the expedition his con- 
firmation was rendered useless. Three ships of 
war were ordered to Pensacola to protect the navy 
yard there, and a little later a company of regulars 
was dispatched in the sloop-of-war Brooklyn to 
reenforce Fort Pickens at the same place; an 
expedition which connects itself with other epi- 
sodes to be more particularly noticed hereafter. 

G-eneral Scott had vainly urged upon Floyd the 
reenforcement of the two great national forts at 
the extreme southern point of Florida. " There is 
only a feeble company at Key West," he wrote, 
" for the defense of Fort Taylor, and not a soldier 
in Fort Jefferson to resist a handful of fiUibusters 
or a row-boat of pirates." Repeated to the new 
Cabinet, this suggestion was quickly heeded. " By 
the aid of Secretary Holt (a strong and loyal man) 
I obtained permission [January 4] to send succor 
to the feeble garrison of Fort Taylor, Key West, 
and at the same time a company — Major Arnold's 
from Boston — to occupy Fort Jefferson, Tortugas 
Island. If this company had been three days 
later, the fort would have been pre-occupied by 
Floridians. It is known the rebels had their eyes 
upon those powerful forts, which govern the com- 
merce of the Mexican Gulf as Gibraltar and Malta 
govern that of the Mediterranean. With forts 
Jefferson and Taylor, the rebels might have pur- 
chased an early European recognition." 

With the rising excitement came multiplied calls 
for military protection. The superintendent of the 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 



135 



arsenal at Harper's Ferry wrote that ho had reason 
to apprehend an assault. A picked company of 
sixty-eight men was immediately ordered there 
from Carlisle Barracks. So, too, in consequence of 
various warnings, a company of recruits was sent 
to reenforce Fort McHenry, at Baltimore; others 
to Fort Delaware ; and defensive preparations were 
begun at Fort Monroe. 

Tidings also came of insurrectionary designs upon 
the arsenal at St. Louis, Missouri. Recognizing at 
once the value of early precaution in that quarter, 
the officer commanding the Department of the West 
received from Gleneral Scott very explicit orders on 
the 26th of January. That important depot con- 
tained at the time 60,000 stands of improved arms, 
one and a half millions of ball cartridges, and 90,000 
pounds of powder, several field-pieces and siege- 
guns, and various supplies, all entirely unprotected. 
The officer in immediate charge was, there is 
reason to suspect, then meditating its surrender 
to the conspiring State authorities. Obeying the 
urgent instructions of the G-eneral-in-Chief, Gen- 
eral Harney rapidly concentrated troops, until, 
by the 19 th of February, there were nearly five 
hundred men, regulars and recruits, at the arsenal. 
Among these, it is interesting to note, were Cap- 
tain Nathaniel Lyon and his company. His pres- 
ence proved invaluable in insuring its final safety ; 
and a few months later he rendered conspicuous 
service to the Union in the unfolding drama of 
civil war. 

More important, however, than any of the fore- 
going were certain combined measures to secure 
the peace and safety of Washington city, namely. 



Chap. X. 



Thomas, 
Assistant 
Acljiitaut- 
Geueral, to 
Gen. Har- 
ney, Jan 
26, 1801. 
W. R. VoL 
I., Series 
III., p. 69. 



Gen. Frost 
to Gov. 
Jackson, 

Jan. 24, 1861. 
James 

Peckliam, 

" Life of 

Lyon," 

p. 43. 



Williams 
to Lyon, 
Jan. 29, 1861. 
W. R. VoL 
I., Series 
III., p. 76. 



Ldb ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. X. the enlistment and organization of the volunteer 
militia of the District of Columbia, the concentra- 
tion at the national capital of all the regular troops 
which could be spared, and the appointment of a 
Congi'essional Committee of Investigation. In the 
early days of January, 1861, there was universal 
excitement and alarm in Washington. The con- 
spiracy had already made gigantic strides, and 
popular apprehension outstripped it. The signs 
of revolution were multiplying. The rash action 
of South Carolina had become contagious. States 
were seceding. Delegations were retiring from 
Congress with ostentation. Forts, arsenals, and 
custom-houses in the South were being seized. 
Army and navy officers, of Southern birth and 
kinship, were resigning to join the rebellion. On 
the other hand, these movements produced their 
inevitable counterpart in an eager awakening, an 
increased vigilance, and a sterner patriotic de- 
termination among the people of the Northern 
States. 

The national capital was the natural focus of all 
this excitement. Here were the representatives of 
the whole land; daily Congressional debates; nightly 
caucuses of both parties ; an unusual congregation 
of prominent politicians to seek or render informa- 
tion ; Eumor with her busy tongue, and Intrigue 
with her secret mask. On the whole, Washington 
was loyal from prudence and interest, but disloyal 
through personal association and the attraction of 
social influence. For many years the cotton mag- 
nates had given the political tone in Congress, while 
their wives and daughters held sway in society. 
For the moment, the capital seemed to lean towards 



THE NATIONAIi DEFENSE 



137 



secession. Truculent harangues in Congress were 
applauded from the well-filled galleries, and the 
most daring of the fire-eaters were feasted and flat- 
tered. So strong was the Southern drift of local 
sentiment, that the Federal city began to be con- 
fidently looked upon by the conspirators as the 
prospective capital of a Southern confederacy.^ 
Nothing seemed wanting to the early consumma- 
tion of such a scheme but the secession of Virginia 
and Maryland, of which the signs were becoming 
only too abundant. And reasoning from this to 
plausible consequences, the coolest heads began to 
fear a popular outbreak to seize upon the buildings 
and archives of the Government, and, as a final 
result, forcibly to prevent the inauguration of the 
President-elect. 

Such was the state of things when the Cabinet 
regime came into power, and this danger formed 
the subject of their earlier discussions. The Presi- 
dent affected not to share these apprehensions. 
Nevertheless he acknowledged his duty and pur- 
pose to preserve the peace, and authorized the neces- 
sary precautions. On the 9th of January, Colonel 
Charles P. Stone, chosen for that duty by Greneral 
Scott, submitted a memorandum in which he 
sketched a plan for the defense of Washington, 
which was adopted, and under which Colonel Stone 

1 The cue for this kind of talk cedes fi-om the Union and joins 



Chap. X. 



had been given by Iverson, of 
Georgia, in a speech in the 
Senate, December 11, 1860, 
which was greeted by "laughter 
and applause in the galleries " 



us, as she ought to do in my 
humble conception, and a South- 
ern confederacy be formed, of all 
the slave States, I see no reason 
why Washington City should not 



"But, sir, so far as the District be continued the capital of the 



of Columbia is concerned, I want 
to say to the people here in all 
kindness, that if Maryland se- 



Southern confederacy," etc., etc. 
— " Globe," December 11, 1860, 
p. 51. 



Buchanan, 
Special 

Mcssase, 
Jan. 8, 18G1. 

Holt, Re- 
port, Feb. 

18, 1861. 
W. R. Vol. 

I., Series 
III., p. 399. 



138 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. X. was appointed inspector-general and ordered to 

organize and drill the militia of the District of 

Columbia. This duty he faithfully discharged, and 

1861. on the 5th of February following reported the 

stone, Re- existcuce of some fourteen volunteer companies, 

port, Feb. // i • 

w V^'^voi constituting a total of 925 men, which can be at 
iii.?p"36. once called into service " ; adding also, " the number 
of volunteers for service can be doubled within seven 
days, with proper facilities." These volunteers dis- 
tinctly avowed Union sentiments, and enlisted to 
serve and defend the Government. Colonel Stone 
fully depended upon them ; and their enrollment 
gave great support to the sentiment of loyalty in 

Gen. Scott, - 

Testimony the communitv. 

before the •' 

seiecj: Not Underrating either the moral or military aid 

Committee ~ •' 

HouS^e- of raw levies of militia. General Scott was never- 
^a^sef^ou," theless too experienced a soldier to rely exclusively 
g?els,^x°o. upon them in an emergency. He therefore obtained 
the President's consent to concentrate at the capital 
available regular forces to the number of eight com- 
panies, a total of about 480 men, comprising four 
companies of artillery acting as infantry, three 
companies of horse artillery or flying artiller}-, and 
a company of sappers and miners, " very superior 
Ibid., p. 61. soldiers," from West Point, ordinarily employed 
there to illustrate practical engineering. It was a 
difficult matter to scrape together this little force, 
even for so vital a service. There were threats and 
dangers in all directions. " I was opposed to strip- 
ping the sea-board so extensively of troops as it has 
been stripped of them. I did not think it was neces- 
sary," said the general, though " these troops were 
not drawn off from any exposed frontier. . . I have 
brought three companies from Kansas. One com- 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 139 

pany has been brought from Plattsburgh in the State chap. x. 
of New York. A company that was driven out of 
the arsenal at Baton Rouge will be here, . . A com- 
pany from the arsenal at Augusta, Georgia, . . . 
and we bring two companies from West Point, 
making eight companies in all." With these regu- 
lars the general felt secure. " I regarded the local 
militia as insufficient to meet any serious danger," 
said he. " Under a shower of brickbats and stones 
you can rarely prevent militia from firing. You 
cannot prevent any new troops from doing so, Gen.scott, 

1 .1 n .1 1 .,.,. -.- , Testimony 

whether you call them regulars or mihtia. I do not before the 

■' ^ . *-■ Select 

like to deal in important cases with men who cannot ^o "Mve^^ 
be relied upon to stand and wait for orders," whereas po^"! No^k 
with these companies he thought he could " perhaps ^^efh cou"' 
go through scenes of extreme peril and not fire a Kid^To'. 
gun or shed a drop of blood." 

Edwin M. Stanton, appointed Attorney-G-eneral 
on the 20th of December, was, with his ardent and iseo. 
l^ositive natui'e, one of the most energetic and un- 
compromising Unionists in the Cabinet. For him, 
the expulsion of Floyd, the reenforcement of 
Sumter, and the other military precautions hastily 
ordered were not sufficient. Chafing under the 
President's painful tardiness, he tm*ned to Con- 
gress as a means for exposing and thwarting the 
intrigues of the conspirators. His presence in the 
Cabinet at the date of the South Carolina secession, 
the Sumter transfer, the commissioners' \dsit, and 
his prominent participation in affairs since the 
Cabinet crisis, had unveiled to him the most search- 
ing official and confidential \aew possible to be 
obtained. He realized fully how narrowly the 
President had escaped the disgrace of ordering 



140 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. X. Anderson back to Moultrie, and how seriously he 
had compromised his dignity and the authority of 
the nation in even unofficially receiving the rebel 
commissioners. He evidently had no abiding faith 
in the President's firmness. Sacrificing his party 
attachments to the paramount demands of national 
safety, he now placed himself in confidential corre- 
spondence with Republican leaders in Congress, 
giving and receiving advice as to the best means 
of preserving the Government. 

1861. The 8th day of January, being a patriotic anni- 

versary, was chosen by Mr. Buchanan to address 
Congress in the special message heretofore quoted, 
transmitted to that body on the 9th. As before, 
it contained a characteristic mixture of true and 
false logic, of hopeful assertion of purpose, and of 
shirking excuse. Declaring in one breath his in- 
tention to " collect the public revenues and protect 
the public property," he avowed in the next a vir- 
tual abdication of all power and duty, commending 
the existing " revolution " to Congress, and assert- 
ing: "On them, and on them alone, rests the re- 

1860. sponsibility." In his annual message (December 3) 
he had advocated the recognition and protection of 
property in slaves " in all the common Territories 
throughout their territorial existence." From this 
extreme Southern demand he now so far receded 
as to recommend a compromise "by letting the 
North have exclusive control of the territory above 
a certain line, and to give Southern institutions 
protection below that line." 

This state paper is cited here to notice another 
point. It submitted, without comment, the late 
correspondence between the President and the 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 141 

rebel commissioners.^ No sooner had this special chai'. x. 
message been read in the House than Mr. Howard, 
of Michigan, arose and offered a resolution to ap- 
point a committee of five to make immediate in- 
quiry " whether any executive officer of the United 
States has been or is now treating or holding com- 
munication with any j)erson or persons concerning 
the surrender of any forts, fortresses, or public 
property of the United States. . . Whether any 
officer of this Government has at any time entered 
into any pledge, agreement, or understanding with 
any person or persons not to send any reenforce- 
ments to the forts of the United States in the har- "oiobe," 
bor of Charleston," etc. Sundiy other energetic p'. 295. 
investigations were also included. 

Such proposals are ordinarily mere partisan ma- 
noeuvi'es, but this one had a deeper significance. 
Confidence in Mr. Buchanan was utterly gone ; and 
this resolution, so pointedly questioning the Presi- 
dent's dealings with treason, was immediately 
passed by more than a two-thirds vote — Republi- 
cans, Douglas Democrats, and Southern conserva- 
tives uniting in its support, showing the most 
hopeful reaction against the conspiracy yet mani- 
fested by either House of Congress. The Com- 
mittee was appointed, and Mr. Howard, an able 
and prudent man, made chairman. He has left us 
an interesting history of its origin and purpose. 
"That Committee was raised at the request of 
loyal members of the Cabinet. The resolutions 
came from them, and were placed in my hands 

1 Excepting the commissioners' Jefferson Davis had supplied this 
final rejoinder, which the Presi- document in the Senate debate, 
dent had refused to receive ; but as already stated. 



142 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. X. 



Howard to 

Attorney- 
General 
Hoar, Feb. 

7, 1870. 

Cited in the 

"Atlantic," 

Oct., 1870, 

p. 467. 



with a request that I would oifer them, and thus 
become, if they should pass, chairman of the Com- 
mittee. At first I refused to assume so fearful a 
responsibility. But, being urged to do so by Mem- 
bers and Senators, I at last consented, on condition 
that the Speaker would allow me to nominate two 
members of the Committee. I selected Mr. Dawes, 
of Massachusetts, and Mr. Reynolds, of New York. 
Mr. Reynolds was elected as a Democrat, but he 
was true as steel and a good lawyer. I do not 
know that Mr. Stanton wrote the resolutions cre- 
ating the Committee. I did not see him write 
them. I never heard him say he wrote them. It 
would be easier, however, to persuade me that Mr. 
Jefferson did not write the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence than that Mr. Stanton did not write those 
resolutions." 

With this Committee Mr. Stanton, and perhaps 
other members of the Cabinet, continued in confi- 
dential relation and cooperation.^ This has been 
characterized as disrespect and treachery to their 



1 " In regard to February, 
1861, I need only say that at 
the time the secession leaders 
were all in the Senate and House, 
with power enough, and only 
wanting an excuse to get up a 
resistance in the capital to the 
declaration of Mr. Lincoln's elec- 
tion and to his inauguration ; in 
other words, to have excuse and 
opportunity to open the civil war 
here before the new Administra- 
tion and new Congress could be 
in authority to subdue it. I de- 
sired to avoid giving them that 
advantage. I conferred through- 
out with General Scott, and Mr. 
Stanton, then in Mr. Buchanan's 



Cabinet. I presume I conversed 
with others in a way that seemed 
to me best calculated to leave the 
inauguration of a war to the se- 
cessionists, and to delay it, in 
any case, until the new Adminis- 
tration should be in possession of 
the Government. . . On the 2 2d 
of February, in concert with Mr. 
Stanton, I caused the United 
States flag to be displayed 
throughout all the northern and 
westei'n portions of the United 
States."— William H. Seward to 
Schouler, June 13, 1867. Wil- 
liam Sehouler, "Massachusetts 
in the Civil War," Vol. L, pp. 41, 
42. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 143 

chief ; but iu the face of Mr. Buchanan's repeated cuai-. x. 
neglect, and avowed impotence to resist open in- 
surrection, the act seems laudable. Thus organized 
and informed, the Howard Committee became a 
committee of safety and observation, quite as much 
as of investigation. Its labors took a wide range, 
and after the lapse of some weeks it submitted 
five different reports. A majority of its members 
recommended: 1. A bill to call forth the whole 
militia to defend and recover forts and other Grov- 
ernment property. 2. A bill to close insurrection- 
ary ports. 3. A resolution to censure Secretary 
Toucey for having precipitately accepted resigna- 
tions of navy officers ; the report also strongly criti- 
cizing his failure to call home the navy to put down 
insurrection. 4. A resolution declaring the Presi- 
dent had no power to negotiate with the rebel 
commissioners — the report declaring that "with 
full knowledge that the authority of the Govern- 
ment has been set at defiance, its dignity insulted, 
and its flag dishonored, he yet negotiates with 
treason and commits the Government to a partial 
recognition of the revolutionary movement for its 
destruction." A final report by the chaii-man also 
ably refutes the President's theories concerning 
secession, declaring : " Nor can there be any heed 
given to any one of the false and deceitful issues 
attempted to be raised, such as coercing a State — 
making war upon a State. All these pleas are fal- 
lacious, deceitful, and false, if not traitorous." 

Towards the end of January the Committee had, isei. 
by an additional resolution, been directed to inves- 
tigate the rumored plot to seize the capital. After 
examining many and prominent witnesses they re- 



144 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. X. ported (February 14) that they had found no sub- 
'^^^- stantial proof of such a combination, though the 
project had been frequently discussed. This in- 
vestigation and report had a twofold effect. It 
quieted the apprehensions of the timid, at the same 
time that it afforded a warning to mischief-makers 
that the authorities were alert and that such an 
enterprise would be extremely hazardous. 

Could the events of the next three months have 
been foreseen the testimony elicited would have 
been more critically scanned and the witnesses 
more thoroughly examined. Though the plot 
against Washington and any intent to resist the 
inauguration of Mr. Lincoln were stoutly denied, 
there were ample admissions of the public uneasi- 
ness, of the widespread disaffection to the Govern- 
ment, of the existence of a belief and hope in the 
speedy establishment of a Southern confederacy, 
of significant talk in prominent quarters of buying 
the public buildings for its use, of military organi- 
zations in Baltimore and the country towns of 
Maryland, of caucuses to precipitate secession 
there, and of a determination to initiate it by such 
a pressure upon Governor Hicks of that State, 
hitherto firmly loyal, as would compel him to con- 
vene its Legislature. In fact, the precise condition 
of things which bred the Baltimore riots in the fol- 
lowing April is already clearly portrayed in this 
testimony taken in January. 

While the Howard Committee was yet pursuing 
its investigations, and as the day for counting the 
Presidential vote approached, General Scott re- 
quested permission from the Secretary of War to 
bring several additional companies of regulars 




JOSKl'}! HOI.T. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 145 

from Fort Monroe to be replaced by recruits. This chap. x. 
would augment his regulars to some seven hun- [;f/|;^'^^^.*- 
dred men, which, with the police and the militia, ^':*^;j,,^f. 
he deemed sufficient for all contingencies. Before w!*k!**yoi. 
the day arrived a confidential arrangement of sig- iii.'.p"*;?. 
nals was communicated to the officers, the regular ^to'cx^ov" 
troops being placed under command of Colonel jifu^nTisei. 
Harvey Brown. General instructions were issued 
also, in strict confidence, and to officers alone. The <-t';|-, ?™^ 
militia were charged with the care of the various ""n^'ig^fl'- 
bridges of the Potomac ; the regulars were already ^"• 
stationed at convenient points in the city, and mi- 
nute orders were given. " The several companies 
and detachments will have their arms and ac- 
couterments so arranged that, by day or night, 
each man can at once seize his own." The har- 

Lorenzo 

ness and guns were to be ready for prompt service. Thomas,^ 
In case of alarm, every man was to proceed in- ^^iJ*^^f 
stantly to a designated place : the artillery to their f^"ueSS 
stables; the infantry to their parade gi'ounds; wl'ij.^'yoi: 
while mounted messengers were ready to convey ni., p. so. 
news to, and orders from, the General-in-Chief. 

Happily no alarm occurred. On the 13th of isei. 
February, an unusually large and brilliant throng 
filled the galleries of the House of Representatives 
to witness the proceedings of the Presidential 
count. Vice-President Breckinridge, one of the 
defeated candidates, presided over the joint con- 
vention of the two Houses ; Senator Douglas, an- 
other, was on the floor, and moved to dispense with 
certain tedious routine. The sealed returns of the 
electoral votes, cast by the chosen colleges of the 
several States on the 5th of December, were opened iseo. 
and registered. The tellers officially declared the 
Vol. III.— 10 



146 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. X. result already known, viz. : That Lincoln had re- 
ceived 180 votes ; Breckinridge, 72 ; Bell, 39 ; Doug- 
las, 12. Vice-President Breckinridge thereupon 
announced that "Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, 
having received a majority of the whole number 
of electoral votes, is elected President of the United 

" Globe," states for four years commencing the 4th of March, 

Feb. 13, 1861, -f Qp-, ,, 
pp. 893, 894. loDl. 

Elsewhere we have shown that Mr, Lincoln was 
the indisputable choice of the American people in 
the Presidential election of 1860, for the reason 
that if the whole voting strength of the three 
opposing parties had been united upon a single 
candidate, Lincoln would nevertheless have been 
chosen with only a trifling diminution of his elec- 
toral majority. In the proceedings narrated above 
has been set forth the complementary fact that his 
election progressed through every stage of legal 
procedure, verification, and attestation, recognized 
and unchallenged, until at its close the principal 
opposing candidate himself presided over the final 
inquest and formality, and by official proclamation 
became the witness of Lincoln's complete constitu- 
tional and legal right to exercise the powers and 
duties of the Presidential office. 

With the official count of the electoral votes thus 
safely and peacefully completed, the next point 
of possible danger was the inauguration; and 
Secretary Holt and General Scott wisely deter- 
mined to keep all available troops in Washing- 
ton, in order that that public ceremonial might 
also be accomplished without disturbance, and 
with its usual simple pageantry. To the seces- 
sionists the presence of this slight military force 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 147 

had been from the first the occasion of angiy ob- chai-. x. 
jection. " Here, sir," said De Jarnette in the House 
of Representatives on the 10th of January, "in isgi. 
sight of her [Virginia's] own blue hills, in sight of 
the tomb of Washington, is this ungrateful son 
[General Scott] planning his campaign and plant- 
ing his batteries for her subjugation." " I suggest," 
said Hindman, on the day of the Presidential count, 
" that the same committee [the committee to wait 
on the President-elect] be directed to inform Gen- 
eral Scott that there is no further need for his jani- 
zaries about the Capitol, the votes being counted 
and the result proclaimed." The next day, Feb- 
ruary 14, Mr. Branch, member of the Select Com- 
mittee of Five, offered a resolution declaring the 
quartering of troops around the Capitol "im- 
politic and offensive," and that they ought to be ..cnohe," 
removed. Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, had, on ^''p/gla!^^^' 
February 11, offered an amendment asking the 
President "the reasons that have induced him to j,ji^i 
assemble a large number of troops in this city, ^"^pH^^"^^' 
and why they are kept here." The amendment 
passed the House, and being sent to President 
Buchanan, was by him referred to the Secretary of 
War. Mr. Holt replied, on the 18th of February, in 
a long and vigorous report to the President, telling 
the plotters against the Government more salutary 
truth about the secession movement than they 
had been accustomed to hear from the Executive 
Department. 

Its history is a history of surprises and treacheries 
and ruthless spoliations. The forts of the United States 
have been captured and garrisoned, and hostile flags 
unfurled upon their ramparts. Its arsenals have been 



148 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. X. seized, and the vast amount of public arms they con- 
tained appropriated to the use of the captors, while more 
than half a million of dollars found in the mint at New 
Orleans has been unscrupulously applied to replenish the 
coifers of Louisiana. Officers in command of revenue 
cutters of the United States have been prevailed on to 
violate their trust and surrender the property in their 
charge, and instead of being branded for their crimes, 
they and the vessels they betrayed have been cordially 
received into the service of the seceded States. These 
movements were attended by yet more discouraging in- 
dications of immorality. It was generally believed that 
this revolution was guided and urged on by men occupying 
the highest positions in the public service, and who, with 
the responsibilities of an oath to support the Constitu- 
tion still resting upon their consciences, did not hesitate 
secretly to plan and openly to labor for the dismember- 
ment of the republic whose honors they enjoyed and 
upon whose treasury they were living. . . 

At what time the armed occupation of Washington 
City became a part of the revolutionary programme is not 
certainly known. . . The earnest endeavors made by men 
known to be devoted to the revolution, to hurry Virginia 
and Maryland out of the Union, were regarded as pre- 
paratory steps for the subjugation of Washington. . . 
Superadded to these proofs were the oft-repeated declara- 
tions of men in high political positions here, and who 
were known to have intimate affiliations with the revolu- 
tion, if, indeed, they did not hold its reins in their hands, 
to the effect that Mr. Lincoln would not or should not 
be inaugurated at Washington. . . Impressed by these 
circumstances and considerations, I earnestly besought 
you to allow the concentration at this city of a sufficient 
military force to preserve the public peace from all the 
dangers that seemed to threaten it. . . 

To those, if such there be, who desire the destruction 
of the republic, the presence of these troops is neces- 
sarily offensive ; but those who sincerely love our insti- 
tutions cannot fail to rejoice that by this timely precau- 
tion they have possibly escaped the deep dishonor which 
they must have suffered had the capital, like the forts 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 149 

and arsenals of the South, fallen into the hands of chap. x. 
revolutionists, who have found this great Government iioitto 

weak only beeause, in the exhaustless benefieeiKie of its Ffji). iMnei'. 

spirit, it has refused to strike, even in its own defense, ^i:/scriy.H'' 
lest it should be the aggressor. "Wol 

But Mr. Buchanan's nerves were too weak for 
such a healthy response to Mr. Burnett's resolution, .^uf^^of 
and thouofh Mr. Holt, on February 20, wrote him Tiv'^voi. 
a private note, askmg that his report should be 493. 
allowed to reach the country " simply as the views 
entertained by the War Department," even this 
request was not granted by the timid President, 
who substituted for it a very mild special message, ibid.,p.494. 
the transmittal of which he delayed till Saturday, 
March 2, and Mr. Holt's report did not come to the 
public until specially called for by a House resolu- 
tion of July 27, 1861. 

Meanwhile Representative Daniel E. Sickles, of 
New York, had offered a resolution providing for 
celebrating Washington's birthday in the Hall of 
Representatives, which the House passed, after 
changing it by an amendment to recommend to the 
people of the United States to keep the 22d of Feb- 
ruary as a national holiday. Secretary Holt and Gen- 
eral Scott naturally took advantage of the occasion 
to make a military display, which they specially de- 
sired for its political influence, being determined 
to show plotting secessionists as much of the pomp 
and circumstance of war as their very slender 
resources in soldiers would allow. A grand parade 
of flying artillery, of infantry, of the marine corps, 
of every scrap and detachment in the city was 
therefore arranged. On the afternoon of the 21st 
Secretary Holt issued the necessary orders therefor. 



150 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. X. and having sent them to the " National Intelli- 
gencer" with injunctions to be properly published, 
left the department at an early hour and went to 
his dinner. 

Ex-President Tyler was at this time in Washing- 
ton in attendance on the Peace Convention, of 
which we shall speak hereafter, and was making 
himself officious in spying out and thwarting mili- 
tary demonstrations in support of the Government ; 
and he now hurried to the Executive Mansion to 
protest against this parade. About 8 o'clock that 
night Secretary Holt was surprised to receive a 
visit from President Buchanan, who, after some 
casual talk, formally requested his Secretary of 
War to revoke the orders to the Federal troops to 
join in the following day's celebration. Holt ex- 
pressed his unfeigned regret. " However," said he, 
"you are the Commander-in-Chief of the army 
and navy, and your wishes in the matter must be 
obeyed. But I greatly fear that the notices have 
been printed, and that it will be impossible to re- 
call them ; nevertheless, I will do all I can to that 
end." 

The revocation was duly communicated to the 
officers, but could not reach the public, for, as Holt 
explained, the notices had been printed; and on 
1861. the morning of the 22d the streets of Washington 
showed an unusual degree of activity. The fever- 
ish state of the public mind, the notice of the pa- 
rade, and the prompt appearance on the streets of 
companies of the District militia, whose movements 
the President's order did not affect, drew out a 
large concourse of people. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 



151 



Secretary Holt was sitting at his desk in the chap. x. 
War Department about 10 or 11 o'clock in the 
forenoon conversing with the President, who had 
come to him on some business, when Mr. Sickles, 
the author of the House resolution for the ob- 
servance of Washington's birthday, brushing un- 
ceremoniously past the ushers, rushed into the 
room and said : " Mr. President, there are ten 
thousand people out on the streets of Washington . 
to-day to see the parade which was announced, 
and I have just heard that it has been counter- 
manded, and the report is exciting great indigna- 
tion; I came to ask whether it is true, and if so 
whether the parade may not yet be carried out." 
The President, by this time ashamed of what he 
had done, turned to Secretary Holt and said to 
him : "Mr. Secretary, can't you get up this parade ?" 
Mr. Holt promised to try, and hurried to General 
Scott with the new direction, who was, as might 
have been expected, also indignant. " What can 
we do at this late hour ? " asked he. " The officers 
have gone home, and the men are probably scat- versation^ 
tered." " Well," said Holt, " do the very best you Personal 

^^ ^ T 1 •^ 1 T Meiiioran- 

can, and let us make all the display possible." In da. ms. 
the afternoon the parade, though diminished in pro- 
portions, took place, the column marching past the 
Executive Mansion, where Buchanan, Scott, Holt, 
and so much of the Cabinet as still remained loyal 
appeared and received the marching salute. An 
official record of the incident might have been lost 
to history had not Mr. Buchanan on the same day 
felt it necessary to write a formal note to Tyler, 
excusing himself for changing his mind and his 



152 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. X. 



orders, and apologizing for having permitted the 
army and navy to carry the flag of the Union 
thi'ough the streets of the national capital on 
Washington's birthday.-^ 



1 the president to mr. tyler. 

"Washington, 
"February 22, 1S61. 

"My Dear Sir: I find it im- 
possible to prevent two or three 
companies of the Federal troops 
here from joining in the proces- 
sion to-day with the volunteers 
of the District, without giving 
serious offense to the tens of 
thousands of the people who 
have assembled to witness the 
parade. The day is the anniver- 
sary of Washington's birth, — a 
festive occasion throughout the 
land, — and it has been particu- 
larly marked by the House of 
Representatives. These troops 



everyTvhere else join such pro- 
cessions, in honor of the birth- 
day of the Father of his country, 
and it would be hard to assign a 
good reason why they should be 
excluded from this privilege in 
the capital founded by himself. 
They are here simply as a j^osse 
coniitatus to aid the civil author- 
ity in case of need. Besides, 
the programme was published in 
the 'National Intelligencer' of 
this morning without my knowl- 
edge. 

"From your friend, 
" Very respectfully, 

" James Buchanan." 

[Curtis, " Life of Buchanan," 
Vol. IL, p. 495.] 



CHAPTER XI 

THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TRUCE 

HAVING briefly grouped together the more chap. xi. 
important measures of defense adopted by 
the Cabinet regime, we must recapitulate the events 
ah'eady described, namely : the firing on the Star of 
the West and her retreat; Anderson's threat of 
retaliation and his failure to keep it; Grovernor 
Pickens's demand for the surrender of Sumter and 
Anderson's refusal ; Anderson's proposal to refer 
the question to Washington and the Grovernor's 
acceptance ; and finally the departure of the two 
messengers, who arrived in Washington on the 
evening of January 13. The Star of the West im\. 
had returned to New York ; and the commander 
of the unfortunate expedition was on the same 
day writing his official report. 

Colonel I. W. Hayne, the Governor's envoy, called 
on President Buchanan on the following day, the 
14th. The President, doubtless already fully in- 
formed by Anderson's messenger, appears to have 
made no difficulty about receiving him in an "in- 
formal and unofficial " interview ; he declined, how- 
ever, to hold any conversation with him, and insisted 
that their transactions must be in writing. Colonel 
Hayne thereupon gave him notice that he " bore a 



154 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XI. 

Hsiyno to 
Buchauan, 
Jan.3l,18Gl. 
House Re- 
port, No. 91. 
Select Com- 
mittee of 
Five. 2d 
Session, 
36tli Con- 
gress, p. 64. 



Pickens to 
Buchanan, 
Jan.l2,18f;i. 
Ibid., p. 70. 



Buchanan 
to the Com- 
missioners, 
Dec.31,1860. 
W. R. Vol. 
I., p. 118. 



letter from the Governor of South Carolina in re- 
gard to the occupation of Fort Sumter," and that 
he would deliver it the next day. 

Remembering the advantage he had hitherto de- 
rived from his tone of audacity, Governor Pickens 
persevered in the use of this favorite and usually 
successful weapon. " I have determined to send to 
you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-General of 
South Carolina, and have instructed him to demand 
the delivery of Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charles- 
ton to the constituted authorities of the State of 
South Carolina. The demand I have made of Major 
Anderson, and which I now make of you, is suggested 
because of my earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed 
which a persistence in your attempt to retain pos- 
session of that fort will cause and which will be 
unavailing to secure to you that possession." Such 
was the language of the Governor's letter to the 
President, adding at the close that South Carolina 
would account for the value of the fort. It had been 
the unremitting effort of the conspirators to reduce 
the controversy to a question of dollars and cents, 
and in this they were much encouraged by the 
language of the President himself, who in his reply 
to the rebel commissioners had placed his action on 
no higher grounds than that it was his " duty to 
defend Fort Sumter as a portion of the public prop- 
erty of the United States." 

Meanwhile the occniTcnces at Charleston and 
Hayne's mission had been the subject of a confer- 
ence by the Senators from the Cotton States yet in 
Washington. Not anticipating a reenforcement of 
Sumter, but trusting in the peaceful consummation 
of their scheme of secession, they had determined, 



THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TRUCE 155 

in a caucus on January 5, " that the States should cuai-. xi. 
go out at once and provide for an early organization 
of a confederate government not later than 15th 
Februaiy," while they themselves proposed to remain 
in Congress until the 4th of March to " keep the Yniee to 
hands of Mr. Buchanan tied," and defeat hostile jan!"^^!. 
legislation. But events were crowding them. They l,p'. 443!' 
had not entirely succeeded in keeping " the hands 
of Mr. Buchanan tied." Reenforcement had been 
attempted despite their vigilance and intrigue. A 
second elfort might succeed. Thompson had been 
driven out of the Cabinet. And now Governor 
Pickens's rashness was about to precipitate hostili- 
ties and rouse the North. They sent a messenger Hayne to 
to Colonel Hayne to remonstrate against this hot jln*;3i^,LSfii'. 
haste, which might expose their web of conspiracy port! no. 91. 
to the shock of sudden war. They desired delay setii'con-' 

gress, pp. 

until they could consult more fully, and devise fur- 64, 65. 
ther means to " keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan 
tied." 

Colonel Hayne, having readily joined in their 
scheme, did not deliver the Governor's letter to the 
President as he had appointed. Instead thereof, and 
on the same day, ten of the Senators from the States 
of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, 
and Texas prepared an open letter to Colonel Hayne. 
In diplomatic phrases they requested him to delay 
the delivery of the Governor's letter to the Presi- 
dent. They had assurances, they said, that Sumter 
was held with no hostile or unfriendly purpose, but 
" merely as property of the United States." " We 
represent States," they continued, " which have 
already seceded from the United States, or will 
have done so before the 1st of February next, and 



156 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XL wMch will meet youi' State in convention on or be- 
fore the 15th of that month. Our people feel that 
they have a common destiny with your people, and 
expect to form with them, in that convention, a 
new confederation and provisional government. 
We must and will share your fortunes — suffering 
with you the evils of war, if it cannot be avoided, 
and enjoying with you the blessings of peace if it 
can be preserved. . . We therefore trust that an 
arrangement will be agreed upon between you and 
the President, at least till the 15th of February 
next, by which time your and our States may in 
convention devise a wise, just, and peaceable solu- 
tion of existing difficulties. . . If not clothed with 
power to make such an arrangement, then we trust 
that you will submit our suggestions to the Gov- 
ernor of your State for his instructions. Until you 

Wifffall and ■,.-,-, 

others to havc rcccivcd and communicated his response to 
"House Re^' ^^^ President, of course your State will not attack 
2d8e^s'ion; Fort Sumtcr, and the President will not offer to 
reenforce it." 

This letter was written on January 15, and to 
give an air of deliberation and dignity to a corre- 
spondence invented purely for the purpose of con- 
suming time, two days were allowed to elapse for 
its pretended consideration. On the 17th Colonel 
Hayne prepared a reply. " I am not clothed with 
power to make the arrangement you suggest," he 
wrote, " but provided you can get assurances with 
which you are entirelj^ satisfied, that no reenforce- 
ments will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, 
and that public peace will not be disturbed by any 
act of hostility towards South Carolina, I will refer 
yom' communication to the authorities. . , If your 



36th Con 
gress, p 



grcss, p. 60. 



THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TR'/CE 157 

proposition is acceded to you may assure the Presi- chai-. xi. 
dent that no attack will be made on Fort Sumter ^°^^^Ximi 
until a response from the Grovernor of South Caro- *'^i;','i^^/^°- 
lina has been received and communicated to him." portlNo^oi. 

A plain evidence that this whole correspondence 'm\Tcon-' 
was nothing but a scheme of delay is afforded in 
the fact that it took these Senators two days more 
(until January 19) to wi^te a note of half a dozen 
lines, submitting it to the President, and asking 
its consideration. Mr. Buchanan fell easily into 
the trap of dilatory diplomacy. Though un- 
doubtedly bound by Anderson's truce of the 12th, 
of which he received notice on the 13th, he could, 
according to its terms, have ended it by a re- 
turn messenger to Charleston. The Cabinet was 
apparently in a mood to send a second relief expe- 
dition and reenforce Sumter at all hazards; for 
Secretary Black in a forcible letter of inquiry to 
Greneral Scott asked on January 16 : 

What obstacles exist to prevent the sending of such 
reenforcements at any time when it may be necessary to 
do so f . . . Major Anderson has a position so nearly im- 
pregnable that an attack upon him at present is wholly 
improbable and he is supplied with provisions which will 
last him very well for two months. 

In the meantime Fort Sumter is invested on every side 
by the avowedly hostile forces of South Carolina. It is 
in a state of siege. . . If the troops remain in Fort 
Sumter without any change in their condition, and the 
hostile attitude of South Carolina remains as it is now, 
the question of Major Anderson's surrender is one of 
time only. . . The authorities of South Carolina are im- 
proving every moment, and increasing their ability to 
prevent reenforcement every hour, while every day that 
rises sees us with a power diminished to send in the 
requisite relief. . . I am persuaded that the difficidty of 
relieving Major Anderson has been very much magnified 



158 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XI. to the miiids of some persons. . . The Star of the West 
did pass the battery and did overcome the difficulties of 
the navigation, meeting with no serious trouble from 
either cause. They have tried it ; we can say probatum 
est ; and there is an end of the controversy. I am con- 
vinced that a pirate, or a slaver, or a smuggler who could 
be assured of making five hundred dollars by going into 
the harbor in the face of all the dangers which now 
threaten a vessel bearing the American flag, would laugh 
them to scorn. , . Would the South Carolinians dare to 
fii-e upon any vessel which Major Anderson would tell 
them beforehand must be permitted to pass on pain of 
his guns being opened upon her assailants? But sup- 
pose it impossible for an unarmed vessel to pass the 
battery, what is the difficulty of sending the Brooklyn or 
the Macedonian in ? ... I admit that the state of things 

Black to ™^y ^^6 somewhat worse now than they were a week ago, 
jan^ie'ise: '^ ^^'® probably getting worse every day; but is not 
w. R. 'vol. that the strongest reason that can be given for taking 
' 142. time by the forelock ? 

Clearly Secretary Black was in an altogether 
different frame of mind from that in which, as 
Attorney-General, lie penned his famous opinion 
on coercion. If the current of events had educated 
him into a logic so faultless and an enthusiasm so 
eager, it is fair to assume that the patriotic Holt, 
the belligerent Dix, and the impulsive Stanton en- 
tertained substantially identical views. Unfortu- 
nately the contemporary records are very meager. 
There is a dispatch from Holt to Anderson of the 
same date with the letter quoted above. He is 
told that lie rightly designates the firing into the 
Star of the West as an " act of war," without prov- 
ocation. That his " forbearance to return the fire is 
fully approved by the President. . . Your late dis- 
patches, as well as the very intelligent statement 
of Lieutenant Talbot, have relieved the Govern- 



THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TRUCE 159 

ment of the apprehensions previously entertained cuai>. xi. 
for your safety. In consequence it is not its pur- 
pose at present to reenforce you. The attempt to 
do so would no doubt be attended by a collision of 
arms and the effusion of blood — a national calam- 
ity which the President is most anxious if possible 
to avoid. . . Whenever, in your judgment, addi- 
tional supplies or reinforcements are necessary for 
your safety, or for a successful defense of the fort, j^^,^ ^^ 
you will at once communicate the fact to this de- janlifi^isGi. 
partment, and a prompt and vigorous effort will be l, p. uo. ' 
made to forward them." 

This was perhaps as little as could in magnanimity 
be said to a brave and conscientious commander ; 
on the other hand it was doubtless all that could 
be obtained from a President once more taking pj.jQ^e4ijj 
counsel of his fears instead of his duty. "^ifife of 

We learn from Mr. Buchanan's own memoran- .^'/-'^vo'i. 
dum that, on the afternoon of this same 16th of Jan- " 454. "" ' 
uary. Senator Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, called 
upon him on behalf of the seceding Senators, and, 
after some general talk about Fort Sumter, turned 
the conversation upon Major Anderson's truce. Pre- 
mising that there was a truce agreed upon so long 
as Colonel Hayne was there (to which the President 
assented), Clay went on to say that the Senators 
wanted Hayne " to remain a few days and submit a 
proposition to the Government of South Carolina to 
agree that Major Anderson should be placed in his 
former position," and that the truce " might be ex- 
tended until the meeting at Miliedgeviile, or even 
till the 4th of March." Mr. Buchanan replied in 
■substance that he could consider no proposition 
unless it were in writing, that he would not with- 



160 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XI. draw Aiiflerson from Sumter, and that the truce 
would only continue "until Colonel Hayne left 
here, which I supposed would be in a few days." 
The President writes further that "in the course 
of conversation I told him that I felt as much anx- 
iety to prevent a collision and spare the effusion of 
blood as any man living ; but this must be done in 
consistency with the discharge of all my duties as 
laid down in my annual message and my late 
special message." The anxiety of the seceding 
Senators for delay " even till the 4th of March " is 
here plainly admitted. The inference is also irre- 
sistible that the loyal Cabinet members were 
discouraged at finding Mr. Buchanan again in 
communication with the emissary of a Grovernor 
who had wantonly fired on the flag and a cabal of 
conspirators who were about to send him notice of 
their intent to set up a government in rebellion, 
and with sublime effrontery asked him to promise 
them a safeguard for the act. 

The correspondence between the Senators and 
Colonel Hayne was sent to the President. Two 
more days were lost in considering and discuss- 
1861. ing it, and on January 22 he instructed Mr. 
Holt to reply : " The President has no authority to 
enter into such an agreement or understanding; 
as an executive officer he is simply bound to pro- 
tect the public property, so far as this may be prac- 
ticable, and it would be a manifest violation of his 
duty to place himself under engagements that he 
would not perform this duty either for an indefinite 
or a limited period. At the present moment it is 
not deemed necessary to reenforce Major Ander- 
son, because he makes no such request, and feels 




STEPHEN R. MALLORY. 



Holt to 
Fitzpat- 



THE SUMTEE AND PICKENS TRUCE 161 

quite secure in his position. Should his safety, chai-.xi. 
however, require reenforcements, every eti'ort will 
be made to supply them. In regard to an assur- 
ance from the President ' that the public peace will 
not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards 
South Carolina,' the answer will readily occur to 
yourselves. To Congress and to Congress alone 
belongs the power to make war, and it would be 
an act of usurpation for the Executive to give any jl^ry, and 
assurance that Congress would not exercise this %^,im^ 
power, however strongly he may be convinced that l, p. iso. 
no such intention exists." 

Both parties could derive comfort from this re- 
ply: the President that he had rejected the sug- 
gested arrangement " until the 15th of February " ; 
the Senatorial cabal that he had practically granted 
it by entertaining their mediation, in disavowing 
any present intention to reenforce Sumter, and in 
tacitly adopting and indefinitely prolonging Ander- 
son's truce. Neither are we to forget the under- 
current of inter\dews, solicitations, and private 
manipulations which were again working upon 
the scanty courage of President Buchanan. The 
scheme of dilatory diplomacy was succeeding. 
The month of January was rapidly slipping by 
during this parade of etiquette, this interchange 
of request and refusal, this bandying of theory 
and argument. Meantime the tide of rebellion 
was rising day by day. Batteries were building 
at Charleston ; forts were being seized by order of 
the Governors of the Cotton States ; the South was 
becoming a vast camp ; a rebellious military league 
was preparing to unite in provisional government 
at Montgomery, Alabama. 
Vol. III.— 11 



162 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XI. The Senatorial cabal took care to continue and 
prolong the correspondence. They sent Mr. Holt's 
letter to Colonel Hayne, and he in turn went 
through the dumb show of referring it to Charles- 
ton. This communication, he said, was far from 
satisfactory. But since they expressed their con- 

wil&ifanci Mence that Sumter would not be reenforced, nor 

others, Jau. 

HoiiseRe- ^hc pubUc pcacc distm^bed, he would still with- 
^id'Son,' hold the Governor's letter, "and refer the whole 
g^els^^p^'k matter to the authorities of South Carolina." 

Pending the reference, we must notice another 
episode which now combined itself with this Sena- 
torial intrigue. One of the most important naval 
and military stations of the United States was that 
of Pensacola, Florida. Here was a large and valu- 
able navy yard ; near it, on the main land, Fort 
Barrancas, built for a garrison of 250 men, but oc- 
cupied by only a nominal garrison of 46 men under 
Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer ; Fort McRae, built for 
a war garrison of 650 men, but occupied by a single 
ordnance-sergeant ; and on Santa Rosa Island, im- 
mediately opposite, Fort Pickens, built for a garri- 
son of 1260 men, entirely empty. These were all 
strong and defensible works, and among the first 
whose occupation was originally recommended by 
General Scott (October 29, 1860). Hence, when 
under the Cabinet regime he received permission 
to act, he wrote to Lieutenant Slemmer (January 
3): "The General-in-Chief directs that you take 
measures to do the utmost in your power to pre- 
vent the seizure of either of the forts in Pensacola 
Harbor by surprise or assault— consulting first 
with the commander of the navy yard, who will 
probably have received instructions to cooperate 



THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TRUCE 163 

with you." Secretary Toucey sent a similar order chap. xi. 
to Commodore Armstrong, in command of the 
navy yard. 

These orders arrived on the 9th, Lieutenant 
Slemmer, young, ardent, and patriotic, immedi- 
ately called upon Armstrong, who, having served 
his country half a century, was slow from age and 
infirmity, and indifferent through the influence of 
two or three of his disloyal subordinate officers. 
Nevertheless the lifelong habits of strict discipline 
and the peremptory instructions just received, 
induced him to place the steamer Wyandotte, of 
six guns, and the storeship Supply, as also thirty 
ordinary seamen from the yard, at the service of 
the lieutenant. With this help Slemmer now re- 
peated the strategy of Anderson. Spiking the 
guns and destroying the remaining powder in 
Forts Barrancas and McRae, he transferred his 
command, with all available supplies, to Fort 
Pickens, on Santa Rosa Island. The 9th, the 
10th, and the 11th of January were occupied in isei, 
this work, and the transfer was substantially com- 
pleted, notwithstanding the efforts of the two or 
three subordinate officers of the navy yard, who 
were in complicity with the rebels, to delay and 
thwart the movement. 

Lieutenant Slemmer was not a moment too 
quick. The Florida Convention passed an ordi- 
nance of secession on the 10th, and two days 
afterwards a regiment of Florida and Alabama 
volunteers, headed by two commissioners, under 
authority of the Grovernor of Florida, appeared at 
the navy-yard gate and demanded its surrender. 
There were a few hasty formalities, Commodore 



164 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XI. 

House Re- 
poi't. No. 87, 

2(1 Session, 

36th Con- 
gress. Also 

Slemnier 

Report, 

Feb. 5, 1861. 

W. R. Vol. 

I., pp. 334- 
342. 



" Mr. Biicli- 
auaii's Ad- 
ministra- 
tion," p. 214. 
Ex-Secre- 
tary 
Toiicey, 
Testimony 
before the 
Hale Com- 
mittee, 
Nov.18,1861. 
Senate Re- 
port, No. 37, 
2d Session, 
37tti Con- 
gress, p. 234. 



Armstrong first managing to destroy his signal 
books. Then the flag was hauled down, and the 
navy yard, as well as the marine hospital and the 
two abandoned forts, were occupied by the rebels. 
Slemmer's promptness, however, had saved Fort 
Pickens and the two ships. 

A considerable rebel force was shortly afterwards 
concentrated to take it ; but its leader, Colonel 
Chase, was a former engineer officer, and had 
himself built the fort. Knowing its strength he 
explained that he would not risk an assault upon 
it with less than five thousand men, and submitted 
to an imputation of cowardice, with which he was 
taunted at a council of war, rather than make a 
futile attack. 

The prompt and gallant course of Lieutenant 
Slemmer was like a little gleam of sunshine in the 
overshadowing gloom of defection and treason in 
the South. The telegraph was already in the hands 
of the rebels, and the news only reached Washing- 
ton after a lapse of some days, and then through 
private channels. Secretary Toucey had indeed, 
in anticipation of danger, ordered several ships to 
Pensacola — the St. Louis, of twenty guns, from 
Vera Cruz, on December 24; the Macedonian, of 
twenty- two guns, from Portsmouth, on January 5 ; 
the Sabine, of fifty gnns, from Vera Cruz, on Janu- 
ary 9. But none of these arrived in time. It was 
now determined to send immediate reenforcements 
to Slemmer to enable him to hold Fort Pickens. 
The Brooklyn, which returned to Norfolk after her 
useless mission of succor to the Star of the West, 
was therefore ordered to take on board a company 
of regulars from Fort Monroe, under command 



THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TRUCE 



165 



of Captain Vogdes, of the avtillory, and proceed on 
this errand. The orders were issued on the 21st, 
and she sailed from Hampton Eoads on the 24th 
of January. 

At this junctm-e the antagonistic sentiments of 
loyalty and treason were convulsing the Legisla- 
ture of Virginia, then in extra session at Richmond. 
Among other temporizing expedients, that body 
appointed ex-President John Tyler and Judge 
John Robertson commissioners to procure prom- 
ises from the general Government on one hand, 
and the seceding States on the other, to abstain 
"from any and all acts calculated to produce a 
collision of arms," during a certain Peace Conven- 
tion of the States, proposed and urged by Virginia, 
of which we shall speak in a future chapter. On 
this mission Mr. Tyler reached Washington and 
held an interview with Mr. Buchanan on the 24th 
of January. He found him in a mood of mixed 
despondency and stubbornness. He said " he could 
give no pledges ; that it was his duty to enforce the 
laws, and the whole power rested with Congress. 
He complained that the South had not treated him 
properly ; that they had made unnecessary demon- 
strations by seizing unprotected arsenals and forts, 
and thus perpetrated acts of useless bravado, which 
had quite as well been left alone." But the ex- 
President talked him into a more complaisant 
humor. The States, he said, would account for 
the public property they had seized. This and 
other arguments soothed Mr. Buchanan ; he prom- 
ised to refer Tyler's mission to Congress, with a 
strong recommendation to that body to " avoid the 
passage of any hostile legislation." Mr. Tyler was 



Chap. XI. 

Tlionias 
to J)in)ick 
and VoK- 
(Ics, Jan. 

21, 1801. 

W. K. Vol. 

T., pp. 351, 

352. 

Vof?(le8 to 

Thomas, 

Jan. 31, 1861. 

Ibid., p. 356. 



1861. 



Tyler 
to Gov. 
Letcher, 
" National 
Intelligen- 
cer," Feb. 
4, 1861. 



166 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XI. 



Tyler to 
Letclicr, 
"National 
Intelligen- 
cer," Feb. 
i, 1861. 



Tyler to 
Buchanan, 
Jan 25,1801. 
"National 
Intelligen- 
cer," Feb. 
i, 1861. 



Buchanan 

to Tyler, 

Jan. 2.5, 1861. 

Ibid. 



quick to note the impression he had made. "A 
moment's reflection satisfied me that if the mes- 
sage contained the recommendation to Congress to 
abstain from hostile legislation, I was at liberty to 
infer a similar determination on his part of a state 
of quietude." 

On the following day Mr. Tyler was chatting 
familiarly with Secretary Black and Attorney- 
General Stanton, who were making him a call of 
ceremony, when a dispatch was handed him that 
the Brooklyn had sailed with troops from Norfolk. 
He handed the dispatch to his visitors, but they 
at once became discreetly non-committal. " I am 
attached to the law department," said Stanton, 
" and not in the way of knowing anything about 
it." Secretary Black said, "he had heard and 
believed that the Brooklyn had sailed with some 
troops, but he did not know when she sailed, or to 
what point she was destined." But the ex-Presi- 
dent was not to be put off. He wrote a hurried 
note to Mr. Buchanan, asking to be informed " on 
what day the Brooklyn received her orders, on what 
day she sailed, and whether she has recruits for 
any Southern port, and if so, for which f" His 
persistent inquisitiveness was only partially satis- 
fied. At midnight he received a note in reply, in 
which Mr. Buchanan told him that her orders 
were issued on the Monday or Tuesday preced- 
ing; that "she goes on an errand of mercy and 
relief," and that "her movements are in no way 
connected with South Carolina." All of which 
information Tyler transmitted by telegraph next 
morning to his co-commissioner Judge Robertson, 
at Charleston. 



THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TllUCE 167 

This much being known it was easy enough to chap. xi. 
divine the destination of the Brooklyn. Her or- 
ders, however, were still a subject of uncertainty. ^^^ g^^.^.^. 
The ships long since ordered to Pensacola were ^,,^^^,^?;y^ 
arriving. Together the forces began to assume for- '^eiorrtilo 
midable proportions. " The fleet before Fort Pick- ^'JStee!"' 
ens could upon an emergency have thrown fiv(^ s^emiu^Re- 
or six hundred men into the fort without includ- 2d 8ess*iou,' 

37th Cou- 

ing the company from Fort Monroe." Might not gres8,p.235. 
the Brooklyn carry instructions to Lieutenant 
Slemmer, or some other officer of known energy, to 
assume the offensive, and retake or destroy the 
navy yard and the two strong forts on the main- 
land ? It was a critical moment for the revolting 
States. Now, if ever, they needed a few weeks of 
undisturbed consolidation. Even the impetuous 
Governor of South Carolina was clamorous for 
quiet and for speedy organization. " Urge Missis- 
sippi," he wi'ote to his commissioner, " to send dele- 
gates to the Montgomery meeting of States at as 
early a day as possible— say 4th February— to ensToJaS- 
form immediately a strong provisional government. Jl^gl'isei!' 
It is the only thing to prevent war; and let that luteiusen- 
convention elect immediately a commander-m-chiei so, isei. 
for the seceding States." 

The Senatorial cabal therefore added their own 
redoubled efforts to those of ex-President Tyler to 
" keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied." One of 
their number (Mr. Mallory) had hurried to Pensa- 
cola to inspect the situation. From him there now 
came a dispatch, dated January 28, to Senators 
SlideU, Hunter, and Bigler— thus shrewdly coup- 
ling the influence of a Pennsylvania Democrat to 
that of the leading conspirators — "with an urgent 



168 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XI. request that they would lay it before the President. 
This dispatch expressed an ardent desire to pre- 
serve the peace, as well as the most positive assur- 
ance from himself and Colonel Chase that no attack 
anaii'sAd- would be made on the fort if its present status 
iion,"p.2i5. should be suffered to remain." Under these com- 
bined importunities the fortitude of Mr. Buchanan 
broke down. Despite his repeated declarations, — 
through Mr. Holt's note of January 22 — in his 
conversation with Mr. Tyler, January 24 — and 
"Globe" again in his special message to Congress, January 
pp.600, 601.' 28, — that he would make no pledges, he once more 
bound himself in what may for convenience be 
called the Fort Pickens truce. By his direction 
the following joint instructions from the Secre- 
1861- taries of War and Navy were on the 29th of Janu- 
ary telegraphed to the combined forces at Pensacola 
Harbor: "Upon receiving satisfactory assurances 
from Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that Fort 
Pickens will not be attacked, you are instructed 
not to land the company on board the Brooklyn, 
unless said fort shall be attacked, or preparations 
made for its attack. The provisions necessary for 
the supply of the fort you will land. The Brook- 
lyn and the other vessels of war on the station will 
remain, and you will exercise the utmost vigilance, 
and be prepared at a moment's warning to land the 
anan> Ad." compauy at Fort Pickens, and you and they will 
ti™n?''p.Ti"6. instantly repel any attack on the fort." 

Mr. Buchanan asserts that this arrangement re- 
ceived " the approbation of every member of his 
Ibid. Cabinet." It would be difficult to reconcile this 
statement with their other acts and opinions, ex- 
cept upon a single hypothesis: that perhaps they 



THE SUMTER AND PICKENS TRUCE 



169 



tolerated it as his stubborn resolve, in preference 
to some more pernicious and compromising deci- 
sion. But the assertion is positively contradicted 
by Mr, Stanton, who distinctly states that Judge 
Black, General Dix, and himself " had opposed 
that order." ^ Mr. Buchanan also declares that 
General Scott " expressly approved this joint oi-- 
der before it was issued," and in corroboration 
quotes from a private note written by Mr. Holt to 
himself of that date: "I have the satisfaction of 
saying that on submitting the paper to General 
Scott he expressed himself entirely satisfied with 
it, saying there could be no objection to the ar- 
rangement in a military point of view or other- 
wise." General Scott on the other hand disavows 
all knowledge of the joint instruction, and all 
recollection of such an interview with Mr. Holt. 
These differences form a curious historical dis- 
pute, but they do not change the essential character 
of the act. Wliether or not the President's decision 
was sustained by official advice, it remains a glar- 
ing instance of Executive vacillation, and a deplor- 
able surrender of almost vital military advantages. 



CllAl-. XI. 



" Mr. Ruch- 
aiKin's Ad- 

iiiiiiistra- 
tioii,"i).'218. 

(Jon. 8<-ott 
ill tlie " Na- 
tional Intel- 

litrL'iicer," 
Oct. -^l and 
Nov.12,1862. 



1 ' ' Your favor, with the contiuu- 
ation of the historical sketch, was 
duly received. Last evening Judge 
Black and General Dix met at my 
house and consulted together in 
regard to it. . . Speaking of the 
order to the BrooJcIyn not to dis- 
embark the forces sent to Pick- 
ens, unless the fort were attacked, 
you mention it as having been 
made with the entire unanimity 
of your Cabinet and the approval 
of General Scott. That he ap- 
proved it is fully shown by Mr. 
Holt's note to you ; but our recol- 



lection is, that in the Cabinet it 
was opposed by Judge Black, 
General Dix, and myself." — Stan- 
ton to Buchanan, July 16, 1861. 
'•North American Review," No- 
vember, 1879, p. 481. 

Another letter of Stanton to 
Buchanan. March 1, 1862, MS., 
repeats the statement, sajdng: 
"It was well known to yourself 
and every member of the Cabinet 
then present that both Judge 
Black and myself had earnestly 
opposed that order and argued 
strongly against it." 



170 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XL wliicli GmbaiTassed uot only his own, but also the 
succeeding Administration. General Scott has 
left us a conclusive professional criticism of the 
measui'e : 

It was known at the Navy Department that the Brooln- 

lyn, with Captain Vogdes on board, would be obhged in 

open sea to stand off and on Fort Pickens, and in rough 

weather might sometimes be fifty miles off. Indeed, if so 

.^^utoijfJJ: at sea, the fort might have been attacked and easily carried 

raphy,"" before the reenforcement could have reached the beach 

625." ' (in open sea), where alone it could land. 

Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Holt, and myself were all landsmen 
and could kuow but little of the impossibility of landing 
troops on an open sea beach with a high wind and surf. 
Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, with officers about 
him of intelligence and nautical experience, ought to have 
said pluraply that if Vogdes was not to land except in 
case of attack upon Fort Pickens, he might as well have 
remained at Fortress Monroe, as the prohibition placed the 
inthe''^"Na- ^^^'^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^® ^^^ conccmed, at the mercy or (as the 
tionai Intel- eveut showed) on the want of enterprise on the part of 

liff6llC6r/ 1. r 

Nov.12,18'62. the rebel command at Pensacola. 

The Fort Pickens truce concluded, the Senatorial 
cabal permitted Colonel Hayne to resume the duties 
of his mission to the President concerning Fort 
Sumter. Their manipulation of this negotiation is 
once more revealed by a comparison of dates in the 
correspondence. Colonel Hayne referred the matter 
1861. to Grovernor Pickens on January 24 ; the Governor 
wrote his instructions in reply on the 26th ; but in 
order not to embarrass the Fort Pickens transac- 
tion, the ordinary twenty-four hours' transmission 
was stretched out to four days. On January 31 
Colonel Hayne directed his first official communica- 
tion to the President. After stating the occasion of 
delay, he said : 



THE SUMTEIi AND PICKENS TllUCE 171 

You will perceive that it is upon the presumption that it Ciiai>. xi. 
is solely as property that you eoiitinue to hold Fort Sum- 
ter, that I have been selected for the performance of the 
duty upon which I have entered. I do not come as a mili- 
tary man to demand the surrender of a fortress, but as the 
legal officer of the State, — its attorney-general, — to claim 
for the State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent 
domain, and to pledge the State to make good all injury 
to the rights of property which arise from the exercise 
of the claim. South Carolina, as a separate, independent 
sovereign, assumes the right to take into her own posses- 
sion everything within her limits essential to maintain her 
honor or her safety, irrespective of the question of prop- 
erty, subject only to the moral duty requiring that com- 
pensation should be made to the owner. . . Repudiating 
as you do the idea of coercion, avowing peaceful inten- 
tions, and expressing a patriot's horror for civil war and ilfici^nan, 
bloody strife among those who once were brethren, it is "^nolfse Re-' 
hoped that on further consideration you will not, on a port, No. 91, 
mere question of property, refuse the reasonable demand 36th cou°' 
of South Carolina, which honor and necessity alike com- ^IK^' 
pel her to vindicate. 

He concluded by setting forth that either the as- 
sertion or exercise of the right to send reenforce- 
ments to Sumter would be regarded as a declaration 
of war. The noteworthy feature of this missive 
is, however, that Governor Pickens's characteristic 
urgency was all at once abated. If the President 
were not prepared to give an immediate answer, he 
might send it within a reasonable time to Charles- 
ton, and Hayne might close his mission and return. 

It was nearly a week later that the President 
gave his reply through Secretary Holt, who wrote 
on February 6 : 

The proposal then, now presented to the President, 
is simply an offer on the part of South Carolina to buy 
Fort Sumter and contents as property of the United 



172 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XI. 



Holt to 

Hayne, 

Feb. 6, 1861. 

W. R. Vol. 

I., pp. 166, 

167. 



"Mr. Buch- 
anan's Ad- 
ministra- 
tion," p. 205. 



Buchanan 
in the " Na- 
tional Intel- 
ligencer," 
Nov. 1, 1862. 



Gen. Scott, 
" Autobiog- 
raphy," 
Vol. II., pp. 
621, 622. 

"Mr. Buch- 
anan's Ad- 
ministra- 
tion," p. 210. 
Adjutant- 
General to 
Col. Scott, 
Feb.Ql,186l. 
W. R. Vol. 
I., p. 179. 



States, sustained by a declaration, in effect, that if she 
is not permitted to make the purchase she wUl seize the 
fort by force of arms. . . The title of the United States 
to Fort Sumter is complete and incontestable. Were 
its interests in this property purely proprietary, in the 
ordinary acceptation of the term, it might probably be 
subjected to the exercise of the right of eminent domain ; 
but it has also political relations to it, of a much higher and 
more imposing character than those of mere proprietorship. 
It has absolute juinsdiction over the fort and the soil on 
which it stands. This jurisdiction consists in the author- 
ity to "exercise exclusive legislation" over the property 
refeiTed to, and is therefore clearly incompatible with the 
claim of eminent domain now insisted upon by South 
Carolina. This authority was not derived from any ques- 
tionable revolutionary source, but from the peaceful 
cession of South Carolina herself, acting through her 
Legislature under a provision of the Constitution of the 
United States. 

This seems to have ended the argument on the 
subject. A few days later Colonel Hayne, imitating 
the rebel commissioners, sent a splenetic epistle to 
the President and left the city. The Administration, 
acting on the theory that Mr. Holt's reply of Feb- 
ruary 6 terminated Anderson's truce, turned their 
attention anew to a second relief expedition to 
Sumter. Several plans were discussed, and one 
apparently adopted. The evidence as to its origin 
and preparation is vague and conflicting. 

Captain Ward, of the navy, was to take three or 
four small steamers, belonging to the coast sm^vey, 
and endeavor to make his way to Anderson, with 
supplies and reenforcements. Mr. Buchanan claims 
to have initiated it on the 31st of January ; an order 
concerning it, dated February 21, shows that its 
time of sailing was even then uncertain. The gov- 
erning causes in this instance may perhaps be best 



THE SUMTEll AND PICKENS TRUCE 



173 



iuferred from a lotter of Holt to Audcrsou, Feb- cuap. xi. 
ruary 23, which discloses an abaudoumout of the 
attempt : 

A dispatch received in this city a few days since from 
Governor Pickens, connected with the declaration on 
the part of those convened at Montgomery, claiming 
to act on behalf of South Carolina, as well as the other 
seceded States, that the question of the possession of 
the forts and otlier public property therein had been 
taken from the decision of the individual States, and 
woidd probably be preceded in ics settlement b}^ negotia- 
tion with the Government of the United States, has im- 
pressed the President with a belief that there will be no 
immediate attack on Fort Sumter, and the hope is in- 
dulged that wise and patriotic counsels may prevail and 
prevent it altogether. The labors of the peace Congress 
have not yet closed, and the presence of that body here 
adds another to the powerful motives already existing for ^oit to 

T -, ■ „ • ^n Anderson, 

the adoption of every measure, except m necessary sen- Feb.23,i86i. 

\V "R Vol 

defense, for avoiding a collision with the forces that sm*- i., p. i83. ' 
round you. 

Dilatory diplomacy had done its allotted work. 
While Mr. Bachanan refused a truce in theory, he 
granted one in fact. Between the 12tli of Janu- 
ary and the 6th of February the insurrection at isei. 
Charleston worked day and night in building bat- 
teries and preparing men and material to attack 
Sumter. In other States the processes of secession, 
seizure, drill, equipment, and organization had also 
been going on with similar activity. Receiving no 
effective discouragement or check, the various ele- 
ments of rebellion had finally united in a provi- 
sional congress at Montgomery, which, two days 
later, perfected a provisional government for the 
rebellion. There can be no severer criticism of 
this delusive policy of concession and inaction than 



174 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XI. 



Pickens to 
Cobb, Feb. 

13, 1861. 
W. R. Vol. 
I., pp. 254-6. 



the course and argument of Governor Pickens, as 
shown in a letter written by him to the president 
of the new provisional congress at Montgomery, on 
the 13th of February, on being informed that it had 
taken charge of the " questions and difficulties " be- 
tween the Government and the rebellion : 

I am perfectly satisfied that the welfare of the new 
confederation and the necessities of the State require 
that Fort Sumter should be reduced before the close of 
the present Administration at Washington. . . Mr. Lin- 
coln cannot do more for this State than Mr. Buchanan 
has done. . . If war can be averted, it will be by mak- 
ing the capture of Fort Sumter a fact accomplished dur- 
ing the continuance of the present Admhiistration, leaving 
to the incoming Administration the question of an open 
declaration of war. 

This, then, was to be the harvest of concilia- 
tion — of the "wise, just, and peaceful solution," 
which the Senatorial cabal had promised — of "a 
patriotic horror for civil war and bloody strife," 
which Colonel Hayne had invoked — of the allure- 
ments of accommodation which Governor Pickens 
had so temptingly blended with his threats of vio- 
lence and assault. Having lulled Mr. Buchanan 
into confidence, he proposed its sudden and secret 
violation, and in the same breath with his encomiums 
on peace, officially advised the shedding of blood, 
not upon any present necessity, but for the pros- 
pective gain of an improved vantage-ground towards 
the new Administration. Prudential reasons de- 
ferred the scheme for the moment. Six weeks later 
it was adopted and enacted by the provisional gov- 
ernment of the conspiracy. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE COTTON "REPUBLICS" 

IN the main the secession incidents and proceed- chap, xn 
ings enacted in South Carolina were imitated 
and repeated in the other Cotton States. Their 
several Governors initiated the movement by 
early official action — proclamations, messages, and 
orders. The office-holders at each State capital 
formed a convenient local junto of conspiracy. 
The programme in each case ran through es- 
sentially the same stages. There was first the 
meeting of the Legislature, prompted and in- 
fluenced by the State officials and the Senators 
and Representatives in Congress. Then under a 
loud outcry of public danger which did not exist, 
hasty measures to arm and defend the State — large 
military ap^Dropriations and extensive military or- 
ganization. Next an act to call a convention, 
ostensibly to consult public opinion, but really for 
the occasion to rouse and mislead it. In each of 
the Cotton States the Breckinridge Democracy, the 
most ultra of the three factions, was largely in the 
majority. Again, the long political agitation had 
brought into power and prominence the most rad- 
ical leaders of this extreme party. 

These leaders were generally disunionists at heart, 
even where they had not been active and persist- 



176 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XII. eut conspirators. They uow took up with ahierity 
the task of electing a secession convention. That 
the people were not with them a month before the 
Presidential election is proved by the replies of the 
several Governors to South Carolina, which are cited 
in a previous chapter. Nothing but the election 
itself had occurred to change that feeling; no threat, 
no act, no law, no catastrophe. ITa<l governors and 
officials remained silent, the people would have ft'h 
no want and seen no danger. Rut when official 
action began the agitation, first l)y prochinuitions, 
then by legislative enactments, and histly by forc- 
ing the issue upon the people through an election 
for delegates, there came an ineWtable growth and 
culmination of excitement. In this election it was 
the audacious, the ambitious, the reckless element 
which took the lead, gathered enthusiasm, and 
organized success. 

It nmst be remembere<l tliat this result was 
reached under specially favoring conditions. The 
long slavery discussion hail engendered a ijrooding 
discontent, and the baseless complaint of sectional 
injustice had gi'own through mere repetition tioni 
clamor into belief. The Presidential election h'ft 
behind it the sharp sting of defeat. Not in form 
and in law, but nevertheless in ess«»ntial chara<*ter- 
istics, the South was controlled Ity a land<d aris- 
tocracy. The great plantation masters dominated 
societ)'^ and politics; there was no diffused and 
healthy popular action, as in the town-meetings 
of New England. Even the slaves of the wealthy 
proprietors spoke with habitual contempt of the 
" poor white trash " who lived in mean cabins and 
hoed their own corn and cotton. 




t.LM l.AI. IlitVV Kl.l. < ollii. 



THE COTTON "REPUBLICS" 177 

Except in Georgia the opposition to the seces- cuai-. xii 
sionists' programme was either hopelessly feeble or 
entirely wanting. The Bell and Douglas factions 
had bitterly denounced Lincoln and the Repub- 
licans during the Presidential campaign. Disarmed 
by their own words, they could not now defend 
them. The seaboard towns and cities of the South, 
jealous of the commercial supremacy of the North, 
anticipated in independence and free trade a new 
growth and a rich prosperity. Over all floated the 
constant dream of Southern Utopias — an indefinite 
expansion southward into a great slave empire. 
Under these various causes the election in most in- 
stances went by default. 

Three special agencies cooperated with marked 
effect to stimulate the movement. Very early each 
Cotton State sent commissioners to each of the 
other Southern States, and in every case the most 
active and zealous secessionists were of course ap- 
pointed. These commissioners attended, harangued, 
and intrigued with the various deliberative assem- 
blies, and thus constituted a network of most indus- 
trious propagandism. Another potent influence was 
the assembling of military conventions, that is, con- 
vocations of the militia captains, majors, colonels, 
and would-be generals, to spur on or intimidate 
lagging Legislatures and conventions. Finally, 
the third and most effective piece of machinery 
was the State delegations in Congress assembled 
in Washington City at the beginning of December, iseo. 
and sending a running fii-e of encouragement or 
orders home to the capitals of their States. 

Even with all this organization acting intelli- 
gently and persistently for a common end, from two 

Vol. III.— 12 



178 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XII. to three months were required to work up the peo- 
ple of the Cotton States to an acquiescence in the 
rebellion the conspirators had for years been plan- 
ning. Without being exactly of contemporaneous 
date, it happened that in general the month of No- 
vember witnessed the assembUng of the Legis- 
latures and the making of necessary laws and 
appropriations. The month of December was 
mainly occupied by the election of delegates to the 
State conventions. In this stage the voice of cen- 
tral authority from Washington was begun to be 
utilized. 

While the election excitement was at its highest 
ferment, there came from Washington, under date 
I860. of the 14th of December, the revolutionary circu- 
lar, signed by about one-half the Southern Sen- 
ators and Representatives in Congress, quoted 
elsewhere. This circular announced that argument 
was exhausted, that hope was extinguished, that 
the Republicans would grant nothing which would 
or ought to satisfy the South, and that the honor, 
safety, and independence of the Southern people 
required immediate separate State secession, and 
the organization of a Southern Confederacy. 

The effect of a Congressional firebrand of such 
dimensions thrown upon the inflammable temper 
of the Cotton States at such a juncture may be 
easily imagined. Their people could not know that 
no single assertion in this circular was warranted 
by the facts; that Congi'ess had not deliberated; 
that the compromise committees had not reported, 
and that the Republicans had in no shape pre- 
sented or declared an ultimatum. The circular had 
been issued for a purpose, and served that end com- 



THE COTTON "REPUBLICS" 179 

pletely. Few Southern voters or speakers could cuai'. xii. 
dare to stand up and deny in Georgia or Alabama 
the accusation made by these "honorable" signers 
in Washington. 

But the central cabal did not stop with this single 
pronmiciamiento. By this time the revolution, both 
local and central, had gained an accelerated mo- 
mentum, and was rushing to its climax. Non- 
coercion was promised, Cass was driven from the 
Cabinet, the President was overawed, Congress 
was demoralized. Secession had secured a free 
path, and counted on an easy victory. The pro- 
gramme seems to have been to attain separation 
by easy stages during the remainder of Mr. Buch- 
anan's term, and not to organize the new Confed- 
eracy till after the 4th of March. 

But about New Year's the central conspiracy 
received a serious check. There was a Cabinet 
crisis. Buchanan momentarily asserted himself. 
Floyd was in turn di'iven from the Cabinet, the 
Unionists gained control of it, and Holt was made 
Secretary of War. This portended loyalty, deci- 
sion, energy, reenforcements. Immediately there 
came a shower of telegrams and orders from the 
Washington fire-eaters to the Cotton-State leaders, 
proclaiming danger and urging action. The cen- 
tral cabal was called together, deliberated ear- 
nestly, and perfected and hastened the plot. At a 
caucus held on January 5 (in one of the rooms of isei. 
the Capitol building itself, it is said), the decisive 
and final revolutionary programme committed it- 
self to the following distinct points and plan : 
First. Immediate secession. Second. A conven- 
tion at Montgomery, Alabama, not later than the 



180 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XII. 15th of February, to organize a Confederacy. 
1861. Third. That, to prevent hostile legishitioii under 
the changed and loyal impulses of the President 
and his reconstructed Cabinet, the Cotton-State 
Senators should remain awhile in their places, to 
" keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied." Finally, 
and most important of all, the caucus appointed a 
committee, consisting of Senators Jefferson Davis, 
Slidell, and Mallory, " to carry out the object of 
this meeting."^ The future chief of the gi-eat 



1 Senator Yulee, of Florida, to 
Joseph Finegau, Esq. : 

"Washington, Jan. 7, 1861. 
"My Dear Sir: On the other 
side is a copy of resolutions 
adopted at a consultation of the 
Senators from the seceding States 
— in which Georgia, Alabama, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mis- 
sissippi, and Florida were pres- 
ent. The idea of the meeting was 
that the States should go out at 
once, and provide for the early 
organization of a Confederate 
Government, not later than 15th 
February. This time is allowed 
to enable Louisiana and Texas to 
participate. It seemed to be the 
opinion that if we left here, force, 
loan, and volunteer bills might be 
passed, which would put Mr. Lin- 
coln in immediate condition for 
hostilities ; whereas by remaining 
in our places until the 4th of 
March, it is thought we can keep 
the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, 
and disable the Eepublicans from 
effecting any legislation which 
will strengthen the hands of the 
incoming Administration. The 
resolutions will be sent by the 
delegation to the president of the 
convention. I have not been able 
to find Mr. Mallory this morning. 



Hawkins is in Connecticut. I 
have therefore thought it best to 
send you this copy of the resolu- 
tions. 

"In haste, yours truly, 

"D. L. Yulee. 
"Joseph Finegan, Esq., 
" ' Sovereignty Convention,' 
"Tallahassee, Florida." 

The following are the resolu- 
tions referred to : 

" Resolved 1. That in our opin- 
ion each of the Southern States 
should, as soon as may be, secede 
fi'om the Union. 

'■^Resolved 2. That provision 
should be made for a convention 
to organize a Confederacy of the 
seceding States, the convention 
to meet not later than the loth 
of February, at the city of Mont- 
gomery, in the State of Alabama. 

' 'Resolved 3. That in view of the 
hostile legislation that is threat- 
ened against the seceding States, 
and which may be consummated 
before the 4th of March, we ask 
instructions whether the delega- 
tions are to remain in Congress 
until that date for the purpose of 
defeating such legislation. 

"Resolved 4. That a committee 
be and are hereby appointed, con- 



THE COTTON "REPUBLICS" 181 

rebellion was chosen to preside over its primary cuai". xii. 
organization. 

If there had been any hesitation in the several 
State conventions about taking the final plunge, 
we may suppose that it disappeared when the pro- 
gramme outlined in this central caucus of January 
5, at Washington, was transmitted. We find that 
nearly the whole secession movement very speedily 
followed. Mississippi passed her ordinance on Jan- 
uary 9, Florida on January 10, Alabama on January isei. 
11, Georgia on January 19, Louisiana on January 
26, and Texas, where peculiar conditions existed, 
on February 1. 

Immediately connected with the passage of these 
secession ordinances, and in some instances even 
preceding them, another step in the insurrec- 
tionary scheme was taken. Each Governor who 
organized the revolution in his State, now find- 
ing a little army of impulsive volunteers and 
ambitious officers at his nod and beck, ordered 
two or three regiments to the nearest fort or ar- 
senal, where an ordnance-sergeant or an attenu- 
ated infantry or artillery company of Federal 
soldiers was representing the Government title 
rather than the Government power. The insur- 
gents demanded possession, and made a display 
of force. The officer in charge yielded to the in- 
sisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, tliey were signed by Messrs. 
and Mallory, to carry out the ob- Davis and Brown, of Mississippi ; 
jects of this meeting." Hemphill and Wigfall, of Texas; 

" The copy of these resolutions, Slidell and Benjamin, of Louisi- 
forwarded by Senator Mallory ana; Iverson and Toombs, of 
January 6, 1861, to the presi- Georgia; Johnson, of Ai-kansas; 
dent of the Florida Convention, Clay, of Alabama, and Yulee 
shows that they were adopted on and Mallory, of Florida." [W. R. 
the 5tb of that month, and that Vol. I., pp. -l-lo— ±4.] 



182 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XII. evitable. He received the demand for surrender 
to the State ; he complied under protest. There 
was a salute to the flag, peaceable evacuation, and 
he was allowed unmolested transit home as a mili- 
tary courtesy. 

By this process there was a quick succession of 
captures through which all the military strongholds 
and depots in the Cotton States, excepting Fort 
Sumter in Charleston harbor, Fort Pickens in Pen- 
sacola harbor, Fort Taylor at Key West, and Fort 
Jefferson on Tortugas Island, passed to the occupa- 
tion and use of the rebellion, giving it a vantage- 
ground for defense, and a store of war material for 
offense, which for the first time since the Presiden- 
tial election gave the revolution a serious and for- 
midable strength. We have thus far described the 
secession movement throughout the South in its 
general aspect. It is worth while to glance at some 
of its features more in detail. 

The State of Florida was the most zealous fol- 
lower of South Carolina. She has a magnificent 
geographical area, which, with a climate favorable 
to a class of sub-tropical products, is enough to make 
her eventually the garden State of the South. But 
this immense domain was virtually a wilderness, 
notwithstanding that her earliest permanent settle- 
ment was almost three centuries old. Her white 
population did not reach the ratio of one Represent- 
ative in Congress.^ There was not a single town of 
three thousand inhabitants within her borders. She 
therefore became an easy prey to her ultra pro- 

1 The population of Florida in representation for Members of 

1860 was: white, 77,748; free Congress, from 1852 to 1863, 

colored, 932; slave, 61,745; was 93,423. [Spofford, " Amer- 

total, 140,425. The ratio of ican Almanac," 1878, p. 170.] 



THE COTTON "REPUBLICS" 183 

slavery leaders, who were the first to applaud aud chap. xir. 
second the Charleston insurrection. "Florida is 
with the gallant Palmetto State," wrote her Gov- 
ernor, November 9 ; and his message to the Legis- isgo. 
lature, November 26, clamored for " secession from 
our faithless, perjured Confederates." Under the 
manipulations of such an executive, backed by the 
equally aggressive advice and exertions of her two 
United States Senators, prominent among the con- 
spirators at Washington, she went through the 
forms of a convention and the passing of a seces- 
sion ordinance, January 10. Her Governor, with 
total disregard of authority, had already seized the 
arsenal at Appalachicola on January 5, Fort Marion isei. 
and the ordnance depot at St. Augustine on the 
7th, as well as a schooner belonging to the Coast 
Survey. There were, in the arsenal, no arms, but 
500,000 musket cartridges, 300,000 rifle cartridges, 
and 50,000 pounds of gunpowder. On the 8th he 
ordered the seizui'e of the navy yard and unoc- 
cupied forts at Pensacola, which was accomplished 
on the 12th. However insignificant in her political 
power, the gain of Florida was nevertheless of gi*eat 
military and strategical value to the rebellion. 

In Mississippi, the revolutionary sentiment had 
long been fostered by her most able and influen- 
tial politicians. Jefferson Davis, eager to wear the 
mantle of Calhoun, had two years before announced 
the new rebellion. His speech at Vicksburg, No- 
vember 27, 1858, is thus reported in the " Daily 
Mississippian." 

Before coDcluding his remarks, he would anticipate the 
interrogatory which his audience might be disposed to 
propound to him, in view of the fast growing strength of 



184 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XII. the abolition party, as to what policy he would recom- 
mend in the event of the triumph of that party in 18G0. 
He was for resistance — stern resistance. Rather than 
see the Executive chair of the nation filled by a sworn 
enemy of our rights, he would shatter it into a thousand 
fragments before he had an opportunity of taking his 
seat. . . The Government is at an end the very moment 
that an abolitionist is elected to the Presidency. 

The Governor of Mississippi also was one of the 
most advanced revolutionists in the South. He 
declared himself ready for action as early as Au- 
gust 30, 1860. 

I assure you that I do sympathize and expect to 
continue to act with those who dare all and hazard 
all, rather than see Mississippi become a dependent 
province of a Black Republican government, and hold 
her constitutional rights by the frail tenure of Black 
Republican oaths. When sparks cease to fly upwards, 
Comanches respect treaties, and wolves kill sheep no 
more, the oath of a Black Republican might be of some 
value as a protection to slave property. 

With Jefferson Davis in the Senate to conspire 
and advise, and Governor Pettus at home to order 
and execute, the fate of Mississippi could not long 
remain in doubt. The Legislature had in the 
previous winter provided a military fund of $150,- 
000. Early in October the State made a purchase 
of arms, which at Jefferson Davis's request, and 
with Floyd's concm-rence, were obligingly inspected 
by a Government officer. The Legislature was 
I860. convened to meet, November 26, to consider "the 
propriety and necessity of providing surer pnd bet- 
ter safeguards for the lives, liberties, and property 
of her citizens than have been found or are to be 
hoped for in Black Republican oaths." Commis- 
sioners to other States were appointed, and an 



THE COTTON " KEPUBLICS " 185 

election ordered, in pursuance of which a conven- chap. xii. 
tion met, January 7, and passed a secession ordi- isci. 
nance on January 9, 84 yeas to 15 nays. The 
proceedings, as in other States, were secret and 
precipitate. Military organization was stimulated 
to the utmost, and on the 20th the unfinished fort 
on Ship Island and the marine hospital on the 
Mississippi River were seized by the insurrection- 
ists at the Grovernor's orders. 

The State of Alabama had by her dominant 
partisanship on the slavery question been carried 
farther towards revolt than the other Cotton States. 
Her Legislature, on February 24, 18G0, \vith but 
two dissenting voices, provided by joint resolution 
that in case of the election of a Eepublican Presi- 
dent, the Governor should at once by proclamation 
order an election of delegates to a convention " to 
consider and do whatever in the opinion of said 
convention the rights, interests, and honor of the 
State of Alabama requires [sic] to be done for their 
protection." A fund of $200,000 was appropriated 
for "military contingencies"; and the Grovernor 
was further authorized to send delegates to any 
future convention of the slave States. 

A week after the November elections, the Grov- 
ernor in a public letter announced that he would 
exercise this power to inaugurate revolution as 
soon as the choice of Lincoln should be made cer- 
tain by the vote of the electoral college on De- iseo, 
cember 5. In the same letter he made a labored 
argument that Alabama ought to secede at once 
and " cooperate afterwards." His proclamation was 
in due time issued, and the delegates were elected 
on December 24. A spirited canvass seems to have 



186 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XII. been made. Judge Campbell, of the United States 
Supreme Court, addressed the voters in an earnest 
letter against disunion. Partisans separated them- 
selves into three groups designated respectively as 
" submissionists," " cooperationists," and " straight- 
out secessionists." The southern half of the State, 
embracing the cotton-lands and strong slave 
counties on the Gulf, was intensely revolutionary ; 
the northern end, reaching up towards the com- 
merce of the free States, was, or believed itself to 
be, conservative and union-loving; and the final 
popular decision was supposed to hang in consider- 
able doubt. 

The meeting of the convention at Montgomery, 
1861. January 7, soon dispelled this idea. On the first 
day it unanimously adopted a resolution declaring 
in substance that "Alabama cannot and will not 
submit to the Administration of Lincoln and Ham- 
lin." That any of the members after such a vote 
should have hesitated to commit themselves to the 
full scope of the conspirators' programme, shows 
the confused perception of their own attitude and 
intention. They did not appear to realize how 
helplessly they were drifting in the current of 
rebellion. Upon such material the radical seces- 
sionists concentrated their influence. Outside pres- 
sure gathered in overwhelming force. Telegrams 
poured in upon them in profusion. " They came 
so thick and fast, they seemed like snowflakes to 
fall from the clouds," said one of the members. 
Crowds besieged the doors. The Governor had on 
January 4, without warrant, seized Mount Vernon 
arsenal and Forts Morgan and Gaines at Mobile, 
and had caused the banks to suspend payment. 



THE COTTON " REPUBLICS " 187 

and he now asked to be justified in these usurpa- chap. xn. 

tions. News arrived that Florida and Mississippi 

had seceded. Application was made for military 

help to seize Pensacola. In the midst of the 

excitement came telegrams of the firing on the 

Star of the West at Charleston, and its attending 

incidents. 

Before these combined influences conservative 
resolves and combinations gave way, and an ordi- 
nance of immediate secession was prepared. The 
ubiquitous Yancey, fresh from his Northern dis- 
avowals of the " Scarlet Letter," was on hand in 
the role of leading conspirator, and came near 
" precipitating revolution " in the convention itself, 
by his flaming declamation. The "cooperationists" 
were pleading for delay, when he indiscreetly 
threatened the penalties of treason against any 
factious minority which should venture to disobey 
an ordinance of secession. The northern members 
flared up under the taunt. "Will the gentleman 
go into those sections of the State and hang all 
who are opposed to secession ! Will he hang them 
by families, by neighborhoods, by counties, by Con- 
gressional districts ? Who, sir, will give the bloody 
order? . . . Are these to be the first-fruits of a 
Southern Republic ? " " Coming at the head of any 
force which he can muster," replied another mem- 
ber, " aided and assisted by the Executive of this 
State, we will meet him at the foot of our moun- 
tains, and there with his own selected weapons, 
hand to hand, and face to face, settle the ques- 
tion of the sovereignty of the people." 

The flurry was quieted, however, and the ordi- 
nance reported on the third day of the session. The 



1.88 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap XII. Conservatives endeavored to substitute a project of 
a slave-State convention and a basis of settlement 
with the North, but it was voted down, 54 to 45. 
After this the radicals had easy sailing, and on 
1861. January 11 the ordinance passed, 61 to 39. It is 
touching to read the expressions of regret, of doubt, 
of protest, with which the opposition members re- 
luctantly gave in their adhesion, and parted from 
their Grovernment and their flag, under the final and 
fallacious promptings of State pride and the bane- 
ful heresy of paramount State allegiance. And 
this lingering sorrow of delegates was followed 
in many localities by the lingering condemnation 
and remonstrance of their constituents. Four 
weeks later Hon. Jere. Clemens wrote from Hunts- 
ville : " There is still much discontent here at the 
passage of the ordinance of secession, but it is 
growing weaker daily, and, unless something is 
done to stir it up anew, will soon die away;" 
adding, also, "Last week Yancey was burned in 
effigy in Limestone." But it was all of no avail ; 
the people writhed helplessly in the toils of their 
false leaders. 

The State of Greorgia was then, and is still, 
regarded as the Empire State of the South. Her 
action, therefore, became an object of the greatest 
solicitude. Her leading men were known to be 
divided in sentiment. The North looked with 
some confidence there for a conservative reaction ; 
but they were leaning on a broken reed. With all 
their asseverations of loyalty, the Unionists of that 
State were such only upon impossible conditions. 
" As a Union man," wrote B. H. Hill, in September, 
" I shall vote in November. As a Union man I shall 



THE COTTON " EEPUBLICS " 189 

hope for the right. As a Southern man I shall chap. xii. 
meet the enemy and go with my State." Alexander 
H. Stephens, equally unsound in his allegiance, was 
ultra-radical on slavery. He believed it the normal 
condition of the negro, and looked forward to its 
spread into every State in the Union. Supporting 
Douglas, he repudiated " Squatter Sovereignty." 
Herschel V. Johnson was an old-time " resistance " 
advocate. This kind of leadership was quasi dis- 
union, especially under the assaults of aggressive 
and uncompromising revolutionists like Toombs, 
Iverson, Cobb, and Governor Brown. 

Nevertheless, the popular voice, which sometimes 
restrains the rashness of leaders, was yet in doubt, 
and compelled a policy of slow approaches to insur- 
rection. Governor Brown, therefore, in his mes- 
sage of November 8, went only to the extent of iseo. 
recommending retaliatory legislation, and that the 
State should be armed. The vote at the Presiden- 
tial election had been : Breckinridge, 51,889 ; Bell, 
42,886; Douglas, 11,590. The statutes required a 
majority vote for electors, hence there was no 
choice by the people. In conformity with law, 
the Legislature was obliged to appoint them ; and 
accordingly it chose (January 29) a college favor- isei. 
able to Breckinridge. In the interim the Legisla- 
ture was convulsed with the topics of the hour. 
Stephens made a famous plea for union ; Toombs 
an equally fervid harangue for disunion. 

Meanwhile the members had listened to an insidi- 
ous suggestion apparently midway between the two 
extremes. " The truth is, in my judgment," wiites 
Stephens, "the wavering scale in Georgia was turned 
by a sentiment, the key-note to which was given in 



190 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XII. the words — 'We can make better terms out of the 
Uuion than in it.' It was Mr. Thomas R. R. Cobb who 
gave utterance to this key-note in his speech before 
the Legislature two days anterior to my address 
before the same body. This idea did more, in my 
opinion, in carrying the State out, than all the argu- 
ments and eloquence of all others combined." A for- 
midable outside pressure in the shape of a military 
convention, and a large secession caucus was also 
organized and led by Governor Brown. The Legis- 
lature could not resist the impetuous current. A 
military appropriation of one million dollars was 

1860. made November 13, and a convention bill passed 
on the 18th. 

Perhaps the most hotly contested election cam- 
paign which occurred in any Southern State now 
took place for the convention, in the course of 
which fifty-two members of the Legislature joined 
in a " cooperation " address, m'ging a conference of 
Southern States instead of immediate secession. 

1861. The vote was cast January 2, and, encouraged by 
apparent success. Governor Brown on the follow- 
ing day ordered the seizure of Fort Pulaski, and 
placed the telegrajjli under surveillance. The con- 
vention assembled at Milledgeville on January 16, 
and the res^jective factions mustered their adher- 
ents for the combat. The struggle was short and 
decisive. In place of a brief and direct secession 
resolution the conservatives offered to substitute a 
proposition to hold a Southern conference at At- 
lanta; also setting forth certain "indispensable" 
amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. It is almost needless to say they were 
exacting and advanced to a degi-ee not before sug- 



THE COTTON " EEPUBLICS " 191 

gested in any quarter. The " Georgia platform," chap. xii. 
hitherto proclaimed by Mr. Stephens as his creed, 
was left far behind. That was a simple affirmance 
of the settlement of 1850. These new "guarantees" 
embraced provisions which would in practice have 
legalized slavery in the free States. There was no 
more hope that the North would accept them than 
that it would set up a monarchy. 

Radical as was this alternative, the straight-out 
secessionists would not even permit a vote to be 
taken upon it. The secession resolution was rushed 
through under the previous question, 166 yeas to 
130 nays. On the following day an inquiry into 
the election for delegates was throttled with similar 
ferocity, 168 to 127. After this all opposition broke 
down, and on January 19 the secession ordinance isei. 
was passed, 208 yeas to 89 nays. It was finally 
signed by all the delegates but six, and even those 
promised their lives and fortunes to the cause. Grov- 
ernor Brown, on January 21, set up the cap-sheaf of 
insurrection by sending six or seven hundred vol- 
unteers to demand and receive the surrender of the 
Augusta arsenal, declaring with sarcastic etiquette 
in his demand that " the State is not only at peace, 
but anxious to cultivate the most amicable relations 
with the United States Grovernment." 

The State of Louisiana followed in the main the 
action of the already mentioned Cotton States, 
except that it was more tardy. Her Grovernor and 
her Senators in Congress were as pronounced as 
the other principal conspirators, but her people, 
as a whole, were not yet quite so ripe for insur- 
rection. " The State of Louisiana," wrote one of 
the secession emissaries, "from the fact that the 



192 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XII. Mississippi River flows through its extent and 
debouches through her borders, and that the great 
commercial depot of that river and its tributaries 
is the city of New Orleans, occupies a position 
somewhat more complicated than any other of the 
Southern States, and may present some cause of 
delay in the consummation and execution of the 
purpose of a separation from the Northwestern 
States, and the adoption of a new political status." 
Here as elsewhere, however, the executive sword 
was thrown into the vibrating scale. First, the 
Governor's proclamation calling an extra session 
of the Legislature to meet December 10; then, on 
the plea of public danger, an appropriation to arm 
the State ; next, on pretext of consulting public 
opinion, a convention bill ; then, having volunteers, 
the seizure of Baton Rouge barracks and arsenal 
(January 10), and Forts Jackson and St. Philip 
(January 15), and other Federal property ; and, 
finally, the terrorism of loud-mouthed revolution. 
When the convention met, January 23, the tide was 
already as irresistible as the waters of the Missis- 
sippi. A proposition for a slave-State conference 
was voted down, 106 to 24; another, to " provide 
for a popular vote," defeated by 84 to 43, and on 
186L January 26, some of the " cooperation " delegates 
having prudently silenced their scruples, the seces- 
sion ordinance was passed, 113 yeas to 17 nays. 
Two exceptional incidents occurred in the action 
of Louisiana. One was the unanimous adoption of 
a resolution recognizing " the right of the free 
navigation of the Mississippi River and its tribu- 
taries by all friendly States bordering thereon," 
and also "the right of egress and ingress of the 




JEi'FERSON DAVIS. 



THE COTTON " KEPUBLICS " 193 

mouths of the Mississippi by all friendly States chap. xii. 
and powers." The other was that one of her Fed- 
eral Representatives, John E. Bouligny, remained 
true to his oath and his loyalty, and continued to 
hold his seat in Congress to the end of his term — 
the solitary instance from the Cotton States.^ 

It is a significant feature in the secession pro- 
ceedings of the six Cotton States which first took 
action, that their conventions in every case neg- 
lected or refused to submit their ordinances of 
secession to a vote of the people for ratification or 
rejection. The whole spirit and all the phenomena 
of the movement forbade their doing so. From 
first to last the movement was forced, not sponta- 
neous, official, not popular; and its leaders could 
not risk the period of doubt which a submission of 
the ordinances would involve, much less their re- 
jection at the polls. To this general rule Texas, 
the seventh seceding State, formed an exception. 
Grovernor Houston opposed secession, and as long 
as possible thwarted the conspirators' plans. By a 
bolder usurpation than elsewhere, they neverthe- 
less assembled an independent and entirely illegal 
convention, passed an ordinance of secession, Feb- 
ruary 1, and held an election to ratify or reject isei. 
it, February 23. Long before this they had in 

1 Another instance of unswerv- only refused to sign the ordi- 

ing Louisiana loyalty is woi-th nance, but refused his allegiance 

recording. James G. Taliaferro, to the Confederate States. After 

delegate from the parish of Cata- the war he became president of 

houla, though a Virginian by birth the Constitutional Convention, 

and a slaveholder, presented to which, under the Reconstruction 

the convention a vigorous protest Acts, restored Louisiana to the 

against the ordinance of secession Union, and was, when he died in 

(which, however, it would not 1876, a Judge of the Supreme 

enter on its journal), and not Court of the State. 

Vol. III.— 13 



194 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XII. substancG joined the State to the rebel Confeder- 
acy, and the popular vote showed a nominal ma- 
jority for secession, though the partial returns, and 
the voting amid a local revolution, afforded no 
trustworthy indication of popular sentiment. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 

FOLLOWING the successive ordinances of se- chap. xm. 
cession passed by the Cotton States, their del- 
egations withdrew one by one from Congress. In 
this final step their Senators and Representatives 
adopted no concerted method, but went according 
to individual convenience or caprice; some mak- 
ing the briefest announcement of their withdrawal, 
others delivering addresses of considerable length. 
These parting declarations contain nothing of his- 
torical interest. They are a mere repetition of 
what they had said many times in debate: com- 
plaints of Northern aggression and allegations of 
Northern hostility ; they failed to make any state- 
ment or acknowledgment of aggressions and hos- 
tility on the part of the South against the North. 
The ceremony of withdrawal, therefore, was formal 
and perfunctory; pre-announced and recognized 
as a foregone conclusion, it attracted little atten- 
tion from Congress and the public. Only two 
cases were exceptional — that of Mr. Bouligny, 
the Representative from Louisiana, who, as already 
mentioned, remained loyal to the Union and re- 
tained his seat in the House ; and that of Senator 
Wigfall, of Texas, who, radically and outspokenly 

195 



19G ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIII. clisloyal, yet kept his seat in the Senate, not only 
through the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's term, 
but even during the special session, assembled ac- 
cording to custom, to confirm the nominations 
made by the new President immediately after his 
inauguration. 

One of the remarkable coincidences of the seces- 
sion conspiracy is, that on the same day which 
witnessed the meeting of a Peace Convention in 
Washington, to deceive and confuse the public 
opinion of the North with discussion of an impos- 
sible compromise, the delegates of the seceded 
States convened at Montgomery, Alabama, to con- 
solidate rebellion and prepare for armed resistance. 
It is not impossible that this was a piece of strategy, 
purposely designed by the secession leaders; for 
the Washington peace conference, despite its con- 
stant avowals of a desire to promote union, was 
originated and managed by the little clique of 
Virginia conspirators whose every act, if not 
preconceived, at least resulted in treasonable 
duplicity. 

The secession conventions of the Cotton States 
had appointed delegates equal in number to their 
former Senators and Representatives in Congress. 
These met in Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th day 
of February, 1861, to form a Southern Confederacy. 
The Washington caucus, it will be remembered, 
suggested the 15th of the month. But such had 
been the success, or, rather, the want of opposition 
to the movement, that it was probably considered 
advisable to hasten the programme, and instead of 
only having preliminary secession complete by the 
4th of March, to finish the whole structure of ac 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 197 

independent governmont buforo tlio inauguration cuap. xiii. 
of LincolUo Thus far Mr. Buchanan had not 
offered the slightest impediment to the insurrec- 
tion ; it might reasonably be inferred that this in- 
action on his part would continue to the end of his 
term. Mr. Lincoln would be powerless until offi- 
cially invested with the executive duties, and thus 
the formal organization of a Southern Confederacy 
could proceed at convenient leisure and in perfect 
immunity from disturbance. 

The meeting at Montgomery had its immediate 
origin in the resolutions of a committee of the 
Mississippi Legislature, adopted January 29; and isci. 
it is another evidence of the secret and swift 
concert of secession leaders, that in six days there- 
after the delegates of South Carolina, Georgia, Ala- 
bama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida were 
assembled for conference. The delegates from 
Texas joined them later on. An organization was 
effected by choosing Howell Cobb chairman, and 
the body called itself a Provisional Congress, 
though it was merely a revolutionary council, in- 
vested with no direct representation of the people, 
but appointed by the secession conventions. Its 
reactionary spirit was shown in returning to the 
antiquated and centralizing mode of voting by 
States. This same rule under the old Congress of 
the Confederation had produced nothing but delay 
and impotence, and earned deserved contempt; 
and these identical delegates, after incorporating 
the rule in their provisional scheme of government, 
immediately rejected it when framing their perma- 
nent one. We may infer that they employed it at 
the moment, because it was admirably suited to 



198 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIII. the use of cliquGS and the purposes of intrigue. 
Very Uttle more than half the delegates of four 
States could carry a measure, and the minority of 
total membership could exercise full power of leg- 
islation. A project of government was perfected 
1861. on February 8, and the name of the " Confederate 
States of America " was adopted. 

This first project was provisional only, to serve 
for one year ; and the Provisional Congi'ess retained 
legislative power for the same period. The tem- 
porary continuance of certain United States laws 
and officials was provided for. On the following 
day (February 9) it elected Jefferson Davis, of Mis- 
sissippi, President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of 
G-eorgia, Vice-President, of the new Confederacy. 
The body then set itself more seriously at work to 
prepare a permanent constitution which should go 
into effect a year later. This labor it completed 
and adopted on the 11th of March. In their perma- 
nent constitution, as in the provisional one, they 
adhered closely to the letter and spirit of the Con- 
stitution of the United States, making few changes 
other than those which the pretensions and designs 
of the rebellion made essential. 

"The new constitution professed to be estab- 
lished by 'each State acting in its sovereign and 
independent character,' instead of simply by 'we 
the people.' It provided that in newly acquired 
territory 'the institution of negro slavery, as it 
now exists in the Confederate States, shall be 
recognized and protected by Congress and by the 
Territorial Government'; also for the right of tran- 
sit and sojourn for 'slaves and other property,' and 
the right to reclaim ' slaves and other persons ' to 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDEIIACY 199 

service or labor. It did not, as consistency ra- chav. xiii. 
quired, provide for the right of secession, or deny 
the right of coercion ; on the contrary, all its impli- 
cations were against the former and in favor of the 
latter; for it declared itself to be the supreme law 
of the land, binding on the judges in every State. 
It provided for the punishment of treason; and de- 
clared that no State should enter into any treaty, 
alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque 
and reprisal, coin money, lay duties, keep troops or 
ships of war in time of peace, make any compact 
with another State or with a foreign power; — a 
sweeping practical negation of the whole heretical "The out- 
dogma of State supremacy upon which they had Reb^iou." 
built their revolt." 

Stephens, being a member of the Congress, was 
sworn into office as Vice-President February 10. isei. 
Davis, with becoming modesty, remained absent 
during the election ; being sent for, he arrived and 
was formally inaugurated on February 18. His 
inaugural address presents few salient points. In 
later times he has disavowed the fiery and belliger- 
ent harangues the newspapers reported him to have 
made on his way to assume his new duties. Per- 
haps the most important announcement of his in- 
augural was the opinion that the new Confederacy 
might welcome the border slave States ; " but be- 
yond this," he continued, "if I mistake not the 
judgment and wiU of the people, a reunion with 
the States from which we have separated is neither 
practicable nor desirable." 

Mr. Davis, in his " Rise and Fall of the Confed- 
erate Grovernment," written fifteen years after the 
war, takes some pains to make the very remark- 



200 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAh. XIII. able assertion that the South did not rebel, secede, 
and fight to preserve and extend slavery, but only 
to maintain " the equality of the States." The gen- 
eration which fought the war needs no proof of 
the incorrectness of this declaration ; but the his- 
torian of the future, without such contemporary 
knowledge, may think this claim, so gravely put 
forth by the leader of the South, possesses some 
critical value. It is therefore worth a moment's 
attention. 

Of what did the " equality of the States " con- 
sist f 1. In a portion of local sovereignty and in- 
dependence. 2. Of a Federal representation in 
government. 3. Of Federal rights of citizenship. 

An attempt to specify the details of rights and 
privileges embraced under these three general 
heads would fill a volume. They include : A right 
to territorial area, to State boundaries, to a State 
constitution, to State laws, to a governor and 
executive officers, a legislature, a judiciary, to 
senators and representatives in Congress, to Pres- 
idential electors, to elections, to taxation, to police, 
to a portion of eminent domain, to State and na- 
tional citizenship, and no end of other powers and 
incidents. 

Out of this mass of equal rights, or " equality " 
as he would call it, — equality local, equality national 
in government, equality individual under national 
laws, — he as a member of the Committee of Thir- 
teen, in the crisis of the secession controversy, 
made but one distinct allegation of privation or 
denial, namely, the right to take slave property 
into Federal Territories and national protection 
for it when there. 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 201 

If Mr. Davis could show that the North claimed cuap. xiii. 
the right for itself and denied it to the South, 
his claim, meager — almost microscopic — as it is, 
would be proved. But his argument totally fails 
when it is remembered that the North freely per- 
mitted and guaranteed to the South every prop- 
erty right in the Territories which she claimed 
for herself, and that she only denied to the 
South, as she denied to herseK, property right in 
slaves anywhere except under exclusive State 
jurisdiction. 

So much for theory. But what of practical and 
popular belief as the basis of popular action in 
secession and rebellion ? It would be impossible to 
repeat the multitude of assertions of Southern 
wi'iters, speakers, addresses of officials, and formal 
resolutions of parliamentary and legislative bodies. 
On this point we must be content to let Mississippi, 
in her secession convention assembled, refute the 
afterthought of the ex-President of the rebel Con- 
federacy. In her "Declaration of the Immediate 
Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of 
the State of Mississippi from the Federal Union," 
she said : 

Our position is thoroughly identified with the insti- 
tution of slavery — the greatest material interest in the 
world. . . A blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and 
civilization. That blow has been long aimed at the 
institution, and was at the point of reaching its con- 
summation. There was no choice left us but submission 
to the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution of the 
Union, whose principles had been subverted to work out 
our ruin. We must either submit to degradation, and 
the loss of property worth four billions of money, or we 
must secede from the Union. 



202 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIII. TMs was adopted, Satui'day, January 26, 1861, 

by the convention assembled at Jackson, Missis- 

" Journal slppl, which ordalncd secession. If we needed 

°c?nve*if-*^ any comment on this formal announcement by 

pik'86, 87.' the convention of Mississippi, one is conveniently 

furnished in the address of the commissioner 

whom that State sent to urge Georgia to secede. 

Said he; 

Mississippi is firmly convinced that there is but one 
alternative. This new union with Lincoln Black Repub- 
hcans and free negroes, without slavery; or, slavery 
under our old constitutional bond of union, without Lin- 
coln Black Republicans or free negroes either, to mo- 
lest us. ^ 

These formulas of the paramount value of the 
"institution" so abound in the literature of the se- 
cession period that it seems a waste of space to 
quote others ; and yet there is one of such promi- 
nence and authority that we cannot forbear to add 
it. The Vice-President of the Confederate States, 
Alexander H. Stephens, chosen, like Davis, because 
he felt the desire and could speak the hope of the 
South, made a speech in Savannah a few weeks 
after his inauguration, in which he explained the 
benefits and improvements of the new "Confed- 
erate " constitution. In this he said : 

The prevailing ideas entertained by him [Jefferson] and 
most of the leading statesmen at the time of the forma- 
tion of the old Constitution, were that the enslavement 
of the African was in violation of the laws of nature ; 
that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and 

1 Address made hy William L. State of Georgria. Delivered De- 
Harris, Commissioner of the State cember 17, 1860. — "Journal of 
of Mississippi, to the Senate and the State Convention " of Missis- 
House of Eepresentatives of the sippi, 1861, p. 205. 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 



203 



politically. . . Our new j^oveniment is founded upon 
exactly the opposite idea ; its foundations are laid, its 
corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the negro is 
not equal to the white man; that slavery — subordination 
to the superior race — is his natural and normal condition. 
This, our new government, is the first, in the history of 
the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, 
and moral truth. . . The substratum of our society is 
made of the material fitted by nature for it, and by ex- 
perience we know that it is best, not only for the supe- 
rior, but for the inferior race, that it should be so. It is, 
indeed, in conformity with the ordinance of the Creator. 
It is not for us to inquire into the wisdom of his ordi- 
nances, or to question them. For his own purposes he 
has made one race to differ from another, as he has made 
" one star to differ from another star in glory." The 
great objects of humanity are best attained when there is 
conformity to his laws and decrees, in the formation of 
governments as well as in all things else. Our Confed- 
eracy is founded upon principles in strict conformity with 
these laws. This stone which was rejected by the first 
builders ** is become the chief of the corner" — the real 
" corner-stone " — in our new edifice. 



Chap. XIIL 



Henry 

Cleveland, 

" Life of 

Alex. H. 

Stephens," 

pp. 721-3. 



Superficially, it appeared that the new govern- 
ment had been agreed upon among the leaders, 
with unusual harmony and unanimity; and such 
is the impression conveyed in the books wintten 
many years after by the two principal chiefs. But 
plausible reports have come down by tradition, that 
no previous legislative body had ever developed an 
equal amount of jealousy and bitterness to that 
which manifested itself in the Provisional Con- 
gress; that there were more candidates for Presi- 
dent than States in the Confederacy, Georgia alone 
having furnished four aspirants, and that the ri- 
valry between Toombs and Cobb in fact brought 
about the selection of Davis, who had openly ex- 



204 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIII. pressed his preference for the post of Greneral~in- 
Chief of the future rebel armies. Cobb might 
indeed dispute the prize of leadership with Davis, 
and especially with Toombs, who was, of all the 
candidates, least suited for such a position. It was 
Cobb who was the master spirit of secession in- 
trigue in Buchanan's Cabinet; it was Cobb who 
carried the wavering Georgia Convention into 
secession; it was Cobb who reappeared as the 
dominating power in the Montgomery Congress. 
Practically, it was Cobb who by recent secret 
manipulations had made the Confederacy possible, 
and erected the Confederate constitution. He 
might without vanity aspire to become its chief 
officer ; yet with a truer recognition of the fitness 
of things, the choice of the delegates fell upon 
Davis, who, for a longer period and with deeper 
representative characteristics, had been the real 
embodiment and head of the conspiracy. 

Jefferson Davis was born in Christian (after- 
wards Todd) County, Kentucky, June 3, 1808. 
Soon afterwards his father removed to Missis- 
sippi ; but the boy was sent to complete the edu- 
cation begun by home and academic studies, to 
Transylvania University, where he remained till 
the age of sixteen. Appointed in that year a cadet 
at the Military Academy at West Point, he received 
the thorough training of that institution, graduat- 
ing in June, 1828 ; he was then attached to the army, 
and served as a lieutenant of infantry in the Black 
Hawk war and other campaigns against the In- 
dians. He resigned his military commission in 
1835, having attained the grade of first lieutenant 
of dragoons. Returning to Mississippi, he se- 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 205 

eluded himself in plantation life, devoting his cnAP. xm. 
time largely to political studies calculated to 
qualify him for a public career. In 1843 he 
launched himself on the tide of Mississippi poli- 
tics, by a speech in the Democratic State Conven- 
tion, which attracted considerable notice. From 
the first he became a central party figure in his 
State, was made a Presidential elector in 1844, 
and chosen a Eepresentative in Congress in 1845. 
When the Mexican war broke out, Da\ds's military 
training and experience naturally carried him into 
the campaign as colonel of a volunteer regiment 
called the Mississippi Rifles ; and he rendered valu- 
able service and won deserved distinction in the 
storming of Monterey and the battle of Buena 
Vista. Returned from the war, the Governor of 
Mississippi appointed him to the United States 
Senate to fill a vacancy. When the next Legisla- 
ture met, it confirmed the Governor's choice by 
electing him for the remainder of the term; and 
a subsequent Legislature reelected him for the full 
term succeeding. 

From the beginning to the end of his public 
career Davis posed as a disciple of Calhoun and 
an advocate of the extreme doctrine of States 
rights. His maiden speech in the Mississippi Con- 
vention of 1843 was to recommend Calhoun as an 
alternative Presidential candidate ; his parting ad- 
dress on leaving the Senate in 1861 di-ew a contrast 
between Calhoun as the advocate of nullification, 
and himself as the advanced defender of secession. 
So also, when President Polk offered him a com- 
mission as brigadier-general of volunteers, to reward 
his military service in Mexico, the Quixotism which 



206 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIII. was a marked feature of Davis's character moved 
him to employ the incident for the ostentatious 
championship of States rights. He declined the 
offer, his biographer says, " on the ground that no 
such commission could be conferred by Federal 
authority, either by appointment of the President 
or by act of Congress." 

His next States-rights exploit occurred in 1851. 
A strong party in Mississippi, violently oj)posing 
the compromise measures of 1850, organized a re- 
sistance movement in that State, and undertook 
upon that issue to elect General Quitman governor 
in 1851. A preliminary election, however, in the 
month of September, showed them to be some 
seven thousand votes in the minority ; whereupon 
Quitman withdrew from the contest. Jefferson 
Davis immediately resigned his full term in the 
United States Senate and took up the canvass 
for Governor of Mississippi, which Quitman had 
abandoned. Davis's short campaign was brilliant 
but unsuccessful ; he was beaten about one thou- 
sand votes by Henry S. Foote, the Union candi- 
date, who had also resigned the remainder of his 
Senatorship to make the contest. 

The defeat appeared to have a salutary influence 
upon Davis's politics, but it proved transient. In 
the Presidential campaign of 1852 a forlorn-hope 
of the States-rights fanatics nominated Quitman 
for President. Davis, with a wiser calculation, 
forsook his reckless friends and supported Pierce ; 
and for this adhesion Pierce gave him a seat in his 
Cabinet as Secretary of War. The history of the 
Kansas trouble shows how faithful he was in 
this position to pro-slavery interests; and when 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 207 

Buchanan succeeded Pierce he again became a cuap. xiii. 
Senator for Mississippi, and assumed the leader- 
ship of the ultra-Democrats. Years afterwards he 
explained that in abandoning for a while his ex- 
treme course, he was conforming his actions to the 
decision which Mississippi pronounced in 1851 in 
favor of the Union. " His opinions," he said, " the 
result of deliberate convictions, he had no power 
to change." When, therefore, he entered the Cab- 
inet of President Pierce in 1853 as Secretary of 
War, and when again on the accession of President 
Buchanan the Legislature of Mississippi returned 
him to the Senate, he was, by his own declaration, 
and by the evidence of his subsequent words and 
deeds, only an acting Unionist, who at heart cher- 
ished the belief of Federal usurpation, and hoped 
and labored for the hour of confederated State 
resistance. 

It may not be without interest to call attention 
at this point to a few coincidences in the careers 
of Jeiferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln. They 
were both born in Kentucky — Davis in the south- 
western, Lincoln near the central part of the State. 
They were both near the same age, Davis being 
less than nine months the elder. Both were taken 
in their early years from their birthplaces — Davis's 
parents emigrating south to Mississippi, Lincoln's 
north to Indiana and Illinois. Both were soldiers 
in the Black Hawk war — Da^^s as lieutenant of 
regulars, Lincoln as captain of volunteers. Both 
were candidates for Presidential electors in 1844. 
Both were soon elected to Congress — Davis in 
1845, Lincoln in 1846. Both were successful poli- 
ticians and popular orators. Both were instinc- 



208 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIII. tively studious, iutrospective, self-contained. Both 
rose to distinction tlirough the advocacy of an ab- 
stract political idea. Both became the chiefs of 
opposing sections in a great civil war. 

These are the only points of resemblance, and 
the contrasts running through their lives are bold 
and radical. It is unnecessary to present them in 
detail; they are comprehended and expressed in 
theii* opposing leaderships. If chance or fate had 
guided their parents to exchange their routes of 
emigration from Kentucky ; if Lincoln had grown 
up on a Southern cotton plantation, and Davis had 
split rails to fence a Northern farm ; if the tall Illi- 
nois pioneer had studied trigonometry at West 
Point, and the pale Mississippi student had steered 
a flat-boat to New Orleans, education might have 
modified but would not have essentially changed 
either. Lincoln would never have become a po- 
litical dogmatist, an apostle of slavery, a leader of 
rebellion ; Davis could never have become the 
champion of universal humanity, the author of a 
decree of emancipation, the martyr to liberty. 
Their natures were antipodal, and it is perhaps by 
contemplating the contrast that the character of 
Davis may be best understood. 

His dominant mental traits were subtlety and 
will. His nature was one of reserve and pride. 
His biographers give us no glimpse of his private 
life. They show us little sympathy of companion- 
ship, or sunshine of genial humor. Houston is 
reported to have said of him that he was " as am- 
bitious as Lucifer and as cold as a lizard." His 
fancy lived in a world of masters and slaves. His 
education taught him nothing but the law of sub- 




JOHN' TYLEK. 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDEEACY 209 

ordination and the authority of command. A cuap. xiii 
Democrat by party name, he was an aristocrat in 
feeUng and practice. lie was a type of the highest 
Southern culture and most exclusive Southern 
caste. In political theory he was a sophist, and 
not a logician. With him, "consent of the gov- 
erned " in a State was truth ; " consent of the gov- 
erned " in a Territory was error. " Rebellion " in a 
State must be obeyed ; " rebellion " in a Territory 
" must be crushed." Constitutional forms in Kan- 
sas in the interest of slavery were sacred law ; con- 
stitutional forms in the Union in the interest of 
freedom were flagrant usurpation. A majority in 
a State was enthroned freedom ; a majority in the 
nation was insufferable despotism. But even his 
central dogma became pliant before considerations 
of self-interest. In his own State, a majority of 
seven thousand against Quitman in September he 
treated as a dangerous political heresy to be over- 
thrown by his personal championship. A majority 
of one thousand against himself in November he 
affected to regard as a command to stultify his 
own opinions. His beliefs were at war with the 
most essential principles of American government. 
He denied the truth of the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, denied the right of the majority to rule, 
denied the supremacy of the national Constitution. 
His narrowness was of that type which craved the 
exclusion of Northern teachers and the official cen- 
sorship of school-books to keep out "Abolition 
poison." It was in perfect keeping with his char- 
acter, and in perfect illustration of the paradoxical 
theories of his followers, that, holding the lash over 
fifty or a hundred slaves, or exercising an inflexible 
Vol. III.— 14 



210 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIII. military dictatorship over nine millions of " his 
people," he could declaim in fervid oratory against 
the despotism of a majority. 

One of his most salient traits was the endeavor 
to maintain a double position on the question of 
disunion. His leadership of the " resistance " party 
in Mississippi in 1850-51 gave him a conspicuous 
starting-point as an instigator of sedition, and 
while laboring then and afterwards to unite the 
South in extreme political demands, and in armed 
preparation for war against the Union if those 
demands were not complied with, he as constantly 
declared that he was no disunionist. Of course he 
could do this only by setting at defiance the 
plainest meaning of words and the clearest signifi- 
cance of acts. As the slavery contest drew to its 
culmination, his recklessness of assertion and an- 
tagonism of declaration on these points reached an 
extreme entitling them to be classed among the 
curiosities of abnormal mental phenomena. As a 
blind man may not be held responsible for his de- 
scription of a painting, or a deaf-mute be expected 
to repeat accurately the airs of an opera, so we can 
only explain Jefferson Davis's vehement denial of 
the charge of hypocrisy and conspiracy through a 
whole decade, by the supposition that he was in- 
capable of understanding the accepted meaning of 
such words as " patriotism," " loyalty," " allegiance," 
" faith," " honor," and " duty." On no other hy- 
pothesis can we credit the honesty of convictions 
and sincerity of expression of sentiments so dia- 
metrically opposed as the following, which occur in 
the same speech : 

Neither in that year [1852], nor in any other, have I 
ever advocated a dissolution of the Union, or a separa- 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 211 

tiou of the State of Mississippi from the Union, except as chap. xiri. 
the hist alternative, and have not considered the remedies 
whicli lie within that extreme as exhausted, or ever been 
entirely hopeless of their success. I hold now, as an- 
nounced on former occasions, that whilst occupying a 
seat in the Senate I am bound to maintain the Govern- 
ment of the Constitution, and in no manner to work for 
its destruction ; that the obligation of the oath of office, 
Mississippi's honor and my own, require that, as a Sena- 
tor of the United States, there should be no want of 
loyalty to the Constitutional Union. . . 

Whether by the House [of Representatives] or by the 
people, if an Abolitionist be chosen President of the 
United States, you will have presented to you the ques- 
tion of whether you will permit the Government to pass 
into the hands of your avowed and implacable enemies. 
Without pausing for your answer, I will state my own 
position to be that such a result would be a species of 
revolution by which the purposes of the Government 
would be destroj^ed, and the observance of its mere forms 
entitled to no respect. In that event, in such manner as 
should be most expedient, I should deem it your duty to 
provide for your safety outside of a Union with those 
who have already shown the will, and would have ac- 
quired the power, to deprive you of your birthright and 
reduce you to worse than the colonial dependence of your 
fathers. . . As when I had the privilege of addressing 
the Legislature a year ago, so now do I urge you to the 
needful preparation to meet whatever contingency may 
befall us. The maintenance of our rights against a hos- 
tile power is a physical problem and cannot be solved by 
mere resolutions. Not doubtful of what the heart will 
prompt, it is not the less proper that due provision 
should be made for physical necessities. Why should not 
the State have an armor}^ for the repair of arms, for the 
alteration of old models so as to make them conform to 
the improved weapons of the present day, and for the 
manufacture on a limited scale of new arms, including 
cannon and carriages ; the casting of shot and shells, and 
the preparation of fixed ammunition ? ^ 

1 Jefferson Davis, speech at Jaeksoii, Mississippi, Nov. 11, 1858. 
In the " Daily Mississipinan," Nov. 15, 1858. 



212 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XIII. That man is not to be envied whose reason can 
be quieted by a casuistry capable of discovering 
consistency between these and analogous proposi- 
tions. From declarations of this quality he could 
prove his record black or white, as occasion de- 
manded, and, in face of direct threats of secession 
in Mississippi, deny in the United States Senate, 
without wincing, that he had avowed disunion 
sentiments. 

Montgomery having witnessed the glories of such 
an inauguration pageant as could be extemporized, 
Davis proceeded to the appointment of his Cabinet. 
Robert Toombs, of Georgia, was made Secretary of 
State ; C. G. Memminger, of South Carolina, Secre- 
tary of the Treasury ; L. P. Walker, of Alabama, 
Secretary of War ; S. R. Mallory, of Florida, Secre- 
tary of the Navy ; J. H. Reagan, of Texas, Post- 
master-General ; and J. P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, 
Attorney-General. Various acts of the Provisional 
Congress authorized the new executive to continue 
the organization of the provisional government of 
the Confederate States. A regular army of about 
10,000 men was ordered to be established ; a navy 
of 10 steam gun-boats authorized to be constructed 
or purchased; 100,000 volunteers for 12 months 
authorized to be enlisted, and existing State troops 
to be received into the provisional army. A loan of 
$15,000,000 was authorized, and an export duty on 
cotton of i cent per pound levied, to pay principal 
and interest. Among the first executive acts, 
Davis assumed control of military operations in the 
several seceded States ; and his Secretary of War 
1861. (March 9) made a requisition for 11,000 volun- 
teers, for contingent service at Charleston, Pensa- 



THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY 213 

cola, and otlier points. Agents were dispatched to chai-. xiil 
Europe to pm*chase material of war ; and to obtain 
if possible a recognition of the Confederate States 
by foreign powers. As a matter of the greatest 
immediate necessity, a commission of three persons 
was appointed to proceed to Washington, to bring- 
about the peaceful acquiescence of the United 
States in the dismemberment of the Union. 



CHAPTER XIV 



FAILURE OF COMPROMISE 



Chap. XIV. ^^7"E liave Seen under what discouraging cir- 
T T cumstanees the House Committee of Thirty- 
three entered upon its allotted work of preparing a 
Congressional compromise. The extreme Southern 
members had in advance announced the futility of 
any such effort, while the central cabal of the con- 
spirators, in open contempt of the Dunn resolution, 
I860. issued their secession manifesto of December 14. 
Nevertheless, the committee continued to meet 
from time to time, and with commendable indus- 
try attacked the chaos of conflicting propositions 
referred to it by the House, or submitted by its 
members. But a very few meetings rendered it 
evident that its labors were foredoomed to failure. 
Two of the members, Boyce, of South Carolina, 
and Hawkins, of Florida, refused to attend even 
a single session. Reuben Davis, of Mississippi, 
attended, to carry out his purpose, which, as an- 
nounced openly in the House, was to act as a spy 
upon its proceedings, and to "prevent its being 
« Globe," made a means of deception " to " arrest the present 
^^ p!59.^^*'' noble and manly movements of the Southern States." 
After the occupation of Sumter and the accession 
of the Cabinet regime, with its change of policy and 



FAILUKE OF COMPROMISE 215 

its earnest efforts in defense of the Union, the mem- cuap. xiv. 
bers of the Committee from the Cotton States, with 
the exception of Hamilton, of Texas, absented 
themselves in a body. In so far, therefore, as it 
concerned the seceding States, the pi-oceedings be- 
came a mere formality, since the faction designed 
to be conciliated refused to take part in or to be 
bound by its transactions. 

If this manoeuvre on the part of the malcontents 
was designed to produce discord between the Re- 
publicans and the Union Meml^ers from the border 
States, it failed of its object. The chairman, Thomas 
Corwin, was by nature a peacemaker, genial, elo- 
quent, witty, and eminently conservative in temper 
and purpose. There were radically different views 
in the Committee, which all discussion failed to har- 
monize in any effective shape, but the deliberations 
were amicable, and furnished throughout no occa- 
sion for disruption or explosion. The general ef- 
fect upon the border-State men was undoubtedly 
good, and convinced them better than could have 
been done in the open House, or by mere personal 
intercourse, that the "Black Republicans" were 
not so terrible as they had been painted. 

The border-State men were, for the most part, 
sincere Unionists. The only danger in their case 
was that they might take fright at merely imagi- 
nary intentions of radicalism ascribed so freely and 
so gratuitously by the South to the North. This 
danger the labors of the Committee helped to 
dissipate, and, on the other hand, the designs of 
the fire-eaters themselves were cleverly unmasked 
by its proceedings. Charles Francis Adams, the 
Massachusetts member, submitted a resolution on 



216 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIV. the 8th of January, affirming "that the peaceful 
acquiescence in the election of a Chief Magistrate 
in accordance with every legal and constitutional 
requirement is the paramount duty of every good 
citizen of the United States." One would have 
thought that so simple and so sound a declaration 
could encounter no objection; but the uncertain 
temper of the times in matters of political faith 
and duty is illustrated in the fact that the Virginia 
member at once moved to amend by reducing the 
positive term, "paramount duty," to the phrase, 
"high and imperative duty." It was thus modi- 
fied to meet tender Southern susceptibilities. But 
many who believed themselves conservatives shrank 
from even this diluted loyalty. Seven members 
"the^oJn*^* from slave States entered on the journal of the 
Houll'^Re- Committee their refusal to vote for it, on the ground 
M'se^^on,' that it did not tend to promote adjustment or con- 

36th Con- . 1 i rN • 1 J.' 

giese. template Congressional action. 

The sessions of the Committee, doubtless has- 
tened by the secession of State after State during 
the first fortnight of the new year, came to a ter- 
mination with the report of the chairman on the 
14th of January, 1861. With the explanation that, 
though not unanimous, a majority of a quorum 
had in each instance been obtained, he submitted 
to the House a series of six propositions, as follows : 

First. A series of declaratory resolutions, affirming in 
substance : 1. Slavery exists by law and usage in fifteen 
States, and we recognize no outside authority to interfere 
with it. 2. The fugitive-slave law should be faithfully 
executed. 3. There is no cause for a dissolution of the 
Union, 4. States must observe their constitutional obli- 
gations. 5. The Union must be preserved. 6. Personal 
liberty bills and kindred legislation should be revised, 



FAILUEE OF COMPROMISE 



217 



and all rights of traveling or sojourning citizens of other cuap.xiv. 
States should be secured. 7. Jolm Brown raids should 
be prevented. 

Second. A joint resolution requesting all States to revise 
their statutes and repeal all laws in conflict with, or tend- 
ing to hinder or embarrass, tlie fugitive-slave law. 

Third. A bill to amend the fugitive-slave law, giving 
the fugitive a jury trial in the State from which he fled, 
with aid of counsel and process for procuring evidence 
at the cost of the United States, and to be delivered to 
claimant, or returned to the place of arrest, according to 
judgment, at the expense of the United States. 

Fourth. A bill to amend the act for the rendition of 
fugitives from justice, giving Federal judges, instead of 
governors of States, authority to act on requisitions. 

Fifth. A bill to admit New Mexico as a State with or 
without slavery. 

Sixth. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, to the effect that 
no amendment to interfere with slavery within the States 
shall originate with any non-slave-holding State, or be- 
come valid without the assent of every one of the States 
composing the Union. 

These propositions had undoubtedly been adopted 
in committee by the surrender of strong prejudices 
and feelings, and as between members assenting 
to them formed a substantial compromise. But 
accompanying this report of the chairman were 
no less than seven minority reports, signed in the 
aggregate by fourteen members, dissenting from 
the main report upon grounds verging towards 
either extreme of the general dispute. Add these 
fourteen dissenters to the habitual absentees, rep- 
resenting the Cotton States, and it at once became 
manifest that the apparent majority report was 
in reality only an opinion of a minority of the 
Committee, and that, as a practical fact and truth- 
ful basis of legislation, the Committee should simply 



House Re- 
port, >'o. 31, 
2d .'Session, 

36th Con- 
greaa. 



218 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIV. havG reported its inability to reach any mature and 
binding conclusion. This view of the matter was 
tacitly taken by the House of Representatives, 
since these propositions were not brought to a 
vote in that body until near the close of the ses- 
sion, long after Congressional compromise ceased 
to have any virtue as a healing remedy. 

While Mr. Corwin's report was purely negative, 
while it shrank from truth and danger, and so far 
from doing good was calculated still further to 
mislead the public into a false confidence, his con- 
tact with the rebel sentiment in the Committee had 
fully informed and awakened him to the startling 
signs of rebellion. He communicated his forebod- 
ings in a private letter, two days afterwards, to the 
President-elect : 

I have been for thirty days in a Committee of Thirty- 
three. If the States are no more harmonious in their 
feelings and opinions than these thirty-three represent- 
ative men, then, appalling as the idea is, we must dis- 
solve, and a long and bloody civil war must follow. I 
cannot comprehend the madness of the times. Southern 
men are theoretically crazy. Extreme Northern men are 
practical fools. The latter are really quite as mad as the 
former. Treason is in the air around us everywhere. It 
goes by the name of patriotism. Men in Congress boldly 
avow it, and the public offices are full of acknowledged 
secessionists. Cod alone, I fear, can help us. Four or five 
States are gone, others are driving before the gale. I have 
^ . , looked on this horrid picture till I have been able to gaze 
Lincoln, on it With perfect calmness. I think, if you live, you may 

Jan. 16. 1861. , 1 iT, .1 

MS. take the oatn. 

And at this point the sincere but despairing 
statesman, not daring to trust himself in express- 
ing his evident loss of faith in the Union, abruptly 
changes the subject. 



FAILURE OF COMPROMISE 219 

The Senate Committee of Thirteen fared no lict- cuai-. xiv. 
tor. It will be remembered that it was ordered by- 
vote of the Senate on December 18, and ap[)()inted "oioiif." 
by the Vice-President on the 20th. The announce- v'un. ' 
ment of the Committee brought Senator Jefferson 
Davis to his feet, with a request that the Senate 
would excuse him from serving. " The position 
which I am known to occupy," he said, " and the 
position in which the State I represent now stands, 
render it altogether impossible for me to serve 
upon that Committee with any prospect of advan- 
tage." The Senate voted to excuse him ; but on the ibid, 
following day, to the general surprise, it was moved 
to reconsider this vote in order that he might serve. 
Several Republicans pressed for an explanation of 
this change of purpose, when it came out that his 
" friends from his section of the country," " enter- 
taining the same opinions " with himself, had cau- 
cused with him on the subject and had prevailed 
upon him to withdi*aw his objections and go on ••Giohe," 
the Committee. This action, although strange at *^m.'^' 
the time, becomes intelligible enough when we re- 
member that it occurred on and following the day 
of the South Carolina secession ordinance, while Mr. 
Buchanan was deliberating on Governor Pickens's 
letter demanding Sumter, and while Floyd was 
wi-iting his surrender instructions ; in short, when 
the conspirators' intrigue was in its most promis- 
ing stage of progress. This being the situation, it 
was their manifest policy, not only to keep a posi- 
tion which might furnish them useful information, 
but also lure on the Administration with the tempt- 
ing bait of compromise and to throw upon the 
RepubUcans and the North the burden of rejecting 



220 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIV. proffei's of peacG and good-will. That Davis did 
not himself originally see the point was probably 
owing to a want of some information about the 
events occurring thick and fast, at the moment he 
made his objection ; that he appreciated the force 
of the advice is shown by his ready acceptance 
of it. 

It needed but little deliberation to develop the 
irreconcilable antagonism of principles and pm*- 
poses which existed in the Committee; and the 
record of its proceedings is of historical interest 
only so far as it shows the individual positions of 
such members as reduced their pohtical schemes to 
writing and submitted them for its action. The 
following is believed to be a fair and brief summary 
of the proposed constitutional amendments in the 
order in which they were presented : 

TOOlVrBS'S PLAN. 

Recognition and protection to property in slaves every- 
where except as limited and prohibited by State laws ; 
surrender of fugitive slaves without writ of habeas corpus 
or jury trial ; no enactment of Congressional laws concern- 
ing slavery without consent of a majority of Senators 
and Representatives from slave-holding States ; no alter- 
ation of these or other constitutional provisions on 
slavery (except of the African slave trade) without consent 
of each and every slave State. 

JEFFERSON DAVIS'S PLAN.l 

Property in slaves shall stand on the same footing in 
all constitutional and Federal relations as other property. 

1 The following from the official submitted by Jefferson Davis : 

journal of the Committee of " Resolved, That it shall be de- 

Thirteen(SenateReport, No. 288, elared by amendment of the 

2d Session, 36th Congress) is Constitution, that property in 

the full text of the proposition slaves, recognized as such by the 



FAILUKE OF COMPROMISE 221 

CRITTENDKN's plan. CiiAi'. XIV. 

1. Restoration and extension of the Missouri Compro- 
mise line ; no abolition of slavery in the District of Colum- 
bia without compensation and voters' consent, or during 
its existence in Virginia and Maryland ; no other Congres- 
sional prohibition or abolition of slavery ; right of trans- 
portation and compensation for rescued f ngitiv(\s ; no 
future constitutional amendment to affect this or otlier 
slavery provision. 

2. Certain amendments of fugitive-slave law ; complete 
suppression of the African slave trade. 

3. Prohibition of slavery north of 3G° 30' ; power t(j 
divide New Mexico at the discretion of ('ongress, and 
admit States thus formed, with or without slavery. 

DOUGLAS'S PLAN. 

The status of each Territory, as now existing by law, 
to remain unchanged ; to be admitted as a State, with or 
without slavery, on attaining 50,000 population; each 
Territory in the mean while to have a delegate in the 
House and a delegate in the Senate ; no further acqui- 
sition of territory, except by a two-thirds vote of each 
House of Congress, its status, when acquired, to remain 
unchanged until it attains 50,000 population, then to 
become a Territory ; the judicial power and the fugitive- 
slave law to apply to Territories and new States. 

No elective or office-holding franchise for the African 
race ; power to acquire territory for colonization at Gov- 
ernment expense ; no power to abolish slavery in Federal 
places within slave States ; no abolition of slavery in the 
District of Columbia without compensation or voters' 
consent, or during its existence in Virginia and Mary- 
land ; no Congressional prohibition of transportation ; 

local law of any of the States of other State, either in escape 
the Union, shall stand on the thereto or of transit or sojourn 
same footing in all constitutional of the owner therein; and in no 
and Federal relations as any other case whatever shall such prop- 
species of property so recognized; erty be subject to be divested or 
and, like other property, shall impaired by any legislative act 
not be subject to be divested or of the United States or of any of 
impaired by the local law of any the Territories thereof." 



222 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIV. Complete suppression of the African slave trade; com- 
pensation for rescued fugitives ; no future constitutional 
amendments on slavery. 

SEWARD'S PLAN. 

No constitutional amendment to authorize Congress to 
abolish slavery in States ; jury trial for fugitives ; Con- 
gress to request a revision of obnoxious State legisla- 
tion. 

bigler's plan. 

Extension of line of 36° 30', with slaverj' and provision 
for four States south of it, and freedom and provision for 
eight States north of it ; no abolition in the District of 
Columbia while slavery exists in Maryland or Virginia ; 
no future slavery amendments. 

rice's plan. 

Repeal all territorial governments ; divide the Federal 

Territories by the line of 36° 30' ; call that portion north 

of it the '' State of Washington," and that south of it the 

" State of Jefferson " ; make provision in each case that 

whenever any portion within an area of 60,000 square 

RepOTt*No. ™iles contains 130,000 inhabitants, a new State may be 

^sfou^^eth ^o^™6^ ^^^ admitted, with such boundaries as Congress 

Congress, may prescribe. 

Without examining in detail the votes on these 
varied and conflicting propositions, it is enough to 
say that not a single one of them commended 
itself to the Committee as a practical basis of com- 
promise ; and, after four meetings, the chairman 
reported to the Senate on the 31st of December, 
1860, "that the Committee have not been able to 
Ibid. agree upon any general plan of adjustment." 

So far, therefore, from bringing about harmony 
of views and action, the labors of the Committee of 
Thirteen had served only to define and sharpen 
political differences. Notwithstanding all this dis- 



FAILUKE OF COMPROMISE 223 

couragement, however, the idea of compromise was cnxi-. xrv. 
clung to with tenacity. The declared conviction 
of parties as they stood admitted of no arrange- 
ment ; but it was argued that extreme views 
should not be permitted to plunge the country 
into civil war. The necessity for agreement was 
freely conceded, but the embarrassment of the 
situation lay in the difficulty of defining who it 
was that held the extreme views which were to 
be abandoned. 

The politicians and representative men of the 
border States were naturally most anxious and 
officious in the interest of a compromise. The 
border States had a close interest and sympathy 
with the South because, like them, they possessed 
the institution of slavery, and were therefore sensi- 
tive to whatever touched or threatened its welfare 
or safety. But they were also bound to the Nortli 
by advantages of commerce and intercourse ; and 
their personal and political relationships extended 
alike to each section. Moreover, they rightly di- 
vined that in case of a conflict they would be apt 
to become the heaviest suiferers, since their soil 
must be the inevitable battlefield. To these mo- 
tives were added that of appreciating the varied 
benefits of the general Grovernment, and the patri- 
otic one of sincerely entertaining a deep-seated 
attachment to the Union. 

It has been stated that Boteler, of Virginia, and 
Powell, of Kentucky, were the originators of these 
two committees of Congress. The real leader of 
the compromise movement in its larger aspects was 
Senator John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky. His 
seventy-two years made him venerable in appear- 



224 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ciiAP.xiv. auce. He had been, in addition to holding lesser 
offices, a member of two Cabinets, Grovernor of his 
State, and six times Senator of the United States ; 
his full sheaf of political honors justly rendered 
him a man of national rank and authority. With- 
out the brilliant qualities of Clay, he was deemed 
the most acceptable successor of that eminent 
statesman ; and he now hoped to repeat the latter's 
memorable public service in stilling the great po- 
litical storm of 1850. 

Thi-ee days after the report of the Committee of 
Thirteen, Mr. Crittenden once more brought for- 
ward his compromise plan, previously submitted 
both to the Senate and to the Committee, which 
declared: "That provision ought to be made by 
law, without delay, for taking the sense of the 
people, and submitting to then- vote the follow- 
ing resolutions as the basis for the final and per- 
manent settlement of those disputes that now 
disturb the peace of the country and threaten the 
existence of the Union." " Sir," said he, in explana- 
tion, "it maybe that we are spell-bound in our party 
politics and in opinions which they have generated 
and fastened and bound upon us against our will ; 
but I appeal with confidence to that great source 
from which we derive our power. When the 
people are in danger, and the people's institu- 
tions, I appeal with confidence to them. If we are 
at fault, if we cannot combine the requisite ma- 
jority here to propose amendments to the Consti- 
tution, which may be necessary to the settlement 
of our present difficulties, the people can. Give us 
"Globe " their voice and their judgment, and they will be our 
•""p-lsr'' safest guides." 



t „.v 







FAILURE OF COMPROMISE 225 

Considering Mr. Crittenden's representative char- cuap. xiv. 
acter, liis far-reaching political influence, his un- 
conditional devotion to the Union, his honorable 
record against the abrogation of the Missouri Com- 
promise, and against the Lecompton fraud, his 
condemnation of the heresy of secession and non- 
coercion, and, in addition to all, his persuasive elo- 
quence in private and in public, great hopes were 
for a while entertained that his name and figure 
would become a successful rallying point for agree- 
ment. Persons who thought this, however, failed 
to note the well-defined attitudes into which the 
contending parties had separated. Mr. Critten- 
den's plan was brought to a test vote on the 16th 
of January, two days after the report of the House isei. 
Committee of Thirty-thi'ee. Its main feature was 
the reenactment of the Missouri Compromise, 
which had been repealed at Mr. Douglas's instance, 
and the application of its provisions to all remain- 
ing Federal territory — that is, that slavery should 
exist south of the line 36° 30' and be prohibited 
north of it. The resolutions also provided that 
the prohibition should extend to future acquisi- 
tions north of the line; and upon motion of Mr. 
Powell, an amendment was adopted that slavery 
should also exist in future acquisitions south of 
it. It had been argued in favor of the plan that it 
definitely settled the status of aU Federal tem- 
tory ; but under this amendment the plan became 
what would be simply the preliminary chapter of 
a new conflict between the sections for a new bal- 
ance or preponderance of power through annexa- 
tion. This was pouring oil on the fire instead of 
quenching it. 
Vol. III.— 15 



226 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XIV. The Eepublican Senators, and the Republican 
party that had won the Presidential victory at the 
November election upon the distinct issue of "no 
extension of slavery," could not accept the propo- 
sition in this shape; they could not even do so 
without the Powell amendment. They were com- 
pelled to insist that the South must submit to the 
legally expressed will of the majority. To recede 
from this was not only the destruction of the Ee- 
publican party; it was the abandonment of gov- 
ernment. The Republican Senators therefore laid 
down their ultimatum in an amendment offered by 
Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, to strike out the 
Crittenden resolutions and amendment, and substi- 
tute the following declaration : 

That the provisions of the Constitution are ample for 
the preservation of the Union and the protection of all 
the material interests of the country ; that it needs to be 
obeyed rather than amended; and that an extrication 
from our present dangers is to be looked for in strenuous 
efforts to preserve the peace, protect the pubhc property, 
and enforce the laws, rather than in new guarantees for 
particular interests, compromises for particular difficul- 
ties, or concessions to unreasonable demands. 

That all attempts to dissolve the present Union, or 
overthrow or abandon the present Constitution, with the 
hope or expectation of constructing a new one, are dan- 
gerous, illusory, and destructive ; that in the opinion of 
the Senate of the United States no such reconstruction 
is practicable, and, therefore, to the maintenance of the 
existing Union and Constitution should be directed all 
"Globe." the energies of all the departments of the Government, 

Jan,16,1861, T ,, ffl. , n M J -i- 

p. 404. and the efforts of all good citizens. 

If the Republicans were not willing to accept the 
Crittenden compromise, the extreme Southern Sen- 
ators were still less so. Upon the question being 



FAILURE OF COMPROMISE 



227 



taken in the Senate, six of the latter refused to 
vote, and thus took upon themselves the responsi- 
bility of effectually killing the Crittenden resolu- 
tions by allowing the Clark substitute to be adopted 
— yeas, 25; nays, 23. The conspirators acted on 
the assumption that their plans were now suffi- 
ciently ripe to enable them to ventm-e on so bold 
an expedient. 

Mr. Crittenden was greatly cast down by the 
result, but not yet entirely despondent. Notice 
was given of a motion to reconsider the vote ; and 
on the following day he telegraphed to friends in 
North Carolina, " In reply, the vote against my 
resolutions will be reconsidered. Their failure was 
the result of the refusal of six Southern Senators 
to vote. There is yet good hope of success." The 
conspirators were, however, not only better in- 
formed, but inflexibly resolved that so far at least 
as they were concerned the veteran statesman's 
prediction should not be verified. 

Compromise, thus twice defeated, was neverthe- 
less so prevalent an idea, or rather seemed so neces- 
sary an expedient, that it once more made its 
appearance in a new shape, and again for a season 
claimed the attention of the country and of Con- 
gress, through the del liberations of an assembly, 
somewhat anomalous in character and authority, 
known to history as the " Peace Convention." 
The particulars of its origin have never been 
made public, though it is stated that the call was 
mainly the work of ex-President Tyler. On the 
19th of January the Legislature of Virginia passed 
a series of resolutions inviting the other States of 
the Union to send commissioners to meet in Wash- 



ciiAP. xrv. 



" Globe," 

Jan.lG,l8Gl, 

p. 409. 



McPlier- 
8on, p. 39 



Henry A. 

Wise, 

" Seven 

Decades,' 

p. 271. 

1861. 
L. E. cut 
tenden, 
" Peace 
Conven- 
tion," p. 9. 



228 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XIV. ington on the 4th day of February " to unite with 
1861. Virginia in an earnest effort to adjust the present 
unhappy controversies, in the spirit in which the 
Constitution was originally formed, and consist- 
ently with its principles, so as to afford to the 
people of the slave-holding States adequate guar- 
antees for the security of their rights." One of the 
resolutions suggested the Crittenden plan as a 
basis of such adjustment. If the convention should 
recommend amendments to the Federal Constitu- 
tion, it was to communicate them to Congress for 
the purpose of having the same submitted by that 
body to the several States for ratification. The 
resolutions further provided that in the mean while 
ex-President Tyler should call upon President 

Chittenden, Buchauau, and Judge John Robertson should visit 
conven- the seccdcd States, to induce both parties to abstain 

tion,"pp. „ . . 

9, 10. irom a collision oi arms. 

The result of Tyler's mission has already been 
mentioned. Buchanan, professing to have no au- 
thority to bind the hands of the Government, 
nevertheless gave an implied promise by send- 
ing a special message to Congress, transmitting 
the Virginia resolutions, and asking that body to 
abstain from legislation calculated to produce a 
collision of arms during the contemplated conven- 
tion. Judge Robertson's visit to the seceded States 
proved worse than barren. The Cotton States were 
all willing enough to promise to keep the peace, 
because they had already made their movements 
seizing the forts and arsenals, and were now stand- 
ing on the defensive. As to commissioners, they 
proposed to send them to Montgomery instead of 
Washington. The replies made by Governors and 



FAILURE OF COMPROMISE 



Legislatures were framed, not to promote union, 
but to work on the sympathies of Virginia for r(;- 
bellion, and had their intended effect. Starting ont 
as an apostle, Robertson came home a pervert. 
" So far as my opportunities have enabled me to 
judge," says his report, "the people and authorities 
of the Southern Confederacy are resolved, inflexi- 
bly and with unparalleled unanimity, to meet all 
the consequences of the step they have taken. 
Judging from the same opportunities, I believe 
that at this time they ardently desire to be re- 
united with the States whose institutions, inter- 
ests, rights, and feelings are similar to their own — 
with those States and with them only. For Virginia, 
most especially, they express and manifest the high- 
est respect and deference. They are, to a far greater 
extent than I had ever conceived, by birth bone of 
her bone and flesh of her flesh. Her ancient fame 
they regard as their rightful inheritance." 

When the Peace Convention organized, com- 
missioners from fourteen States, namely, Rhode 
Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, New 
Hampshii-e, Vermont, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, North Carolina, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and 
Kentucky, appeared to take their seats. At sub- 
sequent periods, seven additional States, Tennes- 
see, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Maine, 
Illinois, and Kansas, also sent commissioners; so 
that before the close of the proceedings twenty-one 
States were represented, some of the commission- 
ers having been appointed by the Legislatures and 
others by the Governors. The body was not only 
respectable in the standing and talents of its mem- 
bers, but comprised many names highest in leader- 



Robertson 
to Gov. 
Letcher, 
Feb. 25,1861. 
Virginia 
Sen;ite 
.lournal 

and Doeii- 
nicut.s, 

Extra 8e.s- 

slon, 1861. 



230 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cuAP.xiv. ship: Lot M. Morrill, of Maine; George S. Boutwell, 
of Massachusetts; David Dudley Field, of New York; 
Frederick T. Frelinghuyseu, of New Jersey ; David 
Wilmot, of Pennsylvania ; Reverdy Johnson, of 
Maryland ; George W. Summers, of Virginia ; James 
Guthrie, of Kentucky ; Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio ; 
Stephen T. Logan, of Illinois ; James Harlan, of 
Iowa, and others. But from the first it was a half- 
hearted, lame, and deceptive movement. The very 
conditions of its existence crippled and paralyzed 
it. The call was "to afford to the people of the 
slave-holding States adequate guarantees for the 
security of their rights." The Northern States 
denied any such necessity. They thought they 
saw in this scheme only a new effort on the part of 
the slave-holding interest to extort that which it 
had failed to gain at the polls, and by the subse- 
quent threat and movement of secession. There 
was considerable hesitation in sendiDg Northern 
delegates, and it was finally done merely to parry 
misconstruction and the imputation of sectional 
hostility. The representation was incomplete — 
California, Oregon, Minnesota, Michigan, and Wis- 
consin were absent from the North ; the seven 
seceded States and Arkansas from the South. The 
assemblage had neither legal authority nor full 
popular confidence. It adopted the absurd and 
illogical method of voting by States, thereby re- 
ducing its representative character at least one- 
half, and setting each separate delegation into 
active discord. It developed all the usual weak- 
nesses of deliberative bodies, irrelevant talk, per- 
sonal jealousy, and parliamentary tricks. Its worst 
derelictions, however, were the prevailing vices of 



FAILUIiE OF COMPROMISE 231 

the period, want of candor, and tlie evasion of cuap.xiv 
palpable and overshadowing issues. 

Ex-President Tyler was called to preside over 
the convention, and Guthrie, of Kentucky, placed at 
the head of the leading committee. By February ikoi. 
15 this committee reported a series of propositions 
to form a constitutional amendment, the chief 
feature of which was a reenactment of the Mis- 
souri Compromise ; in other words, to divide the 
present Territories by the parallel of 36° 30', pro- 
hibiting slavery north and permitting it south of 
that line, and imposing such restrictions upon the 
acquisition of new territory as to amount to a vir- 

^ 1 /» 1 Chittenden, 

tual interdiction. These, with a number oi second- p- i-^- 
ary features and several minority reports and 
amendments, were debated until the 27th, when 
these main features of the committee's project 
were substantially adopted by the close vote of nine 
States in the affirmative and eight States in the 
negative. According to this vote it seemed that pp.Lo'.'ui. 
the convention had agreed upon the Crittenden 
plan, but the result was only an apparent one. 
The previous afternoon, February 26, had demon- 
strated the failure of the convention ; for on that 
day a test vote was taken and the line of 36° 30' re- 
jected, eight to eleven — Delaware, Kentucky, Mary- 
land, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and Tennessee voting aye, and Connecticut, Illinois, 
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, 
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Vermont, and ibid., p. 438. 
Virginia voting no. 

The sentiment and attitude of the members may 
be classified under four heads. 1. A very small 
minority of Southerners demanding extreme con- 



232 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIV. CGSsions to slavery and, as the alternative, bent on 
secession. 2. Republicans who demanded acquies- 
cence in Lincoln's election. 3. Southern unionists 
asking moderate guarantees for slavery, but who 
could not promise that granting them would bring 
back the seceded States. 4. Northern unionists 
willing to concede almost anything for compromise. 
This divergence of opinion rendered the action of 
the convention wholly negative. Every proposition 
met abundant objection but no sufficient support. 
Troublesome queries were thrust aside, not an- 
swered. The convention would vote neither on 
the right of secession nor the duty of coercion. 

All these circumstances, of course, lessened the 
public interest in its final action. The delibera- 
tions were held with closed doors; but the sub- 
stance of its daily proceedings found report in the 
leading newspapers. The rejection of the line of 
1861. 36° 30' on February 26 was the logical termina- 
tion of its labors ; and precisely what produced the 
reversal of its action, and the adoption of that 
identical plan on the following day, has never been 
satisfactorily explained. The journals show that 
the vote of Illinois was changed ; the vote of New 
York not counted, upon merely technical grounds ; 
and the vote of Missouri not cast, the reasons not 
being given. An adjourned evening meeting and 
some informal caucusing which intervened, both of 
which are mentioned, may have had their occult in- 
fluence. At all events the change of attitude and 
the adoption of a positive proposition was merely 
formal and reflected neither the conviction nor 
will of the convention ; the affirmative vote being 
less than a majority of the States represented. 



FAILURE OF COMPROMISE 233 

Nevertheless it was treated as a genuine compro- chai-. xiv. 
mise. A hundred guns were fired to celebrate the 
event, and the proposed amendinont was gravely 
transmitted to Congress. Only live days of the 
session yet remained and the House refused even 
to receive it. In the Senate it elicited some debate, 
and Mr. Crittenden assumed its championship, 
moving to substitute it for his own renewed and 
pending proposition. The Senate, however, clearly .'Gi<.i)e," 
understood its worthlessness and, by ayes 7, noes p.iios. ' 
28, voted down the amendment. 



CHAPTER XV 



THB CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 



Chap. XV. npHOUGrH the efforts for compromise which we 
-L have related failed in the specific form in which 
they were presented to Congress, they were not en- 
tirely barren of result. At a point where it was least 
expected, they contributed to the adoption by Con- 
gress of a measure of adjustment which might have 
restored harmony to the country if the movement 
of the Cotton States had not been originated and 
controlled by a conspiracy bent upon rebellion as 
its prime and ultimate object. 

The report of the Committee of Thirty-three was 
1861, made about the middle of January, but at that time 
none of its six propositions, or recommendations, 
commanded the attention of the House. The se- 
cession stage of the revolution was just culminating. 
All was excitement and surprise over the ordinances 
of the Cotton States, and the seizui-e, without actual 
collision or bloodshed, of the several Southern forts 
and arsenals. The retirement of the Southern 
Members of Congress, and the meeting of the 
revolutionary leaders to unite and construct their 
provisional government at Montgomery, prolonged 
what was to the public a succession of di'amatic 
and spectacular incidents, resembling the move- 

234 



THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 235 

ments of a political campaign rather than the chai-.xv. 
serious progress of a piece of orderly, business-like 
statesmanship. 

The North could not yet believe that the designs 
of the Cotton-State hotspurs were so desperate. 
The more conservative Congressmen from the 
North and from the border States still hoped that 
good might come if an effort of conciliation and 
compromise were once more renewed. Accordingly, 
near the close of the session (February 27, 1861), 
Mr. Corwin, Chau*man of the House Committee of 
Thirty-three, brought forward one of the proposi- 
tions which had been reported more than a month 
before from his Committee. The original report 
proposed, in substance, an amendment of the Con- 
stitution providing that any constitutional inter- 
ference with slavery must originate with the slave 
States, and have the unanimous assent of all the 
States to become valid. Mr. Corwin, by an amend- 
ment, changed the phraseology and purport to the 
following : 

Art. 13. No amendment shall be made to the Consti- 
tution which wiU authorize or give to Congress the 
power to abolish or interfere within any State with the 
domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons 
held to labor or ser\ice by the laws of said State. 

This amendment was adopted by the House on 
February 28, yeas 133, nays 65; the Senate also isei, p. im 
passed it during the night preceding the 4th of 
March, though in the journals of Congress it ap- 
pears dated as of March 2. The variation is ex- 
plained by the fact that the legislative day of the 
journal frequently runs through two or more cal- 
endar days. In that body the vote was, yeas 24, p^lm. 



236 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XV, nays 12, and it was approved by President Buch- 
anan, probably only an hour or two before the 
inauguration of his successor. 

Mr. Lincoln alluded to this amendment in his 
inaugural address, reciting its substance and giv- 
ing it his unreserved approval. "I understand," 
he said, " a proposed amendment to the Constitu- 
tion — which amendment, however, I have not 
seen — has passed Congress, to the effect that the 
Federal Government shall never interfere with 
the domestic institutions of the States, including 
that of persons held to service. To avoid miscon- 
struction of what I have said, I depart from my 
purpose not to speak of particular amendments so 
far as to say that, holding such a provision to now 
be implied constitutional law, I have no objection 
to its being made express and irrevocable." The 
new Administration soon after transmitted this 
joint resolution to the several States to receive 
theii' official action. But nothing came of it. The 
South gave no response to the overture for peace, 
and in the North it was lost sight of amid the over- 
shadowing events that immediately preceded the 
outbreak of hostilities. 

While no practical benefit grew out of the 
constitutional amendment, other measures were 
adopted by Congress, which proved of value later 
in the struggle. The retirement of the Southern 
Members gave the Republicans a certain power of 
legislation in both branches, though under condi- 
tions which required them to be circumspect and 
conservative. Indeed, their policy during this 
stormy and difficult period was to remain strictly 
on the defensive. They must wait patiently until 



THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT '2,U 

Mr. Buchanan's term should expire, and until Mr. cuai-. xv. 
Lincoln could be inaugurated and assume control 
of the executive functions. We find, therefore, 
in the Congressional debates only so much party 
assertion as declared that they would not recede 
from the position taken by the party and indorsed 
by the people in the Presidential election. Indeed, 
it may be said that they did not fully maintain 
their position. They consented to the passage of 
the bills organizing the new Territories of Colorado, 
Dakota, and Nevada, without insisting that they 
should contain a prohibition of slavery. While 
this might be regarded as an important concession, 
and was claimed by Douglas as an abandonment of 
the Chicago platform, yet by this moderation they 
perhaps also secured the admission of Kansas into 
the Union as a free State, which greatly strength- 
ened their power in the Senate. 

So, again, on the other hand, thej^ yielded a point 
to which perhaps it might have been more prudent 
to adhere. The Select Committee of Five and the 
Military Committee of the House had recommended 
three measures of considerable present and pros- 
pective importance. One was a bill to pro\4de for 
calling forth the militia, designed to supply the 
President with military power to execute the laws. 
Another to provide for the collection of duties on 
board a ship, where the custom-house could not be 
used, was intended to meet pending difficulties in 
Charleston harbor. Another was a proposition to 
amend the force bill of 1795. If these acts had be- 
come laws, they might, perhaps, have furnished the 
incoming Administration with at least a part of 
the legal authority for which Lincoln was obliged 



238 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XV. to call the special session of 18G1. But the Repub- 
lican Senators and Representatives adhered to their 
course of inaction, and abstained from passing 
these bills, with the double view of avoiding sec- 
tional irritation, and to leave the new Administra- 
tion free to develop its own policy. 

Mr. Buchanan's Administration had been as un- 
fortunate in its financial management as in its 
treatment of the slavery question. "No nation 
has ever before been embarrassed from too large a 
surplus in its treasury," said he in his inaugural 
address. His Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Cobb, 
soon removed this "embarrassment." When he 
took charge of the department the treasury was 
full to overflowing; when he abandoned it to go 
into secession, even the Senators and Represent- 
atives in Washington could not get enough cash 
on their salaries to pay their board bills. 

" To-day," says the Washington correspondent of 
the New York " Tribune," under date of December 
6, 1860, "the Speaker's warrants on the treasury 
in favor of the pay of Members of Congress were 
presented and refused for a want of funds." This 
disgraceful state of affairs was brought to light by 
a selfish device invented by some of the Members, 
in the scramble for pocket-money. Under date of 
December 7, the same paper relates : " Some Mem- 
bers of the House of Representatives were sharp 
enough to get the Speaker's certificates for pay 
and mileage, and present them personally at the 
treasury, instead of collecting them through the 
Sergeant-at-Arms — thus securing their own dues, 
while others have been denied even pro rata, the 
Secretary already acknowledging an exhaustion of 



THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 23!) 

means." The speech of the Chairman of the Com- cua.. xv. 
mittee of Ways and Means, on December 10, con- .. oi..t.o," 
firms the newspaper statement. "Memhei's are 'ir^!' 
aware," said he, "that the Government lias not 
been able to pay, for the last week or two, our own 
salaries, and many other demands at New York 
and other places." We look in vain in the reports 
of Secretary Cobb for any proper explanation of 
this descent of the Grovernment within four years 
from abundance to bankruptcy. The financial re- 
vulsion of 1857, the Utah expedition, and the se- 
cession movement are mentioned, but they do not 
afford a clear solution of the problem. Mr. Cobb 
dryly states the figures, and leaves the public to Annual Re- 
form its own opinion. His reports show that on ViUTonbo' 
July 1, 1857, the public debt was only $29,060,- i857. '' 
386.90, and that the balance in the treasury was 
$17,710,114.27. On July 1, 1860, the pubhc del^t, 
permanent and temporary, was $64,769,703.08, and 
the balance in the treasury only $3,629,206.71. The luid., iseo. 
actual liabilities of the Government had been in- 
creased $49,790,223.74 ; in other words, the public 
debt had been nearly trebled during three years 
of peace and almost normal prosperity. Thus the 
public credit was already undermined long before 
the secession panic exerted any influence. From 
July 1, 1860, onward, the decline was quick and dis- 
astrous. On September 8, 1860, Secretary Cobb ne- 
gotiated ten millions of five per cent, ten-year bonds ^^Y-^,^/.' 
at par and a slight premium.^ But this, his last ^Lo!m"s^ 
financial transaction, failed in part ; only $7,022,000 su^s?" p. iJa 

1 Under act of June 22, 1860. mium. See Bayley, " U. S. Na- 
In exact figures the rate was at tional Loans, Tenth Census," p. 
from par to 1.45 per cent, pre- '^?, 



240 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XV, was actually paid in; the remaining bidders re- 
fused to fulfill their engagements. His report of 
December 5, 1860, recommending an unconditional 
pledge of the public lands for an issue of treasury 
notes, was calculated to alarm rather than reassure 
capitalists. Three days afterwards he resigned to 
embark in active rebellion. Congress, on December 
17, authorized an issue of ten millions of treasury 
notes, at rates of interest offered by the lowest 
responsible bidder, but did not pledge the pubhc 
lands. 

Mr. Cobb's successor (Philip F. Thomas, ap- 
pointed December 12, 1860), also a secessionist, 
and thereby ill-suited to strengthen the public 
credit, advertised five millions of these treasury 
notes. The bids were opened on December 28, 
1860, when, in addition to the revolutionary reports 
from the Cotton States, the rumor of a conspiracy 
by the rebels to seize Washington and the public 
archives was prevalent. The desperate straits of 
the Government are shown in the first response by 
the capitalists. Less than half the amount adver- 
tised was bid for at all. Only $121,100 was bid for 
at rates under ten per cent.; $39,000 at ten and 
under twelve; $1,787,000 at twelve; and from twelve 
the remaining bids ran up to thirty-six per cent. 
The whole offer would have proven a substantial 
failure had not a few patriotic gentlemen in New 
York (not losing sight of their financial advantage) 
used personal solicitation to make up a combina- 
tion bid for a million and a half at twelve per cent., 
on the condition, however, that the sum should be 
used four days later to pay the January interest on 
the public debt, which would otherwise have suf- 




ELTHr li. A\'A81IBiri;Ni; 



THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 241 

fered default. This half -financial, half-patriotic cjhai-. xv. 
exertion of a few leading banking lii-nis saved i,-i„.i„fiai 
the national credit from dishonor; and the news- "^n.'y."' 
papers once more sharply contrasted from what Dcc.'^y.'i^x). 
height to what depth it had sunk by recalling the 
fact that at the beginning of Buchanan's Adminis- 
tration, Secretary Cobb bought up the six per 
cents of 1868 at sixteen per cent, premium, in 
order to get rid of the surplus in the treasury. 
Seeing the resolute action of these bankers in the 
crisis, other capitalists so far recovered from their 
panic that they now came forward and by private 
agreement upon twelve per cent, interest took the 
balance of the five millions for which, a few days Jan. i.i'sGi 
before, they had been too timid to bid at all. 

In the new Cabinet complications at this junc- 
ture Secretary Thomas in turn resigned, and on 
January 11, 1861, President Buchanan, upon finan- 
cial compulsion as related, appointed John A. Dix, 
then postmaster at New York, to succeed him. 
Personally acquainted with New York merchants 
and bankers, Mr. Dix could make a stronger appeal 
to their interest to support the Government with 
financial aid. A new five million offer of treasury 
notes (the remainder authorized by the act of De- 
cember 17, 1860) had been advertised before 
Thomas's resignation. Dix meanwhile assumed 
the duties of the Treasury Department, and in- 
spired public confidence by his personal worth and 
openly declared loyalty. The bids were opened 
January 19, 1861, and exhibited a decided im- 
provement of financial credit. More than twelve 
millions were bid for, at rates of interest ranging 
from 8f to 20 per cent., the bulk being from 10 

Vol. III.— 16 



242 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XV. to 12 per cGiit. Dix awarded $3,230,000 at rates 
^ArtkU''^ of interest under 11, and the remainder at 11 
"Trunme," pci' Cent. The pubHc liabilities, maturing and 
jan.21,1861. (.^j.j.gjj^^ were now, however, accumulating vdth 
such rapidity that he was compelled to recom- 
mend a new loan. An act of February 8, 1861, 
authorized him to issue twenty-five millions of six 
per cent, ten to twenty years' bonds. Eight mill- 
ions were advertised and awarded to bidders on 
February 23. Financial courage had so far re- 
turned that fourteen millions were bid for and at 
rates which enabled him to sell the whole eight 
millions at an average of a trifle over 9J per cent. 
Feb.S86i. discount.^ 

These financial struggles of the Government, 
which occurred before the revolutionary crisis had 
fairly set in, are related to show that a measure of 
legislation grew out of them which had an impor- 
tant influence in sustaining its power when the 
storm of war soon after burst. The free-trade doc- 
trines of the Democratic party had, with the suc- 
cess of that party in electing Presidents Pierce and 
Buchanan, also resulted in the enactment by Con- 
gress of the low tariff of March 3, 1857. The Re- 
publicans had long alleged that the policy of this 
act would impoverish the treasury, and now when 
the Government revenues had steadily fallen be- 
hind its expenditures, at the rate of about twenty 
millions a year, their complaint appeared to be 
well founded. 

Whatever difference of views might exist about 
financial cause and effect, there could be none that 

lln exact figures the bonds were sold at an average of 90.47,%. 
See Bayley, " U. S. National Loans, Tenth Census," p. 151. 



THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 24o 

some radical measure to replenish the treasury was ("hai-. xv. 
imperative. The Morrill Tariff Bill, as it was called, 
was pending in Congress. A year before it was 
passed by the House, but defeated in the Senate. 
It was now urged by its friends with new zeal. The 
members from the seceding States had been among 
its sturdiest opponents ; but when in January they 
retired from their seats in the House and Senate, 
the adoption of the measure became practicable. 
The Morrill Tariff Act was accordingly passed and 
signed by President Buchanan on March 2, 1861. 
It was a comprehensive measure, raising the duties 
on imported merchandise from an average of nine- 
teen to an average of thirty-six per cent., and had 
the double effect of materially increasing the cus- 
toms receipts and stimulating the productive en- 
ergies of the country. It went into operation 
on the 1st of April, and thus its quickening and isei. 
strengthening help came just at the opportune 
moment, when the nation was compelled to gird 
up its loins for a gigantic war. 

But the law was not alone confined to the sub- 
ject of the tariff. Two important financial provi- 
sions were embodied in it : one gave the President 
authority to borrow ten millions additional, either 
in the form of bonds or treasury notes, and another 
permitted him to " substitute treasury notes for the ?"^.^s^' 
whole, or any part of the money which he was LoauT 
authorized to borrow by previous acts." When bus," p. 77. 
a few days later Lincoln became President, and 
Chase Secretary of the Treasury, they could look 
with a little less dizziness into the financial gulf 
already open, and constantly widening before their 
vision, remembering that by the terms of this act 



244 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XV. they had power to issue about forty millions of 
treasury notes without fui'ther legislation, namely, 
a balance of $13,000,000 under the act of June 22, 
1860; a balance of $17,000,000 under the act of 
February 8, 1861 ; and the $10,000,000 directly pro- 
vided for in the Morrill Tariff Act. 



CHAPTER XVI 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 



AMONG the first congratulations which poured chap. xvr. 
XjL in upon Mr. Lincoln after his election was a 
terse greeting from ex-Governor Chase, dated No- 
vember 7, that admirably expressed the prevalent 
feeling. " You are President-elect. I congratulate 
you and thank God. The great object of my wishes 
and labors for nineteen years is accomplished in the 
overthrow of the slave power. The space is now unroiK 
clear for the establishment of the policy of free- ^r/j/'war-' 
dom on safe and firm grounds. The lead is yours, of's. p. 
The responsibility is great. May God strengthen p- ^w. 
you for your great duties." 

Day after day confirmed the completeness of the 
Republican victory, and two weeks after election 
the city of Springfield was in the blaze and glory 
of a gi-eat celebration to signalize the result. Pro- 
jected merely as a local jubilee, it called to the 
city crowds of rejoicing strangers. Though he had 
not said a public word during the campaign, Mr. 
Lincoln could not on this occasion refuse the sound 
of his voice to the huge torch-light procession and 
the crowds of his neighbors and friends whose 
shouts called him to the door of his modest home. 

215 



246 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XVI. It was iiot the voice of partisan exultation, how- 
ever, but of patriotic liberality. He said : 

Friends and fellow-citizens, please excuse me on this 
occasion from making a speech. I thank you in common 
with all those who have thought lit by their votes to 
indorse the Republican cause. I rejoice with you in 
the success which has thus far attended that cause. 
Yet in all our rejoicings, let us neither express nor 
cherish any hard feeHngs towards any citizen who by his 
vote has differed with us. Let us at all times remember 
that all American citizens are brothers of a common 
country, and should dwell together in the bonds of 
fraternal feeling. 

We will perceive hereafter how in this simple 
utterance of his opening Presidential career he 
struck the key-note of blended firmness and charity, 
which was to become the characteristic of his Ad- 
ministration. 

Springfield now became, for some months, the 
Mecca of American politics. Casual visitors tarried 
for a few hours to shake hands with the newly 
chosen chief; correspondents of leading news- 
papers established temporary headquarters from 
which to send their readers pen-pictures of his per- 
sonal appearance, his daily habits, his home and 
public surroundings, and to catch the flying and 
often contradictory rumors of his probable inten- 
tions. Artists came to paint his portrait, ambitious 
politicians to note new party currents, and veteran 
statesmen to urge the adoption of favorite theories 
or the advancement of faithful adherents. 

To all appearance Lincoln remained unchanged. 
In the unpretending two-story frame house which 
constituted his home, his daily routine continued 
as before, except that his door was oftener opened 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 247 

to welcome the curious visitor or to slicltcr tli(^ chai-.xvi. 
confidential discussion of ominous occurrences 
in national affairs. His daily public occupation 
was to proceed to the Governor's office in the 
State-house, to receive the cordial and entirely un- 
ceremonious greetings of high and low, — whoso- 
ever chose to enter at the open door, — and in the 
interim to keep himself informed, by means of the 
daily-increasing budget of letters and newspapers, 
of the events of the country at large, and to give 
directions to his pi-ivate secretary as to what re- 
plies should be made to important communications. 
Beyond the arrival of distinguished visitors, there 
was in all this no sign of elevation and rulership ; 
he was still the kind neighbor and genial com- 
panion, who had for every one he met the same 
bearing which for a quarter of a century had made 
his name a household synonym of manly affection, 
virtue, and honor. 

Under this quiet exterior and commonplace rou- 
tine he was, however, already undergoing most 
anxious and harassing labors. Day by day the 
horizon of politics gathered gloom, and the theory 
of secession became the theme of every newspaper 
and the staple question of his daily visitors. Even 
upon theories Lincoln maintained a prudent re- 
serve. Nevertheless his qualified comments to 
friends were prompt and clear. 

" My own impression is," said he (November 15), iseo. 
" leaving myself room to modify the opinion if 
upon a further investigation I should see fit to do 
so, that this Government possesses both the au- 
thority and the power to maintain its own integ- 
rity. That, however, is not the ugly point of this 



248 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XVI. matter. The ugly point is the necessity of keeping 
the Government together by force, as ours should 
be a government of fraternity." Later (December 
13) he formulated his opinion a little more in de- 
tail. " The very existence," said he, " of a general 
and national government implies the legal power, 
right, and duty of maintaining its own integrity. 
This, if not expressed, is at least implied in the 
Constitution. The right of a State to secede is not 
an open or debatable question. It was fully dis- 
cussed in Jackson's time, and denied not only by 
him, but by the vote of Congress. It is the duty 
of a President to execute the laws and maintain 
the existing Government. He cannot entertain 
any proposition for dissolution or dismemberment. 
He was not elected for any such purpose. As a 
matter of theoretical speculation it is probably 
true, that if the people, with whom the whole ques- 
tion rests, should become tired of the present 

PeSonai Government, they might change it in the manner 

da™M8°" prescribed by the Constitution." 

The secrets of the incipient rebellion, and the 
treachery and conspiracy of a portion of Mr. 
Buchanan's Cabinet, which have been so fully 
laid bare from data only since become accessible, 
neither Mr. Lincoln nor any one save the actors 
themselves had then means of knowing. But in 
addition to other current sources of information 
the confidential letters of Captain Abner Double- 
day, second in command at Fort Moultrie, written 
to the captain's brother in New York, were, so long 
as mail communication remained, forwarded to 
the President-elect, giving him an inside view of 
matters at that critical post. 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 249 



Ciiw. XVI. 



Most important, however, in influence, and most 
valuable in possible as well as actual cons('({uences, 
were the correspondence and confidence which es- 
tablished themselves at an early day between Mr. 
Lincoln and General Scott. The general was evi- 
dently somewhat proud of his famous "Views," 
written to President Buchanan under date of Octo- 
ber 29, 1860, as a political suggestion. He trans- 
mitted a copy of the same to the President-elect, as 
he had done to many other gentlemen of prominence. 
A brief acknowledgment was written in reply (No- 
vember 9) : "Mr. Lincoln tenders his sincere thanks 
to G-eneral Scott for the copy of his ' Views, etc.,' 
which is received ; and especially for this renewed 
manifestation of his patriotic pui'poses as a citizen, 
connected as it is with his high official position and oeiK s°.«. 
most distinguished character as a military captain." ^"\is!^^ 

The delicate compliment and dignified reserve 
made their impression on the old hero. Called to 
Washington about the middle of December, and 
smarting under the neglect of Secretary Floyd 
and the discouraging indifference of President 
Buchanan, his hopes turned toward the elect of 
the people at Springfield. 

It was at this juncture (December 17) that a iseo. 
friend of long standing called upon the general, 
and in a confidential and frank interview learned 
from his own lips the alarming dangers of the 
Grovernment — the neglect of the Administration 
to send reenforcements, the defenseless situation of 
Fort Moultrie, and that Sumter, the key of Charles- 
ton harbor, lay at the mercy of a mob. "None 
of his suggestions or recommendations have been 
acted upon, and of course he is powerless to do 



250 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XVI. 



Washbiirne 

to Lincoln, 

Dec. 17, 1860. 

MS. 



Lincoln 

to Wash- 

Iturne, Dec. 

21, 1860. 

" North 

American 

Review," 

Nov., 1885, 

p. 460. 



Cameron to 

Lincoln, 
Jan. 3, 1861. 

MS. 



anythiDg further, but liis heart is sound and true. 
' I wish to God,' said he, ' that Mr. Lincoln was in 
office.' He continued, ' I do not know hira, but I 
beUeve him a true, honest, and conservative man.' 
Then he asked earnestly, ' Mr. Washbm-ne, is he a 
firm man ? ' I answered that I had known you 
long and well and that you would discharge your 
duty, and your whole duty, in the sight of the 
furnace seven times heated. He then said reso- 
lutely and hopefully, *A11 is not lost.'" 

In response to this patriotic expression of the 
general, the return mail carried the following letter 
from Lincoln to Washburne, dated December 21 : 
" Last night I received your letter giving an ac- 
count of your interview with General Scott, and 
for which I thank you. Please present my respects 
to the general, and tell him, confidentially, I shall 
be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can 
to either Jiold or retake the forts, as the case may 
require, at and after the inauguration." 

A little later Mr. Lincoln again sent messages of 
esteem and confidence to the general by Senators 
Cameron and Baker, who made visits to Spring- 
field. " I have seen General Scott," writes Cameron 
in reply (January 3), " who bids me say he will be 
glad to act under your orders in all ways to pre- 
serve the Union. He says Mr. Buchanan at last 
has called on him to see that order shall be pre- 
served at the inauguration, in this District; that 
for this purpose he has ordered here two com- 
panies of flying artillery, and that he will organize 
the militia and have himself sworn in as a con- 
stable. The old warrior is roused, and he will be 
equal to the occasion." 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 



251 



This statement was repeated in aii autograph 
note from the general hnnsclf on the following 
day : " Lieuten ant-General Scott is higlily grati- 
fied witli tlie favorable opinion entertained of him 
by the President-elect as ho learns through Sena- 
tors Baker and Cameron, also personal friends of 
General S., who is happy to reciprocate his highest 
respect and esteem. The President-elect may rely 
with confidence on General S.'s utmost exertions 
in the service of his country (the Union) both 
before and after the approaching inauguration." 

The general then mentions in detail the measures 
just taken, under the reorganized Cabinet and the 
accession of Mr. Holt, to countermand the ship- 
ment of the Pittsburgh guns, to send reenforce- 
ments to Fort Jefferson, and to secure the safety 
of Washington for the Presidential count and the 
approaching inauguration. " Permit me," wrote 
Mr. Lincoln in reply, January 11, " to renew to you 
the assurance of my high appreciation of the many 
past services you have rendered the Union, and my 
deep gratification at this evidence of your present 
active exertions to maintain the integi-ity and honor 
of the nation." 

The President-elect was further gratified to re- 
ceive about the same time from the veteran Gen- 
eral Wool a letter of uncompromising loyalty. 
" Many thanks," Lincoln wrote in reply, January 
14, " for your patriotic and generous letter of the 
11th instant. As to how far the military force of 
the Government may become necessary to the 
preservation of the Union, and more particularly 
how that force can best be directed to the object, I 
must chiefly rely upon General Scott and yourself. 



ClIAJ". XVI. 



Oon. Wpott 
to Liuc'olii, 
Jilli 4, 18G1. 



Lincoln to 

Gen. Scott, 

Jan.ll,186L 

MS. 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Trumbull 
to Lincoln, 
Dec. 2, 1860. 

MS. 



Weed to 
Swett, Dec. 
2, 1860. MS. 



It affords me the profoundest satisfaction to know, 
that with both of you judgment and feehng go 
heartily with youi* sense of professional and official 
duty to the work." 

Meanwhile trusty friends in "Washington, both 
in and out of Congress, had kept Lincoln informed 
by letter of public events occurring there, so far as 
they were permitted to come to the knowledge of 
Republicans : how the Cabinet was divided, how 
the message was scouted, the bold utterances of 
treason, the growing apprehensions of the public. 
But general opinion was still in a hopeful mood. 
" Mr. Mann," wi-ote one, " who stated that he knew 
you personally, requested me to say that he had 
seen the Union dissolved twice — once when 
Southern Members of Congress refused for three 
days to occupy their seats — and that it all ended 
in smoke. He did not appear the least alarmed 
about the secession movement, but others, particu- 
larly Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley, expressed 
gi^eat anxiety." 

These were influential names, and it may be well 
to cite theu' own words. " I am anticipating 
troubles," wrote Mr. Weed, December 2, " not gen- 
erally apprehended by our friends. I want the 
North to be sure she is right and then to go ahead." 
Some days later he wrote further : " In consulta- 
tion yesterday with several friends, it was thought 
best to invite the Governors of several States to 
meet in this city on Thursday of next week, so 
that, if possible, there should be harmony of views 
and action between them. It occurred to me that 
you should be apprised of this movement. Of 
course it is to be quiet and confidential. I have 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 253 

been acting without knowledge of your vi(;ws, chai-. xvi 
upon vital questions. But I find it safe to trust 
the head and heart when both are under the guid- 
ance of right motives. I do not want you to be 
saddled with the responsibilities of the Govern- 
ment before you take the helm. On the question 
of preserving the Union, I am unwilling to see a 
united South and a divided North. Nor is such an 
alternative necessary. With wisdom and prudence 
we can unite the North in upholding the suprem- 
acy of the Constitution and laws, and thus united, Lincoiu" 
your Administration will have its foundation upon ^^'ms. 
a rock. . ." 

To this Mr. Lincoln replied as follows on the 
17th of December: 

Yours of the 11th was received two days ago. Should 
the convocation of Governors of which you speak seem 
desirous to know my views on the present aspect of 
things, tell them you judge from my speeches that I will 
be inflexible on the territorial question ; that I probably 
think either the Missouri line extended, or Douglas's and 
Eli Thayer's popular sovereignty, would lose us everything 
we gain by the election ; that filibustering for all south of 
us, and making slave States of it would follow, in spite of 
us, in either case ; also that I probably think all opposi- 
tion, real and apparent, to the fugitive-slave clause of the 
Constitution ought to be withdrawn. 

I believe you can pretend to find but little, if anything, 
in my speeches, about secession. But my opinion is, that 
no State can in any way lawfully get out of the Union g^i^; 
without the consent of the others ; and that it is the duty " weed Me- 
of the President and other Government functionaries to ii., p. 310. 
run the machine as it is. 

Horace Greeley, editor of the New York " Tri- 
bune," not only had similar fears, but, what was 
much worse, by his editorials encouraged the South 



254 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Cn.u'. XVI. 



N. Y. 

Tribune," 

Nov. 30, 

1860. 



Gurley to 

Lincoln, 

Deo. 3, 1800. 

MS. 



Tnimbiill 

to Lincoln, 

Dec. i, I860. 

MS. 



to hope for peaceable disunion. He wrote (Novem- 
ber 30) : " Webster and Marshall and Story have 
reasoned well ; the Federal flag represents a gov- 
ernment, not a mere league ; we are in many re- 
spects one nation from the St. John to the Rio 
G-rande; but the genius of our institutions is essen- 
tially Republican and averse to the employment of 
military force to fasten one section of our Confed- 
eracy to the other. If eight States, having five 
millions of people, choose to separate from us, they 
cannot be permanently withheld from so doing by 
Federal cannon." 

" There is a pretty general belief here that the 
Cotton States will go out of the Union," wrote a 
correspondent from Washington. " One South 
Carolina Member is sorry for the condition of 
things in his State — is at heart opposed to dis- 
union; but I will not mention his name lest it 
should by some means get into the newspapers. 
Orr was forced into the secession movement 
against his will. This I have from good authority, 
and yet the statement may be a mistake. It is 
hard to get at the exact truth." 

From another Mr. Lincoln received information 
as to the course of his party friends: "A good feel- 
ing prevails among Republican Senators. The im- 
pression with all, unless there be one exception, is, 
that Republicans have no concessions to make or 
compromises to offer, and that it is impolitic even 
to discuss making them. . . I was a little surprised 
that the House voted to raise a committee on the 
state of the Union. . . Inactivity and a kind spirit 
is, it seems to me, all that is left for us to do, till 
the 4th of March." 



THE PEESIDENT-ELECT 255 

"I liave never in my life," wrote Mr. Corwin, chap.xvi. 
Chairman of the Committee of Thirty- three (Decem- 
ber 10), " seen my country in such a dangerous 
position. I look upon it with great alarm, but I 
am resolved not to be paralyzed by dismay. Our 
safety can only be insured by looking the danger 
full in the face and acting with calm dignity in S^hu^o^nf 
such way as [that] if possible we may ride out the ^^'^ms. 
storm." 

These few extracts out of a multitude indicate 
the cuiTent and character of the reports which 
reached Mr. Lincoln from various quarters. The 
hopes of the more sanguine were, unfortunately, 
not realized. The timid grew more despondent, 
the traitors bolder, and the crisis almost became a 
panic. Business men and capitalists of the Eastern 
States were beginning to exert a pressure for con- 
cessions to avert civil war, under which stanch 
Republicans were on the point of giving way. The 
border States, through their presses and their 
public men, implored a compromise, but their en- 
treaty was uniformly directed to the Republicans 
to make concessions, and more often to justify than 
to denounce disunion. Some of the conspirators 
themselves adroitly encouraged this effort to de- 
moralize the North by a pretense of contrition. 
" South Carolina, I suppose," wrote a friend to Mr. 
Lincoln, " will try on her secession project. Per- 
haps some of the Cotton States will follow. Their 
number will not be large. Indeed, I know that 
some of the heretofore most rabid secessionists 
now tremble before the brink on which they 
stand. They would retreat without trying the 
experiment if they had not kindled a fire at home 



256 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XVI. whicli is beyond their control. This, in substance, 
Fogg to Jefferson Davis stated to Fitch no lonerer asro than 

Liucoln, ^ '-' 

Det^-^T^isco. yesterday." The profession did not well accord 
with the signing of the conspirators' secession 
address by that Senator only three days before. 
" I listened yesterday to Mr. Crittenden's speech," 
wi'ote another friend, " in support of his proposed 
compromise. In my opinion he is one of the most 
patriotic and at the same time mischievous of the 
Southern Senators. . . After Mr. Crittenden, Mr, 
Johnson, of Tennessee, took the floor. . . His 
simple declaration that the supposed wrongs must 
be settled inside of the Union is worth a hundred- 

toLiiio™in, fold more than all the patriotic wailing of the 
^''ms. ■ antediluvian Crittendens." 

There were plenty of correspondents to announce 
and describe the present and impending dangers, 
but none to furnish a solution of the difficulty. 
There was no end of wild suggestion, and that too 
from pi'ominent men ordinarily capable of giving 
counsel. One, as we have seen, was for accepting 
disunion. Another thought a letter or proclamation 
from the President-elect would still the storm. A 
third wanted him to drop down into Washington 
" with a carpet-sack." A fourth advised him to 
march to the capital with a hundred thousand 
" wide-awakes." Still a fifth proposed he should 
create a diversion by the purchase of Cuba. 

It was a providential blessing that in such a 
crisis the President-elect was a man of unfailing 
common sense and complete self-control. He 
watched the rising clouds of insurrection ; he noted 
the anxious warnings of his friends. He was neithei' 
buoyed up by reckless hopes, nor cast down by ex- 




THUItLOW AVKEI). 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 257 

aggerated fears. He bided his time, grasped at no chap. xvr. 
rash counsels or experiments, uttered neither pre- 
mature ery of alarm nor boast of overweening con- 
fidence. He resisted pressing solicitations to change 
his position, to explain his intention, to offer, either 
for himself or the great national majority which 
chose him, any apology for his or their high pre- 
rogative exercised in his election. 

It must not, however, be inferred from the forego- 
ing that Mr. Lincoln shut himself up in total silence. 
To discreet friends, as well as to honorable oppo- 
nents, under the seal of confidence, he was always 
free to repeat his well-formed convictions, and 
even in some degree to foreshadow his probable 
course. It is gratifying to note in this connection, 
especially since it evinces his acute judgment of 
human nature, that in few instances was such con- 
fidence violated during the whole period of his 
candidacy and official life. By unnoticed begin- 
nings he easily and naturally assumed the leader- 
ship of his party in the personal interviews and 
private correspondence following the election. He 
was never obtrusive or dictatorial; but in a sug- 
gestion to one, a hint to another, a friendly explana- 
tion or admonition to a third, he soon gave direction, 
unity, and confidence to his adherents. 

William CuUen Bryant, for instance, was strongly 
opposed to Mr. Seward's going into the Cabinet. 
Lincoln wrote him a few lines in explanation, which 
brought back the following qualified acquiescence : 
" I have this moment received your note. Nothing 
could be more fair or more satisfactory than the 
principle you lay down in regard to the formation 
of your council of official advisers. I shall always 
Vol. hi.— 17 



258 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XVI. 

Bryant to 

Lincoln, 

Jan. 3, 1861. 

MS. 



Greeley to 
Lincoln, 

Dec. 22, 1860. 
MS. 



be convinced that whatever selection you make it 
will be made conscientiously." 

Mr. G-reeley was, as we have seen, indulging in 
damaging vagaries about peaceable secession, and 
to him Lincoln sent a word of friendly caution. 
Greeley wrote a statement of his views in reply, but 
substantially yielded the point. He said a State 
could no more secede at pleasure from the Union 
than a stave could secede from a cask. That if 
eight or ten contiguous States sought to leave, he 
should say, " There 's the door —go ! " But, " if the 
seceding State or States go to fighting and defying 
the laws, the Union being yet undissolved save by 
theu' own say-so, I guess they will have to be 
made to behave themselves. . . I fear nothing, care 
for nothing, but another disgraceful back-down of 
the free States, That is the only real danger. Let 
the Union slide — it may be reconstructed ; let 
Presidents be assassinated, we can elect more ; let 
the Republicans be defeated and crushed, we shall 
rise again. But another nasty compromise, where- 
by everythiag is conceded and nothing secured, 
will so thoroughly disgrace and humiliate us that 
we can never again raise our heads, and this 
country becomes a second edition of the Barbary 
States, as they were sixty years ago. ' Take any 
form but that.' " 

On this point Lincoln's note had reassured his 
shrinking faith. The " Tribune " announced that 
Mr. Lincoln had no thought of concession, and 
thenceforward that powerful journal took a more 
healthy and hopeful tone. 

Hon. William Kellogg, the Illinois Representative 
on the Committee of Thirty-three, wrote to him 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 259 

for instructions as to the course he should pursue, cfiap. xvi. 
Under date of December 11, Mr. Lincohi replied : 

Entertain no proposition for a compromise in rejj^ard to 
the extension of slavery. The instant yon do they have 
us under again : all our labor is lost, and sooner or later 
must be done over. Douglas is sure to be again trying 
to bring in his '^ Popular Sovereignty." Have none of it. 
The tug has to come, and better now than later. You jj^pointo 
know I think the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution Keiiogg. 
ought to be enforced — to put it in its mildest form, ks. 
ought not to be resisted.^ 

It is evident that Lincoln was at this time not 
"without serious apprehension that the threats and 
movements of secession might induce some of the 
less sturdy Republicans to listen to appeals for 
concession; for on December 13 he repeated this 
monition to his friend Washburne in Congi*ess, 
with added emphasis : 

Your long letter received. Prevent as far as possible 
any of our friends from demoralizing themselves and 
their cause by entertaining propositions for compromise 
of any sort on slavery extension. There is no possible 
compromise upon it but what puts us under again, and 
all our work to do over again. Whether it be a Missouri 
line or Eh Thayer's popular sovereignty, it is all the 
same. Let either be done, and immediately fihbustering 
and extending slavery recommences. On that point hold 
firm as a chain of steel. 

Some weeks later Kellogg visited Lincoln to 
further urge his views of compromise on the Presi- 

1 It would have been well had fieed his consistency. He lost his 

his advice been followed. Under friends and gained no followers, 

the pressure of the disunionists His concession was spurned by 

and of the border-State men, Kel- the disunionists; and being a 

logg's firmness gave way, and he large and corpulent man, the 

announced his willingness to re- wits of the day made themselves 

cede from the Eepublican decla- merry by dubbing his apostasy 

rations. The change only sacri- the " Mammoth Cave." 



260 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XVI. dent-elect. As a result of that visit Lincoln wrote 
the following letter to Seward on February 1 : 

On the 21st ult. Hon. W. Kellogg, a Republican Mem- 
ber of Congress of this State, whom you probably know, 
was here in a good deal of anxiety seeking to ascertain 
to what extent I would be consenting for our friends to 
go in the way of compromise on the now vexed question. 
While he was with me I received a dispatch from Senator 
Trumbull, at Washington, alluding to the same question 
and teUing me to await letters. I therefore told Mr. 
Kellogg that when I should receive these letters posting 
me as to the state of affairs at Washington, I would write 
to you, requesting you to let him see my letter. To my 
surprise, when the letters mentioned by Judge TrumbuU 
came they made no allusion to the " vexed question." 
This baffled me so much that I was near not writing you 
at all, in compliance with what I had said to Judge Kel- 
logg. I say now, however, as I have all the while said, 
that on the territorial question — that is, the question of 
extending slavery under the national auspices — I am in- 
flexible. I am for no compromise which assists or per- 
mits the extension of the institution on soil owned by the 
nation. And any trick by which the nation is to acquire 
territory, and then allow some local authority to spread 
slavery over it, is as obnoxious as any other. I take it 
that to effect some such result as this, and to put us 
again on the high road to a slave empire, is the object of 
all these proposed compromises. I am against it. As to 
fugitive slaves. District of Columbia, slave trade among 
the slave States, and whatever springs of necessity from 
the fact that the institution is amongst us, I care but 
little, so that what is done be comely and not altogether 
Seward, outrageous. Nor do I care much about New Mexico, if 
^'^^Ms.^^'^^' further extension were hedged against. 

We shall describe somewhat in detail the forma- 
tion of Lincoln's Cabinet, and will only mention 
I860. here that on December 13 he began that work by 
tendering the post of Secretary of State to Mr. 
Seward, which offer was accepted December 28. 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 261 

The correspondence between these eminent men chap.xvi. 
affords an interesting view of the beginnings of 
the new Administration. "Mr. Weed finding it 
not inconvenient to go West," wrote Seward, De- 
cember 16, "I have had some conversation with 
him concerning the condition and the prospect of 
public affairs, and he will be able to inform you 
of my present unsettled view of the subject upon 
which you so kindly wrote me a few days ago. 
I shall remain at home until his return, and shall 
then in further conference with him have the ad- ^Lmcoin,*' 
vantage of a knowledge of the effect of public ms. 
events certain to occur this week." 

Thurlow Weed, the editor of the "Albany Even- 
ing Journal," who held a unique position as the 
intimate friend of Seward and as a politician of 
unrivaled influence in the State of New York, went 
to Springfield and had several interviews with the 
President-elect. There is no record of these con- 
ferences ; but it is likely that Mr. Weed urged on 
those occasions, as he did on all others, the utmost 
forbearance, conciliation, and concession to the 
South. To employ his favorite formula, he wanted 
Republicans " to meet secession as patriots and not 
as partisans." The sentiment and the alliteration 
were both pleasing ; but Lincoln, trained in almost 
life-long debate with Douglas, the most subtle jug- 
gler in words ever known to American politics, was 
not a man to deal in vague phrases. He told Mr. 
Weed just what he would concede and just how 
far he would conciliate — drew him a sharp and 
definite line to show where partisanship ends and 
where patriotism begins. When Mr. Weed returned 
he bore with him the written statement of Lincoln ; 



262 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XVI. what he beheved, and was determined to assert and 
maintain on pending and probable issues. 

Mr. Seward's letter of December 26, to Lincoln, 
gives us the sequel of this visit. 

I had only the opportunity for conferring with Mr. 
Weed which was afforded by our journeying together on 
the railroad from Syracuse to Albany. 

He gave me verbally the substance of the suggestion 
you prepared for the consideration of the Republican 
Members, but not the wi-itten proposition. This morning 
I received the latter from him, and also information for 
the first time of youi* expectation that I would write to 
you concerning the temper of parties and the pubhc here. 

I met on Monday my Republican associates on the 
Committee of Thirteen, and afterwards the whole Com- 
mittee. With the unanimous consent of our section I 
offered three propositions which seemed to me to cover 
the ground of the suggestion made by you through Mr. 
Weed as I understood it. 

First. That the Constitution should never be altered 
so as to authorize Congress to abolish or interfere with 
slavery in the States. This was accepted. 

Second. That the fugitive-slave law should be amended 
by granting a jury trial to the fugitive. This in opposi- 
tion to our votes was amended so as to give the jury in 
the State from which the fugitive fled, and so amended 
was voted down by our own votes. The Committee had 
already agreed to Mr. Crittenden's amendment concerning 
the fees of the commissioner, making them the same when 
the fugitive is returned to slavery as when he is discharged. 

Our Third resolution was that Congress recommend 
to all the States to revise their legislation concerning 
persons recently resident in other States, and to repeal 
all such laws which contravene the Constitution of the 
United States, or any law of Congress passed in pursu- 
ance thereof. This was rejected by the pro-slavery vote 
of the Committee. 

To-day we have had another meeting. I offered, with 
the concurrence of my political associates^ a fourth propo- 



THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 



263 



sition, viz. : That Congress should pass a law to punish ch.vp. xvt. 
invasions of our States and conspiracies to effect such 
invasions, but the latter only in the State and district 
where the acts of such complicity were committed. This 
by the votes of our opponents was amended so as prac- 
tically to carry out Mr. Douglas's suggestion of last winter 
for the revival of the old Sedition law of John Adams's 
time, and then was rejected by our own votes. 

This evening the Republican members of the Committee 
with Judge Trumbull and Mr. Fessenden met at my 
house to consider your written suggestion and determine 
whether it shall be offered. While we think the ground 
has been already covered, we find that in the form you 
give it, it would divide our friends not only in the Com- 
mittee but in Congress ; a portion being unwilling to give 
up their old opinion that the duty of executing the con- 
stitutional provisions concerning fugitives from service 
belongs to the States, and not at all to Congress. But we 
shall confer and act as wisely as we can. 

Thus far I have reported only our action on the sub- 
ject of your suggestion. I proceed now to tell you what 
I think of the temper of the parties and of the public here. 

South Carolina has already taken her attitude of defi- 
ance. Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are 
pushed on towards the same attitude. I think that they 
could not be arrested even if we should offer all you sug- 
gest and with it the restoration of the Missouri Com- 
promise line. But persons acting for those States intimate 
that they might be so arrested because they think that 
the Republicans are not going to concede the restoration 
of that line. 

The action of the border States is uncertain. Sympathy 
there is strong with the Cotton States, while prudence and 
patriotism dictate adhesion to the Union. Nothing could 
cerfainlij restrain them but the adoption of Mr. Crittenden's 
compromise, and I do not see the slightest indication of 
its adoption on the Republican side of Congress. The 
Members stand nearly or quite as firm against it as the 
country is. Under these circumstances, time and acci- 
dent, it seems to me, must determine the course of the 
border States. 



264 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XVI. 



Seward to 

Lincolu, 

Dec.2G,l860. 

MS. 



Probably all the debate aud conferences we have hith- 
erto had will sink out of the public mind within a week 
or two, when the Republican members shall have refused 
to surrender at discretion to the State of South Carolina. 
New and exciting subjects will enter into the agitation 
and control results. 

Thus I have said all that I am able to say of the temper 
of parties and of the public. I add, very respectfully, my 
owTi opinion on the probable future. 

The United States of America, their Constitution, their 
capital, their organization in all its departments, and with 
all its military and naval forces, will stand and pass with- 
out resistance into your hands. There will be several, 
perhaps all, of the slave States standing in a contumacious 
attitude on the 4th of March. Sedition will be growing 
weaker and loyalty stronger every day from the acts of 
secession as they occur. 

But now the crisis in the affairs of the Govern- 
ment was approaching. It is already foreshadowed 
in Mr. Seward's letter of December 28. " There is 
a feverivsh excitement here," wrote he, "which 
awakens all kinds of apprehensions of popular 
disturbance and disorders connected with your 
assumption of the Government." And he sug- 
gested that Mr. Lincoln should prepare to come to 
Washington a week sooner than usual on such oc- 
casions ; prefacing the advice with the statement, 
" I do not entertain these apprehensions myself." 
But by the day following he became convinced of 
the danger, and again wrote : 

At length I have gotten a position in which I can see 
what is going on in the councils of the President. It 
pains me to learn that things there are even worse than 
is understood. The President is debating day and night 
on the question whether he shall not recall Major An- 
derson and surrender Fort Sumter and go on arming 
the South. A plot is forming to seize the capital on or 



THE PEESIDENT-ELECT 265 

"before the 4th of March, and this, too, has its accomplices chap. xvi. 
in the public councils. I could tell you more particularly 
than I dare write, but you must not imagine that I am 
giving you suspicions and rumors. Believe me that I gp^ardto 
know what I write. In point of fact, the responsibilities wmoin. 

Dec 29 I860 

of your administration must begin before the time arrives. "mh. 

Mr. Seward then advises that the President 
should arrive earlier, that he appoint his Secre- 
taries of War, Navy, and Treasury, and that they 
come to Washington as soon as possible. 

The events of a day or two, however, dissipated 
the apparent magnitude of the crisis. Buchanan's 
council broke up, Floyd retired in disgrace, the 
Cabinet was reorganized ; Holt was made Secre- 
tary of War, and the plots of the conspirators 
were exposed and for a season baffled. 



CHAPTER XVII 



STEPHENS'S SPEECH 



CH. xvn. T?OLLOWING the lead of South Carolina, the 
JL Governor of Georgia began the secession 
movement in that State almost immediately after 
the Presidential election, by such public declara- 
tions and acts as fell within the scope of his per- 
sonal influence and official authority. But Georgia 
had given a heavy vote for Douglas, and her people 
were imbued with a strong feeling of conditional 
unionism. An opposition to hasty secession at 
once developed itself of so formidable a character 
that all the influence and cunning of the seces- 
sionists were needed to push their movement to 
success. The ablest men in the State hurried to 
Milledgeville and met in a sort of battle royal of 
speech-making and wire-pulling ; the Legislature 
was the target, and its action or non-action upon mil- 
itary appropriations and a convention bill was the 
result to be affected. Senator Toombs and others 
made speeches to promote secession ; and in reply 
to these Alexander H. Stephens addressed the 
^Legislature by special invitation on the 14th of 
November. His speech takes rank as the ablest 
made by a Southerner in opposition to disunion. 
The occasion appears to have been one of gi-eat 

266 



STEPHENS'S SPEECH 267 

excitement. Toombs sat on the platform beside cu. xvn. 
the speaker, and interlarded the address witli his 
cynical interrogatories and comments, which 
Stephens met in every instance with successful 
repartee. 

The speaker declared that to secede in conse- 
quence of Lincoln's election was to break the Con- 
stitution and show bad faith. " We went into the 
election with this people," said he. "The result 
was different from what we wished ; but the elec- 
tion has been constitutionally held." Mr. Lincoln 
could do the South no harm against an adverse 
House and Senate. This Government, with all its 
defects, came nearer the object of all good govern- 
ments than any other on the face of the earth. 
One by one he refuted the charges and complaints 
which had been advanced by Toombs, and warned 
his hearers against the perils of sudden disunion. 
Liberty once lost might never be restored. Georgia 
had grown great, rich, and intelligent in the Union. 

I look upon this country, with our institutions, as the 
Eden of the world, the Paradise of the Universe. It may 
be that out of it we may become greater and more pros- 
perous ; but I am candid and sincere in telling you that 
I fear if we yield to passion, and without sufficient cause 
shall take that step, instead of becoming greater, or more 
peaceful, prosperous, and happy — mstead of becoming 
gods we will become demons, and at no distant day com- 
mence cutting one another's throats. 

The speech created an immense sensation 
throughout the South, and but for an artful 
trick of the secessionists would have arrested 
and changed the immediate tide of secession in 
Georgia. Seeing that the underlying Union feel- 



268 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XVII. 



Alex. H. 

Stephens, 
"A Consti- 

tutioual 
View of the 

Late War 

between 

the States," 

Vol. XL, p. 

321. 



Stephens, 
Farewell 
Speech, 
Augusta, 
Ga., July 

2, 1859. 

Cleveland, 

" Life of 

Stephens," 

p. 650. 



ing was about to endanger their scheme of revolt, 
through defection or hesitation on the part of the 
Empire State of the South, they devised an adroit 
plea to appropriate its whole force to further their 
own plans. They persistently urged that " we can 
make better terms out of the Union than in it." 
Mr. Stephens himself has explained the misrepre- 
sentation and its result. " Two-thirds at least of 
those who voted for the ordinance of secession did 
so, I have but little doubt, with a view to a more 
certain re-formation of the Union." 

To understand this statement more thoroughly, 
it must be added that Mr. Stephens's great Union 
speech was also enthusiastically hailed by the 
North as a sign of firm allegiance. But that part 
of the country totally misapprehended its spirit 
and object. With all his eloquently asserted de- 
votion to the Union, he was a pro-slavery man of 
the most ultra type. He defended the institution 
upon the "higher law" doctrine. "If slavery," said 
he, "as it exists with us is not best for the African, 
constituted and made as he is, if it does not best 
promote his welfare and happiness, socially, mor- 
ally, and politically, as well as that of his master, 
it ought to be abolished." He believed slavery 
should be protected in the Territories by Federal 
law. He did not go quite to the extent of advocat- 
ing a revival of the African slave trade ; but went 
so far as to suggest that without such a re-opening 
the South could not maintain her coveted balance 
of power. " If the policy of this country," said he, 
" settled in its early history, of prohibiting further 
importations or immigrations of this class of popu- 
lation, is to be adhered to, the race of competition 



STEPHENS'S SPEECH 



269 



between us and our brethren of the North in the 
colonization of new States, which heretofore has 
been so well maintained by us, will soon have to 
be abandoned." 

So again, while he asserted that the South had 
lost nothing, but gained much through the slavery 
agitation, and while he maintained that she was 
menaced by no danger, he had been for nearly ten 
years a conditional disunionist. During the agita- 
tion of 1850, a convention of Georgia passed cer- 
tain resolutions, known as the " Georgia platform." 
The resolutions declared the acceptance of the 
compromise of 1850 as a "permanent adjustment"; 
and then went on to threaten disunion in case that 
adjustment were violated.^ This "Georgia plat- 
form" was Mr. Stephens's rally in g-gi-ound and 
stronghold ; latterly he had extended it by includ- 
ing personal liberty bills as a cause of disunion. 
He loved the Union, but he held the Union second- 
ary to the Georgia platform; and he opposed se- 
cession because he thought it a departure from this 
platform. "Not only a departure from the Georgia 
platform," said he, " and from the long-established 



ClI. XVII. 

fitephens, 
Farewell 
8iR'ech, 
AiigUHta, 
Ga., July 

2, 1859. 
Cleveland, 

"Life of 

Stephens," 

p. G47. 



I "Fourth. That the State of 
Georgia, in the judgment of this 
convention, will, and ought to re- 
sist, even (as a last i-esort) to a 
disruption of every tie which 
binds her to the Union, any fu- 
ture act of Congress abolishing 
slavery in the District of Colum- 
bia, without the consent and peti- 
tion of the slaveholders thereof, 
or any act abolishing slavery in 
places within the slave-holding 
States, purchased by the United 
States for the erection of forts, 
magazines, arsenals, dock-yards. 



navy yards, and other like pur- 
poses ; or in any act suppressing 
the slave trade between slave- 
holding States ; or in any refusal 
to admit as a State any Territory 
applying, because of the exist- 
ence of slavery therein ; or in any 
act prohibiting the introduction 
of slaves into the Territories of 
Utah and New Mexico ; or in any 
act repealing or materially modi- 
fying the laws now in force for 
the recovery of fugitive slaves." 
— Stephens, "War Between the 
States," Vol. II., p. 676. 



270 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CH. XVII. principles of the national Democratic party, but an 

entire change of position of the entire South, of all 

A?igu^ta' parties, not of all individuals, in relation to the 

septfiTiseo, power and jurisdiction of the Federal Government 

^^^p.^mi*^' over the subject of African slavery." 

When the disruption of the Charleston Conven- 
tion paralyzed the Democratic party, Mr. Stephens 
lost heart. He thought the times out of joint. He 
saw no further prospect of doing good. The pop- 
stephensto ular fevcr must run its course. If disunion came 
ju?y 1,1860. he avowed he would yield to the misfortune. His 
p- 672. ' destiny, he said, lay with Georgia and the South. 
It will appear from this that Mr. Stephens was a 
most unsafe political mentor. Yet, out of this leth- 
argy of conviction and will came the splendid out- 
burst of patriotic eloquence and Union argument 
of his Milledgeville speech ; only to be marred, 
however, at its close by renewed adhesion to the 
Georgia platform, and a new subserviency to the 
"will of Georgia." 

The newspapers brought the report of Mr. 
Stephens's speech to Springfield, the home of Mr. 
Lincoln, as well as to all other Northern cities, and 
the President-elect read its stirring periods with 
something of the general hope that a gleam of 
light was shining upon dark places. Like other 
men in the North, he had no means of knowing 
the eccentricities of Mr. Stephens's principles and 
policy, and therefore probably shared the general 
error of overvaluing his expressions of attachment 
to the Union. He had personally known him as a 
fellow-Congressman and a fellow- Whig in 1847-49 ; 
they had become co-laborers in their advocacy of 
the nomination and election of General Taylor to 



STEPHENS'S SPEECH 271 

the Presidency, and through these associations con- en. xvii. 
tracted a warm social and political friendship. 

It was, therefore, most natural that, upon read- 
ing his reported speech, Mr. Lincoln addressed a 
note of a few lines to Mr. Stephens, asking him for 
a revised copy; and this note led to a short but 
most interesting correspondence. 

Mr. Stephens replied courteously, saying that 
his speech had not been revised by him; that 
while the newspaper report contained several 
verbal inaccuracies, its main points were suffi- 
ciently clear for all practical pm-poses. The note 
closed with the following sentence : " The country 
is certainly in great peril, and no man ever had 
heavier or greater responsibilities resting upon 
him than you have in the present momentous 
crisis." The phrase seemed to open the way to a 
confidential interchange of thought; and a few 
days afterwards Mr. Lincoln wrote the following 
frank letter : 

For your oivn eye only. 

Springfield, III., Dec. 22, 1860. 
Hon. a. H. Stephens. 

My Dear Sir : Your obliging answer to ray short note 
is just received, and for which please accept my thanks. 
I fuUy appreciate the present peril the country is in, and 
the weight of responsibility on me. Do the people of the 
South really entertain fears that a Republican adminis- 
tration would, directly or indirectly, interfere with the 
slaves, or with them about the slaves? If they do, I 
wish to assure you, as once a friend, and still, I hope, 
not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears. The 
South would be in no more danger in this respect than 
it was in the days of Washington. I suppose, however, 
this does not meet the case. You think slavery is right 
and ought to be extended, while we think it is wrong 



2«6. 



272 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CH. xvri. and ought to be restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. 

stepiicns, It certainly is the only substantial difference between us. 
tw'^^u fhi' Yours very truly, 

states," A. Lincoln. 

Vol. II., p. 

With equal frankness Mr. Stephens, under date 
of December 30, wrote a long reply, which is con- 
spicuous for its candid admissions. Premising 
that though differing from him politically he was 
not Mr. Lincoln's enemy, Mr. Stephens proceeded 
as follows : 

I will also add that in my judgment the people of the 
South do not entertain any fears that a Republican ad- 
ministration, or at least the one about to be inaugurated, 
would attempt to interfere directly and immediately with 
slavery in the States. Their apprehension and disquie- 
tude do not spring from that source. They do not arise 
from the fact of the known antislavery opinions of the 
President-elect. Washington, Jefferson, and other Pres- 
idents are generally admitted to have been antislavery in 
sentiment. But in those days antislavery did not enter 
as an element into party organizations. . . But now this 
subject, which is confessedly on all sides outside of the 
constitutional action of the Government so far as the 
States are concerned, is made the central idea in the plat- 
form of principles announced by the triumphant party. 
The leading object seems to be simply, and wantonly, if 
you please, to put the institutions of nearly half the 
States under the ban of public opinion and national con- 
demnation. This, upon general principles, is quite 
enough of itself to arouse a spirit not only of general in- 
dignation, but of revolt on the part of the proscribed. . . 
We at the South do think African slavery, as it exists 
with us, both morally and politically right. This opinion 
is founded upon the inferiority of the black race; you, 
however, and perhaps a majority of the North, think it 
wrong. Admit the difference of opinion. The same dif- 
ference of opinion existed to a more general extent 
amongst those who formed the Constitution when it was 
made and adopted. The changes have been mainly to 




ALKXAXDEI! II. STEl'HKNS. 



STEPHENS'S SPEECH 



273 



our side. As parties were not formed on this difference 
of opinion then, why shoukl they be now? The same 
difference would, of course, exist in the supposed case of 
religion. When parties, or combinations of men, there- 
fore, so form themselves, must it not be assumed to arise 
not from reason or any sense of justice, but from fanati- 
cism ? The motive can spring from no other source, and 
when men come under the influence of fanaticism, there 
is no telling where their impulses or passions may drive 
them. This is what creates our discontent and apprehen- 
sion. . . Conciliation and harmony, in my judgment, can 
never be established by force. Nor can the Union, under 
the Constitution, be maintained by force. The Union 
was formed by the consent of Independent Sovereign 
States. Ultimate sovereignty still resides with them 
separately, which can be resumed, and will be, if their 
safety, tranquillity, and security in their judgment require 
it. Under our system, as I view it, there is no rightful 
power in the general Government to coerce a State in 
case any one of them should throw herself upon her re- 
served rights, and resume the full exercise of her sover- 
eign powers. Force may perpetuate a Union — that 
depends upon the contingencies of war. But such a 
Union would not be the Union of the Constitution : it 
would be nothing short of a consolidated despotism. 

Mr. Lincoln could not, of course, enter upon a 
further discussion of the topics raised, and made 
no reply to Mr. Stephens's letter. The correspond- 
ence is noteworthy as showing how both writers 
agreed upon the actual and underlying cause of the 
political crisis — namely, that the South believed 
slavery to be right and ought to be extended, while 
the North believed it was wi'ong and ought to be 
restricted. It was a conflict of opinion. Such con- 
flicts have come in all times, in all nations, and 
under all forms of government. But, admitting the 
existence of such a conflict of opinion, the legiti- 
mate inquiry arises. Was it a proper cause of war ? 
Vol. III.— 18 



Cn. XVII. 



Stephens, 

" War Be- 

twceu the 

States," 

Vol. II., pp. 

267-70. 



274 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

CH.XVII. History must answer this question unhesita- 
tingly and emphatically in the negative. In ages 
happily past, the anger of a king, the caprice 
of a mistress, or the ambition of a minister has 
often deluged a nation in blood. But in our day 
the conscience of civilization demands that the 
sword shall only defend the life of governments, 
and the life, liberty, and property of their subjects. 
It has ordained that written constitutions shall 
decide claims of rulers and rights of citizens. 
Casuistry the most adroit could not prove the 
right of the free States to expel the slave States 
for believing the institution of slavery to be a 
substantial blessing ; equally absurd was the doc- 
trine that the slave States had a right to destroy 
the Union by secession because the free States 
thought slavery a moral, social, and political e\il. 
Upon this question, as upon all others, public 
opinion was the arbiter appointed by the Consti- 
tution and laws. Upon this question the lawful 
and constitutional verdict had been pronounced by 
the election of Lincoln ; and the proper duty of 
the South under the circumstances had been ad- 
mirably stated by Mr. Stephens himself in his 
Milledgeville speech : " In my judgment the elec- 
tion of no man, constitutionally chosen to that 
high office, is sufficient cause for any State to sep- 
arate from the Union. It ought to stand by and 
aid still in maintaining the Constitution of the 

^plgl!"^' country." 

Mr. Stephens's letter ignored the existence of the 
pro-slavery sentiment in the South,which had for six 
years been united and unceasing in party affiUation 
and action, and that this party action had wrought 



STEPHENS'S SPEECH 275 

tlie repeal of the Missouri Compromise in violation ch. xvii. 
of plighted political faith and generous comity be- 
tween sections. Moreover that antisla very opinions 
had not only been under ban of public sentiment 
there, but had notoriously for years been visited 
with molj violence, and been made the subject of 
prohibitory penal statutes. The experiment of a 
sentimental union dreamed of by Stei)hens and 
others had been fully tried in the compromise of 
1850, and first and flagrantly violated by the South 
herself, against every appeal and protest. 



Ch. XVIII. 



O' 



CHAPTER XVIII 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

iNE of the vexatious duties of Lincoln was to 
answer the importunings of a class of sincere, 
but timid men, alarmed by the signs of disunion, 
who besought him to make some public statement 
to quiet the South. Requests of this character 
were not confined to one party, but came from all ; 
the more considerable number being from Repub- 
licans and from Southern unionists or followers of 
Bell and Everett. The great bulk of these letters 
was, of course, never answered; but occasionally 
one was received from a man of such standing and 
influence that to ignore it would not only seem 
ungracious, but might subject the President-elect 
to more serious misrepresentation than it had 
already been his lot to endure. To show both a 
prominent phase of current politics and his manner 
of dealing with it, we print several replies of this 
class. 

Thus, for instance, he wrote, confidentially, to 
Mr. William S. Speer, a citizen of Tennessee, under 
date of October 23 : 

I appreciate your motive when you suggest the pro- 
priety of my writing for the public something disclaiming 
all intention to interfere with slaves or slavery in the 
States ; but in my judgment it would do no good. I 

276 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 277 

have already done this many, many times ; and it is in cu. xviir. 

print, and open to all who will read. Those who will not 

read or heed what I have already publicly said would not 

read or heed a rt;petition of it. " If they hear not Moses ji;yj;:|?'^/:° 

and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though kiaeo. ms. 

one rose from the dead." 

Among the newspapers of the West, none had 
taken a higher rank or wielded a gi'eator influence 
than the " Louisville Journal." It had in a man- 
ner been Mr. Lincoln's primer in politics in those 
early days when he labored through Blackstone, 
or even farther back when he was yet struggling 
with Kirkham's grammar on the shady knolls of 
New Salem. Compared with these rocks and pit- 
falls of letters, the anecdotes, the wit, the epigram- 
matic arguments of the "Louisville Journal" were 
a very garden of delight, not only to Lincoln, but 
to the crude yet knowledge-hungry intellects of 
the whole Mississippi Valley. In time the "Jour- 
nal" became a great luminary, and the name of 
its witty editor a household word. For many 
years it was a beacon and watch-tower of the Whig 
party; then the Pandora's box of the Nebraska 
bill was opened ; and when finally in the extraor- 
dinary campaign of 1860 Lincoln read this once 
favorite sheet, it was to find himself the victim of 
its satii'e and depreciation. Victory, however, is a 
sovereign balm for detraction; and it must have 
been easy for him to forgive his old friend George 
D. Prentice when the latter wrote him (October 26) : 
"There is evidently a very strong probability of 
your being elected to the Presidency by the pop- 
ular vote." Exi3ressing the " strongest " confidence 
in both his "personal and political integrity," he 



278 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Prentice to 

Lincoln, 
Oct. 26, 1860. 

M8. 



c'H. XVIII. suggested that in the event of his election he should 
publish a letter setting forth his conservative views 
and intentions, " to assure all good citizens of the 
South and to take from the disunionists every ex- 
cuse or pretext for treason." 

To this appeal Mr. Lincoln prepared a reply, 
October 29, though it was not then sent: 

Your suggestion that I in a certain event shall write 
a letter setting forth my conservative views and inten- 
tions is certainly a very worthy one. But would it do 
any good 1 If I were to labor a month, I coidd not ex- 
press my conservative views and intentions more clearly 
and strongly than they are expressed in our platform and 
in my many speeches already in print and before the 
public. And yet even you, who do occasionally speak of 
me in terms of personal kindness, give no prominence to 
these oft-repeated expressions of conservative views and 
intentions, but busy yourself with appeals to all conserva- 
tive men to vote for Douglas, — to vote any way which 
can possibly defeat me, — thus impressing your readers 
that you think I am the very worst man living. If what 
I have already said has faded to convince you, no repeti- 
tion of it would convince you. The writing of your letter, 
now before me, gives assurance that you would publish 
such a letter from me as you suggest ; but, till now, what 
reason had I to suppose the '' Louisville Journal," even, 
woidd publish a repetition of that which is already at its 
command, and which it does not press upon the public 
attention ? 

And now, my friend, — for such I esteem you person- 
ally, — do not misunderstand me. I have not decided 
that I wiU not do substantially what you suggest. I 
will not forbear from doing so merely on punctdio and 
pluck. If I do finally abstain, it wiU be because of appre- 
hension that it would do harm. For the good men of the 
South — and I regard the majority of them as such — I 
have no objection to repeat seventy and seven times. 
But I have bad men also to deal with, both North and 
South; men who are eager for something new upon 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 279 

whieli to base ik^w misrepresentations; men \vlii» would cii.xvrri. 
like to frig-hten me, or at least to fix ni)on me the diarae- 
ter of timidity and eowardiee. Tliey wonld seizin iipon 
almost any letter I could write as being an " awfnl coming Lincoln to 
down." I intend keeping my eye npon these gentlemen, oJ^tfa^iecb. 
and to not nnnecessarily pnt any weapons in their hands. ms. 

This letter was withheld till after election. ()ii 
the 16th of November he wrote a letter of very- 
similar purport to Mr. N. Pasehal, editor of the 
" Missouri Republican." 

I conld say nothing which I have not already said, and 
which is in print, and accessible to the public. Pardon 
me for suggesting that if the papers like yours, which 
heretofore have persistently garbled and misrepresented 
what I have said, will now f nlly and fairly place it be- 
fore their readers, there can be no further misunderstand- 
ing. I beg you to believe me sincere, when I declare I 
do not say this in a spirit of complaint or resentment ; 
but that I urge it as the true cure for any real uneasiness 
in the country, that my course may be other than con- 
servative. The Republican newspapers now and for some 
time past are and have been republishing copious extracts 
from my many published speeches, which would at once 
reach the whole public if your class of papers would also 
publish them. I am not at liberty to shift my ground — 
that is out of the question. If I thought a repetition 
would do any good I would make it. But in my judgment Li,,^.,,,^ ^^ 
it would do po-sitive harm. The secessionists per se, l)e- ^i;'-;^'ii=']- 
lieving they had alarmed me, would clamor all the louder. ms. 

With the solicitations of this nature coming from 
his political friends, Mr. Lincoln was not only as 
firm and decided, but more emphatic in criticism. 
On November 5, the day before the Presidential isgo. 
election, there arrived at Springfield, and called 
upon him, a gentleman from New England, of prom- 
inence in political and official life, who brought and 
presented letters of this same tenor from a consid- 



280 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. xtiii. erable uumber of citizens representing commercial 
and manufacturing industries in that region. He 
was one of those keen, incisive talkers who go 
direct to the heart of a mission. 

" I have called to see," he said, " if the alarms of 
many persons in New England engaged in com- 
merce and manufactures cannot by some means be 
relieved. I am myself largely interested in manu- 
factures. Oui' trade has fallen off, our workmen 
are idle, we get no orders from the South, and with 
the increasing chances of civil war, bankruptcy and 
ruin stare us in the face." 

Something in the persistence and manner of his 
interlocutor, something in the tone of the letters 
presented, and still more in the character of the 
signers, ii-ritated Lincoln to a warmth of retort he 
seldom reached. He divined at once the mercenary 
nature of the appeal, and it roused him to repel the 
pressure. His visitor closed by asking some con- 
servative promise " to reassure the men honestly 
alarmed." 

" There are no such men," bluntly replied Lincoln. 
" This is the same old trick by which the South 
breaks down every Northern victory. Even if I 
were personally willing to barter away the moral 
principle involved in this contest, for the commer- 
cial gain of a new submission to the South, I would 
go to Washington without the countenance of the 
men who supported me and were my friends before 
the election ; I would be as powerless as a block of 
buckeye wood." 

The man still insisted, and Lincoln continued : 

"The honest men (you are talking of honest 
men) will look at our platform and what I have 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 281. 

said. There they will find everything I could now cn. xviii. 
say, or which they would ask me to say. All I 
could add would be but repetition. Having told 
them all these things ten times already, would 
they believe the eleventh declaration ? Let us be 
practical. There are many general terms afloat, 
such as 'conservatism,' 'enforcement of the irre- 
pressible conflict at the point of the bayonet,' ' hos- 
tility to the South,' etc., all of which mean nothing 
without definition. What then could I say to allay 
their fears, if they will not define what particular 
act or acts they fear from me or my friends ! " 

At this stage of the conversation his visitor, who 
with true military foresight had provided a reserve, 
handed him an additional letter numerously signed, 
asking if he did not there recognize names that 
were a power. 

" Yes," retorted Lincoln sharply, glancing at the 
document, " I recognize them as a set of liars and 
knaves who signed that statement about Seward 
last year." 

The visitor was taken aback at this familiarity 
with the local politics of his State, but rallied and 
insisted that there were also other names on the 
list. Lincoln now looked through the paper more 
carefully, his warmth meanwhile cooling down a 
little. 

" Well," answered he, laughing, " after reading 
it, it is about as I expected to find it. It annoyed 
me to hear that gang of men called respectable. 
Their conduct a year ago was a disgrace to any 
civilized citizen." 

Here his visitor suggested that the South was 
making armed preparations. 



282 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XVIII. " The North," answered Lincoln, " does not fear 
invasion from the slave States, and we of the 
North certainly have no desire, and never had, to 
invade the South. They have talked about what 
they intend to do, in the event of a Black Repub- 
lican victory, until they have convinced themselves 
there is really no courage left in the North." 

" Have we backed this time ? " interrupted the 
visitor. 

" That is just what I am pressed to do now," 
replied Lincoln. " If I shall begin to yield to these 
threats, if I begin dallying with them, the men who 
have elected me (if I shall be elected) would give 
me up before my election, and the South, seeing 
it, would deliberately kick me out. If my friends 
should desire me to repeat anything I have before 
said, I should have no objection to do so. If they 
required me to say something I had not yet said, 
I would either do so or get out of the way. If I 
pereonai sliould be clcctcd, the first duty to the country 
dl™*M8"' would be to stand by the men who elected me." 
Still, from time to time, the point was pressed 
upon him from other influential quarters. Henry J. 
Raymond, editor of the " New- York Times," joined 
in urging it. Lincoln, on November 28, answered 
him confidentially as follows : 

Yours of the 14tli was received in due course. I have 
delayed so long to answer it, because my reasons for not 
coming before the public in any form just now had sub- 
stantially appeared in your paper (the " Times "), and 
hence I feared they were not deemed sufficient by you, 
else you would not have written me as you did. I now 
think we have a demonstration in favor of my view. On 
the 20th instant Senator TrumbuU made a short speech, 
which I suppose you have both seen and approved. Has 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 283 

a single newspaper, heretofore against us, urged that cn. xviii. 
speech upon its readers with a purpose to quiet public, 
anxiety ? Not one, so far as I know. On the contrary, 
the "Boston Courier" and its class hold me responsiWo 
for that speech, and endeavor to inflame the North with 
the belief that it foreshadows an abandonment of Repub- 
lican ground by the incoming Administration ; while the 
"■ Washington Constitution " and its class hold the same 
speech up to the South as an open declaration of war 
against them. This is just as I expected, and just what 
would happen with any declaration I could make. These 
political fiends are not half sick enough yet. Party 
malice, and not public good, possesses them enth*ely. 
" They seek a sign, and no sign shall be given them." Raymond, 
At least such is my present feeling and purpose. jis. 

And in this purpose he remained steadfast to 
the end, though put to yet more trying tests. It 
has been mentioned, that with the opening of Con- 
gress, and the formation of the Senate Committee 
of Thirteen and the House Committee of Thirty- 
three, certain conservative men from the border 
slave States endeavored to gain control of the po- 
litical situation by forming a neutral or mediating 
party between the disunionists and the Repub- 
licans. Their policy was a mistake ; for, while 
reprobating present dismemberment, their attitude 
on the slavery question indicated clearly enough 
that, if clung to, it would inevitably drive them to 
the extreme plans of the Cotton States. Some of 
these would-be "neutral" States eventually went 
that direful road; and those which did not were 
saved only by the restraint of the Union army. 
But for the time their leaders were sincerely pa- 
triotic. From one of the most prominent of these, 
John A. Grilmer, of North Carolina, to whom Lincoln 
afterwards made a tender of a Cabinet appoint- 



284 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Gilmer to 

Lincoln, 

Dec. 10, 1800 

MS. 



CH. XVIII. ment, he received an inquiry, dated December 10, 
concerning his opinions on several points of the 
slavery controversy, saying: "I am not without 
hope that a clear and definite exposition of your 
views on the questions mentioned may go far to 
quiet, if not satisfy, all reasonable minds ; that on 
most of them it will become plain that there is 
much more misunderstanding than difference, and 
that the balance are so much more abstract than 
practical." 

However difficult to resist this appeal, so influen- 
tial, so respectful, so promising, the President-elect 
felt himself bound to adhere to his policy of refus- 
ing any public utterance, for reasons which he 
set forth at some length in a confidential answer, 
written on the 15th of December: 

I am greatly disinchned to write a letter on the sub- 
ject embraced in yours ; and I would not do so, even 
privately as I do, were it not that I fear you might mis- 
construe my silence. Is it desired that I shall shift the 
ground upon which I have been elected? I cannot do 
it. You need only to acquaint yourself with that ground, 
and press it on the attention of the South. It is all in 
print and easy of access. May I be pardoned if I ask 
whether even you have ever attempted to procure the 
reading of the Republican platform, or my speeches, by 
the Southern people ? If not, what reason have I to ex- 
pect that any additional production of mine would meet 
a better fate ? It would make me appear as if I repented 
for the crime of having been elected and was anxious to 
apologize and beg forgiveness. To so represent me would 
be the principal use made of any letter I might now 
thrust upon the pubhc. My old record cannot be so 
used; and that is precisely the reason that some new 
declaration is so much sought. 

Now, my dear sir, be assured I am not questioning 
your candor; I am only pointing out that while a new 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 285 

letter would hurt the cause wliieh I think ;i just one, you en. xviir. 
can quite as well effect every patriotic object with th<! 
old record. CarefuUy read i)a«,'es 18, 19, 74, 75, 88, 8!), 
and 267 of the volume of Joint Debates between Sen- 
ator Douglas and myself, with the Republican Platform 
adopted at Chicago, and all your questions will be substan- 
tially answered. I have no thought of rccomnieiiding the 
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, nor tlii; 
slave trade among the slave States, even on the conditions 
indicated; and if I were to make such recommendation, 
it is quite clear Congress would not follow it. 

As to employing slaves in arsenals and dock-yards, it is 
a thing I never thought of in my life, to my recollection, 
till I saw your letter ; and I may say of it precisely as I 
have said of the two points above. 

As to the use of patronage in the slave States, where 
there are few or no Republicans, I do not expect to in- 
quire for the politics of the appointee, or whether he does 
or not own slaves. I intend in that matter to accommodate 
the people in the several localities, if they themselves will 
allow me to accommodate them. In one word, I never 
have been, am not now, and probably never shall be in 
a mood of harassing the people either North or South. 

On the Territorial question I am inflexible, as you see 
my position in the book. On that there is a difference 
between you and us ; and it is the only substantial differ- 
ence. You think slavery is right and ought to be ex- 
tended ; we think it is wi-ong and ought to be restricted. 
For this neither has any just occasion to be angry with 
the other. 

As to the State laws, mentioned in your sixth question, 
I really know very little of them. I never have read one. 
If any of them are in conflict with the fugitive-slave 
clause, or any other part of the Constitution, I certainly 
shall be glad of their repeal ; but I could hardly be justi- Lincoln to 
fied, as a citizen of Illinois, or as President of the United jyS^;^_ 
States, to recommend the repeal of a statute of Vermont 
or South Carolina. 

We have given samples of these solicitatious 
coming from Republicans, from Douglas Demo- 



ns. 



286 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. xviii. crats, and from the adherents of Bell ; the follow- 
ing, coming from the foui'th political school, will 
be found of equal interest. Its origin is given in 
the words of the principal actor, General Duff 
Green, who, in a letter nearly three years after- 
wards, thus described it: "In December, 1860, 
at the request of the President of the United 
States, I went to Springfield to see Mr. Lincoln 
and urge him to go to Washington and exert his 
influence in aid of the adjustment of the questions 
then pending between the North and the South. 
I was authorized by Mr. Buchanan to say to him 
that if he came he would be received and treated 
with the courtesy due to the President-elect. I 
saw Mr. Lincoln at his own house, and did urge 
the necessity of his going to Washington and unit- 
ing his efforts in behalf of peace, telling him that 
Duff Green ^^ ^7 opiuiou he alouc could prevent a civil war, 
son dJ^s, and that if he did not go, upon his conscience must 

Mami863. j.^g^ ^-^^ ^j^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^j^ ^^ g^g^„ 

Whether this proposition came by authority or 
not, Lincoln could not question either the truth 
of the envoy or the motive of the mission. In 
either case the appeal was adroitly laid. Of course 
it was impossible to accept or even to entertain it ; 
on the other hand, a simple refusal might be made 
the basis of very serious misrepresentation. He 
therefore wi'ote the following reply : 

^ ^ ^ Springfield, III., Dee. 28, 1860. 

Gen. Duff Green, 

My Dear Sir : I do not desire any amendment of the 
Constitution. Recognizing, however, that questions of 
such amendment rightfully belong to the American peo- 
ple, I should not feel justified nor inclined to withhold 
from them if I could a fair opportunity of expressing 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 287 

their will thereon through either of the modes prescribed cir. xviii. 
iu the instrument. 

In addition I declare that the maintenance inviolate of 
the rights of the States, and especially the right of each 
State to order and control its own domestic institutions 
according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to 
that balance of powers on which the perfection and en- 
durance of our political fabric depend ; and I denounce 
the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any 
State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as the 
gravest of crimes. 

I am greatly averse to writing anything for the public at 
this time ; and I consent to the publication of this only upon 
the condition that six of the twelve United States Senators 
for the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Florida, and Texas shall sign their names to what is writ- 
ten on this sheet below my name, and allow the whole to 
be published together. ^ours truly, 

A. Lincoln. 

We recommend to the people of the States we represent 

respectively, to suspend all action for dismemberment of j^^,,^^^^ ^„ 

the Union, at least until some act deemed to be violative of g'g'*^*^|'f8*e^ 
our rights shall be done by the incoming Administration. isis. 

This letter Lincoln transmitted to Senator Trum- 
bull at Washington, with the following direction : 

General Duff Green is out here endeavoring to draw a 
letter out of me. I have written one which herewith I 
inclose to you, and. which I believe could not be used to 
our disadvantage. Still, if on consultation with our dis- 
creet friends you conclude that it may do us harm, do 
not deliver it. You need not mention that the second 
clause of the letter i& copied from the Chicago Platform, j .j^^,,^ ^^ 
If, on consultation, our friends, including yourself, think J™^;^'^^^,;^ 
it can do no harm, keep a copy and deliver the letter to ms. 
General Green. 

It is not definitely known whether this letter was 
delivered. Nothing further came of Duff Green's 
mission except a letter from himself in the " New 



288 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XVIII. York Herald " mentioning his visit and Ms failure, 
in the vaguest generalities. His aim had appar- 
ently been to induce Lincoln tacitly to assume 
responsibility for the Southern revolt; and when 
the latter by his skillful answer pointed out the 
real conspirators, they were no longer anxious to 
have a publication made. 

The whole attitude and issue of the controversy 
was so tersely summed up by Lincoln in a confi- 
dential letter to a Republican friend, under date of 
January 11, 1861, that we cannot forbear citing it 
in conclusion : 

Yours of the Gth is received. I answer it only because 
I fear you would misconstrue my silence. What is our 
present condition °? We have just carried an election on 
principles fairly stated to the people. Now we are told 
in advance the Government shall be broken up unless we 
surrender to those we have beaten, before we take the 
offices. In this they are either attempting to play upon 
us or they are in dead earnest. Either way, if we surren- 
der, it is the end of us, and of the Government. They 
will repeat the experiment upon us ad libitum. A year 
wiU not pass till we shall have to take Cuba as a con- 
dition upon which they will stay in the Union. They 
now have the Constitution under which we have hved 
over seventy years, and acts of Congress of their own 
framing, with no prospect of their being changed ; and 
they can never have a more shallow pretext for breaking 
up the Government, or extorting a compromise, than 
now. There is in my judgment but one compromise 
LiiKX)in to which would really settle the slavery question, and that 
hT' j" ^' ^*^^^1*^ ^6 ^ prohibition against acquiring any more ter- 
11, 1861. MS. ritory. 





^^^■-v 




N. B. JUDD. 



CHAPTER XIX 

SPRINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON 

AS the date of inauguration approached, formal ohap.xix. 
JTS^ invitations, without party distinction, came Mar. 4,i86l 
from the Legislatures of Indiana, Ohio, Pennsyl- 
vania, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, 
tendering Mr. Lincoln the hospitalities of those 
States and their people, and inviting him to visit 
their capitals on his journey to Washington. 
Similar invitations also came to him from the 
municipal authorities of many cities and towns on 
the route, and railroads tendered him special trains 
for the use of himself and family. Mr. Lincoln 
had no fondness for public display, but in his long 
political career he had learned the importance of 
personal confidence and hve sympathy between 
representatives and constituents, leaders and 
people. About to assume unusual duties in extraor- 
dinary times, he doubtless felt that it would not 
only be a gracious act to accept, so far as he could, 
these invitations, in which all parties had freely 
joined, but that both people and Executive would 
be strengthened in their faith and patriotism by a 
closer acquaintance, even of so brief and ceremonial 
a character. Accordingly, he answered the Gov- 
ernors and committees that he would visit the 
Vol. III.— 19 289 



290 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIX. citles of Indiaiiapolis, Columbus, Cincinnati, Cleve- 
land, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Albany, New York, 
Trenton, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg; while to 
the Governor of Massachusetts he replied that the 
want of time alone constrained him to omit that 
State from his route of travel. 
1861. Monday, the 11th day of February, was fixed as 

the time of departure, and a programme and 
schedule of special trains from point to point were 
arranged, extending to Saturday, the 23d, the time 
appointed for his arrival in Washington. Early 
Monday morning (the 11th) found Mr. Lincoln, his 
family, and suite at the rather dingy little railroad 
station in Springfield, with a throng of at least a 
thousand of his neighbors who had come to bid 
him good-bye. It was a stormy morning, which 
served to add gloom and depression to their spirits. 
The leave-taking presented a scene of subdued 
anxiety, almost of solemnity. Mr. Lincoln took a 
position in the waiting-room, where his friends 
filed past him, often merely pressing his hand in 
silent emotion. 

The half -finished ceremony was broken in upon 
by the ringing bells and rushing train. The crowd 
closed about the railroad car into which the Pres- 
ident-elect and his party ^ made their way. Then 
came the central incident of the morning. The 

1 The Presidential party which George W. Hazard, Captain John 

made the whole journey consisted Pope, Colonel Ward H. Lamon, 

of the following persons : Mr. Colonel E. E. Ellsworth, J. M. 

Lincoln, Mrs. Lincoln, their three Burgess, George C. Latham, W. 

sons, Robert T., William, and S. Wood, and B. Forbes. Besides 

Thomas, Lockwood Todd, Doctor these a considerable number of 

W. S. Wallace, John G. Nicolay, other personal friends and digni- 

John Hay, Hon N. B. Judd, Hon. taries accompanied the President 

David Davis, Colonel E. V. Sum- from Springfield to Indianapolis, 

ner, Major David Hunter, Captain and places beyond. 



SPKINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON 291 

bell gave notice of starting ; but as the conductor chai-. xix. 
paused with Ms hand lifted to the bell-rope, Mr. 
Lincoln appeared on the platform of the car, and 
raised his hand to command attention. The by- 
standers bared their heads to the falling snow- 
flakes, and standing thus, his neighbors heard his 
voice for the last time, in the city of his home, 
in a farewell address^ so chaste and pathetic, that 
it reads as if he already felt the tragic shadow of 
forecasting fate : 

My friends : no one, not in my situation, can appreciate 
my feeling of sadness at this parting. To this place, and 
the kindness of these people, I owe everything. Here I 
have lived a quarter of a century, and have passed from 
a young to an old man. Here my children have been 
born, and one is bm*ied. I now leave, not knowing when 
or whether ever I may return, with a task before me 
greater than that which rested upon Washington. With- 
out the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended 
him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot 
fail. Trusting in Him, who can go with me, and remain 
with you, and be everywhere for good, let us confidently 
hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending 
you, as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I 
bid you an affectionate farewell. 

A proper description of the Presidential tour 
which followed would fill a volume. It embraced 
two weeks of official receptions by committees, 
mayors, governors, and legislatures; of crowded 
evening receptions and interminable hand-shak- 
ings ; of impromptu or formal addresses at every 
ceremony; of cheers, salutes, bonfires, military 

1 This address was correctly down immediately after the train 

printed for the first time in the started, partly by Mr. Lincoln's 

" Century Magazine " for Decern- o\ra hand and partly by that of 

ber, 1887, from the original his private secretary from his 

manuscript, having been written dictation. 



292 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIX. parades, and imposing processions amid miles of 
spectators. 

Political dissension was for the moment hushed 
in the general curiosity to see and hear the man 
who by the free and lawful choice of the nation 
had been called to exercise the duties of the Presi- 
dential office. The universal eagerness was perhaps 
heightened by the fact that during the same two 
weeks the delegates from the States in insurrection 
were in session at Montgomery, Alabama, occupied 
with the temporary organization of a government 
openly pledged to rebellion, and whose doings were 
daily reported by the telegraph and printed in 
every newspaper. Personal curiosity was thus 
supplemented by growing political anxiety, and 
every word of the President-elect was scanned for 
some light by which to read the troubled and un- 
certain future. Mr, Lincoln was therefore obliged 
to measure his public utterances with unusual 
caution ; and while he managed to avoid any an- 
nouncement of policy, the country was neverthe- 
less able to read between the lines that it had made 
no mistake in the man to whom it had confided 
the preservation of the Government. 

It would, of course, be impossible in a single 
chapter to cite his many speeches on this journey, 
in which there occurred, of necessity, a great deal 
of repetition. It will, perhaps, give a better idea 
of their general tenor to reproduce passages from 
a few of the most noteworthy. In reading these it 
must be borne in mind that they were reported and 
printed under such circumstances of haste and con- 
fusion that verbal accuracy could not be expected, 
and that they are but abstracts, in which the full 



SPEINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON 293 

structure of his seiitoiices is often abridged or cuap.xix. 
transposed to permit the whole to be brought witliin 
the limits of an ordinary press dispatch. 

The train which left Springfield in the morning 
arrived in Indianapolis before nightfall, where, in 
response to an address from Governor Oliver P. 
Morton, Mr. Lincoln said : 

Most heartily do I thank you for this maguificeut re- 
ception, and while I cannot take to myself any share of 
the compliment thus paid, more than that which pertains 
to a mere instrument, an accidental instrument perhaps 
I should say, of a great cause, I yet must look upon it as 
a most magnificent reception, and as such most heartily 
do I thank you for it. You have been pleased to address 
yourself to me chiefly in hehalf of this glorious Union in 
which we hve, in all of which you have my hearty sym- 
pathy, and, as far as may be within my power, will liave, 
one and inseparably, my hearty cooperation. While I 
do not expect, upon this occasion, or until I get to Wash- 
ington, to attempt any lengthy speech, I will only say 
that to the salvation of the Union there needs but one 
single thing, the hearts of a people like yours. The 
people, when they rise in mass in behalf of the Union 
and the liberties of this country, truly may it be said, 
" The gates of hell cannot prevail against them." In all 
trying positions in which I shall be placed, and doubtless 
I shall be placed in many such, my rehauce will be upon 
you and the people of the United States; and I wish 
you to remember, now and forever, that it is your busi- 
ness, and not mine; that if the union of these States 
and the liberties of this people shaU he lost, it is but 
little to any one man of fifty-two years of age, but a 
great deal to the thirty millions of people who inhabit 
these United States, and to their posterity in all coming 
time. It is your business to rise up and preserve the 
Union and liberty for yourselves, and not for me. . . 
I appeal to you again to constantly bear in mind that 
not with politicians, not with Presidents, not with office- 
seekers, but with you, is the question, ShaU the Union 



294 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XIX. aud shall the liberties of this country be preserved to 
the latest generations. 

The ceremonies during his stay here called out 
another address from him, in which he asked the 
following pertinent questions: 

I am here to thank you much for this magnificent wel- 
come, aud still more for the generous support given by 
your State to that political cause which I think is the true 
and just cause of the whole country and the whole world. 
Solomon says there is " a time to keep silence," and when 
men wrangle by the month with no certainty that they 
mean the same tJiing, while using the same ivord, it per- 
haps were as well if they would keep silence. The words 
" coercion " and " invasion " are much used in these days, 
and often with some temper and hot blood. Let us make 
sure, if we can, that we do not misunderstand the mean- 
ing of those who use them. Let us get exact definitions 
of these words, not from dictionaries, but from the men 
themselves, who certainly appreciate the things they would 
represent by the use of words. What, then, is *' Coercion " ? 
What is " Invasion " ? Would the marching of an army 
into South Carohna, without the consent of her people, 
and with hostile intent towards them, be 'invasion""? 
I certainly think it would ; and it would be '^ coercion " 
also if the South Carolinians were forced to submit. But 
if the United States should merely hold and retake its 
own forts and other property, and collect the duties on 
foreign importations, or even withhold the mails from 
places where they were habitually violated, would any 
or all of these things be " invasion '' or " coercion " ? Do 
our professed lovers of the Union, but who spitefully re- 
solve that they will resist coercion and invasion, under- 
stand that such things as these on the part of the United 
States would be coercion or invasion of a State ? If so, 
their idea of means to preserve the object of their affec- 
tion would seem exceedingly thin aud airy. If sick, the 
little pills of the homeopathist would be much too large 
for them to swallow. In their view, the Union, as a family 
relation, would seem to be no regular marriage, but a sort 
of "free-love" arrangement, to be maintained only on 



SPRINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON 295 

"passional attraction." By the way, in \vli;it, consists the chai-.xix. 
special sacredness of a State? I speak not of tlie pijsition 
assigned to a State in the Union, by the Constitution ; 
for that, by the bond, we all recognize. That position, 
however, a State cannot carry out of the Union with it. 
I speak of that assumed primary right of a State to rule 
all which is less than itself, and ruin all whic^li is larger 
than itself. If a State and a county, in a given case, 
should be equal in extent of territory, and equal in num- 
ber of inhabitants, in w^hat, as a matter of principle, is 
the State better than the county? Would an exchange 
of names be an exchange of rif/hts upon principle ? On 
what rightful principle may a State, being not more than 
one-fiftieth part of the nation, in soil and population, 
break up the nation and then coerce a proportionally 
larger subdivision of itself, in the most arbitrary way ? 
What mysterious right to play tyrant is conferred on a 
district of country, with its people, by merely calling it 
a State? Fellow-citizens, I am not asserting anything; 
I am merely asking questions for you to consider. 

At Columbus, Ohio, lie said to the Legislature of 
that State, conveued in joint session in the hall of 
the Assembly : 

It is true, as has been said by the President of the 
Senate, that very great responsibility rests upon me in 
the position to which the votes of the American people 
have called me. I am deeply sensible of that weighty 
responsibility. I cannot but know what you all know, 
that without a name, perhaps without a reason why I 
should have a name, there has fallen upon me a task such 
as did not rest even upon the Father of his Country; and 
so feehng, I cannot but turn and look for that support 
without which it will be impossible for me to perform 
that great task. I turn, then, and look to the American 
people, and to that God who has never forsaken them. 
Allusion has been made to the interest felt in relation to 
the policy of the new Administration. In this I have 
received from some a degree of credit for having kept 
silence, and from others some deprecation. I still think 
that I was right. . . I have not maintained silence fi-om 



296 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

chap.xix. any want of real anxiety. It is a good thing that there is 
no more than anxiety, for there is nothing going wrong. 
It is a consoling circumstance that when we look out, 
there is nothing that really hurts anybody. We entertain 
different views upon political questions, but nobody is 
suffering anything. This is a most consoling circum- 
stance, and from it we may conclude that all we want is 
time, patience, and a reliance on that God who has never 
forsaken this people. 

During a brief halt of the train at Steuben ville, 
where a large crowd was assembled, be made the 
following short statement of the fundamental ques- 
tion at issue : 

I fear that the great confidence placed in my ability is 
unfounded. Indeed, I am sure it is. Encompassed by 
vast difficulties as I am, nothing shall be wanting on my 
part, if sustained by the American people and God. I 
believe the devotion to the Constitution is equally great 
on both sides of the river. It is only the different under- 
standing of that instrument that causes difficulty. The 
only dispute on both sides is, "What are their rights?" 
If the majority should not rule, who would be the judge ? 
Where is such a judge to be found? We should all be 
bound by the majority of the American people — if not, 
then the minority must control. Would that be right ? 
Would it be just or generous? Assuredly not. I reiterate, 
that the majority should ride. If I adopt a wrong policy, 
the opportunity for condemnation will occur in four 
years' time. Then I can be turned out, and a better man 
with better views put in my place. 

Necessarily omitting any description of the 
magnificent demonstrations, and the multiplied 
speeches in the State and city of New York, his 
addresses in the capital of New Jersey must 
be quoted, because they show a culminating ear- 
nestness of thought and purpose. To the Senate 
he said: 



SPRINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON 'J!)7 

I am very grateful to you for the honorable rccepti(»ii ciim.xix 
of which I have been the object. I cannot l)ut rcmenibcr 
the place that New Jersey holds in our early history. In 
the revolutionary strug-j^le few of the States among the 
Old Thirteen had more of the battlefields of the country 
within their limits than New Jersey. May I be pardoned 
if, upon this occasion, I mention that away back in my 
childhood, the earliest days of my being able to read, I 
got hold of a small book, such a one as few of the younger 
members have ever seen, '' Weems' Life of Washington." 
I remember all the accounts there given of the battle- 
fields and struggles for the liberties of the country, and 
none fixed themselves upon my imagination so deeply as 
the struggle here at Trenton, New Jersey. The crossing 
of the river ; the contest with the Hessians ; the great 
hardships endui-ed at that time, all fijsed themselves on 
my memory more than any single revolutionary event ; 
and you all know, for you have all been boys, how these 
early impressions last longer than any others. I recollect 
thinking then, l)oy even though I was, that there must 
have been something more than common that these men 
struggled for. I am exceedingly anxious that that thing — 
that something even more than National Independence ; 
that something that held out a great promise to all the 
people of the world to all time to come — I am exceed- 
ingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution, and the 
liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance 
with the original idea for which that struggle was made, 
and I shall be most happy indeed if I shall be an humble 
instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this, his 
almost chosen people, for perpetuating the object of that 
great struggle. You give me this reception, as I under- 
stand, without distinction of party. I learn that this 
body is composed of a majority of gentlemen who, in the 
exercise of their best judgment in the choice of a chief 
magistrate, did not think I was the man. I understand, 
nevertheless, that they came forward here to greet me 
as the constitutionally elected President of the United 
States — as citizens of the United States — to meet the 
man who, for the time being, is the representative of the 
majesty of the nation — united by the single purpose to 



298 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cuAP.xix. perpetuate the Constitution, the Union, and the liberties 
of the people. As such, I accept this reception more 
gratefully than I could do did I believe it were tendered 
to me as an individual. 

Passing then to the Assembly Chamber, he ad- 
dressed the members of the lower house in con- 
clusion : 

. , . You, Mr. Speaker, have well said that this is a 
time when the bravest and wisest look back with doubt 
and awe upon the aspect presented by our national af- 
fairs. Under these circumstances, you will readily see why 
I should not speak in detail of the course I shall deem it 
best to pursue. It is proper that I should avail myself of 
all the information and all the time at my command, in 
order that when the time arrives in which I must speak 
officially, I shall be able to take the ground which I deem 
the best and safest, and from which I may have no oc- 
casion to swerve. I shall endeavor to take the ground I 
deem most just to the North, the East, the West, the 
South, and the whole country. I take it, I hope, in good 
temper, certainly with no malice towards any section. I 
shall do all that may be in my power to promote a peace- 
ful settlement of all our difBculties. The man does not live 
who is more devoted to peace than I am, none who would 
do more to preserve it, but it may be necessary to put the 
foot down firmly. [Here the audience broke out into 
cheers so loud and long, that for some moments it was 
impossible to hear Mr. Lincoln's voice.] And if I do my 
duty and do right, you will sustain me, will you not! 
[Loud cheers, and cries of " Yes, yes, we will."] Received 
as I am by the members of a Legislature, the majority of 
whom do not agree with me in political sentiments, I 
trust that I may have their assistance in piloting the ship 
of State through this voyage, surrounded by perils as it 
is ; for if it should suffer wreck now, there will be no 
pilot ever needed for another voyage. 

Perhaps in no one of the many addresses de- 
livered during his tour was he so visibly moved 



SPRINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON 299 

and affected by his surroundings as when he chap.xix. 
spoke in Independence Hall in Philadelphia, which 
he visited on the 22d of February, the anniversary mi. 
of Washington's birthday. He said : 

I am filled with deep emotion at finding myself stand- 
ing in this place, where were collected together the wisdom, 
the patriotism, the devotion to principle from which 
sprang the institutions under which we live. You have 
kindly suggested to me that in my hands is the task of 
restoring peace to our distracted country. I can say in 
return, shs, that all the pohtical sentiments I entertain 
have been drawn, so far as I have been able to draw 
them, from the sentiments which originated in and were 
given to the world from this hall. I have never had a 
feeling, politically, that did not spring from the senti- 
ments embodied in the Declaration of Independence. I 
have often pondered over the dangers which were in- 
cm-red by the men who assembled here and framed and 
adopted that Declaration. I have pondered over the toils 
that were endured by the oflfieers and soldiers of the army 
who achieved that independence. I have often inquired 
of myself what great principle or idea it was that kept 
this Confederacy so long together. It was not the mere 
matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland, 
but that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence 
which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, 
but hope to all the world, for all future time. It was that 
which gave promise that in due time the weight would 
be lifted from the shoulders of all men and that all shoidd 
have an equal chance. This is the sentiment embodied in 
the Declaration of Independence. Now, my friends, can 
this country be saved on that basis? If it can, I wiU con- 
sider myself one of the happiest men in the world if I can 
help to save it. If it cannot be saved upon that principle, 
it will be truly awful. But if this country cannot be 
saved without giving up that principle, I was about to 
say I would rather be assassinated on this spot than sur- 
render it. Now, in my view of the present aspect of 
affah's, there is no need of bloodshed and war. There is 
no necessity for it. I am not in favor of such a course ; 



300 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

cuAP.xix. and I may say in advance that there will be no bloodshed 
unless it be forced upon the Government. The Govern- 
ment will not use force, unless force is used against it. 

My friends, this is wholly an unprepared speech. I did 
not expect to be called on to say a word when I came 
here. I supposed it was merely to do something towards 
raising a flag — I may, therefore, have said something 
indiscreet. [Cries of "No, No."] But I have said noth- 
ing but what I am willing to live by, and, if it be the 
pleasure of Almighty God, die by. 

In his last speech of the series, delivered in 
Harrisburg, before the assembled Legislature of 
Pennsylvania, he happily described an interesting 
ceremony which had taken place that same morn- 
ing before leaving Philadelphia : 

I appear before you only for a very few brief remarks, 
in response to what has been said to me. I thank you 
most sincerely for this reception, and the generous words 
in which support has been promised me upon this occasion. 
I thank your great commonwealth for the overwhelming 
support it recently gave, not me personally, but the cause 
which I think a just one, in the late election. Allusion 
has been made to the fact — the interesting fact, perhaps 
we should say — that I for the first time appear at the 
capital of the great commonwealth of Pennsylvania upon 
the birthday of the Father of his Country. In connection 
with that beloved anniversary, connected with the history 
of this country, I have already gone through one exceed- 
ingly interesting scene this morning in the ceremonies at 
Philadelphia. Under the conduct of gentlemen there, I 
was for the first time allowed the privilege of standing in 
the old Independence Hall, to have a few words addressed 
to me there, and opening up to me an opportunity of ex- 
pressing, with much regret, that I had not more time to 
express something of my own feelings, excited by the 
occasion, somewhat to harmonize and give shape to the 
feehngs that had really been the feehngs of my whole 
life. Besides this, our friends there had provided a mag- 
nificent flag of the country. They had arranged it so 



SPRINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON 301 

that I was given the honor of raising it. And wlion it chap.xix. 
went up, I was pleased that it went to its place by the 
strength of my own feeble ai*m. When, according to 
the arrangement, the cord was puUed, and it floated glori- 
ously to the wind, without an accident, in the briglit, 
glowing sunshine of the morning, I could not help liop- 
ing that there was, in the entire success of that beautiful 
ceremony, at least something of an omen of what is to 
come. Nor could I help feeling then, as I often have felt, 
in the whole of that proceeding I was a very humble in- 
strument. I had not provided the flag ; I had not made 
the arrangements for elevating it to its place ; I had ap- 
plied but a very small portion of my feeble strength in 
raising it. In the whole transaction I was in the hands 
of the people who had arranged it, and if I can have the 
same generous cooperation of the people of the nation, I 
think the flag of our country may yet be kept flaunting 
gloriously. I recur for a moment but to repeat some 
words uttered at the hotel, in regard to what has been 
said about the military support which the general Gov- 
ernment may expect from the commonwealth of Pennsyl- 
vania in a proper emergency. To guard against any 
possible mistake do I recm* to this. It is not with any 
pleasure that I contemplate the possibility that a neces- 
sity may arise in this country for the use of the military 
arm. While I am exceedingly gratified to see the mani- 
festation upon your streets of your military force here, 
and exceedingly gratified at your promise to use that 
force upon a proper emergency — while I make these 
acknowledgments I desire to repeat, in order to preclude 
any possible misconstruction, that I do most sincerely 
hope that we shall have no use for them ; that it will 
never become theii* duty to shed blood, and most es- 
pecially never to shed fraternal blood. I promise that 
so far as I may have wisdom to direct, if so painful a 
result shall in anywise be brought about, it shall be 
through no fault of mine. 



1861. 



CHAPTER XX 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY 

Chap. XX. /^N the moriiing of February 23 the whole 
V_/ country was surprised at the telegraphic 
announcement, coupled with diverse and generally 
very foggy explanations, that the President-elect, 
after his long and almost triumphal journey in 
the utmost publicity, and with well-nigh universal 
greetings of good-will, had suddenly abandoned 
his announced programme and made a quick and 
secret night journey through Baltimore to the 
Federal capital. Public opinion at the time, and 
for years afterwards, was puzzled by the event, 
and the utmost contrariety of comment, ranging 
from the highest praise to the severest detrac- 
tion which caricature, ridicule, and denunciation 
could express, was long current. In the course of 
time, the narratives of the principal actors in the 
affair have been published,^ and a sufficient state- 
ment of the facts and motives involved may at 

1 See narrative of S. M. Felton, of Colonel Stone, Lossing, "Civil 

in Schouler, " Massachusetts in War," Vol. II., pp. 147-49 ; 

the Civil War," Vol. I., pp. 59- Lincoln's statement to Lossing, 

65; Judd to Pinkerton, Nov. 3, lb.. Vol. L, pp. 279, 280; Lin- 

1867, Edwards, "Life of N. B. coin's statement to Arnold, Ar- 

Judd," pamphlet, pp. 11-17; nold, "Lincoln and Slavery," p. 

Pinkerton, "The Spy of the Ee- 171 ; and Lamon, "Life of Lin- 

bellion," pp. 45-103 ; Kennedy coin," pp. 511-26, Also, MS. 

to Lossing, embracing narrative letters printed in this chapter. 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY 303 

length be made. The newspapers stated (without chap. xx. 
any prompting or suggestion from Mr. Lincoln) 
that an extensive plot to assassinate him on his 
expected trip through Baltimore about midday of 
Saturday had been discovered, which plot the 
earlier and unknown passage on Friday night dis- 
concerted and prevented. 

This theory has neither been proved nor dis- 
proved by the lapse of time ; Mr. Lincoln did not 
entertain it in this form^ nor base his course upon 
it. But subsequent events did clearly demon- 
strate the possibility and probability of attempted 
personal violence from the fanatical impulse of 
individuals, or the sudden anger of a mob, and 
confirmed the propriety of his decision. 

The threats of secession, revolution, plots to 
seize Washington, to burn the public buildings, to 
prevent the count of electoral votes and the 
inauguration of the new President, which had for 
six weeks filled the newspapers of the country, 
caused much uneasiness about the personal safety 
of Mr. Lincoln, particularly among the railroad 
officials over whose lines he was making his jour- 
ney; and to no one of them so much as to Mr. 
S. M. Felton, the President of the Philadelphia, 
Wilmington, and Baltimore Railway, whose line 
formed the connecting link from the North to the 
South, from a free to a slave State, from the region 
of absolute loyalty to the territory of quasi- 

1 Mr. Lincoln, long afterwards, to rim no risk, wliere no risk was 

declared: "I did not then, nor necessary." Hon. I. N. Arnold, 

do I now, believe I should have iu his work, "Lincoln and Sla- 

been assassinated, had I gone very," says in a note, p. 171, that 

through Baltimore as first eon- the above was "stated to the 

templated ; but I thought it wise author by Mr. Lincoln." 



304 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XX. rebellion. Independently of politics, the city of 
Baltimore at that time bore an unenviable reputa- 
tion as containing a dangerous and disorderly 
element ; her " roughs " had a degree of newspaper 
notoriety by no means agreeable to quiet and non- 
combative strangers. 

But Baltimore and other portions of Maryland 
were also profoundly moved by the incipient rebel- 
lion. Grovernor Hicks had been plied with persua- 
sion, protest, and even threats of personal violence, 
to induce him to convene the Legislature of that 
State, so that secession might begin under a legal 
pretext. The investigation of the Select Com- 
mittee of Five, though it found no organized plot 
to seize the capital of the nation, gave abundant 
traces of secession conspu'acy of various degrees — 
especially of half-formed military companies, or- 
ganizing to prevent Northern troops from passing 
through Baltimore to Washington or other points 
in the South. As part and parcel of this scheme, 
the railroads were to be destroyed and the bridges 
burned. The events of April, as they actually 
occurred, had already been planned, informally at 
least, in January. 

Aside from patriotism, the duty of protecting 
the tracks and bridges of the railroad of which he 
was president induced Mr. Felton to call to his aid 
Mr. Allan Pinkerton, chief of a Chicago detective 
agency, whom he had before employed on an im- 
portant matter. 

He was a man of great skiU and resources [wi-ites Mr. 
Felton]. I furnished him with a few hints and at once 
set him on the track with eight assistants. There were 
then drilling upon the line of the railroad some three 




FKEDICRICK W. SEWAKl 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY 305 

military organizations, professedly for home defense, pre- chap, xx 
tending to be Union men, and in one or two instances 
tendering their services to the railroad in case of trouble. 
Their propositions were duly considered ; but the defense 
of the road was never intrusted to their tender mercies. 
The first thing done was to enlist a volunteer in each of 
these military companies. They pretended to come from 
New Orleans and Mobile, and did not appear to be want- 
ing in sympathy for the South. They were furnished 
with uniforms at the expense of the road, and drilled as 
often as their associates in arms ; became initiated into 
all the secrets of the organization, and reported every day 
or two to then* chief, who immediately reported to me the 
designs and plans of these military companies. One of 
these organizations was loyal ; but the other two were 
disloyal, and fully in the plot to destroy the bridges, and 
march to Washington, to wrest it from the hands of the 
legall}^ constituted authorities. Every nook and corner 
of the road and its vicinity was explored by the chief 
and his detectives, and the secret working of secession 
and treason laid bare and brought to light. Societies 
were joined in Baltimore, and various modes known to 
and practiced only by detectives were resorted to, to win 
the confidence of the conspirators and get into their 
secrets. The plan worked well ; and the midnight plot- 
tings and daily consultations of the conspirators were 
treasured up as a guide to our f utm-e plans for thwarting 
them. . . It was made as certain as strong circumstantial 
and positive evidence could make it, that there was a plot 
to burn the bridges and destroy the road, and murder Mr. 
Lincoln on his way to Washington, if it tm-ned out that 
he went there before troops were called. If troops were 
first called, then the bridges were to be destroyed, and 
Washington cut off and taken possession of by the South. 
I at once organized and armed a force of about two hun- 
dred men, whom I distributed along the line between the 
Susquehanna and Baltimore, principall}' at the bridges. 
These men were drilled secretly and regularly by drill- 
masters, and were apparently employed in whitewashing 
the bridges, putting on some six or seven coats of white- 
wash, saturated with salt and alum, to make the outside 
Vol. III.— 20 



306 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XX. of the bridges as nearly fire-proof as possible. This white- 
washing, so extensive in its application, became the nine- 
days' wonder of the neighborhood. Thus the bridges were 
strongly guarded, and a train was arranged so as to con- 
centrate all the forces at one point in case of trouble. The 
programme of Mr. Lincoln was changed; and it was de- 
cided by him that he would go to Harrisburg from Phila- 
delphia, and thence over the Northern Central road by 
day to Baltimore, and thence to Washington. We were 
schouier ^heu informed by our detective that the attention of the 
chuscttsin consplrators was turned from our road to the Northern 
the Civil Central, and that they would there await the coming of 

War," Vol. TXT T • 1 

I., pp. 61,62. Mr. Lincoln. 

It appeared from the reports of Pinkerton's 
detectives that among the more suspicious indi- 
cations were the very free and threatening expres- 
sions of a man named Ferrandini, an Italian, 
sometime a barber at Barnum's Hotel in Balti- 
more, but who had become captain of one of the 
military companies organized in that city to pro- 
mote secession. Ferrandini's talk may not have 
Lamon, I)een conclusive proof of a conspiracy, but it 
Atoiham showed his own intent to commit assassination, 
p.^'sie.' and conveyed the inference of a plot. Coupled 
with the fact that the Baltimore aii* was fuU of 
similar threats, it established the probability of a 
mob and a riot. Add to this Ferrandini's testi- 
mony (February 5, 1861), that he was then drilling 
a company (fifteen members) of " Constitutional 
Guards " in Baltimore, formed for the express pur- 
pose "to prevent Northern volunteer companies 
from passing through the State of Maryland ... to 
come here [Washington] to help the United States 
troops, or anybody else, to invade the South in any 
shape whatever"; also that another corps, caUed 
the National Volunteers, had formed, "to protect 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY 307 

their State," and began drilling the previous Satur- cuav. xx. 
day; also that he had "hoard that the minute-men 
have fifteen companies" in Baltimore — and we 
have the direct evidence of extensive organization, before*the 
and strong presumption of the uses to which it mutfc o'" 
could be turned. Then, if we remember that riot, i^a-v. ' 
murder, and bridge-burning actually took place in 
Baltimore two months later, in exact accordance 
with the plans and ideas formulated, both in the 
loose talk and the solemn testimony by Ferrandini 
and others, we are unavoidably driven to the con- 
clusion that Mr. Felton, General Scott, Governor 
Hicks, and others had abundant cause for the very 
serious apprehensions under which they acted. 

N. B. Judd, a resident of Chicago, of peculiar 
prominence in Illinois politics and a personal friend 
of Lincoln, was perhaps the most active and influen- 
tial member of the suite of the President-elect. Pink- 
erton the detective knew Judd personally, and, as 
the Presidential party approached, notified him by 
letter at Buffalo, and by special messenger at New 
York, of the investigations he was making in Balti- 
more. Judd as yet said nothing of the matter to 
any one. When the party arrived in Philadelphia, 
however, he was instantly called to a conference 
with Mr. Felton and the detective. Pinkerton laid 
his reports before the two, and, after an hour's 
examination, both were convinced that the proofs 
of a plot to assassinate the President-elect were as 
serious and important as in the nature of things 
such evidence can ever be. 

He immediately took Pinkerton with him to Mr. 
Lincoln's room at the Continental Hotel, to whom 
the whole story was repeated, and where Judd 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



CHAP. XX. advised that, in the opinion both of Mr. Felton 
and himself, Mr. Lincoln's safety required him to 
proceed that same evening on the 11 o'clock train. 
" If you follow the course suggested," continued 
Judd, "you wiU necessarily be subjected to the 
scoffs and sneers of your enemies, and the disap- 
proval of your friends, who cannot be made to 
believe in the existence of so desperate a plot." 
Mr. Lincoln replied that he appreciated these sug- 
gestions, but that he could stand anything that 
was necessary. Then rising from his seat he said : 
"I cannot go to-night; I have promised to raise 
the flag over Independence Hall to-morrow morn- 
juddto ing, and to visit the Legislature at Harrisburg. 

NovSisOT. Beyond that I have no engagements." 

Hitherto, all Lincoln's movements had been made 
under the invitation, arrangement, direction, and 
responsibility of committees of legislatures, gov- 
ernors of States, and municipal authorities of 
towns and cities. No such call or greeting, how- 
ever, had come from Maryland ; no resolutions of 
welcome from her Legislature, no invitation from 
her Governor, no municipal committee from Balti- 
more. The sole proffers of friendship and hospi- 
tality from the commonwealth came from two 
citizens in their private capacity — Mr. Gittings, 
President of the Northern Central Railroad, who 
tendered a dinner to Mr. Lincoln and his family ; 
and Mr. Coleman, of the Eutaw House, who ex- 
tended a similar invitation to the President-elect 
and his suite. Appreciating fully these acts of 
personal courtesy, Mr. Lincoln yet felt that there 
was no evidence before him that the official au- 
thority of the city would be exercised to restrain 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY 



the uuruly elements which would on such an occa- chap, xx 
sion densely pack the streets of Baltimore. 

During their ten days' experience on the journey 
thus far, both he and his suite had had abundant 
evidence as to how completely exposed and per- 
fectly helpless every individual of the party, and 
especially Mr. Lincoln, was at times, even amid 
the friendliest feeling and the kindest attention. 
He had been almost crushed in the corridor of the 
State-house at Columbus; arriving after dark in 
the Pittsburgh depot, a stampede of the horses of a 
small cavalry escort had seriously endangered his 
carriage and its occupants; at Buffalo, Major 
Hunter, of his suite, had his arm broken by a sud- 
den rush of the crowd. If with all the good-will 
and precautions of police and military such perils 
were unavoidable in friendly cities, what might 
happen where authorities were indifferent, where 
municipal control and public order were lax, and 
where prejudice, hostility, and smoldering insurrec- 
tion animated the masses of people surging about 
the carriages of an unprotected street procession ? 

Yet with all these considerations Mr. Lincoln 
could not entirely convince himself that a de- 
liberate plot to murder him was in existence. "I 
made arrangements, however, with Mr. Judd for 
my return to Philadelphia the next night, if I 
should be convinced that there was danger in going 
through Baltimore. I told him that if I should 
meet at Harrisburg, as I had at other places, a 
delegation to go with me to Baltimore, I should 
feel safe, and go on." 

Mr. Judd devoted the remainder of the afternoon 
and nearly the whole of the night of February 21 isei. 



Lincoln's 
statement 
to Lossing, 

Lossing, 

" Civil 

War," Vol. 

I., p. 280. 



310 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XX. 



Judd to 
Pinkerton, 
Nov. 3, 1867. 



1861. 



to the discussion and perfection of arrangements 
for a night journey through Baltimore, as sug- 
gested by himself and Mr. Felton, and as con- 
ditionally accepted by the President-elect. Only 
four persons joined in this discussion — Mr. Judd, 
Mr. Pinkerton, Mr. Franciscus, General Manager 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and Mr. Henry San- 
ford, representing Colonel E. S. Sanford, President 
of the American Telegraph Company. At 4 o'clock 
A. M. the party separated, having agreed on the 
following plan : that after the reception at Harris- 
burg, a special train consisting of a baggage car 
and one passenger car, starting at 6 p. m., should 
convey Mr. Lincoln and one companion back to 
Philadelphia, the track between the two cities to 
be kept clear of everything; that Mr. Felton at 
Philadelphia should detain the 11 o'clock p. m. 
Baltimore train until the arrival of the special train 
from Harrisburg; that Pinkerton should have a 
carriage ready in which to proceed through Phila- 
delphia from one depot to the other; that an 
employee of his should engage berths in the sleep- 
ing-car of the Baltimore train ; that Mr. Sanford 
should so disconnect the wires as to make any 
telegraphing between the several points within cer- 
tain hours impossible ; and that Mr. Lincoln should 
have for his single escort and companion Ward H. 
Lamon, of his suite, a devoted personal friend from 
Illinois — young, active, and of almost herculean 
frame and strength. 

At 6 o'clock on the morning of February 22, the 
appointed flag-raising by the President-elect, over 
Independence Hall in Philadelphia, was duly cele- 
brated, and on the trip to Harrisburg, which fol- 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY 311 

lowed as soon as possible, Mr. Judd communicated chap. xx. 
the details of his plan to Mr. Lincoln. Before 
leaving Philadelphia Lincoln had received at the 
Continental Hotel the visit of Frederick W. Seward, 
who came as a special messenger from his father 
in Washington, to place the following correspond- 
ence in his hands : 

[Seward to Lincoln.] 

Washington, February 21, 1861. 

My Dear Sir : My son goes express to you. He wiU 
show you a report made by our detective to General 
Scott, and by him communicated to me this morning. I 
deem it so important as to dispatch my son to meet you 
wherever he may fiud you. 

I concur with General Scott in thinking it best for you 
to reconsider your arrangement. No one here but Gen- 
eral Scott, myseh, and the bearer is aware of this com- 
munication. 

I should have gone with it myself, but for the peculiar 

sensitiveness about my attendance at the Senate at this 

crisis. „ 

Very truly yours, 

WiLLiAJM H. Seward. ms. 

[General Scott to Seward.] 

February 21, 1861. 

My Dear Sir : Please receive my friend, Colonel Stone, 

chief of General Weightman's staff, and a distinguished 

young ofiQcer with me in Mexico. He has an important 

communication to make. _^ , . 

Yours truly, 

WiNFiELD Scott. ms. 

[Colonel Stone's Report.] 

February 21, 1861. 

A New York detective officer who has been on duty in 
Baltimore for three weeks past reports this morning that 
there is serious danger of violence to, and the assassina- 



312 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XX. tion of, Ml*. Lmcoln in his passage tlirougli that city, 
should the time of that passage be known. He states 
that there are banded rowdies holding secret meetings, 
and that he has heard threats of mobbing and violence, 
and has himself heard men declare that if Mr. Lincoln 
was to be assassinated they would like to be the men. 
He states further that it is only within the past few days 
that he has considered there was any danger, but now he 
deems it imminent. He deems the danger one which the 
authorities and people in Baltimore cannot guard against. 
All risk might be easily avoided by a change in the trav- 
eling arrangements which would bring Mr. Lincoln and 
a portion of his party through Baltimore by a night train 
MS. without previous notice. 

Here was a new and most serious additional 
warning. The investigation on which it was based 
was altogether independent of that made by Pink- 
erton, and entirely unknown to him. Colonel 
Stone, it will be remembered, was the officer to 
whom General Scott intrusted the organization 
and command of the District Militia for the de- 
fense of Washington and the general supervision 
and control of the city. The detectives, three in 
number, were from New York, and at the request 
of Colonel Stone had been selected and placed on 
duty by Mr. Kennedy, Superintendent of Police of 
New York City.^ In both cases similar observations 
had been made, and similar conclusions arrived at. 

Warned thus of danger by concuiTent evidence 
too grave to be disregarded, and advised to avoid 
it, not only by Judd and Felton in Philadelphia, 
but now also by Mr. Seward, the chief of his new 
Cabinet, and by General Scott, the chief of the 
army, Mr. Lincoln could no longer hesitate to 

1 See in Lossing, " Civil War," Vol. II., pp. 147-49, a letter from 
Kennedy, and the narrative of Colonel Stone. 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY 313 

adopt their suggestion. Whether the evidence chap. xx. 
would prove ultimately true, or whether violence 
upon him would be attempted, was not the ques- 
tion. The existence of the danger was pointed out 
and certified by an authority he had no right to 
disregard; the trust he bore was not merely the 
personal safety of an individual, but the fortune 
and perhaps the fate of the Government of the 
nation. It was his imperative duty to shun all 
possible and unnecessary peril. 

A man of less courage would have shrunk from 
what must inevitably appear to the public like a 
sign of timidity; but Lincoln on this and other 
occasions concerned himself only with the larger 
issues at stake, leaving minor and especially per- 
sonal consequences to take care of themselves. 
Frederick W. Seward was, therefore, informed by 
Judd "that he could say to his father that all 
had been arranged, and that, so far as human fore- 
sight could predict, Mr. Lincoln would be in Wash- judd to 
ington at 6 o'clock the next morning." With this Nov. 3,^867*. 
message Mr. Seward returned to Washington, while 
Mr. Lincoln and his suite proceeded to Harrisburg, 
where on that same Friday, the 22d of February, isei. 
he was officially received by the Grovernor and the 
Legislature of Pennsylvania. 

No other member of Mr. Lincoln's suite had as 
yet been notified of anything connected with the 
matter ; but Mr. Judd had suggested to him that 
he felt exceedingly the responsibility of the advice he 
had given and the steps he had taken, and that he 
thought it due to the age and standing of the lead- 
ing gentlemen of the President-elect's party that at 
least they should be informed and consulted. " To 



314 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cuAP. XX. the above suggestions," writes Judd, " Mr. Lincoln 
assented, adding : ' I reckon they will laugh at us, 
Judd, but you had better get them together.' It was 
arranged that after the reception at the State-house, 
and before dinner, the matter should be fully laid 
before the following gentlemen of the party : Judge 
David Davis, Colonel E. V. Sumner, Major David 
Hunter, Captain John Pope, and Ward H. Lamon." 
Mr. Judd's narrative then further recites what 
occurred : 

The meeting thus arranged took place in the parlor of 
the hotel, Mr. Lincoln being present. The facts were laid 
before them by me, together with the details of the pro- 
posed plan of action. There was a diversity of opinion, 
and some warm discussion, and I was subjected to a very 
rigid cross-examination. Judge Davis, who had expressed 
no opinion, but contented himself with asking rather 
pointed questions, turned to Mr. Lincoln, who had been 
hstening to the whole discussion, and said : " Well, Mr. 
Lincoln, what is your own judgment upon this matter? " 
Mr. Lincoln replied : " I have thought over this matter 
considerably, since I went over the ground with Pinker- 
ton last night. The appearance of Mr. Frederick Seward, 
with warning from another source, confii-ms Mr. Pinker- 
ton's belief. Unless there are some other reasons besides 
fear of ridicule, I am disposed to carry out Judd's plan." 
Judge Davis then said : " That settles the matter, gentle- 
men." Colonel Sumner said: '' So be it, gentlemen; it is 
against my judgment, but I have undertaken to go to 
Washington with Mr. Lincoln, and I shall do it." I tried 
to convince him that any additional person added to the 
risk ; but the spirit of the gallant old soldier was up, and 
debate was useless. 

The party separated about 4 P. m., the others to go to 
the dinner table, and myself to go to the railroad station 
and the telegi-aph office. At a quarter to six I was back 
at the hotel, and Mr. Lincoln was still at the table. In a 
few moments the carriage drove up to the side door of 
the hotel. Either Mi-. Nicolay or Mr. Lamon called Mr. 



LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOUllNEY 315 

Lincoln from the table. He went to his room, changed Ciiap. xx. 

his dinner dress for a traveling suit, and came down with 

a soft hat sticking in his pocket, and his shawl on his 

arm.i As the party passed through the hall I said, in a 

low tone, " Lamon, go ahead. As soon as Mr. Lincoln is 

in the carriage, drive off ; the crowd must not be allowed 

to identify him." Mr. Lamou went first to the carriage ; 

Colonel Sumner was following close after Mr. Lincoln ; I 

put my hand gently on his shoulder ; he turned to see 

what was wanted, and before I could explain, the carriage 

was off. The situation was a little awkward, to use no 

stronger terms, for a few moments, until I said to the 

Colonel : " When we get to Washington, Mr. Lincoln 

shall determine what apology is due to you." 

It is needless to describe the various stages of 
Mr. Lincoln's journey. The plan arranged by the 
railroad and telegraph officials was carried out to 
the smallest detail without delay or special inci- 
dent, and without coming to the knowledge of any 
person on the train or elsewhere, except those to 
whom the secret was confided. The President- 
elect and his single companion were safely and 
comfortably carried from Harrisburg to Philadel- 
phia, and at midnight took their berths in the 
sleeping-car of the regular train from New York, 
passing through Baltimore unrecognized and un- 
disturbed, and arriving in Washington at 6 o'clock 
on the morning of February 23. Here they were isei. 
met by Mr. Seward and E. B. Washburne, and 
conducted to Willard's Hotel. The family and 

1 Many caricatures and com- scription was the pure invention 

ments of that day were based of a newspaper correspondent 

upon the following sentence in understood to be Joseph Howard, 

a dispatch to the " New- York Jr., who later in the war was im- 

Times " : "He wore a Scotch prisoned in Fort Lafayette for 

plaid cap and a very long mill- publishing a forged proclamation, 

tary cloak, so that he was en- about the draft, in the New York 

tirely unrecognizable." This de- newspapers. 



316 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XX. suite made the journey direct from Harrisburg to 
Baltimore, according to the programme, arriving 
in Washington late that evening. They encoun- 
tered in Baltimore no incivility, nor any unusual 
disorder, though, as elsewhere, dense crowds, very 
inadequately controlled by the police, surrounded 
the railroad depots and filled the streets through 
which their carriages passed. All motive, however, 
to commit an assault was now past, since it was 
everywhere known that Mr. Lincoln was not with 
the party, but ah-eady at his destination. 



CHAPTER XXI 

LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 

ARRIVED in Washington and installed in the cnAP.xxi. 
J\. spacious parlors of Willard's Hotel, fronting 
on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mr. Lincoln had a little 
more than a week to prepare for the inauguration. 
Of this a part was taken up with the customary 
introductory visits — to the outgoing President and 
Cabinet, where Mr. Buchanan and his councilors 
received him with cordial politeness; to the two 
Houses of Congress, where he was enthusiastically 
welcomed by friends and somewhat sullenly gi-eeted 
by opponents; and to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, whose venerable chief and associate 
justices extended to him an affable recognition as 
the lawful successor in constitutional rulership. 

In his own parlors, also, the President-elect re- 
ceived numerous demonstrations of respect. Presi- 
dent Buchanan and his Cabinet officially returned 
his visit. The Peace Conference, embracing dis- 
tinguished delegates from all the free States and 
the border slave States, and headed by their chair- 
man, ex-President Tyler, waited upon him in a "Proceed- 

■ .7 7 ^ ^ lugg of the 

body, in pursuance of a formal and unanimous P|^^eCon- 
resolution. His Presidential rivals, Douglas and pp. 336,337. 
Breckinridge, each made him a call of courtesy. 

317 



318 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. The mayoi' and the municipal council came in an 
official visit of welcome. Several delegations and 
many high functionaries repeated these ceremonial 
calls, which again were supplemented by numerous 
cordial invitations to private hospitality. 

While all these tokens of respect were sincere and 
loyal, there was a deep anxiety in public feeling to 
learn how the new President would deal with an 
organized rebellion, which had been allowed by 
his predecessor to establish itself without the least 
hinderance, and which, while committing repeated 
acts of war, had as yet perpetrated no violence or 
bloodshed — only, however, because it had met 
neither official nor military resistance. 

Mr. Lincoln's chief labor during this interim was 
consultation with the more influential leaders of 
the Republican party, who, either as members of 
Congress, delegates in the Peace Conference, or as 
casual or special visitors to the capital, had a final 
word to offer about the composition of his Cab- 
inet or the policy of his Administration. Thus, 
1861. from the 23d of February to the 4th of March, 
every moment of the day and many hours of the 
night were occupied. As his doors were at all 
times freely opened, and as his life-long habit was 
to listen patiently to counsel from all quarters, it 
is safe to say that no President ever approached 
his task better informed of the temper of his fol- 
lowers, and decided more deliberately upon his 
general course of conduct. Yet, here as after- 
wards, he followed the practice of holding his 
convictions open to the latest moment, and of not 
irrevocably committing himself to specific acts till 
the instant of their execution. 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 319 

But neitli(3r in the formation of liis Cabinet nor chap.xxi 
in his proposed administrative policy did this final 
consultation with his party friends work any essen- 
tial alteration of his own well-formed opinions. 
His executive councilors were choscni upon plans 
long since matured in his own mind ; and liis 
inaugural address, composed and privately printed 
at Springfield, received on the last days several 
slight changes in the text, and a number of verbal 
changes, mainly suggested by the very few indi- 
viduals to whom he submitted it. Judge David 
Davis read it while in Springfield. 0. H. Browning 
read it in Indianapolis after the Presidential jour- 
ney was begun, and suggested perhaps the most 
important modification which was made. Francis 
P. Blair, Sr., read it in Washington, and highly 
commended it, suggesting no changes. 

As would be natural in any gi'eat political leader 
scanning his successful rival's first act of practical 
statesmanship, the most careful scrutiny of the 
document was made by Mr. Seward. The Presi- 
dent-elect handed him a copy some time during the 
day of his arrival ; and the next day being Sunday, 
Mr. Seward spent part of it in examining the in- 
augural and in writing out the list of alterations 
and amendments which he thought advisable. On 
Sunday evening he wrote the following letter, 
which, with his list of suggestions, he sent to Mr. 

Lincoln : 

Sunday Evening, February 24, 1861. 

My Deae Sir : I have suggested many changes of little 
importance severally, but in their general effect tending 
to soothe the public mind. Of course the concessions are 
as they ought to be, if they are to be of avail, at the cost 
of the winning, the triumphant party. I do not fear their 



320 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. displeasure. They will be loyal, whatever is said. Not 
so the defeated, irritated, angered, frenzied party. I, my 
dear sir, have devoted myself singly to the study of the 
case here — with advantages of access and free commu- 
nication with all parties of all sections. I have a common 
responsibility and interest with you, and I shall adhere 
to you faithfully in every case. You must, therefore, 
aUow me to speak frankly and candidly. In tliis spirit, I 
declare to you my conviction, that the second and third 
paragraphs, even if modified as I propose in my amend- 
ments, will give such advantages to the Disunionists that 
Virginia and Maryland will secede, and we shall within 
ninety, perhaps within sixty, days be obliged to fight the 
South for this capital, with a divided North for our 
reliance, and we shall not have one loyal magistrate or 
ministerial ofiflcer south of the Potomac. 

In that case the dismemberment of the republic would 
date from the inauguration of a Republican Adminis- 
tration. I therefore most respectfully counsel the omis- 
sion of those paragraphs. I know the tenacity of party 
friends, and I honor and respect it. But I know also 
that they know nothing of the real peril of the crisis. It 
has not been their duty to study it, as it has been mine. 
Only the soothing words which I have spoken have saved 
us and carried us along thus far. Every loyal man, and 
indeed every disloyal man, in the South, will tell you this. 

Your case is quite like that of Jefferson. He brought 
the first Republican party into power against and over a 
party ready to resist and dismember the Government. 
Partisan as he was, he sank the partisan in the patriot in 
his inaugural addi-ess, and propitiated his adversaries by 
declaring : '' We are all Federalists, all Republicans." 1 
could wish that you would think it wise to foUow this 
example in this crisis. Be sure that while all your 
administrative conduct will be in harmony with Repub- 
lican principles and policy, you cannot lose the Repub- 
lican party by practicing in your advent to office the 
magnanimity of a victor. 

Very faithfully your friend, 

[Wm. H. Seward.] 
The Honorable Abraham Lincoln. 




HANMl'.AL 1IA:MLIN. 



LINCOLN'S INAUQURATION 321 

General Remarks : chai'. xxi. 

The arg'ument is strone: and eonclnsive, and onj^ht not 
to be in any way abridg-ed or modified. 

Bnt something besides or in addition to argument is 
needful — to meet and remove prejudice and passion in 
the South, and despondency and fear in the East. 

Some words of affection — some of calm and cheerful 
confidence-^ 

Mr. Seward only suggested two important 
changes: (1) To omit the reference to the Chi- 
cago platform mentioned in his letter, with the 
announcement that the President would follow 
the principles therein declared. (2) Instead of a 
declaration of intention to reclaim, hold, occupy, 
and possess the places and property belonging to 
the Government, to speak ambiguously about the 
exercise of power, and to hint rather at forbear- 
ance. The other modifications in his list were 
simple changes of phraseology — affecting only 
the style, and changing no argument or proposi- 
tion of policy. 

Wliether these were on the whole an improve- 
ment depends perhaps upon the taste of the critic, 
whether he prefers a full and formal or a direct 
and sententious diction. The literary styles of Mr. 
Seward and Mr. Lincoln differed essentially. Mr. 
Seward was strongly addicted to long, sonorous 
sentences, and unusually felicitous in them, ampli- 
fying his thought to general application and to 
philosophic breadth. Mr. Lincoln liked to con- 
dense his idea into a short sentence, with legal con- 
ciseness and specific point. In the present crisis 

1 MS. For the copy of this letter and other valuable mauuseripts, 
we are indebted to the Hon. Frederick W. Seward. 

Vol. III.— 21 



322 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Seward, 

Senate 

Speech, 

Jan. 12, 1861 

" Globe," 

p. 343. 



CHAP. XXI. Mr. Seward's policy, as announced in his 12th of 
January speech, was " to meet prejudice with con- 
ciliation, exaction with concession which surren- 
ders no principle, and violence with the right hand 
of peace." Mr. Lincoln's policy was without 
prejudice or passion to state frankly and maintain 
firmly the position and doctrines assumed by the 
American people in the late Presidential election. 
Mr. Seward believed himself to be the past and the 
coming peacemaker ; and thus his whole effort was 
to soften, to postpone, to use diplomacy. His cor- 
rections of the inaugural were in this vein : a 
more careful qualification of statement, a greater 
ambiguity of phrase, a gain in smoothness, but a 
loss in brevity and force. 

Mr. Lincoln adopted either in whole or in part 
nearly all the amendments proposed by Mr. 
Seward. But those which he himself modified, 
and such further alterations as he added of his 
own accord, show that whatever the inaugural 
gained in form and style in these final touches 
came as much through his own power of literary 
criticism as from the more practiced pen of Mr. 
Seward. The most vital change in the document 
was in adopting a suggestion of his friend Brown- 
ing, not to announce a purpose to recapture 
Moultrie and other forts and places already seized 
by the rebels, but for the present to declare only 
that he would hold those yet in possession of the 
Government. One other important change Mr. 
Lincoln himself made. In the original draft any 
idea of an amendment of the Constitution was 
rather repelled than invited. In the revision Mr. 
Lincoln said he should " favor rather than oppose 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 3'23 

a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act cuai-. xxi. 
upon it," and further expressed his willingness to 
accept the amendment recently proposed by Con- 
gress. All these various alterations, proposed or 
adopted, are added as notes to the text of the in- 
augural in this chapter, where the critical student 
may compare them. 

It was in the closing paragraph of the inaugural 
that Mr. Lincoln's mastery in literary art clearly 
revealed itself. Mr. Seward, as we have seen in 
the postscript of his letter, thought that "some 
words of affection — some of calm and cheerful 
confidence," "to meet and remove prejudice and 
passion in the South, and despondency and fear in 
the East," ought to be added. In the original draft 
the concluding sentence, addressing itseK to " my 
dissatisfied feUow-countrymen," was : " With you 
and not with me is the solemn question, Shall it be 
peace or a sword ? " This ending Mr. Seward pro- 
posed to strike out, and submitted two di'afts of a 
closing paragraph to take its place. One of them 
was long and commonplace; under the other 
lurked a fine poetic thought cumbrously expressed. 
This Mr. Lincoln took, and with his more artistic 
sense transformed it into an illustration of perfect 
and tender beauty. 

The acts of the last ten days of Mr. Buchanan's 
Administration were entu-ely colorless and nega- 
tive. The deliberations and recommendations of the 
much- vaunted Peace Conference proved as worth- 
less as Dead Sea fruit. The concluding labors of 
Congress were of considerable importance, but of 
no immediate effect. There was, therefore, as 
little in public affairs as in public advice to cause 



324 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. the President-elect to reconsider or remodel Ms 
thoughts and purposes. 

Mar. 4, 1861. Inauguration Day fell on Monday, and the cere- 
monies took place with unusual attention to display, 
and uncommon precautions to insure public order 
and the safety of all the participants. General 
Stone, who had charge of the military arrange- 
ments, has related them with some minuteness. 

On the afternoon of the 3d of March, General Scott 
held a conference at his headquarters, there being present 
his staff, General Sumner, and myself ; and then was ar- 
ranged the programme of the procession. President 
Buchanan was to drive to Willard's Hotel and caU upon 
the President-elect. The two were to ride in the same 
carriage, between double files of a squadron of the Dis- 
trict of Columbia cavalry. The company of sappers and 
miners were to march in front of the Presidential car- 
riage, and the infantry and riflemen of the District of 
Columbia were to follow it. Riflemen in squads were to 
be placed on the roofs of certain commanding houses 
which I had selected along Pennsylvania Avenue, with 
orders to watch the windows on the opposite side, and to 
fire upon them in case any attempt should be made to 
fire from those windows on the Presidential carriage. The 
small force of regular cavalry which had arrived was to 
guard the side-street crossings of Pennsylvania Avenue, 
and to move from one to another during the passage of the 
procession. A battalion of District of Columbia troops 
were to be placed near the steps of the Capitol, and rifle- 
men in the windows of the wings of the Capitol. On the 
arrival of the Presidential party at the Capitol the troops 
were to be stationed so as to return in the same order after 
the ceremony.i 

General Stone does not mention another item of 
preparation — that on the brow of the hill, not far 
from the north entrance to the Capitol, command- 

1 General C. P. Stone, "Washington on the Eve of the War." 
"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 24. 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 325 

ing both the approach and the broad plateau of the cuap.xxi. 
east front, was stationed a battery of flying artil- 
lery, in the immediate vicinity of which General 
Scott remained a careful observer of the scene dur- 
ing the entire ceremonies, ready to take personal 
command and direction should any untoward oc- 
currence render it necessary. 

The closing duties of the session, which expired Mar. i, mi. 
at noon, kept President Buchanan at the Capitol 
till the last moment. Accompanied by the Com- 
mittee of the Senate, he reached Willard's Hotel 
and conducted the President-elect to his carriage, 
in which, side by side, they rode in the procession, 
undisturbed by the slightest disorder. When they 
reached the Senate Chamber, already densely 
packed with officials and civilians, the ceremony 
of swearing-in the Vice-President was soon per- 
formed. Then in a new procession of dignitaries 
Mr. Lincoln was escorted through the corridor of 
the great edifice to the east portico, where below 
the platform stood an immense throng in waiting. 
The principal actors — the Senate Committee of 
Arrangements, the out-going President, the Presi- 
dent-elect and his family, the Chief-Justice in his 
robe, the Clerk of the Court with the Bible — took 
their places in a central gi'oup on the front of the 
platform, in full view of the waiting multitude. 
Around this central group other Justices in their 
robes. Senators, Representatives, officials, and 
prominent guests crowded to their seats. 

To the imaginative spectator there might have 
been something emblematic in the architectural 
features of the scene. The construction of the 
great dome of the Capitol was in mid-progress, 



326 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

f^HAP. XXI. and huge derricks held by a network of steel ropes 
towered over the incomplete structure. In the 
grounds in front stood the bronze statue of Lib- 
erty, not then lifted to the pedestal from which 
she now greets the rising sun. At that moment, 
indeed, it required little poetic illusion to fancy 
her looking with a mute appeal for help to the 
man who was the center of all eyes and hearts; 
and could she have done so, her gaze would already 
have been rewarded with a vision of fateful proph- 
ecy. For in the central group of this inauguration 
ceremony there confronted each other fom* historic 
personages in the final act of a political drama 
which in its scope, completeness, and consequence 
will bear comparison with those most famous in 
human record, — Senator Douglas, the author of 
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, represent- 
ing the legislative power of the American Govern- 
ment; Chief-Justice Taney, author of the Dred 
Scott decision, representing the influence of the 
judiciary; and President Buchanan, who by his 
Lecompton measures and messages had used the 
whole executive power and patronage to intensify 
and perpetuate the mischiefs born of the repeal 
and the dictum. Fourth in the group stood Abra- 
ham Lincoln, President-elect, illustrating the vital 
political truth announced in that sentence of his 
Cincinnati speech in which he declared : " The peo- 
ple of these United States are the rightful masters 
of both Congresses and com-ts, not to overthrow 
the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who 
pervert the Constitution."^ 

1 The dramatic element of the noticed by Dr. Holland, in his 
scene iu another view has been "Life of Lincoln," p. 278. where 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 



327 



When the cheers which greeted his appearance cfiap.xxi. 
had somewhat abated, Senator Edward D. Bakoi;, 
of Oregon, rose and introduced Mr. Lincohi to the 
audience ; and stepping forward, the President- 
elect, in a firm, clear voice, thoroughly practiced in 
addressing the huge open-air assemblages of the 
West, read his inaugural address, to which every 
ear listened with eagerness. 

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 

Fellow-citizens of the United States: In eorapli- Mar.4, isei. 
ance with a custom as old as the Government itself, I 
appear before you to address you briefly, and to take in 
your presence the oath prescribed by the Constitution of 
the United States to be taken by the President " before 
he enters on the execution of his office." ^ 



he says: "Mr. Lincoln himself 
must have wondered at the 
strange conjunction of person- 
ages and events. The ' Stephen ' 
of his first speech in the old Sen- 
atorial campaign was a defeated 
candidate for the Presidency, who 
then stood patriotically at his 
side, holding the hat of the Ee- 
publican President, which he had 
politely taken at the beginning of 
the inaugural address ; ' James ' 
had just walked out of office to 
make room for him ; ' Franklin ' 
had passed into comparative ob- 
scurity or something worse ; and 
' Roger' had just administered to 
him the oath of office." 

1 Mr. Lincoln's original draft 
contained at this point the fol- 
lowing paragraphs : 

"The more modern custom of 
electing a Chief Magistrate upon 
a previously declared platform of 
principles supersedes in a great 
measure the necessity of re-stat- 



ing those principles in an address 
of this sort. Upon the plainest 
grounds of good faith, one so 
elected is not at liberty to shift 
his position. It is necessarily 
implied, if not expressed, that in 
his judgment the platform which 
he thus accepts binds him to 
nothing either unconstitutional 
or inexpedient. 

" Having been so elected upon 
the Chicago platform, and while 
1 would repeat nothing in it, of 
aspersion or epithet, or question 
of motive, against any man or 
party, I hold myself bound by 
duty, as well as impelled by in- 
clination, to follow, within the 
Executive sphere, the principles 
therein declared. By no other 
course could I meet the reason- 
able expectations of the coun- 
try." 

Mr. Seward proposed either to 
omit the whole, or to amend them 
as follows : 



328 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. I <3o not Consider it necessary at present for me to dis- 
cuss those matters of administration about which there is 
no special anxiety or excitement. 

Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the 
Southern States that by the accession of a Republican 
Administration their pi'operty and their peace and per- 
sonal security are to be endangered. There has never 
been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. 
Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has 
all the while existed and been open to their inspection. 
It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him 
who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of 
those speeches when I declare that '' I have no purpose, 
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of 
slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no 
lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." 
Those who nominated and elected me did so with full 
knowledge that I had made this and many similar decla- 
rations, and had never recanted them. And, more than 
this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and 
as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic 
resolution which I now read : 

'' Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights 
of the States, and especially the right of each State to 
order and control its own domestic institutions according 
to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that bal- 
ance of power on which the perfection and endurance of 
our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless 
invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Terri- 
tory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest 
of crimes." 

I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I 

" The more modern custom of With this explanation I deem it 

nominating a Chief Magistrate my duty, as I am disposed in 

upon a previously declared sum- feeling, to follow, so far as they 

mary of principles supersedes in apply to the Executive sphere, 

a great measure the necessity of the principles on which I was 

restating those principles in an brought before the American 

address of this sort. It is neces- People." 

sarily implied, if not expressed, Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Sew- 
that the summary binds the ard's preference of the alter- 
oflScer elected to nothing either native suggestions made, and 
unconstitutional or inexpedient, omitted the whole. 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 329 

only press upon the public attention the most conclusive cnAr. xxi. 
evidence of which the case is susceptible, that tlie prop- 
erty, peace, and security of no section are to be in any- 
wise endangered by the now incoming Administration. 
I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently 
with the Constitution and the laws, can bo given, will 
be cheerfully given ^ to all the States when lawfully 
demanded, for whatever cause — as cheerfully to one 
section, as to another. 

There is much controversy about the delivering up of 
fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read 
is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of 
its provisions : 

'* No person held to service or labor in one State, under 
the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in conse- 
quence of any law or regulation therein be discharged 
from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on 
claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be 
due." 

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was in- 
tended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what 
we call fugitive slaves ; and the intention of the lawgiver 
is the law. All Members of Congress swear their support 
to the whole Constitution — to this provision as much as 
to any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves, whose 
cases come within the terms of this clause, "shall be 
delivered up " their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they 
would make the effort in good temper, could they not, 
with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by 
means of which to keep good that unanimous oath? 

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause 
should be enforced by national or by State authority ; 
but surely that difference is not a very material one. If 

2 In the original draft this sen- cumstances to all the States," 

tenee stood : " The protection etc. 

which, consistently with the Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the 
Constitution and the laws, can be suggestion, but himself modified 
given will be cheerfully given to it so as to read : " will be cheer- 
all the States," etc. fully given to all the States when 

Mr. Seward proposed to amend lawfully demanded, for whatever 
it thus : "will be cheerfully given cause — as cheerfully to one see- 
in every case and under all cir- tion, as to another." 



330 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little con- 
sequence to him, or to others, by which authority it is 
done. And should any one, in any case, be content that 
his oath shall go unkept, on a merely unsubstantial con- 
troversy as to liow it shall be kept? 

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not aU the 
safeguards of liberty known in civilized and humane 
jurisprudence to be introduced so that a free man be not, 
in any case, surrendered as a slave f^ And might it not 
be well at the same time to provide by law for the en- 
forcement of that clause in the Constitution which guar- 
antees that " the citizen of each State shall be entitled to 
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States?" 

I take the official oath to-day with no mental reserva- 
tions and with no purpose to construe the Constitution 
or laws by any hypercritical rules. And while I do not 
choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as 
proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much 
safer for all, both in official and private stations, to con- 
form to and abide by all those acts which stand unre- 
pealed, than to violate any of them trusting to find 
impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional. 
It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a 
President under our National Constitution. During that 
period fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens 
have, in succession, administered the Executive branch 
of the Government. They have conducted it through 
many perils, and generally with great success.* Yet, 
with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the 
same task for the brief constitutional term of four years, 
under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of 
the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now 
formidably attempted.^ 

3 The remainder of this para- Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Sew- 

graph was not in the original ard's suggestion to make it read : 

draft. Mr. Lincoln added it of " and generally with great suc- 

his own accord. cess." 

* This sentence stood in the 5 In the original this sentence 
original : " They have conducted read : "A disruption of the Fed- 
it through many perils ; and on eral Union is menaced, and, so 
the whole, wdth great success." far as can be on paper, is already 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 331 

I hold that, in conteinphitiou of universal law and of c;iiai>. xxi. 
the Constitution, the union of these States is perpetual. 
Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamen- 
tal law of all national governments. It is safe to assert 
that no government proper ever had a provision in its 
organic law for its own termination. Continue to exe- 
cute all the express provisions of our National Consti- 
tution, and the Union will endure forever — it being 
impossible to destroy it except by some action not 
provided for in the instrument itself. 

Again, if the United States be not a Government 
proper, but an association of States in the nature of con- 
tract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade 
by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a 
contract may violate it — break it, so to speak, but does 
it not require all to lawfully rescind it ? 

Descending from these general principles, we find the 
proposition that, in legal contemplation, the Union is 
perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. 
The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was 
formed, in fact, by the articles of association in 1774. It 
was matured and continued by the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence in 177G. It was further matured,^ and the 
faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted 
and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Ar- 
ticles of Confederation in 1778. And, finally, in 1787, 
one of the declared objects for ordaining and estab- 
lishing the Constitution was, ^' to form a more j^&^'fect 
Union." 

But if destruction of the Union by one, or by a part 
only, of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is 

effected. The particulars of what ^ This sentence originally 

has been done are so familiar and stood : " It was further matured 

so fresh that I need not waste and expressly declared and 

any time in recountina; them," pledged to be perpetual," etc. 

Mr. Seward proposed to change Mr. Lincoln of his own accord 

it as follows: "A disruption of amended it as follows: "It was 

the Federal Union, heretofore further matured, and the faith 

only menaced, is now formidably of all the then thirteen States 

attempted." expressly plighted and engaged 

Mr. Lincoln adopted the sug- that it should be perpetiial," 

gestion. etc. 



332 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap. XXI. less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the 
vital element of perpetuity.'^ 

It follows from these views that no State, upon its own 
mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union ; that 
resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; 
and that acts of violence, within any State or States, 
against the authority of the United States, are insurrec- 
tionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.^ 

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution 
and the laws, the Union is unbroken ; and to the extent 
of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself 
expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be 
faithfully executed in all the States.^ Doing this I deem 
to be only a simple duty on my part ; and I shall per- 
form it, so far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, 
the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, 
or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary.!*^ I 
trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as 



"^ In the original this paragraph 
concluded as follows : " The 
Union is less perfect than be- 
fore, which contradicts the Con- 
stitution, and therefore is ab- 
surd." 

Mr. Seward proposed to strike 
out the words "and therefore is 
absurd." Mr. Lincoln adopted 
this suggestion, and in addition 
remodeled the whole sentence, 
so as to read: "The Union is 
less perfect than before the Con- 
stitution, having lost the vital 
element of perpetuity." 

8 The first half of this sentence 
originally closed : " ordinances 
to that effect are legally noth- 
ing," and the second half, " are 
insurrectionai'y or treasonable, 
according to circumstances." Mr. 
Seward's suggestions to strike 
out the word " nothing " and 
substitute the word "void," and 
to strike out the word "treason- 
able" and substitute the word 
"revolutionary" were adopted. 



9 In the original this sentence 
stood: "I therefore consider 
that the Union is unbroken ; and, 
to the extent of my ability, I 
shall take care that the laws of 
the Union be faithfully executed 
in all the States." 

Mr. Seward proposed to amend 
it as follows: "I therefore con- 
sider that, in view of the Consti- 
tution and the laws, the Union is 
unbroken; and to the extent of 
my ability I shall take care, as 
the Constitution itself expressly 
enjoins upon me, that the laws 
of the Union be faithfully exe- 
cuted in all the States." 

Mr. Lincoln adopted the 
change. 

10 This phrase originally stood ; 
' ' or in some tangible way direct 
the contrary." 

Mr. Seward's suggestion to 
strike out the words " tangible 
way " and substitute therefor the 
words " aiithoritative manner" 
was adopted. 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 



333 



the declared purpose of the Union that it mil constitu- cuai'.xxi, 
tionally defend and maintain itself.'^ 

lu doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or vio- 
lence ; and there shall be none, unless it be forced u})on 
the national authority. ^- The power confided to me will 
be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and 



11 This sentence originally 
closed: "will have its own and 
defend itself." Mr. Seward's sug- 
gestion to strike out these words 
and insert "will constitutionally 
defend and maintain itself," was 
adopted. 

12 In the original draft this 
paragraph, after the first sen- 
tence, stood as follows : 

"All the power at my disposal 
will be used to reclaim the public 
property and places which have 
fallen ; to hold, occupy, and pos- 
sess these and all other property 
and places belonging to the Gov- 
ernment, and to collect the du- 
ties and imposts ; but beyond 
what may be necessary for these 
objects, there will be no invasioa 
of any State. Where hostility to 
the United States, in any interior 
locality, shall be so great and so 
universal as to prevent compe- 
tent resident citizens from hold- 
ing the Federal offices, there will 
be no attempt to force obnoxious 
strangers among the people for 
that object. While the strict 
legal right may exist in the Gov- 
ernment to enforce the exercise 
of these offices, the attempt to do 
so would be so irritating, and so 
nearly impracticable withal, that 
I deem it better to forego for the 
time the uses of such offices." 

Mr. Seward proposed to strike 
out all the above, and to insert 
the following : 

" The power confided to me 
shall be used indeed with effi- 
cacy, but also with discretion in 



evei'y case and exigency, accord- 
ing to the circumstances actually 
existing, and witli a view and a 
hope of a peaceful solution of 
the national troubles, and the 
restoration of fraternal sympa- 
thies and affections. There are 
in this Government, as in every 
other, emergencies when the ex- 
ercise of power lawful in itself is 
less certain to secure the just 
ends of administration than a 
temporary forbearance from it, 
with reliance on the voluntary 
though delayed acquiescence of 
the people in the laws which have 
been made by themselves and 
for theii" own benefit. I shall not 
lose sight of this ob^dous maxim." 
Mr. Lincoln, however, did not 
adopt this proposal, but made a 
slight change which had been 
suggested by another friend. At 
Indianapolis he gave a copy of his 
original draft to Hon. O. H. 
Browning, who, after carefully 
reading it, on his return wrote to 
Mr. Lincoln (February 17, 1861) 
referring to this paragraph : 
" Would it not be judicious so to 
modify this as to make it read : 
'All the power at my disposal 
will be used to hold, occupy, and 
possess the property and places 
belonging to the Government, 
and to collect the duties and im- 
posts, etc.,' omitting the declara- 
tion of the purpose of reclama- 
tion, which will be construed 
into a threat or menace, and will 
be in-itating even in the border 
States? On principle the pass- 



334 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. places belonging to the Government, and to collect the 
duties and imposts ; but beyond what may be necessary 
for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of 
force against or among the people anywhere. Where 
hostility to the United States, in any interior locality, 
shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent 
resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there 
will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among 
the people for that object. While the strict legal right 
may exist in the Government to enforce th(; exercise of 
these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, 
and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better 
to forego for the time the uses of such offices. 

The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished 
in all parts of the Uuiou.i^ So far as possible, the people 
everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security 
which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. 
The course here indicated will be followed unless current 
events and experience shall show a modification or change 
to be proper, and in every case and exigency my best dis- 
cretion will be exercised according to circumstances actu- 
ally existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful 
solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of 
fraternal sympathies and affections.^^ 

That there are persons in one section or another who 

age is right as it now stands. Mr. Lincoln himself changed this 
The fallen places oixght to be re- to read: "The mails, unless re- 
claimed. But cannot that be pelled." 

accomplished as well or even i^This paragraph originally 
better without announcing the closed with the following sen- 
purpose in your inaugural ?" tence : " This course will be pur- 
Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. sued until current experience 
Browning's advice, and modified shall show a modification or 
his own phraseology as proposed, change to be proper." Mr. Lin- 
He also made in this paragraph coin himself changed this so as to 
another slight change of phrase- read: " The course here indicated 
ology. For, "there will be no will be followed unless current 
invasion of any State," he sub- events and experience shall show 
stituted, " there will be no in- a modification or change to be 
vasion, no using of force against proper." He also added a part 
or among the people anywhere." of the language proposed by Mr. 
I'^This phrase originally was, Seward for the previous para- 
"The mails, unless refused, will graph, as will be seen by eom- 
continue to be furnished," etc. parison. 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURA.TION 335 

seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of chap. xxi. 
any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny ; but 
if there be such, I need addi*ess no word to thera.^^ To 
those, however, who really love the Union, may I not 
speak ? 

Before entering upon so grave a matter as the de- 
struction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its 
memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain 
precisely why we do it f ^^ Will you hazard so desperate a 
step while there is any possibility that any portion of the 
ills you fly from have no real existence ? Will you, while 
the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones 
you fly from — will you risk the commission of so fearful 
a mistake ? 

All profess to be content in the Union, if all constitu- 
tional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that 
any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been 
denied ? ^^ I think not. Happily the human mind is so 
constituted,^*^ that no party can reach to the audacity of 
doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in 
which a plainly written provision of the Constitution has 
ever been denied. If by the mere force of numbers a 
majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written 
constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, 

15 This sentence originally pernicious principles are fully 

stood: "That there are persons understood." 

who seek to destroy the Union," Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the 

etc. Mr. Seward proposed to suggestion. 

amend so as to make it read : ^^ Mr. Lincoln himself struck 

"That there are persons in one out the word " Union," as it orig- 

section as well as in the other, inally appeared in this sentence, 

who seek to destroy the Union," and inserted in lieu the words 

etc. Mr. Lincoln changed the " fabric, with all its benefits, its 

amendment to, " That there are memories, and its hopes." 

persons in one section or another ^'^ Mr. Seward proposed to in- 

who seek to destroy the Union sert the word "distinct" after 

at all events, and are glad of any the words, "Is it true, then, that 

pretext," etc. any," in the second sentence of 

Mr. Seward also proposed to this paragraph, 

add to the last clause of the sen- Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the 

tence, after the word "them," suggestion. 

the following: "because I am is In this sentence Mr. Lin- 
sure they must be few in number coin himself changed the word 
and of little influence when their "constructed" to " constituted." 



336 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. justify revolution — certainly would, if such right were a 
vital one. But such is not our ease. All the vital rights 
of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to 
them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and pro- 
hibitions,^^ in the Constitution, that controversies never 
arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be 
framed with a provision specifically applicable to every 
question which may occur in practical administration.'-^'' 
No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of reason- 
able length contain, express provisions for all possible 
questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by 
national or by State authority? The Constitution does 
not expressly say. Blaij Congress prohibit slavery in the 
Territories ? The Constitution does not expressly say. 
3Iiisf Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The 
Constitution does not expressly say. 

From questions of this class spring all our constitu- 
tional controversies, and we divide upon them into 
majorities and minorities. If the minority will not ac- 
quiesce, the majority must, or the Government must 
cease. There is no other alternative ; for continu- 
ing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the 
other. 21 

If a minority in such case will secede rather than ac- 
quiesce, they make a precedent which in turn will divide 
and ruin them ; for a minority of their own will secede 
from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled 
by such minority. 22 For instance, why may not any por- 
tion of a new confederacy, a year or two hence, arbi- 
trarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present 

19 The phrase, "bj' affirmations 21 Jq t^ig paragraph Mr. Sew- 
and negations," Mr. Seward pro- ard proposed to substitute the 
posed to make, "by affirmations words "acquiesce" and "aequi- 
and negations, guarantees and escence "for "submit "and " sub- 
prohibitions." mission." 

Mr. Lincoln adopted the sug- Mr. Lincoln adopted the sug- 
gestion, gestion. 

20 The phrase, "applicable to 22 The original phrase, "a 
every question," Mr. Seward pro- minority of their own number 
posed to change to, " applicable will secede from them," Mr. 
to every possible question." Lincoln himself changed to, "a 

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt tlie minority of their own will secede 
change. from them." 



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Kl,l)i;(i:l) FACSI.MII,!', OF Ml{. SKWAKD'S SUGGESTION FOR THF. CI.OSK oF TIIF, 
IWIKMIKAI, AllDHKSS. (FROM THE OKI(;lNAI, MS.) 



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KKl)i;Ci;i) FACSIMILE OF THE (LOSING PAIiAGRAPH OF THE INAUGURAL AUnRESS AS 

liKWRITTKN I:Y MR. LINCOLN. (FROM THE ORIGINAL FROM WHICH 

THE ADDRESS WAS DELIVERED.) 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 337 

Union now claim to secede from it ?'-':' All who cherish cuAi'.xxr. 
disnuion sentiments are now being educated to the exact 
temper of doing this. 

Is there such perfect identity of interests among the 
States to compose a new Union as to produce harmony 
only, and prevent renewed secession ? 21 

Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of 
anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional 
checks and limitations, and always changing easily with 
deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is 
the only true sovereign of a free people. 25 Whoever re- 
jects it does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. 
Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a 
permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, 
rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in 
some form is all that is left. 

I do not forget the position, assumed by some, that 
constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme 
Court ; nor do I deny that such decisions must be bind- 
ing, in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the 
object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very 
high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all 

23 In the original these sen- eisely as portions of the present 

tences ran as follows; "For Union now claim to secede from 

instance, why may not South it ? All who cherish disunion 

Carolina, a year or two hence, sentiments are now being edu- 

arbitrarily secede from a new cated to the exact temper of 

Southern Confederacy, just as doing this." 

she now claims to secede from 24p'or the original phrase, "a 

the present Union ? Her peo- Southern Union," Mr. Lincoln 

pie, and, indeed, all secession himself substituted, "a new 

people, are now being educated Union." 

to the precise temper of doing 25 The original sentence, "A 

this." constitutional majority is the 

Mr. Seward proposed to sub- only true sovereign of a free 

stitute the names "Alabama or people," Mr. Seward proposed to 

Florida" for " South Carolina " ; change to, "A majority held in 

and the word " commiinities " for restraint by constitutional checks 

"people." and limitations, and always 

Instead of adopting this, Mr. changing easily with deliberate 

Lincoln re-wrote the whole, as changes of popular opinions and 

follows: "For instance, why sentiments, is the only true 

may not any portion of a new sovereign," etc. 

confederacy, a year or two hence, Mr. Lincoln adopted the 

arbitrarily secede again, pre- change. 

Vol. III.— 22 



338 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Chap, XXI. other departments of the Government.26 And while it is 
obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous 
in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being 
limited to that particular case, with the chance that it 
may be overruled, and never become a precedent for 
other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a 
different practice. ^^ At the same time, the candid citizen 
must confess that if the policy of the Government, upon 
vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrev- 
ocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the 
instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between 
parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to 
be their own rulers, having to that extent practically re- 
signed their government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal. -^ Nor is there in this view any assault upon the 
court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may 
not shrink to decide cases properly brought before them, 
and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to tuim their 
decisions to political purposes. 29 



'^^In this sentence the final 
clause, "while they are also en- 
titled to very high respect and 
consideration in all parallel cases 
by all other departments of the 
Government," was suggested by 
Mr. Seward and adopted by Mr. 
Lincoln. 

27111 the original this phrase 
ran: "the greater evils of a dif- 
ferent rule." Mr. Seward pro- 
posed to substitute "practice" 
for "rule," and Mr. Lincoln 
struck out the word "greater," 
making it read, " the evils of a 
different practice." 

28 In the original this sentence 
stood : " but if the policy of the 
Government, upon vital ques- 
tions affecting the whole people, 
is to be irrevocably fixed by de- 
cisions of the Supreme Court, it 
is plain that the people will have 
ceased to be their own rulers, 
having turned their government 
over to the despotism of the few 
life officers composing the court." 



Mr. Seward proposed to amend 
it as follows: " At the same time, 
the candid citizen must confess 
that if the policy of the Govern- 
ment, upon vital questions af- 
fecting the whole people, is to 
be irrevocably fixed by decisions 
of the Supreme Court, made in 
the ordinary course of litigation 
between parties in personal ac- 
tions, the people will have ceased 
to be their own rulers, having 
practically resigned their govern- 
ment into the hands of that emi- 
nent tribunal." 

Mr. Lincoln adopted the amend- 
ment, first changing the phrase, 
" made in the ordinary course of 
litigation," to, "the instant they 
are made, in ordinary litigation," 
and also the phrase, "having 
practically resigned," to, "hav- 
ing to that extent practically 
resigned." 

29 The original draft here con- 
tained the following paragraph : 

"The Republican party, as I 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 339 

One section of our country believes slavery is right, chap, xxl 
and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is 
tvrong, and ought not to be extended.-"' This is the only 
substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave clause of the 
Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the 
foreign slave trade, are each as well enforced,^! perhaps, 
as any law can ever be in a community where the moral 
sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself.^^ 
The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obli- 
gation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, 
I think, cannot be perfectly cured ; and it would be worse 
in both cases after the separation of the sections, than 
before. The foreign slave trade, now imperfectly sup- 
pressed, would be ultimately revived without restriction 
in one section ; ^^ while fugitive slaves, now only partially 
surrendered, would not be surrendered at aU by the 
other. 

Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot 
remove our respective sections from each other, nor build 
an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife 
may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond 
the reach of each other ; but the different parts of our 
country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to 
face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must 
continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make 
that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory 

understand, have avowed the pur- si The phrase, "as well en- 
pose to prevent, if they can, the forced as any law," Mr. Seward 
extension of slavery under the suggested should read : " as well 
national auspices ; and upon this enforced, perhaps, as any law," 
arises the only dispute between etc. 
the sections." The suggestion was adopted. 

Mr. Seward proposed to strike 32 The phrase, " where the mor- 

out the whole paragraph, and al sense of the people is against 

Ml'. Lincoln adopted the sugges- the law itself," Mr. Seward sug- 

tion. gested should read : " where the 

30 In the original this phrase moral sense of the people imper- 

stood: "One section believes fectly supports the law itself." 

slavery is right," etc. Mr. Sew- The suggestion was adopted, 

ard proposed to make it read : 33 The phrase, " would be re- 

" One section of our country be- vived," Mr. Seward suggested 

lie ves slavery is right," etc. should read: "would be ulti- 

Mr. Lincoln adopted the mately revived." 

amendment. The suggestion was adopted. 



340 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Chap. XXI. after separation than leforef Can aliens make treaties 
easier than friends can make laws '? Can treaties be more 
faithfully enforced between aliens, than laws can among 
friends f Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight 
always ; and when, after much loss on both sides, and 
no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old 
questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon 
you. 

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the 
people who inhabit it. "Whenever they shall grow weary 
of the existing Government they can exercise their con- 
stitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary 
right to dismember or overthrow it.^^ I cannot be igno- 
rant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens 
are desirous of having the National Constitution amended. 
While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully 
recognize the rightful authority of the people over the 
whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes pre- 
scribed in the instrument itseK ; and I should, under 
existing circumstances, favor rather than oppose a fair 
opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I 
will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems 
preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with 
the people themselves, instead of only permitting them 
to take or reject propositions originated by others, not 
especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not 

3* Following the words, ' ' dis- Mr. Seward proposed to change 

member and overthrow it," the the first sentence of the above to 

original continued : the following : " While so great 

" As I am not much impressed a diversity of opinion exists on 

with the belief that the present the question what amendments, 

Constitution can be improved, I if indeed any, would be effective 

make no recommendations of in restoring peace and safety, it 

amendments. I am rather for would only tend to aggravate the 

the old ship, and the chart of the dispute if I were to attempt to 

old pilots. If, however, the peo- give direction to the public mind 

pie desire a new or an altered in that respect." 
vessel, the matter is exclusively Mr. Lincoln did not adopt Mr. 

their own, and they can move in Seward's suggestion; but struck 

the premises, as well without as out all the above, and remodeled 

with an Executive reeommenda- the whole paragraph to the form 

tlon. I shall place no obstacle in in which it now stands in the text, 

the way of what may appear to adding also the reference to the 

be their wishes." new constitutional amendment. 



LINCOLN'S INAUGUKATION 341 

be precisely such as they would wish to either accept chai-.xxi. 
or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the 
Constitution — which amendment, however, I have not 
seen — has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal 
Government shall never interfere with the domestic insti- 
tutions of the States, including that of persons held to 
service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, 
I depart from my purpose, not to speak of particular 
amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a pro- 
vision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no 
objection to its being made express and irrevocable. 

The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the 
people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix 
terms for the separation of the States. The people them- 
selves can do this also if they choose ;3^ but the Executive, 
as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to admin- 
ister the present Government, as it came to his hands, and 
to transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successor. 

Why should there not be a patient confidence in the 
ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or 
equal hope in the world ? In our present differences is 
either party without faith of being in the right ? ^^ If the 
Ahnighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and 
justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the 
South,37 that truth and that justice will surely prevail by 
the judgment of this great tribunal of the American 
people. 

By the frame of the Government under which we live, 
this same people have wisely given their public servants 
but little power for mischief ; and have, with equal wis- 
dom, provided for the return of that little to their own 
hands at very short intervals. While the people retain 

35 The original phrase, "can do ^7 The original phrase, "be on 

this if they choose," Mr. Lincoln our side or on yours," Mr. Sew- 

himself changed to read, "can ard suggested should read : "be 

do this also if they choose." on the side of the North, or of 

36 The original phrase, "is the South, of the East, or of tho 

either party without faith in West." 

the right ? " Mr. Lincoln him- Mr. Lincoln changed it to read : 

self changed to, " is either party " be on your side of the North, or 

without faith of being in the on yours of the South, that truth 

right?" and," etc. 



342 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

CHAP. XXI. their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any ex- 
treme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure 
the Government in the short space of four years.^*^ 

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and ivell 
upon this whole subject.^^ Nothing valuable can be lost 
by taking time.**^ If there be an object to hurry any of 
you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take 
deliherately, that object will be frustrated by taking time ; 
but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you 
as are now dissatisfied, still have the old Constitution un- 
impaired, and, on the sensitive point, the laws of your 
own framing under it ; while the new Administration will 
have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. 
If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the 
right side in the dispute, there still is no single good 
reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, 
Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never 
yet forsaken this favored land are still competent to ad- 
just, in the best way, all our present difficulty. 

In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and 
not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The 
Government will not assail you^^ You can have no con- 
flict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You have 
no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the Government, 
while I shall have the most solemn one to " preserve, pro- 
tect, and defend it." ^ 

38 The original phrase, " While Mr. Lincoln changed it to, 

the people remain patient and "think calmly and well." 

true to themselves, no man, even *OThe original sentences: 

in the Presidential chair, can," "Nothing valuable can be lost 

etc., Mr. Seward proposed to by taking time. Nothing worth 

change to, " While the people re- preserving is either breaking or 

tain their virtue and vigilance, burning," Mr. Seward proposed to 

no legislature and no administra- strike out. 

tion can," etc. Mr. Lincoln retained the first, 

Mr. Lincoln changed it to read and struck out the second, 

as follows : " While the people *^ In the original sentence, 

retain their virtue and vigilance, " The Government will not assail 

no administration, by any extreme you, unless you first assail it," 

of wickedness or folly, can," etc. Mr. Seward suggested striking 

39 The original phrase, "take out the last clause, 

time and think well," Mr. Seward Mr, Lincoln adopted the sug- 

suggested should read: "think gestion. 

calmly and think well." 42 The original draft, after the 



LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION 



343 



I ain loth to close. "We are not enemies, but friends, chap, xxl 
We must not be enemies. Though passion may have 



words, "preserve, protect, and 
defend it," concluded as follows, 
addressing itself to "my dissat- 
isfied fellow-countrymen " : "You 
can forbear the assault upon it, 
I cannot shrink from the defense 
of it. With you, and not with 
me, is the solemn question of 
' Shall it be peace or a sword ? ' " 

Mr. Seward did not like this 
termination ; his letter, previous- 
ly quoted, suggested that " some- 
thing besides or in addition to 
argument is needful — to meet 
and remove prejudice and passion 
in the South, and despondency 
and fear in the East, Some words 
of affection — some of calm and 
cheerful confidence." Accord- 
ingly he submitted two separate 
drafts for a closing paragraph, 
from which Mr. Lincoln might 
choose one to substitute for the 
two sentences which he proposed 
to strike out. 

Suggestions for a closing para- 
graph : 

NO. I. 

"However unusual it may be 
at such a time to speak of sec- 
tions or to sections, yet in view 
of the misconceptions and agita- 
tions which have strained the 
ties of brotherhood so far, I hope 
it will not be deemed a departure 
from propriety, whatever it may 
be from custom, to say that if 
in the criminations and miscon- 
structions which too often imbue 
our political contests, any man 
south of this capital has been led 
to believe that I regard with a less 
friendly eye his rights, his inter- 
ests, or his domestic safety and 
happiness, or those of his State, 
than I do those of any other por- 
tion of my country, or that I 



would invade or disturb any legal 
right or domestic institution in 
the South, he mistakes both my 
principles and feelings, and does 
not know me. I aspire to come 
in the spirit, however far below 
the ability and wisdom, of Wash- 
ington, of Madison, of Jackson, 
and of Clay. In that spirit I here 
declare that in my administration 
I shall kiiow no rule but the Consti- 
tution, no guide but the laws, and 
no sentiment but that of equal 
devotion to my whole country, 
east, west, north, and south." 



" I close. We are not, we must 
not be, aliens or enemies, but 
fellow-countrymen and brethren. 
Although passion has strained 
our bonds of affection too hardly, 
they must not. I am sure they will 
not, be broken. The mystic chords 
which, proceeding from so many 
battlefields and so many patriot 
graves, pass through all the 
hearts and all hearths in this 
broad continent of ours, will yet 
again harmonize in their ancient 
music when breathed upon by the 
guardian angel of the nation." 

The first of these drafts, con- 
taining 139 words in its opening 
sentence, and made up of phrases 
which had become extremely 
commonplace by iteration in the 
six years' slavery discussion, was 
clearly inadmissible. The second 
draft, containing the germ of a 
fine poetic thought, Mr. Lin- 
coln took, and, in a new develop- 
ment and perfect form, gave it 
the life and spirit and beauty 
which have made it celebrated 
in the text. 



344 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

cnAP.xxi. strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The 
mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle- 
field, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearth- 
stone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus 
of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, 
by the better angels of our nature. 

A cheer greeted the conclusion. Chief- Justice 
Taney arose, the clerk opened his Bible, and Mr. 
Lincoln, laying his hand upon it, with deliberation 
pronounced the oath : 

"I, Abraham Lincoln, do solemnly swear that 
I will faithfully execute the office of President of 
the United States, and will, to the best of my 
ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu- 
tion of the United States." 

Then, while the battery on the brow of the hill 
thundered its salute, citizen Buchanan and Presi- 
dent Lincoln returned to their carriage, and the 
military procession escorted them from the Capitol 
to the Executive Mansion, on the threshold of 
which Mr. Buchanan warmly shook the hand of 
his successor, with cordial good wishes for his 
personal happiness and the national peace and 
prosperity. 



CHAPTER XXII 

LINCOLN'S CABINET 



THE work of framing the new Cabinet was en. xxii. 
mainly performed on the evening of the Presi- eon weuea 
dential election. After the polls were closed on the ^""tufuf"^ 



6th of November (so Mr. Lincoln related a year or personai 
two later), the superintendent of the telegi'aph at da."M8. 
Springfield invited him to his office to remain 
and read the dispatches as they should come 
in. He accepted the offer; and reporting himself 
in due time at the telegraph office, from which all 
other visitors were excluded at 9 o'clock, awaited 
the result of the eventful day. Soon the telegi-ams 
came thick and fast — first from the neighboring 
precincts and counties ; then from the great West- 
ern cities, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati ; and 
finally from the capitals of the doubtful States, 
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the Empire State 
of New York. Here in this little room, in the com- 
pany of two or three silent operators moving about 
their mysteriously clicking instruments, and re- 
cording with imperturbable gra\dty the swift- 
throbbing messages from near and far, Mr. Lincoln 
read the reports as they came, first in fragment- 
ary dribblets, and later in the rising and swelling 
stream of cheering news. 



346 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. There was never a closer calculator of political 
probabilities than himself. He was completely at 
home among election figures. All his political life 
he had scanned tables of returns with as much 
care and accuracy as he analyzed and scrutinized 
maxims of government and platforms of parties. 
Now, as formerly, he was familiar with all the 
turning-points in contested counties and " close " 
districts, and knew by heart the value of each and 
every local loss or gain and its relation to the 
grand result. In past years, at the close of many 
a hot campaign, he had searched out the comfort 
of victory from a discouraging and adverse-looking 
column of figures, or correctly read the fatal omen 
of defeat in some single announcement from a 
precinct or county. 

Silently, as they were transcribed, the operators 
handed him the messages, which he laid on his 
knee while he adjusted his spectacles, and then 
read and re-read several times with deliberation. 
He had not long to wait for indications. From a 
scattering beginning, made up of encouraging local 
fragments, the hopeful news rose to almost un- 
interrupted tidings of victory. Soon a shower of 
congratulatory telegrams fell from the wires, and 
while his partisans and friends in all parts of the 
country were thus shaking hands with him " by 
lightning " over the result, he could hear the shouts 
and speeches of his Springfield followers, gathered 
in the great hall of the State-house across the street. 

Of course his first emotions were those of a kin- 
dling pleasure and pride at the completeness of his 
success. But this was only a momentary glow. 
He was indeed President-elect ; but with that con- 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 347 

sciousness there fell upon him the appalling shadow cn. xxii. 
of his mighty task and responsibility. It seemed 
as if he suddenly bore the whole world upon his 
shoulders, and could not shake it off ; and sitting 
there in the yet early watches of the night, he read 
the still coming telegi-ams in a sort of absent- 
minded mechanical routine, while his inner man 
took up the crushing burden of his country's 
troubles, and traced out the laborious path of 
future duties. "When I finally bade my friends 
good-night and left that room," said Lincoln, " I 
had substantially completed the framework of my 
Cabinet as it now exists." 

Though the grouping and combining of the new 
President's intended councilors occurred at this 
time, it is no less true that some of them were 
selected at a much earlier date. For a month 
after the election he gave no intimation whatever 
of his purpose. Cabinet-making is at all times 
difficult, as Mr. Lincoln felt and acknowledged, 
even though he had progressed thus far in his 
task. Up to the early days of December he fol- 
lowed the current of newspaper criticism, daily 
read his budget of private letters, gave numerous 
interviews to visiting politicians of prominence and 
influence, and, on the occasion of a short visit to 
Chicago, met and conferred with Mr. HamUn, the 
Vice-President-elect — all constituting, most prob- 
ably, little else than a continued study of the 
Cabinet question. Never arbitrary or dictatorial in 
the decision of any matter, he took unusual care on 
this point to receive patiently and consider seriously 
all the advice, recommendations, and objections 
which his friends from different States had to offer. 



348 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. His personal experience during his service as a 
Member of Congress had given him an insight into 
the sharp and bitter contentions which grow out of 
office-seeking and the distribution of patronage. 
It was therefore doubtless with the view to fortify 
himself in his selections that he now determined to 
make definite offers of some, at least, of the Cabinet 
appointments. The question of taking part of his 
constitutional advisers from among his political 
opponents, and from the hostile or complaining 
Southern States, had been thoroughly debated in 
his own mind. The conclusion arrived at is plainly 
evinced by the following, written by him, and in- 
serted as a short leading editorial in the Spring- 
field "Journal" on the morning of December 12 
(or 13), 1860: 

"We hear such frequent allusions to a supposed purpose 
on the part of Mr. Lincoln to caU into his Cabinet two 
or three Southern gentlemen from the parties opposed 
to him politically, that we are prompted to ask a few 
questions. 

First. Is it known that any such gentleman of char- 
acter would accept a place in the Cabinet ? 

Second. If yea, on what terms does he surrender to Mr. 
Lincoln, or Mr. Lincoln to him, on the pohtical differences 
between them, or do they enter upon the administration 
in open opposition to each other ? 

The high authorship of these paragraphs was not 
announced, but the redudio ad ahsurdum was so 
complete that the newspapers were not amiss in 
guessing whence they emanated. 

The selection of enemies being out of the ques* 
tion, Mr. Lincoln chose his ablest friends. On the 
morning of December 8, 1860, he penned the fol- 
lowing letters : 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 349 

Springfield, III., December 8, 18G0. cn.xxii. 
My Dear Sir: With your permission I shall at the 
proper time nominate you to the Senate for confirmation 
as Secretary of State for the United States. Please let 
me hear from you at yoiir own earliest convenience. 
Your friend and obedient servant, 

^T TT a A. Lincoln. ms. 

Hon. WiLLL\M H. Seward, 

Washington, D. C. 

(Private and confidential.) 
Springfield, III., December 8, 1860. 

My Dear Sir : In addition to the accompanying and 
more formal note inviting you to take charge of the State 
Department, I deem it proper to address you this. Ru- 
mors have got into the newspapers to the effect that the 
department named above would be tendered you as a 
compliment, and with the expectation that you would de- 
cline it. I beg you to be assured that I have said nothing 
to justify these" rumors. On the contrary, it has been my 
purpose, from the day of the nomination at Chicago, to 
assign you, by your leave, this place in the Administra- 
tion. I have delayed so long to communicate that pur- 
pose, in deference to what appeared to me a proper 
caution in the case. Nothing has been developed to 
change ray view in the premises; and I now offer yon the 
place in the hope that you will accept it, and with the be- 
lief that your position in the public eye, your integrity, 
ability, learning, and great experience all combine to 
render it an appointment preeminently fit to be made. 

One word more. In regard to the patronage sought 
with so much eagerness and jealousy, I have prescribed 
for myself the maxim, '' Justice to all"; and I earnestly 
beseech your cooperation in keeping the maxim good. 
Your friend and obedient servant, 

Hon. William H. Seward, ^' I^^^^^' 

Washington, D. C. 

This letter, so full of frankness and delicate 
courtesy, together with the brief note preceding 



350 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CH. XXII. it, was sent to two intimate friends of the Presi- 
dent-elect at Washington, with the request, if their 
judgment concurred in the step, to hand them to 
Mr, Seward. They were at once delivered, and the 
recipient wrote the following equally courteous and 
characteristic answer : 

Washington, December 13, 1860. 

My Dear Sir: I have had the honor of receiving as 
well your note which tenders to me a nomination to the 
Senate for the office of Secretary of State, as also your 
private and confidential letter on the same subject. 

It would be a violation of my own feelings, as well as a 
great injustice to you, if I were to leave occasion for any 
doubt on your part that I appreciate as highly as I ought 
the distinction which, as the Chief Magistrate of the Re- 
public, you propose to confer upon me, and that I am 
fully, perfectly, and entirely satisfied with the sincerity 
and kindness of your sentiments and wishes in regard to 
my acceptance of it. 

You will readily believe that, coming to the considera- 
tion of so grave a subject all at once, I need a little time 
to consider whether I possess the qualifications and temper 
of a minister, and whether it is in such a capacity that my 
friends would wish that I should act if I am to continue 
at all in the public service. These questions are, more- 
over, to be considered in view of a very anomalous condi- 
tion of public aifairs. I wish, indeed, that a conference 
with you upon them were possible. But I do not see how 
it could prudently be held under existing circumstances. 
Without publishing the fact of your invitation, I will, 
with your leave, reflect upon it a few days, and then give 
you my definite answer, which, if I know myself, will be 
made under the influence exclusively of the most earnest 
desire for the success of your Administration, and through 
it for the safety, honor, and welfare of the Union. 

Whatever may be my conclusion, you may rest assured 
of my hearty concurrence in your views in regard to the 
distribution of the public offices as you have communi- 
cated them. 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 351 

Believe me, my dear sir, most respectfully and most cu. xxii. 
faithfully your friend and humble servant, 

WiLLIAJI H. SEWAED. MS, 

The Hon. Abraham Lincoln, 

President-elect of the United States. 

Before the end of the month, Mr. Lincoln re- 
ceived a short and simi^le note from Mr. Seward 
signifying his acceptance. Meanwhile he had 
sent (December 13) a verbal message to Edward 
Bates, of St. Louis, Missouri, that he would go 
there the next day to see and consult him about 
some points connected with the formation of his 
Cabinet. " I thought I saw an unfitness in his 
coming to me, and that I ought to go to him," Diary. I\i8. 
wi'ites Mr. Bates with his old-school politeness. Ac- 
cordingly, the following Saturday (December 15) 
found him at Mr. Lincoln's office in Springfield. 

They had had a personal acquaintance of some 
eight years ; and after cordial greetings the Presi- 
dent-elect proceeded without further prelude to tell 
him that since the day of the Chicago nomination it 
had been his purpose to tender him one of the places 
in his Cabinet. Some of his friends had asked the 
State Department for him. He could not now offer 
him this, which was usually considered the first place 
in the Cabinet, for the reason that he should offer 
that place to Mr. Seward, in view of his ability, his 
integrity, his commanding influence, and his fitness 
for the place. He did this as a matter of duty to 
the party and to Mr. Seward's many and strong 
friends, while at the same time it accorded perfectly 
with his own personal inclinations, notwithstand- 
ing some opposition on the part of sincere and 
warm friends. He would, therefore, offer Mr. 



352 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. Bates what he supposed would be more congenial, 
peraonai ^ud loY whlch he was certainly in every way quali- 
drMs"" fied— the Attorney-Generalship. 

Within a few days it was announced by author- 
ity that Mr. Bates had been tendered and had ac- 
cepted a place in the new Cabinet. His adhesion 
was looked upon as a sure indication of a moder- 
ate and constitutional policy by the incoming Ad- 
ministration. 

The choice of Mr. Seward as the head of the 
Cabinet, as well as his probable acceptance, was 
also soon whispered about among leading Republic- 
ans in Congress, rumored in the public press, and 
in time confirmed by a semi-official statement in 
the "Albany Evening Journal," the organ of Mr. 
Seward's friend Thurlow Weed. This action of 
Mr. Lincoln gave the party at large general grati- 
fication, since up to the Chicago Convention Mr. 
Seward had been its chief favorite. Whatever of 
antagonism existed between pronounced and con- 
servative Eepublicans was thus happily neutralized, 
and the respective partisans of Mr. Seward and 
Mr. Bates each felt themselves bound to the new 
Administration through the presence of a trusted 
leader in Mr. Lincoln's councils. 

To these two selections a third had in the mean 
time been virtually added. As the individual held 
a less prominent position in the nation, and as the 
choice was merely provisional, it provoked no con- 
1860. test. On December 11, three days after writing 
his letter to Mr. Seward, two gentlemen called 
upon the President-elect to present the claims of 
Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, one of the "pivotal 
States " in the November election, to a seat in the 




CALKB B. SMITH, 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 353 

Cabinet. After a short talk, showing that the ques- cn. xxir. 
tion had ah*eady gone through the crucible of his 
judgment, Mr. Lincoln replied that, being deter- 
mined to act with caution and not embarrass him- 
self with promises, he could only say that he saw 
no insuperable objections to Indiana's having a pergonal 
place, or to Smith being the man. To this decision dtr^Ms!" 
Mr. Lincoln held finn, though very considerable 
pressure came upon him in behalf of another citi- 
zen of Indiana, already then distinguished and 
destined to attain still greater eminence. A letter 
which Mr. Lincoln wrote, explaining why he ad- 
hered to his original choice, will be of interest in 
this connection as illustrating one of his rules of 
conduct which contributed so much to his popular 
strength; namely, neither to forget a friendship 
nor remember a grudge. 

Executive Mansion, March 8, 1861. 

Hon. Schuyler Colfax. 

My Dear Sir : Yoiir letter of the 6th has just been 
handed me by Mr. Baker, of Minnesota. When I said to 
you the other day that I wished to write you a letter, I 
had reference, of course, to my not having offered you a 
Cabinet appointment. I meant to say, and now do say, 
you were most honorably and amply recommended ; and 
a tender of the appointment was not withheld, in any 
part, because of anything happening in 1858.^ Indeed, I 
should have decided as I did easier than I did, had that 
matter never existed, I had partly made up my mind in 
favor of Mr. Smith — not conclusively, of course — before 
your name was mentioned in that connection. When you 
were brought forward I said, '' Colfax is a young man, 
is already in position, is running a brilliant career, and is 

1 The allusion here is to the fact coin and Douglas, Mr. Colfax was 
that in the Senatorial campaign understood to favor the reelection 
of 1858 in Illinois, between Lin- of Douglas. 

Vol. III.— 23 



354 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. sure of a bright future in any event — with Smith it is 

now or never." I considered either abundantly competent, 

MS. Also and decided on the ground I have stated. I now have to 

riuted in ^6^ *^^^ y^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ °^® *^® injustice to suppose for 

Hoiiistcr, a moment that I remember anything against you in 

"Life of ,. 

Colfax." malice. ,^ , , 

Yours very truly, 

A. Lincoln. 

The next step in Cabinet-making was much 
more complex as a political and personal adjust- 
ment, and proved for the moment too difficult of 
execution. Mr. Lincoln had frequently and with- 
out reserve expressed his decided preference for 
ex-Governor Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, as his Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, not only on account of his ac- 
knowledged executive talent, but above all because 
his spotless integrity of character would at once 
impart confidence in the national credit, now 
greatly impaired by recent maladministration and 
liable to be lost in the convulsions of civil war. 
There seemed, too, an eminent fitness in this 
selection. He was looked upon as the most prom- 
inent and able representative of the second great 
constituent element of the Eepublican party — 
the former Democrats of the Northern States 
whose anti-slavery convictions had joined them 
to the new party of freedom. 

But against this preference there rose up the 
local claim of the State of Pennsylvania and of 
Senator Simon Cameron as her most prominent 
citizen. The manufacturing industry of that State 
created a local sentiment in behalf of a protective 
tariff stronger than all other party issues. Pro- 
tection had not, indeed, been a prominent question 
in the late election, yet the Republican platform 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 355 

proclaimed that the " industrial interests " should cn. xxii. 
be encouraged; the bulk of the new party were 
former tariff men ; Mr. Lincoln himself had been 
an avowed protectionist in other political cam- 
paigns, and was known not to have changed his 
convictions on this point. Stronger than all was 
the implied understanding in favor of protec- 
tion — unwritten indeed, but none the less relied 
upon by politicians and parties. Now that the 
election was won, Pennsylvania claimed control of 
the Treasury Department as that branch of the 
Government which could wield the greatest influ- 
ence, both upon legislation and administration, for 
the promotion of her industrial prosperity. Gov- 
ernor Chase had a wider national reputation than 
Senator Cameron, but each was a leader in his own 
State, each had received the almost unanimous 
complimentary vote of his own State in the Chi- 
cago Convention. 

In view of these conflicting motives and inter- 
ests, the President-elect invited Mr. Cameron to 
visit him at Springfield, and interviews took place 
between them on the 30th and 31st of December. iseo. 
Their conversations were undoubtedly intended to 
be frank and explicit, and yet it would appear that 
a temporary misunderstanding grew out of them, 
the precise nature of which has never become pub- 
lic history. When Mr. Cameron returned to his 
home he bore with him the following note : 

Springfield, III., December 31, 1860. 

Hon. SmoN Cameron. 

My Dear Sir : I think fit to notify you now, that by 
your permission I shall at the proper time nominate you 
to the U. S. Senate for confirmation as Secretary of the 



356 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. Treasury, or as Secretary of War — which of the two I 
have not yet definitely decided. Please answer at your 
MS. earliest convenience. 

Your obedient servant, 

A. Lincoln. 

The purpose of the President-elect, evidently 
formed with deliberation, was suddenly changed, 
but, as the sequel proved, for a time only. If he 
ever explained his reason for so doing, it was to 
witnesses who are long since dead. One of the 
secondary causes he has himself left on record. It 
happened that just at this juncture he received, 
both by letter and through personal visits from 
Pennsylvania politicians, the indications of a bit- 
ter hostility to Cameron from an influential and 
very active minority in that State, headed by the 
newly elected Governor and the chairman of the 
State central committee, who protested in severe 
terms against Cameron's appointment. The situa- 
tion required prompt action, and, keeping his own 
counsel, Mr. Lincoln wrote : 

(Private.) 

Springfield, III., Jan. 3, 1861. 
Hon. Simon Cajvieron. 

My Dear Sir : Since seeing you things have developed 
which make it impossible for me to take you into the 
Cabinet. You will say this comes of an interview with 
McClure ; and this is partly, but not wholly, true. The 
more potent matter is wholly outside of Pennsylvania; 
and yet I am not at liberty to specify it. Enough that it 
appears to me to be sufficient. And now I suggest that 
you write me deehning the appointment, in which case I 
do not object to its being known that it was tendered 
you. Better do this at once, before things so change 
that you cannot honorably decline, and I be compelled to 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 357 

openly recall the tender. No person living knows or has cn. xxii. 
an intimation that I write this letter. 

Yours truly, A. Lincoln. 

P. S, Telegraph me instantly on receipt of this, saying, ms. 
"All right."— A. L. 

It will be seen from this that Mr. Lincoln did 
not offer any explanation of his course ; also that 
he had so well kept his secret, both of the tender 
and the recall, that, since his judgment so dic- 
tated, he could reverse his own action and the 
world be none the wiser. Still further does it ap- 
pear from this letter that he had either enjoined or 
expected an equal discretion on the part of Mr. 
Cameron. But the latter, in haste to control the 
party politics of Pennsylvania, and dictate who 
from that State should succeed him in the Senate, 
had shown Mr. Lincoln's first note. Mr. Cameron 
was, therefore, not only unable to telegraph "All 
right," but was in a measure compelled also to 
show the recall to a few special friends ; and thus 
the incident, though the correspondence and the 
actual details were carefully kept out of the news- 
papers, was more or less understood in confidential 
circles of politics. 

As might have been expected, Mr. Cameron's 
nearest personal friend came at once to Spring- 
field; and the conferences on the subject may be 
sufficiently inferred from a letter and its inclosure 
which he carried back, 

(Private and confidential.) 

Springfield, III., Jan. 13, 1861. 
Hon. Simon Cameron, 

My Dear Sir: At the suggestion of Mr. Sanderson, 
and with hearty good-wiU besides, I herewith send you a 



358 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. letter dated Jan. 3 — the same in date as the last you 
received from me. I thought best to give it that date, as 
it is in some sort to take the place of that letter. I learn, 
both by a letter of Mr. Swett and from Mr. Sanderson, 
that your feelings were wounded by the terms of my 
letter really of the 3d. I wrote that letter under great 
anxiety, and perhaps I was not so guarded in its terms as 
I should have been ; but I beg you to be assured I in- 
tended no offense. My great object was to have you act 
quickly, if possible before the matter should be compli- 
cated with the Penn. Senatorial election. Destroy the 
offensive letter or return it to me. 

I say to you now I have not doubted that you would 
perform the duties of a Department ably and faithfully. 
Nor have I for a moment intended to ostracize your 
friends. If I should make a Cabinet appointment for 
Penn. before I reach Washington, I will not do so with- 
out consulting you, and giving all the weight to your 
views and wishes which I consistently can. This I have 
always intended. yours truly, 

A. Lincoln. 
[Inclosure.j 

Springfield, III., Jan. 3, 1861. 
Hon. Simon Cajieron. 

My Dear Sir: When you were here, about the last 
of December, I handed you a letter saying I should at the 
proper time nominate you to the Senate for a place in the 
Cabinet. It is due to you and to truth for me to say you 
were here by my invitation, and not upon any sugges- 
tion of your own. You have not as yet signified to me 
whether you would accept the appointment, and with 
much pain I now say to you that you will relieve me from 
great embarrassment by allowing me to recall the offer. 
This springs from an unexpected complication, and not 
from any change of my view as to the ability or faithful- 
ness with which you would discharge the duties of the place. 
I now think I will not definitely fix upon any appoint- 
Ms. ment for Pennsylvania until I reach Washington. 

Your obedient servant, 

A. Lincoln. 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 



359 



Before further describing this Cameron dilemma, 
we must look at another complication which was 
added to it. On the day he had given Mr. Cameron 
his wi-itten tender of a place (December 31), he 
had also telegraphed to Governor Chase, "In these 
troublous times I would like a conference with you. 
Please visit me here at once." By a curious coin- 
cidence, Mr. Chase arrived in Springfield on the day 
(January 3) on which Mr. Lincoln wrote the recall 
of the tender to Mr. Cameron. As in other instances, 
the President-elect waived all ceremony and called 
on Mr. Chase at his hotel. " I have done with you," 
said he, " what I would not perhaps have ventured 
to do with any other man in the country — sent for 
you to ask you whether you will accept the appoint- 
ment of Secretary of the Treasury, without, how- 
ever, being exactly prepared to offer it to you." 
He also informed him of the selection of Mr. Sew- 
ard and Mr. Bates, which he heartily approved. 
Nothing was, of course, said of the tender to Cam- 
eron or its recall ; but the opposition to Cameron in 
Pennsylvania and the urging of Mr. Dayton, of New 
Jersey, instead, the apparent acquiescence of all in 
the choice of Mr. Chase, and the threatening affairs 
of the nation as well as the strife among Eepublican 
factions, were fully talked over during his visit, 
which lasted two days. Mr. Chase stated that he 
"was not prepared to say that he would accept that 
place if offered." Neither did he positively decline. 
He valued the trust and its opportunities, but he 
was reluctant to leave the Senate. It was resolved 
to ask the advice of friends, and abide the course of 
events. "A good deal of conversation," writes Mr. 
Chase, "followed in reference to other possible 



c'H. xxn. 



Warden, 
" Life, of 

Siiliiion P. 
Cliiise," 

pp. Mi, 305. 



Schnckers, 

" Life of 8. 

P. Chase," 

p. 201. 



Warden, 

" Life of 

Salmon P. 

Chase," 

p. 365. 



360 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cu. XXII. members of the Cabinet, but everything was left 
open when we parted." 

All these important visits to Springfield were her- 
alded in the newspapers, and the rumors connected 
therewith proportionately magnified. Particularly 
did the statement of Mr. Cameron's selection, and 
its quick contradiction, put both his friends and 
opponents on the alert. Pennsylvania politics 
were for the moment at a white heat, and letters 
showered into Springfield. Politicians are but 
human, and Mr. Cameron was sorely wounded in 
pride and weakened in prestige. He felt hurt at 
the form as well as the substance of the recall, 
which, being intended to remain secret, was more 
explicit than conventional. While he did not con- 
ceal his chagrin, on the whole he kept his temper, 
taking the ground that he neither originally solic- 
ited the place, nor would he now decline it. His 
enemies, seeing him at bay, redoubled their eiforts 
to defeat him. They charged him with unfitness, 
with habitual intrigue, with the odium of corrupt 
practices. Mr. Lincoln, however, soon noticed that 
these allegations were vaguely based upon news- 
paper report and public rumor, and that, when re- 
quested to do so, no one was willing to make specific 
charges and furnish tangible proof. 

While the opponents of Mr. Cameron hastened 
to transmit to Springfield protests against his 
appointment, his friends were yet more active in 
forwarding recommendations in his behalf. All 
1861. through the month of January this epistolary 
contest seemed the principal occupation of the 
Pennsylvania Republicans, and to some extent it 
communicated itself to other localities. Sharp as 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 



361 



were the assaults, the defense was yet more earnest, cn. xxii. 
and testimonials came from all ranks and classes, 
— citizens, clergymen, editors, politicians, and offi- 
cials of all grades, and in numbers fully as three to 
one, — indorsing his private and personal worth, 
his public services, his official uprightness. As- 
tute Washington politicians were nonplused, and 
frankly confessed that his vindication from asper- 
sion was complete and overwhelming and that they 
could not account for it — attributing it, as usual, 
to his personal intrigue. 

Eeasons aside, it was evident that Pennsyl- 
vania demanded Cameron, and in the same con- 
nection protested against Chase, in the Treasury 
Department, insisting that the latter, through his 
Democratic teachings and party affiliations, was 
necessarily wedded to the doctrines of free trade, 
and hence inimical to the manufacturing prosperity 
of that State, which was anxiously looking forward 
to protective legislation. Mr. Cameron was highly 
o-ratified at this manifestation from his own State, 
as he had a right to be, and was thereby able to 

" , . . Morehead 

declare himself entirely satisfied with the situation ]« Lmcoiu, 
as thus left, and to express his continued good- will 
towards the President-elect. 

Pending this incident, still another phase of the 
Cabinet question had more fully developed itself at 
Washington. The proposition to appoint at least 
one distinctly Southern man continued from time 
to time to be urged upon Mr. Lincoln, notably by 
some of the most prominent and, it may be added, 
most radical Republican Senators and Representa- 
tives in Congress. To the policy of such a step the 
President-elect cordially assented; but the real 



MS. 



362 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

cu. XXII. question was, as lie had already so sharply defined 
it : Would any Southern man of character and in- 
fluence accept such a place? Since Mi*. Seward's 
selection, he too joined in the current suggestion. 
" I feel it my duty," he wrote, December 25, " to 
submit for your consideration the names of Colonel 
Fremont for Secretary of War, Randall Hunt, of 
Louisiana, and John A. Gilmer or Kenneth Ray- 
nor, of North Carolina, for other places. Should 
you think that any of these gentlemen would be 
likely to be desirable in the Administration, I 
should find no difficulty, I think, in ascertaining 
^Li^com? whether they would accept, without making the 
^^'''ms. ■ matter public." In another note, of December 28, 
he added the name of Robert E. Scott, of Vir- 
ginia, to his list of Southern candidates. There- 
upon Mr. Lincoln sent him authority to make the 
inquiry, while he himself wrote directly to John A. 
Gilmer asking him to come to Springfield. Mr. 
Seward's letters had also urged, in this connection, 
that in view of the threatened revolution Mr. Lin- 
coln should come to Washington somewhat earlier 
than usual, and should at once select his Secre- 
taries of War and Navy, that they might begin to 
devise measures of safety. To all these sugges- 
tions Mr. Lincoln sent the following reply : 

(Private.) 

^ .__ _^ ^ Springfield, III., Jan. 3, 1861. 

Hon. W. H. Seward. ' ' ' 

My Dear Sir : Yours without signature was received 
last night. I have been considering your suggestions as to 
my reaching Washington somewhat earher than is usual. 
It seems to me the inauguration is not the most danger- 
ous point for us. Our adversaries have us now clearly at 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 363 

disadvantage. On the second Wednesday of February, cn. xxii. 
when the votes should be officially counted, if the two 
Houses refuse to meet at all, or meet without a quorum of 
each, where shall we be ? I do not think that this count- 
ing is constitutionally essential to the election ; but how 
are we to proceed in absence of it ? 

In view of this, I think it best for me not to attempt 
appearing in Washington till the result of that ceremony 
is known. It certainly would be of some advantage 
if you could know who are to be at the heads of the 
War and Navy Departments ; but, until I can ascertain 
definitely whether I can get any suitable men from the 
South, and who, and how many, I cannot weU decide. As 
yet, I have no word from Mr. Gilmer, in answer to my 
request for an interview with him. I look for something ms 
on the subject, through you, before long. 

Yours very truly, 

A. Lincoln. 

The result of Mr. Seward's inquiries soon came, 
and revealed precisely the hesitation and difficulty 
which the President-elect had foretold. " Mr. Gr., of 
N. C, says he will consider of the proposition, and 
that he trusts that before giving an answer he will 
be able to name a person better calculated than 
himself for the purpose indicated. I do not think 
he will find such a person. He will not reply fur- 
ther, until required to do so by you, directly or in- 
directly. I will communicate with him if you wish. 
I think he would not decline. I have tried to get 
an interview on my own responsibility with Mr. 
Scott, but he has not yet come, though he has 
promised to do so. . . I still think Randall Hunt, ^lSd? 
of Louisiana, would be well chosen." And again: ^^ms. 
" Mr. Gilmer has written home confidentially, and 
will give me an answer in a few days. He is in- 
quiring about Randall Hunt. What do you know 



564 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



CH. XXII. of Meredith P. Gentry, of Tennessee ? " To this Mr. 



Seward to 

Lincoln, 

Jan. 8, 1861. 

MS. 



MS. 



Lincoln answered : 



(Private. 



Springfield, III., Jan. 12, 1861, 
Hon. W. H. Seward. 

My Dear Sir : Yours of the 8th received. I still hope 
Mr. Gilmer will, ou a fair understanding with us, consent 
to take a place in the Cabinet. The preference for him 
over Mr. Hunt or Mr. Gentry is that, up to date, he has 
a living position in the South, whUe they have not. He 
is only better than Winter Davis in that he is farther 
South. I fear if we could get, we could not safely take, 
more than one such man — that is, not more than one 
who opposed us in the election, the danger being to lose 
the confidence of our own friends. 

Your selection for the State Department having become 
public, I am happy to find scarcely any objection to it. I 
shall have trouble with every other Northern Cabinet 
appointment, so much so that I shall have to defer them 
as long as possible, to avoid being teased to insanity to 
make changes. 

Your obedient servant, 

A. Lincoln. 



Seward to 

Lincoln, 

Jan. 15, 1861. 

MS. 



Under date of January 15 Mr. Seward sent an 
additional report on the subject. " I think," wrote 
he, "Mr. Scott has been terrified into dropping 
the subject about which I wrote to you. He has 
not come to see me ; so we will let him pass, if 
you please. I still think well and have hopes of 
Gilmer." But Mr. Lincoln was by that time 
thoroughly satisfied that this last hope would also 
prove idle ; for he himself had a second letter from 
Mr. Gilmer (dated January 29) in which that gen- 
tleman declined his invitation to come to Spring- 
field, and in which, having missed receiving Mr. 
Lincoln's former reply, he still pathetically insisted 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 365 

that the President-elect should save the couiitiy ]jy en. xxii 
writing a letter to satisfy the South. 

Mr. Seward was so much of an optimist that he 
clung to the idea of securing a Southern unionist. 
In another letter which he wrote to the President- 
elect, under date of January 27, it is curious to 
note how he continues his search after the impos- 
sible, against the accumulation of evidence which 
convinced his reason but could not subdue his hope: 

Mr. Cameron showed me the letter you had sent to hini, 
and seems entirely satisfied with it. 

I saw Mr. Robert E. Scott, of Virginia, to-day pursuant 
to appointment. He is a splendid man, and he would he 
a fit and creditable representative of the Southern Union 
party. Whether he is not too exacting for his section to 
make a practical minister for you is cpiite doubtful in 
my mind. I will think more. 

Recent events in Virginia have opened access for me 
to Union men in Virginia and other Southern States. 
Among others, Mr. James Barbour, of the State of Vir- 
ginia, has visited me. He is a Democrat, but the master 
sphit of the Union party, and he left upon my mind a 
most favorable impression as a man of talent, spirit, 
loyalty, and practicabihty. We will talk of him when 
you come here. 

The appeals from the Union men in the border States 
for something of concession or compromise are very 
painful, since they say that without it their States must 
all go with the tide, and your Administration must begin 
with the free States meeting all Southern States in a 
hostile Confederacy. Chance might render the separation 
perpetual. Disunion has been contemplated and dis- 
cussed so long there that they have become frightfully 
famihar with it, and even such men as Mr. Scott and 
William C. Rives are so far disunionists as to think that 
they would have the right and be wise in going if we will 
not execute new guaranties which would be abhorrent in 
the North. It is almost in vain that I tell them to wait, 
let us have a truce on slavery, put our issue on disunion, 



366 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. and seek remedies for ultimate griefs iu a constitutional 
question. 

This is the dark side of the picture. Now for the 
brighter one. Beyond a peradventure disunion is falling 
and union rising in the popular mind. Our friends say 
we are safe in Maryland, and Mr, Scott and others tell 
us that union is gaining rapidly as an element in 
Virginia. 

In any case you are to meet a hostile armed confeder- 
acy when you commence — you must reduce it by force 
or conciliation. The resort to force would very soon be 
denounced by the North, although so many are anxious 
for a fray. The North will not consent to a long civil 
war. A large portion, much the largest portion of the 
Republican party, are reckless now of the crisis before 
us ; and compromise or concession, though as a means 
of averting dissolution, is intolerable to them. They be- 
lieve that either it will not come at all, or be less disas- 
trous than I think it will be. For my own part I think 
that we must collect the revenues, regain the forts in the 
Gulf, and if need be maintain ourselves here ; but that 
every thought that we think ought to be conciliatory, 
forbearing, and paternal, and so open the way for the 
rising of a Union party in the seceding States which will 
bring them back into the Union. 

It will be very important that your inaugural address 
be wise and winning, I am glad that you have sus- 
pended making Cabinet appointments. The temper of 
your Administration, whether generous and hopeful of 
Seward to ^^^^^^^ ^^ harsh and reckless, will probably determine the 
Lincoln, fate of OUT couutry. May God give you wisdom for the 
MS. ' great trust and responsibility. 

In this attitude matters remained until towards 
the end of February, when Mr. Lincoln arrived in 
Washington; namely, Mr. Seward, of New York, 
and Mr. Bates, of Missouri, had positively accepted 
definite places in the Cabinet ; Mr. Chase, of Ohio, 
and Mr. Smith, of Indiana, had been virtually 
chosen, but were yet held under advisement; a 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 367 

tender had been made to Mr. Cameron, of Pennsyl- en. xxii. 
vauia, and recalled but not declined ; and Southern 
men, like Gilmer, of North Carolina, and Scott, of 
Virginia, had not the courage to accept. 

In addition to these, Mr. Lincoln had by this 
time practically settled in his own judgment upon 
Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, as the New Eng- 
land member, though no interview had been held 
nor tender made. But as early as the meeting 
(November 22) between the President and Vice- isco. 
President elect at Chicago, this name had been 
the subject of special consultation; and a friend 
had obtained from Mr. Welles the latter's wi'itten 
views upon current political questions, especially 
the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution. A 
great number of letters and formal recommenda- 
tions since received had but confirmed Mr. Lin- 
coln's first impressions as to his fitness, availability, 
and representative character. 

Washington was thronged with politicians, called 
there by the proceedings of Congress; by the im. 
Peace Convention, just closing; by the secession 
excitement ; and especially by the advent of a new 
and yet untried party in administration. Willard's, 
then the principal hotel, was never in its history 
more busy nor more brilliant. Here Mr. Lincoln 
and his suite had spacious and accessible rooms, 
and here, during the six or eight working-days 
which intervened between his arrival and the inau- 
guration, was the great political exchange where 
politicians, editors, committee-men, delegations, 
Congressmen, Governors, and Senators congi'e- 
gated, and besieged the doors of the coming power 
from morning till midnight. 



368 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. Mr. Lincoln had a sincere respect for great 
names in politics and statesmanship, the more so 
because his own life had in the main been provin- 
cial. Nevertheless, he quickly noted that here at 
the center, as well as in lesser and more distant 
circles, there was present harmony in the chief 
party tenets, but that great diversity and cross- 
purpose, even serious antagonism, as to men and 
measures in detail were likely to arise in the future ; 
that the powerful cross-lights of the capital only 
intensified the factional contests, local jealousies, 
and the national difficulties and dangers he had 
already viewed more remotely but quite as accu- 
rately from Springfield ; that the wisdom of trained 
actors in the political drama was as much beclouded 
by interest or prejudice as was his own by inex- 
perience and diffidence. 

After a week's patient listening he found his 
well-formed judgment about the composition of 
his Cabinet unshaken. He had by this time finally 
determined to place Cameron in the War Depart- 
ment, and Chase was understood to have accepted 
the Treasury. Hence the East and the West, the 
great "pivotal States," the Whig and Democratic 
elements of the Republican party each by three 
members, were all believed to be fairly and accept- 
ably represented. The slave States too, through 
Mr. Bates, of Missouri, had a voice in the new 
council; but the charge of sectionalism had been 
so persistently iterated by the South, that it was 
thought best to give the single remaining place to 
Maryland, even then balancing between loyalty 
and open secession ; and the final controversy was 
whether that choice should fall upon Montgomery 




MOSTCOMEKY BLAIK. 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 369 

Blair, a Democrat, and meiubcr of a historic aiid cn. xxii. 
influential family, or upon Ilonry Wintei' Davis, a 
young Whig of rising fame. 

Something of the obstinacy and bitterness of the 
entire contest was infused into this last struggle 
over a really minor place. This was partly be- 
cause so little r(!mained to quarrel al)out, but 
mainly because it was supposed to be the casting 
vote of the new Cabinet, which should decide the 
dominancy of the Wliig Republicans or Democratic 
Republicans in Mr. Lincoln's Administration. In 
the momentary heat and excitement this phase of 
the matter expanded beyond any original design, 
until Mr. Lincoln realized that it was no longer 
a merely local strife between Blair and Davis 
in Maryland, but the closing trial of strength 
and supremacy between Whigs and Democrats of 
the new party throughout the Union, headed re- 
spectively, though perhaps unconsciously, by Sew- 
ard and Chase. This contingency, too, had been 
foreseen by the President-elect, and he had long 
ago determined not to allow himself to be made 
the football between rival factions. Carrying out, 
therefore, his motto of " Justice to all," as formu- 
lated in his tender to Seward, he determined to 
appoint Mr. Blair. When reminded that by such 
selection he placed four Democrats and only three 
Whigs in his Cabinet, he promptly replied that " he 
was himself an old-line Whig, and he should be 
there to make the parties even"; a declaration 
which he repeated, sometimes jocularly, sometimes 
earnestly, often afterwards. 

Heated partisans from both factious doubtless 
found it difficult to persuade themselves that this 

Vol. hi.— 24 



370 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXII. 



Hon. N. B. 

Judd, Con- 

versatiou. 
J. G. N., 
Personal 

Memoran- 
da. M8. 



inexperienced man would persist in attempting to 
hold an even and just balance between the two. 
But he had already made up his mind that if the 
quarrel became irrepressible it should be carried 
on outside of his Administration. During the two 
or three days which elapsed after his selections 
were finally determined upon, and before their 
actual transmission to the Senate for confirma- 
tion, there were interminable rumors of changes, 
and, of course, a corresponding rush to influence 
new combinations. Late one night a friend gained 
access to him, and in great excitement asked, " Is 
it true, Mr. Lincoln, as I have just heard, that we 
are to have a new deal after all, and that you 
intend to nominate Winter Davis instead of Blair I " 
" Judd," replied he, " when that slate breaks again, 
it will break at the top." 

These plottings at last bore mischievous fruit. 
Superserviceable friends doubtless persuaded Sew- 
ard that the alleged ascendency of the Chase 
faction in the Cabinet was real and ominous. 
Hence, possibly, the subjoined note: 



Washington, March 2, 1861. 

My Dear Sir: Circumstances which have occurred 
since I expressed to you in December last my wilUngness 
to accept the ofiBce of Secretary of State seem to me to 
render it my duty to ask leave to withdraw that consent. 

Tendering to you my best wishes for the success of 
your Administration, with my sincere and grateful ac- 
knowledgments of all your acts of kindness and confi- 
dence towards me, I remain, very respectfully and 
sincerely, 

Your obedient servant, 

William H. Seward. 

MS. The Hon. Abraham Lincoln, President-elect. 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 371 

This, from the man who for several months had ch. xxh. 
held intimate counsel with him, had taken active 
part in the formation of the Cabinet, and had read 
and partly revised the inaugural, was unexpected. 
Did it mean that he would withdraw and complain 
that he was forced out because a preponderating 
influence was given to his rival ? The note was 
received on Saturday, and Mr. Lincoln pondered 
the situation till Monday morning. While the 
inauguration procession was forming in the streets, 
he wrote the following and handed it to his private 
secretary to copy, with the remark, " I can't afford 
to let Seward take the first trick." It was dated, for 
form's sake, at the Executive Mansion, though it 
was written and copied at Willard's. 

Executive Mansion, March 4, 1861. 

My Dear Sir : Your note of the 2d instant, asking 

to withdraw your acceptance of my invitation to take 

charge of the State Department, was duly received. It 

is the subject of the most painful solicitude with me ; and 

I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the 

withdi'awal. The public interest, I think, demands that 

you should ; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted 

in the same direction. Please consider and answer by 9 

o'clock A. M. to-morrow. 

Your obedient servant, 

A. Lincoln. ms. 

Hon. WilliajM H. Seward. 

When the inauguration pageant was ended, and 
the usual public reception and hand-shaking were 
concluded, Mr. Seward called upon the President 
at the Executive Mansion, and the two men had 
a long and confidential talk, in which Seward's 
answer, sent the following morning, was perhaps 
already foreshadowed: 



372 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CH. XXII. March 5, 1861. 

My Dear Sir : Deferring to your opinions and wishes 
as expressed in your letter of yesterday, and in our con- 
versation of last evening, I withdraw my letter to you of 
the 2d instant, and remain, with great respect and esteem, 
Your most obedient servant, 

William H. Seward. 

MS. The President of the United States. 

Whereupon, at 12 o'clock, the Senate being con- 
Mar. 5, 1861. vened in extra session, the President sent to that 
body the names of his proposed Cabinet, as follows : 

For Secretary of State, William H. Seward, of New York. 
For Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio. 
For Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania. 
For Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, of Connecticut. 
For Secretary of the Interior, Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana. 
For Attorney-General, Edward Bates, of Missouri. 
For Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blah-, of Maryland. 

The Senate confirmed all these nominations with- 
out delay ; and on the day after, March 6, most of 
the appointees were formally inducted into office. 
That evening occurred the first Cabinet meeting, 
for introduction and acquaintance ; and the new 
President greeted his Cabinet at the Executive 
Mansion substantially as he had planned it, on 
the night of the November election, in the little 
telegraph office at Springfield. 

Carping critics might indeed at the moment 
have specified defects, incongruities, jealousies, 
and seeds of possible discord and disaster in the 
new Cabinet, but we can now understand that 
they neither comprehended the man who was to 
dominate and govern it, nor the storms of state 
which, as captain and crew, he and they were 
to encounter and outride. He needed advisers, 



LINCOLN'S CABINET 373 

helpers, executive eyes and hands, not alone in en. xxn. 
department routine, but in the higher qualities of 
leadership and influence; above all, his principal 
motive seems to have been representative charac- 
ter, varied talent — in a word, combination. States- 
manship implies success ; success demands cooper- 
ation, popular sympathy, and support. He wished 
to combine the experience of Seward, the integrity 
of Chase, the popularity of Cameron ; to hold the 
West with Bates, attract New England with Welles ; 
please the Whigs through Smith, and convince the 
Democrats through Blair. 

Mr. Lincoln possessed a quick intuition of human 
nature and of the strength or weakness of indi\'idual 
character. His whole life had been a practical study 
of the details and rivalries of local partisanship. 
He was, moreover, endowed in yet unsuspected 
measure with a comprehensive grasp of gi-eat 
causes and results in national politics. He had 
noted and heralded the alarming portent of the 
slavery struggle. With more precision than any 
contemporary, he had defined the depth and 
breadth of the moral issues and rights it involved ; 
he had led the preliminary victory at the Novem- 
ber polls. Now that secession was proclaimed in 
every Cotton State, his simple logic rose above 
minor considerations to the peril and the protec- 
tion of the nation, to the assault on and the defense 
of the Constitution. He saw but the ominous cloud 
of civil war in front, and the patriotic faith and 
enthusiasm of the people behind him. The slogan 
of a Seward committee, a Chase delegation, or a 
Cameron clan was but the symbol and promise of 
a Wide- A wake club to vote for freedom, or of an 



374 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXII. armed regiment on the battlefield to maintain it. 
Neither did any one yet suspect his delicate tact 
in management, strength of will, and firmness of 
purpose. In weaker hands such a Cabinet would 
have been a hot-bed of strife ; under him it became 
a tower of strength. He made these selections be- 
cause he wanted a council of distinctive and diverse, 
yet able, influential, and representative, men, who 
should be a harmonious group of constitutional 
advisers and executive lieutenants — not a board 
of regents holding the great seal in commission 
and intriguing for the succession. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 

IN his letter of January 4, General Scott had ch.xxiii. 
promised Mr. Lincoln that from time to time isei. 
he would keep him informed of the situation of 
military affairs. This promise the general failed 
to redeem ; probably not through any intentional 
neglect, but more likely because in the first place 
Buchanan's policy of delay, indecision, and informal 
negotiation with the conspirators left everything 
in uncertainty; and, secondly, because the atten- 
tion of the Administration (and measurably of the 
whole country) was turned to hopes of compro- 
mise, especially through the labors of the Peace 
Convention. The rebels, on their part, were ab- 
sorbed in the formation of the provisional govern- 
ment at Montgomery; Lincoln was making his 
memorable journey from Springfield to Washing- 
ton by way of the chief cities of the North; the 
Fort Pickens truce was practically a secret ; and 
thus the military status was for the time being 
lost sight of beyond the immediate neighborhood 
of Charleston. Since the reorganization of Buch- 
anan's Cabinet on December 31, and the expulsion iseo. 
or defection of traitors from the departments and 
from Congress, the whole North had breathed 
somewhat easier. The firing on the Star of the 



376 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



CH. XXIII. West had created a storm of indignation ; but this, 

too, quickly subsided, and by a sort of common 

consent all parties and sections looked to the in- 

1861. coming Administration as the only power which 

could solve the national crisis. 

The key-note of such a solution was given in the 
inaugural of the new President. This announced 
a decided, though not a violent, change of policy. 
Buchanan's course had been one professedly of 
conciliation, but practically of ruinous concession. 
Lincoln, receiving from his hands the precious 
trust of the Grovernment, — not in its original in- 
tegrity, but humbled, impaired, diminished, and 
threatened, — announced his purpose of concilia- 
tion, conservation, and restoration. "The policy 
chosen," said he, " looked to the exhaustion of all 
peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger 
ones. It sought only to hold the public places and 
property not already wrested from the Government, 
and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on 
time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised 
a continuance of the mails at Government expense 
to the very people who were resisting the Govern- 
ment, and it gave repeated pledges against any 
disturbance to any of the people or any of their 
rights. Of all that which a President might con- 
stitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, 
M^Sag°to everything was forborne without which it was 
jSrf liei. believed possible to keep the Government on foot." 
This pacific purpose was now, however, destined 
to receive a rude shock. When on the morning of 
1861. the 5th of March Lincoln went to his office in the 
Executive Mansion, he found a letter from Mr. 
Holt, still acting as Secretary of War, giving 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 377 

him news of vital importance received on the cn. xxiil 
morning of the inauguration — namely, that Fort 
Sumter must, in the lapse of a few weeks at most, 
be strongly reenforced or summarily abandoned. 
Major Anderson had in the previous week made an 
examination of his provisions. There was bread 
for twenty-eight days ; pork for a somewhat longer 
time; beans, rice, coffee, and sugar for different 
periods from eight to forty days. 

He had at the same time consulted his officers on 
the prospects and possibilities of relief and reen- 
forcement. They unanimously reported that before 
Sumter could be permanently or effectively succored 
a combined land and naval force must attack and 
carry the besieging forts and batteries, and hold 
the secession militia at bay, and that such an 
undertaking would at once concentrate at Charles- 
ton all the volunteers, not alone of South Carolina, 
but of the adjacent States as well. " I confess," 
wrote Anderson, transmitting the reports and esti- 
mates of his nine officers, "that I would not be 
willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to 
throw reenforcements into this harbor within the 
time for our relief rendered necessary by the 
limited supply of our provisions, and with a view ^^,^1.30^ 
of holding possession of the same, with a force of pebSiseu 
less than twenty thousand good and well-disci- ^prinfed^'ilf 
plined men." Mr. Holt, quoting from previous ^\'., p'. 197?^ 
instructions to and reports from the major, added 
that this declaration "takes the Department by 
surprise, as his previous correspondence contained 
no such intimation." 

Retrospective criticism as to why or how such a 
state of things had been permitted to grow up was. 



378 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CH. XXIII. of course, useless. Here was a most portentous 
complication, not of Lincoln's own creating, but 
which he must nevertheless meet and overcome. 
He had counted on the soothing aid of time ; time, 
on the contrary, was in this emergency working 
in the interest of rebellion. General Scott was 
at once called into council, but his sagacity and 
experience could afford neither suggestion nor 
encouragement. That same night he returned the 
papers to the President with a somewhat lengthy 
indorsement reciting the several events which led 
to, and his own personal efforts to avert, this con- 
tingency, but ending with the gloomy conclusion : 
"Evacuation seems almost inevitable, and in this 
view our distinguished Chief Engineer (Brigadier 
Totten) concurs — if indeed the worn-out garrison 
be not assaulted and carried in the present week." 
This was a disheartening, almost a disastrous, be- 
ginning for the Administration. The Cabinet had 
only that day been appointed and confirmed. The 
Presidential advisers had not yet taken their posts — 
all had not even signified their acceptance. There 
was an impatient multitude clamoring for audience, 
and behind these swarmed an army of office-seekers. 
Everything was urgency and confusion, every- 
where was ignorance of method and routine. 
Rancor and hatred filled the breasts of political 
opponents departing from power; suspicion and 
rivalry possessed partisan adherents seeking ad- 
vantage and promotion. As yet, Lincoln virtually 
stood alone, face to face with the appalling prob- 
lems of the present and the threatening responsibih- 
ties of the future. Doubtless in this juncture he 
remembered and acted upon a biblical precedent 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 



379 



which iu after days of trouble and despondency ch. xxiil 
he was wont to quote for justification or consola- 
tion. When the children of Israel murmured on 
the shore of the Red Sea, Moses told them to 
" stand still and see the salvation of the Lord." 
Here, at the very threshold of his Presidential 
career, Lincoln had need to practice the virtue 
of patience — one of the cardinal elements of his 
character, acquired in many a personal and polit- 
ical tribulation. 

He referred the papers back to General Scott to 
make a more thorough investigation of all the 
questions involved. At the same time he gave 
him a verbal order touching his future policy, 
which a few days later was reduced to writing, 
and on the installation of the new Secretary of 
War transmitted by that functionary to the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief through the regular official channels, 
as follows : " I am directed by the President to say 
he desires you to exercise all possible vigilance for 
the maintenance of all the places within the mili- 
tary department of the United States, and to 
promptly call upon all the departments of the 
Government for the means necessary to that end." 

On the 9th of March, in written questions, Lin- 
coln in substance asked General Scott to inform 
him: 1st. To what point of time can Anderson 
maintain his position in Sumter? 2d. Can you, 
with present means, relieve him within that time ! 
3d. What additional means would enable you to 
do so ? This was on Saturday following the inau- 
guration. The chiefs of the several departments, 
with the exception of Cameron, Secretary of War, 
had been during the week inducted into office. 



Cameron 

to Scott 

(written by 

Lincoln). 

MS. 

1861. 



MS. 



380 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

ch, xxni. That night the President held his first Cabinet 
council on the state of the country ; and the crisis 
at Sumter, with the question of relieving the fort, 
were for the first time communicated to his assem- 
bled advisers. The general effect was one of dis- 
may if not consternation. For such a discussion 
all were unprepared. Naturally all decision must 
be postponed, and the assistance of professional 
advice be sought. Wliat followed has been written 
down by an eye-witness and participant : 

March 9, 1861, Saturday night. — A Cabinet council 
upon the state of the country. I was astonished to be 
informed that Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor, must 
be evacuated, and that General Scott, General Totten, 
and Major Anderson concui* in opinion, that as the place 
has but twenty-eight days' provision, it must be relieved, 
if at all, in that time ; and that it will take a force of 
twenty thousand men at least, and a bloody battle, to 
relieve it ! 

For several days after this, consultations were held as 
to the feasibility of relieving Fort Sumter, at which were 
present, explaining and aiding. General Scott, General 
Totten, Commodore Stringham, and Mr. Fox, who seems 
to be au fait in both nautical and military matters. The 
army officers and navy officers differ widely about the 
degree of danger to rapid-moving vessels passing under 
the fire of land batteries. The army officers think de- 
struction almost inevitable, where the navy officers think 
the danger but slight. The one believe that Sumter 
cannot be relieved — not even pro\dsioned — without an 
army of twenty thousand men and a bloody battle. The 
other (the naval) believe that with light, rapid vessels 
they can cross the bar at high tide of a dark night, run 
the enemy's forts (Moultrie and Cummings Point), and 
reach Sumter with little risk. They say that the greatest 
danger will be in landing at Sumter, upon which point 
there may be a concentrated fire. They do not doubt 
that the place can be and ought to be relieved. 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 381 

Mr. Fox is anxious to risk his life in loading? the relief, cn. xxiii. 
and Commodore Stringham seems e<iually confident of 
success. 

The naval men have convinced me fully that the thing 
can be done, and yet as the doing of it would be almost 
certain to begin the Avar, and as Charleston is of little 
importance as compared with tlu^ chief points in the Gulf, 
I am willing to yield to the military counsel and evacuate 
Fort Sumter, at the same time strengthening the forts 
in the Gulf so as to look down opposition, and guarding 
the coast with all our naval power, if need be, so as to 
close any port at pleasure. ^^^^^^ 

And to this effect I gave the President my written Diary, ms. 
opinion on the 16th of March. 

This extract from the diary of Edward Bates, 
the Attorney-G-eneral in the new Administration, 
shows us the drift and scope of the official dis- 
cussions on the Sumter question. To understand 
its full bearings, however, we must examine it a 
little more specifically. The idea of the evacuation 
and abandonment of the fort was so repugnant 
that Mr. Lincoln could scarcely bring himself to 
entertain it; we have his own forcible statement 
of how the apparently crushing necessity presented 
itself to his mind. General Scott, on March 11 isei. 
and 12, made written replies to the questions the 
President had propounded, and submitted the di-aft 
of an order for evacuation. 

He believed Anderson could, in respect to pro- 
visions, hold out some forty days without much 
suffering, but that the assailants, having overpow- 
ering numbers, could easily wear out the garrison 
by a succession of pretended night attacks, and, 
when ready, take it easily by a single real assault. 
To supply or reenforce the fort successfully, he 
should need a fleet of war vessels and transports 



382 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXIII. which it would take four months to collect ; and, 
besides, 5000 regulars and 20,000 volunteers, which 
it would require new acts of Congress to authorize 
and from six to eight months to raise, organize, 
and discipline. " It is, therefore, my opinion and 
advice," wi*ote Scott, " that Major Anderson be in- 
structed to evacuate the fort so long gallantly held 
by him and his companions, immediately on pro- 
curing suitable water transportation, and that he 
MS. embark with his command for New York." " In a 
purely military point of view," says Lincoln, " this 
reduced the duty of the Administration in the case 
to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely 
out of the fort. It was believed, however, that to 
so abandon that position, under the circumstances, 
would be utterly ruinous ; that the necessity under 
which it was to be done would not be fully under- 
stood; that by many it would be construed as a 
part of a voluntary policy ; that at home it would 
discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its 
adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a 
recognition abroad; that in fact it would be our 

Me8°ag"to national destruction consummated. This could 

July*, 1861. not be allowed." 

The dire alternative presented caused a thorough 
reexamination and discussion of the various plans 
of relief which had been suggested ; and since the 
army and the navy showed some considerable dis- 
agreement in opinions, these discussions were held 
before the President and Cabinet in the executive 
council chamber itself. General Scott's first im- 
pulse had been to revive and reorganize the Ward 
1861. expedition, prepared about the middle of February, 
which was to have consisted of several small Coast 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 383 

Survey steamers. To this end he called Captain ch. xxiii. 
Ward to Washington and again discussed the 
plan. But considering the increase of batteries 
and channel obstructions, it was now by both of 
them pronounced impracticable. One other offer 
seemed worthy of consideration. This was the 
plan proposed by Gustavus V. Fox, a gentleman 
thirty-nine years of age, who had been nineteen 
years in the United States Navy, had been en- 
gaged in the survey of the Southern coast, had 
commanded United States mail steamers, and had 
resigned from the navy in 1856 to engage in civil 
pursuits. He was a brother-in-law of the new 
Postmaster-General Blair, who seconded his pro- 
ject with persistence. He had made his proposal 
to General Scott early in February, and, backed by 
prominent New York merchants and shippers, 
urged it as he best might through the whole of 
that month. 

In his various communications Captain Fox thus 
described his plan : 

I propose to put the troops on board of a large, com- 
fortable sea-steamer, and hire two (or three) powerful 
light-draught New York tug-boats, having the necessary 
stores on board; these to be convoyed by the United 
States steamer Pawnee, now at Philadelphia, and the 
revenue cutter Harriet Lane. . . Arriving off the bar [at 
Charleston], I propose to examine by day the naval prep- 
arations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to 
oppose our entrance (and a feint or flag of truce would 
ascertain this), the armed ships must approach the bar 
and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson 
would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his 
guns, and would also prevent any naval succor being sent 
down from the city. Having dispersed this force, the 
only obstacles are the forts on Cummings Point and 



384 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXIII. 



Fox, Mem- 
orandum, 
Feb. 6, 1861. 
W. R. Vol. 
I., pp. 203, 
204. 



Fox to 
Blair, Feb. 

23, 1861. 
Ibid., p. 204. 



Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they 
may have erected, distant on either hand from mid- 
channel about three-quarters of a mile. At night, two 
hours before high water, with half the force on board of 
each tug, within relieving distance of each other, I should 
run in to Fort Sumter. 

These tugs are sea-boats, six feet draught, speed four- 
teen knots. The boilers are below, with three and a half 
feet space on each side, to be filled with coal. The ma- 
chinery comes up between the wheel-houses, with a gang- 
way on either hand of five to six feet, enabling us to pack 
the machinery with two or three thicknesses of bales of 
cotton or hay. This renders the vulnerable parts of the 
steamer proof against grape and fragments of shells, but 
the momentum of a solid shot would probably move the 
whole mass and disable the engine. The men are below, 
entirely protected from grape — provisions on deck. The 
first tug to lead in empty, to open their [the enemy's] fire. 
The other two to follow, with the force divided, and 
towing the large iron boats of the Baltic, which would 
hold the whole force should every tug be disabled, and 
empty they would not impede the tugs. 



The feasibility of Captain Fox's plan thus rested 
upon his ability to " run the batteries," and on this 
point the main discussion now turned. As recorded 
in the diary we have quoted, the army officers 
believed destruction almost inevitable, while the 
naval officers thought a successful passage might 
be effected. Captain Fox, who had come to Wash- 
ington, finally argued the question in person before 
the President, Cabinet, and assembled military offi- 
cers, adducing the recorded evidence of examples 
and incidents which had occurred in the Crimean 
war, and the results of Dalilgren's experiments in 
firing at stationary targets ; maintaining that there 
was no certainty whatever, and even only a mini- 
mum of chance, that land batteries could hit a 




BUST OF JAMES LOUIS PETIGRU. 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 385 

small object moving rapidly at right angles to cn. xxiii. 
their line of fire at a distance of thirteen hundred 
yards, especially at night. So far as mere theory 
could do it, he successfully demonstrated his plan, 
convincing the President and at least a majority 
of the Cabinet against the objections of General 
Scott and his subordinate officers. 

Nevertheless, the political question, the more im- 
portant of the two, yet remained to be considered. 
Resolved on prudent deliberation, President Lin- 
coln now, on March 15, asked the written answer isei. 
of his constitutional advisers to the following in- 
quiry : "Assuming it to be possible to now provi- 
sion Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it 
wise to attempt it ? " 

As requested, the members of the Cabinet re- 
turned somewhat elaborate replies, setting forth 
their reasons and conclusions. Two of them, 
Chase and Blair, agreeing with the President's 
own inclinations, responded in the affirmative; 
the five others, Seward, Cameron, Welles, Smith, 
and Bates, advised against the measm-e. 

" I have not reached my own conclusion," wi'ote 
Chase, " without much difficulty. K the proposed 
enterprise will so influence civil war as to involve 
an immediate necessity for the enlistment of armies 
and the expenditure of millions, I cannot, in the 
existing circumstances of the country and in the 
present condition of the national finances, advise cbase to 
it." He argued, however, that an immediate proc- Mar.ie.iseL 
lamation of reasons, and the manifestation of a 
kind and liberal spirit towards the South, would 
avert such a result, and he would therefore return 
an affirmative answer. 
Vol. III.— 25 



38() ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXIII. Blair had beeu from the first in favor of prompt 
and vigorous measures against the insurrection. 
A Democrat of the Jackson school, he would repeat 
Jackson's policy against nullification. He had 
brought forward and urged the scheme of Captain 
Fox. By the connivance of Buchanan's Adminis- 
tration, he argued, the rebellion had been permitted 
unchecked to grow into an organized government 
in seven States. It had been treated practically as 
a lawful proceeding; and, if allowed to continue, 
all Southern people must become reconciled to it. 
The rebels believed Northern men deficient in 
courage to maintain the Government. The evac- 
uation of Sumter would convince them that the 
Administration lacked firmness. Sumter reen- 
forced would become invulnerable, and would 
completely demoralize the rebellion. No expense 
or care should be spared to achieve this result. 
The appreciation of our stocks would reimburse 
the most lavish outlay for this purpose. "You 
should give no thought for the commander and 
his comrades in this enterprise. They willingly 
take the hazard for the sake of the country, and 
the honor, which, successful or not, they will 
SncoK receive from you and the lovers of free govern- 

Mar.15,1861. , . n T j ., 

M8. ment m all lands." 

Seward, in the negative, argued the political 
issue at great length. To attempt to provision 
Sumter would provoke combat and open civil war. 
A desperate and defeated majority in the South, 
had organized revolutionary government in seven 
States. The other slave States were balancing be- 
tween sympathy for the seceders and loyalty to the 
Union, but indicated a disposition to adhere to the 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 387 

latter. The Union must be maintained, peaceably cn. xxiii. 
if it could, forcibly if it must, to every extremity. 
But civil war was the mast uncertain and fearful of 
all remedies for political disorders. lie would save 
the Union by peaceful policy without civil war. 
Disunion was without justification. Devotion to 
the Union was a profound and permanent national 
sentiment. Silenced by terror, it would if en- 
couraged, rally and reverse the popular action of 
the seceding States. The policy of tlie time was 
conciliation. Sumter was practically useless. " I 
would, not provoke war in any way now. I would 
resort to force to protect the collection of the 
revenue, because this is a necessary as well as a 
legitimate Union object. Even then it should be 
only a naval force that I would employ for that 
necessary purpose, while I would defer military 
action on land until a case should arise when we 
would hold the defense. In that case, we should sewarcito 
have the spirit of the country and the approval of Mar!iMa6i. 
mankind on our side." 

Cameron followed the reasoning of the army 
officers. Captain Fox, he said, did not propose to 
supply provisions for more than one or two months. 
The abandonment of Sumter seemed an inevitable cameron 
necessity, and therefore the sooner the better. Mar.ie.isei. 

Welles thought the public mind was becoming 
reconciled to the idea of evacuation as a necessity. 
The strength, dignity, and character of the Gov- 
ernment would not be promoted by a successful linf^oin? 
attempt, while a failure would be disastrous. ' ' ms. 

Smith argued that Sumter was not essential to 
any of the duties imposed on the Government. 
There were other and more effective means to 



388 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CH. XXIII. vindicate its honor, and compel South Carolina to 
Smith to obey the laws. 

MarJMsei. Batcs bcUeved the hazard greater than the gain. 
" True," wrote he, " war already exists by the act 
of South Carolina — but this Government has thus 
far magnanimously forborne to retort the outrage. 
And I am willing to forbear yet longer in the hope 
of a peaceful solution of our present difficulties." 
Pickens, Key West, etc., should, on the contrary, 
be strongly defended, and the whole coast from 
ScoiS South Carolina to Texas be guarded by the entire 

Mar.16,1861. n J^ 

MS. power of the navy. 

Against the advice of so decided a majority, 
Lincoln did not deem it prudent to order the pro- 
posed expedition. Neither did his own sense of 
duty permit him entirely to abandon it. Postpon- 
ing, therefore, a present final decision of the point, 
he turned his attention to the investigation of the 
question immediately and vitally connected with 
it — the collection of the revenue. On the 18th of 
March he directed written inquiries to three of his 
Cabinet officers. To the Attorney-General, whether 

Lincoln to under the Constitution and laws the Executive has 
Marj|i86i. pQ^ei- to collect duties on shipboard off shore? 
To the Secretary of the Treasury, whether, and 
where, and for what cause, any importations are 
taking place without payment of duties 1 Whether 
vessels off shore could prevent such importations 
or enforce payment ? and what number and descrip- 

^'cha8° ,**' tion of vessels besides those already in the revenue 

MavASAki. ^QYvicel To the Secretary of the Navy, what 
amount of naval force he could place at the con- 

^wenp°/° trol of the revenue service, and how much ad- 

Mar^8,1861. ^^^^^^^^1 j^^ thc f UturC ? 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 389 

Pending the i-oceipt of i-oplies to these inquiries, en. xxiii. 
Lincoln determined to obtain information on two 
other points — the first, as to tlie present actual con- 
dition and feeling of Major Anderson; the second, 
as to the real temper and intentions of the people of 
Charleston. Captain Fox had suggested the possi- 
bility of obtaining leave to visit Sumter through 
the influence of Captain Hartstene, then in the 
rebel service at Charleston, but who had in former 
years been his intimate friend and comrade in 
command of a companion steamer of the California 
line. By order of the President, Greneral Scott 
therefore sent him to obtain " accurate information ?» st^oTt? 
in regard to the command of Major Anderson in w. r. 'vol 
Fort Sumter." As Fox anticipated, Hartstene in- " '^oa. 
troduced him to Governor Pickens, to whom he 
showed his order, and, having meanwhile had an 
interview with General Beauregard, was, after some 
delay, permitted to go to the fort under Hartstene's 
escort. He reported : 

We reached Fort Sumter after dark [March 21], and isei. 
I remained about two hours. Major Anderson seemed 
to think it was too late to relieve the fort by any other 
means than by lauding- an army on Morris Island. He 
agreed with General Scott that an entrance from the 
sea was impossible ; but as we looked out upon the 
water from the parapet, it seemed very feasible, more 
especially as we heard the oars of a boat near the fort, 
which the sentry hailed, but we could not see her 
through the darkness until she almost touched the land- 
ing. I found the garrison getting short of supplies, 
and it was agreed that I might report that the 15th of 
Aprd, at noon, would be the period beyond which the fort ciai Report, 
could not be held unless supplies were furnished. I made ^" chfoa|o^" 
no arrangements with Major Anderson for reenforcing or '^J^.j^^f^'" 
supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of my plan. ises. 



390 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



ch. XXIII. Unlike Fox, Anderson was in no wise encouraged 
by the conversation, and wrote : 

I have examined the point alluded to by Mr. Fox last 
night. A vessel lying there will be under the fire of 
thii'teen guns from Fort Moultrie, and Captain Foster 
says that at the pan-coupe or immediately on its right, — 
the best place for her to land, — .she would require, even 

'^o'Adju'^ at high tide, if drawing ten feet, a staging of forty feet. 

tant-Gcu- rpj^ department can decide what the chances will be of 

eral, Mar. i i • n • t 

22, 1861. a safe debarkation and unloading at that point under 
W. R. Vol. , , . ^ ^ 

I., p. 211. these circumstances. 



The other point on which the President sought 
information revealed equally decisive features. It 
so happened that S. A. Hurlbut, of Illinois (after- 
wards Major-General of Volunteers), a personal 
friend of Lincoln, was at the moment in Washing- 
ton. This gentleman was of Charleston birth, four 
years a law student of the foremost citizen and 
jurist of South Carolina, James L. Petigru, and 
then in frequent correspondence with him. On 
March 21 the President called Mr. Hurlbut to him, 
and explaining that Mr. Seward insisted that there 
was a strong Union party in the South, — even in 
South Carolina, — asked him to go personally and 
ascertain the facts. Mr. Hui'lbut telegi-aphed his 
sister in Charleston that he was coming on a visit, 
which, in the threatening aspect of affairs, he might 
not soon be able to repeat. He traveled as a private 
citizen, though purposely with some show of pub- 
licity. Curiosity, however, centered itself upon his 
traveling companion, Ward H. Lamon, who, coming 
with an ostensible Government mission to examine 
some post-office matters, was looked upon as the 
real Presidential messenger, was treated to a formal 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 391 

audience with the Governor, and permitted to cn. xxm. 
make a visit to Fort Sumter. While Lamon was 
hobnobbing with the young secessionists at the 
Charleston Hotel, Hurlbut, quartered at the house 
of his sister, and thus free from the inquisitive 
scrutiny of newspaper reporters, was quietly \dsit- 
ing his former neighbors and friends, in various 
walks of life, and being visited by them. 

Of greater value than all was his confidential 
interview with his former legal preceptor. Mr. 
Petigru was at that time the best lawyer in the 
South, and the strongest man in the State of South 
Carolina so far as character, ability, and purity 
went, and he never surrendered nor disguised his 
Union convictions. Mr. Hurlbut was himself an 
able lawyer, a man of experience and force in poli- 
tics, and a shrewd and sagacious judge of human 
nature. His mission remained entii'ely unsus- 
pected ; and after two days' sojoui-n, he returned 
to Washington and made a long written report to 
the President. 

By appointment I met Mr. Petigru at 1 p. m. and had 
a private conversation with him for more than two hours. 
I was at liberty to state to him that my object was to 
ascertain and report the actual state of feehng in the city 
and State. Our conversation was enth-ely free and con- 
fidential. He is now the only man in the city of Charles- 
ton who avowedly adheres to the Union. . „ From these 
sources I have no hesitation in reporting as unquestion- 
able—that separate nationality is a fixed fact, that there 
is an unanimity of sentiment which is to my mind as- 
tonishing, that there is no attachment to the Union. . . 
There is positively nothing to appeal to. The sentiment 
of national patriotism, always feeble in Carolina, has 
been extinguished and overridden by the acknowledged 
doctrine of the paramount allegiance to the State. False 



392 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXIII. political economy diligently taught for years has now be- 
come an axiom, and merchants and business men believe, 
and act upon the belief, that great growth of trade and 
expansion of material prosperity will and must follow the 
establishment of a Southern republic. They expect a 
golden era, when Charleston shall be a great commercial 
emporium and control for the South, as New York does 
for the North. 



Hurlbnt to 
I^iiuolu, 
Report, 

Mar.27,1861. 
MS. 



These visits to Charleston added two very im- 
portant factors to the problem from which the 
Cabinet, and chiefly the President, were to deduce 
the unknown. Very unexpectedly to the latter, 
and no doubt to all the former as well, a new light 
was now suddenly tlirown upon the complicated 
question. The fate of Sumter had been under 
general discussion nearly three weeks. The Cab- 
inet and the high military and naval officers had 
divided in opinion and separated into opposing 
camps. As always happens in such cases, suspicion 
and criticism of personal motives began to de- 
velop themselves, though, at this very beginning, 
as throughout his whole after-administration, they 
were held in check by the generous faith and un- 
varying impartiality of the President. Hitherto 
the sole issue was the relief or abandonment of 
Sumter; but now, by an apparent change of ad- 
vice and attitude on the part of General Scott, the 
fate of Fort Pickens was also drawn into discussion. 

So far as is known, the loyalty and devotion of 
General Scott never wavered for an instant ; but 
his proneness to mingle political with military 
considerations had already been twice manifested. 
The first was when in his memorial entitled 
"Views," etc., addressed to President Buchanan, 
October 29, 1860, he suggested the formation of 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 393 

four new American Unions if the old should be ch. xxiii. 
dismembered. The second was more re(;ent. On 
the day preceding Lincoln's inauguration, the gen- 
eral had written a letter to Seward. In this he 
advanced the opinion that the now President 
would have to choose one of four plans or policies : 
1st. To adopt the Crittenden compromise, and 
change the Republican to a Union party ; 2d. By 
closing or blockading rebel ports or collecting the 
duties on shipboard outside; 3d. Conquer the States seward. 
bv invading armies, which he deprecated ; and 4th. ' Hci/tt. 
Say to the seceded States: "Wayward sisters, ^'Ji;''[|" 
depart in peace ! " It must be noted that between pp- «25-628. 
three of these alternatives he gives no intimation 
of preference. The letter was simply a sign of the 
prevailing political unrest, and therefore remained 
unnoticed by the President, to whom it was 
referred. 

When Lincoln assumed the duties of govern- 
ment, Scott had among other things briefly pointed 
out the existing danger at Fort Pickens, and the 
President by his verbal order of March 5, directing 
" all possible vigilance for the maintenance of all 
the places," had intended that that stronghold 
should be promptly reenforced. He made in- ^^^. ^ 
quiries on this head four days later, and to his D^\';>,'g^ar. 
surprise found nothing yet done. Hence he put 
his order in writing, and sent it to the War De- 
partment for record March 11, and once more gave 
special directions in regard to Pickens, assuming 
the omission had occurred through preoccupation 
about Sumter. Upon this reminder, Scott be- 
stirred himself, and at his instance the war steamer 
Mohawk was dispatched, March 12, carrying a 



MS. 



394 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXIII. 



1861. 



Scott, 
Memoran- 
duui. W. R. 

Vol. I., 
pp. 200, 201. 
Blair to 
Welles, 
Mayl7,1873. 
Welles, 
"Lincoln 
and Sew- 
ard," p. 65. 



messenger witli orders to Captain Vogdes to land 
his company at Fort Pickens and increase the 
garrison. Both President and Cabinet had since 
then considered that point disposed of for the 
moment. 

On the evening of March 28, the first state din- 
ner was given by the new occnpants of the Execu- 
tive Mansion. Just before the hour of leave-taking, 
Lincoln invited the members of his Cabinet into 
an adjoining room for a moment's consultation ; 
and when they were alone he informed them, with 
evident emotion, that Greneral Scott had that day 
advised the evacuation of Fort Pickens as well as 
Fort Sumter. The general's recommendation was 
formulated as follows, in his written memorandum 
to the Secretary of War : 

It is doubtful, however, according to recent informa- 
tion from the South, whether the voluntary evacuation 
of Fort Sumter alone would have a decisive effect upon 
the States now wavering between adherence to the Union 
and secession. It is known, indeed, that it would be 
charged to necessity, and the holding of Fort Pickens 
would be adduced in support of that view. Our South- 
ern friends, however, are clear that the evacuation of 
both the forts would instantly soothe and give confidence 
to the eight remaining slave-holding States, and render 
their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual. The 
holding of Forts Jefferson and Taylor on the ocean keys 
depends on entirely different principles, and should never 
be abandoned; and indeed the giving up of Forts Sumter 
and Pickens may be best justified by the hope that we 
should thereby recover the States to which they geograph- 
icaUy belon<^ by the liberality of the act, besides retaining 
the eight doubtful States. 

A long pause of blank amazement followed the 
President's recital, broken at length by Blair in 



THE QUESTION OF SUMTER 395 

stroug denunciation, not only of this advice, but en. xxm. 
of Scott's general course regarding Sumter. He 
charged that Scott was transcending his profes- 
sional duties and " playing politician." Blair's 
gestures and remarks, moreover, were understood 
by those present as being aimed specially at Sew- 
ard, whose peace policy he had, with his usual im- 
pulsive aggressiveness, freely criticised. Without 
any formal vote, there was a unanimous expres- 
sion of dissent from Scott's suggestion, and under 
the President's request to meet in formal council 
next day, the Cabinet retired. That night Lin- 
coln's eyes did not close in sleep. It was apparent Diary, ms. 
that the time had come when he must meet the 
nation's crisis. His judgment alone must guide, 
his sole will determine, his own lips utter the word 
that should save or lose the most precious inherit- 
ance of humanity, the last hope of free govern- 
ment on the earth. Only the imagination may 
picture that intense and weary vigil. 



CHAPTER XXIV 



THE REBEL GAME 



CH.xxiv. ^T^HE rebel conspirators were not unmindful of 
I the great advantages they had hitherto derived 
from their complaints, their intrigues, their as- 
sumptions, their arrogant demands. No sooner was 
1861. the provisional government organized at Mont- 
gomery than they appointed a new embassy of 
three commissioners to proceed to Washington and 
make the fourth effort to assist, protect, and if 
possible to establish the rebellion through negotia- 
tion. They not only desired to avert a war, but, 
reasoning from the past, had a well-gi'ounded faith 
that they would secure peaceful acquiescence in 
their schemes. The commissioners were instructed 
to solicit a reception in their official character, and 
if that were refused, to accept an unofficial inter- 
view ; to insist on the de facto and de jure independ- 
ence of the Confederate States; but nevertheless 
to accede to a proposition to refer the subject of 
their mission to the United States Senate, or to 
withhold an answer until the Congi'ess of the 
United States should assemble and pronounce a 
decision in the premises, provided the existing 

Feb.^7^is6i. peaceful status were rigidly maintained. 

This modest programme was made necessary by 
the half-fledged condition of the rebellion: its 



Toombs to 
the Com- 
missioners, 



396 



THE EEBEL GAME 397 

personal jealousies were not yet hushed ; its no- ch. xxiv. 
tious of States rights were not yet swallowed up 
in an imperious military dictatorship ; above all, 
its military preparation consisted mainly of a self- 
sacrificing enthusiasm. Notwithstanding the two 
months' drill and battery-lniilding at Charleston, 
Davis did not agree with Governor Pickens that 
the moment had come to storm Sumter. " Fort 
Sumter should be in our possession at the earliest 
moment possible," wrote the rebel war secretary, 
but "thorough preparation must be made before 
an attack is attempted. . . A failure would de- waiter to 
moralize our people and injuriously affect us in the Mjir. i, isoi. 
opinion of the world as reckless and precipitate." i- 1'- ^5'■'• 
Therefore they made Beauregard a brigadier-general 
and sent him to command in the harbor of Charles- 
ton. Beauregard's professional inspection justified 
this prudence. He wi'ote : 

If Sumter was properly garrisoned and armed, it 
would be a perfect Gribraltar to anything but constant 
shelling night and day from the four points of the com- 
pass. As it is, the weakness of the garrison constitutes 
our greatest advantage, and we must for the present turn 
our attention to preventing it from being reenforced. 
This idea I am gradually and cautiously infusing into 
the minds of all here ; but should we have to open our 
batteries upon it, I hope to be able to do so with all the 
advantages the condition of things here will permit. All ^o^^a^ilerf 
that I ask is time for completing my batteries and pre- \?^'^' ^^^f 
paring and organizing properly my command. i., p. 26. 

The first of the three commissioners, Martin J. 
Crawford, arrived in Washington the day before 
Lincoln's inauguration. He would have nothing 
more to do with Buchanan, he wrote. "His fears 
for his personal safety, the apprehensions for the 



398 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cu. XXIV. security of his property, together with the cares of 

state and his advanced age, render him wholly dis- 

to Toombs, qualified for his present position. He is as inca- 

Mar. 3, 1861. . , „ 1 ., -, 

MS. pable now ot purpose as a child." 

With the arrival of the second commissioner, 
John Forsyth, they prepared to begin operations 
upon the new Administration. It was compara- 
tively easy to call into caucus the active and dis- 
guised secessionists who yet remained in the city. 
Wigfall, Mason, Hunter, and Breckinridge were still 
in the Senate ; Virginia and the other border States 
had a number of sympathizing Congressmen in the 
House; Bell, Crittenden, and Douglas, though 
loyal, could be approached with professions of 
peace ; Seward, in order to gain information, had 
Senate kept Mmsclf duriug the whole winter in relation 
"Gk)be.'' with all parties, and had openly proclaimed that 

Jana2,l861, , . ,. „ ,.,.,. 

p. 343. Ills policy was one oi peace and conciliation. 

The prospect of beginning negotiations seemed 

flattering ; nevertheless, their first caucus over the 

inaugural agreed that " it was Lincoln's purpose at 

^ton^to^' once to attempt the collection of the revenue, to 

Mar%, 1861. reenf orce and hold Forts Sumter and Pickens, and 
W. R. Vol. . , 1 , T , 1 , . , , 

I., p. 263. to retake the other places." A day or two later, on 

comparing the fragmentary gossip they had raked 
together, in which the difficulties of reenforcing 
Sumter were dimly reflected, with a general con- 
versation alleged to have been held by one of their 
informants with Seward, they framed and reported 
to Montgomery a theory of probable success in 
their mission. 

Seward, they thought, was to be the ruling power 
of the new Administration. Seward and Cameron 
were publicly committed to a peace policy. They 



THE REBEL GAME 399 

would establish an iiiiderstandiug with the Secre- en. xxiv. 

tary of State : 

This gentleman is urgent for delay. The tenor of his 
Lmguage is to this effect : I have built up th(! R(^pub- 
lican party ; I have brought it to triuini)h ; but its ad- 
vent to power is accompanied by great difficulties and 
perils. I must save the party and save the Government 
in its hands. To do this, war must be averted ; the negro 
question must be dropped ; the '' irrepressible " conflict 
ignored ; and a Union party to embrace the border slave 
States inaugurated. I have already whipped Mason and 
Hunter in their own State. I must crush out Davis, 
Toombs, and their colleagues in sedition in their respect- 
ive States. Saving the border States to the Union by 
moderation and justice, the people of the Cotton States, 
unwillingly led into secession, will rebel against their 
leaders and reconstruction will follow. 

The commissioners, therefore, deemed it their 
duty to support Mr. Seward's policy. " Until we 
reach the point of pacific negotiations, it is unim- 
portant what may be his subsequent hopes and 
plans. It is well that he should indulge in dreams 
which we know are not to be realized." They, of 
course, make no mention of the arguments, agencies, 
and influences which we may infer they employed 
in their deceitful intent to foster these dreams ; 
unless, indeed, they were instrumental in provok- 
ing the Senate debate of March 6 and 7, in which isei. 
Clingman attacked the inaugural as an announce- 
ment of war, while Douglas defended it as a mani- 
festo of peace, " for the purpose," as Mr. Forsyth 
wrote that Douglas told him, " of fixing that con- 
struction on it and of tomahawking it afterwards Toombs. 

^ . Mar. 8, 1861. 

if it [the Administration] departed from it." ms. 

Acting upon this asserted anxiety of Seward for 
delay and for peace, the commissioners now agreed 



400 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXIV. upon what they elaborately described in a long dis- 
patch to Montgomery as a most ingenious plan. 
They would force the Administration to accept or 
reject their mission, and thereby confront the im- 
mediate issue of peace or war, unless Seward would 
consent to maintain the present military status. 
Having reached this conclusion, they laboriously 
drew up a memorandum which they purposed to 
ask Seward to sign, and sent it to the State Depart- 
ment by an " agent," but Mr. Seward was at home 
ill, and could not be seen. 

Their long dispatches home, and their mysterious 
allusions to conversations, to agents, and interme- 
diaries, convey the impression that they were " in 
relation " with the Secretary of State ; but whether 
they were duped by others, or whether they were 
themselves duping the Montgomery cabinet, indis- 
putable indications in these documents contradict 
their assertions. At last, however, their vigilance 
was rewarded with what they considered an item 
The Cora- c>f important news, and they hurried off several 
toTooS telegrams to Montgomery: "Things look better 
ay^i86i. Y^Q^^Q than was believed." " The impression prevails 
in Administration circles that Fort Sumter will be 
Ibid. evacuated within ten days." This was on Saturday 
night, March 9, and so far from being exclusive or 
"New York advaucc information, it was substantially printed 
Mar.10,1861. ill ucxt momiug's newspapers. After four days' 
consideration by the Lincoln Government, and ex- 
tended discussion in a Cabinet meeting, the loss 
of Sumter seemed unavoidable ; and the rumor 
was purposely given out to prepare the public 
mind, if the need should finally come for the great 
sacrifice. 



•>"*>• 





THE REBEL GAME 401 

The Jefferson Davis cabinet at Montgomery en. xxiv. 
clutched at the report with avidity. Under this 
hope they were no longer satisfied with the " exist- 
ing peaceful status " specified in their instructions 
of February 27, and repeated in the prepared m(;ni- 
orandum of the commissioners. " Can't bind our 
hands a day without evacuation of Sumter and Toombs to 
Pickens," replied Toombs imperativelv by tele- niilTsion^s, 

, ,^ •.-.-. -A- .•-, n " , 1 11 Mar.ll,18Gl. 

graph on Monday, March 11. Until bumter should ms. 
be evacuated it was idle to talk of peaceful negotia- 
tion, he added in his written dispatch to the com- 
missioners, while they were further instructed to 
" pertinaciously demand " the withdrawal of the ibui-.^Mar, 
troops and vessels from Pickens and Pensacola. 

Thus spurred into activity, the commissioners 
deemed it incumbent on them to make an effort. 
The whole tenor of their previous dispatches was 
calculated to convey the impression that they 
were twisting the Secretary of State at pleasure 
between their diplomatic thumb and finger. On 
Monday, March 11, they sent him their first mes- 
sage — not the demand of Toombs that day re- 
ceived by telegraph, not even the mild suggestion 
of their original instructions to maintain the sta- 
tus and appeal to Congress, but a meek inquiry 
whether they would be allowed to make a sort of 
back-door visit to the State Department. To 
describe it in their own words : " We availed 
ourselves of the kind consent of Senator Hunter, Tiipcom 



14, 1861. 

M8. 



iinssioiicrs 



of Virginia, to see Mr. Seward, and learn if he nVi^„„nhs. 
would consent to an mformal interview with us." ms. 
Mr. Seward, of course, received Senator Hunter 
politely, for he still professed to be a loyal Senator 
representing a loyal State, and gave him the stereo- 
VoL. in.— 26 



402 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

CH. XXIV. typed diplomatic reply, that " lie would be obliged 
to consult the President." The next morning Seward 
sent Hunter a note of irreproachable courtesy, but 
of freezing conclusiveness. " It will not be in my 
power," he wi'ote, " to receive the gentlemen of 
whom we conversed yesterday. You will please 
explain to them that this decision proceeds solely 

Seward to it i i i p i r» 

Hunter, ou puolic grouuds aud not trom any want of per- 

Mar.12,1861. i , ,. 

MS. sonal respect." 

This was a cold bath to the commissioners, and 
the theories of their own finesse, and of the tor- 
turing perplexities into which Seward had been 
thrown, became untenable, and they reported : 

To-day at 11 o'clock Mr. Hunter brought us the prom- 
ised reply, a copy of which is appended to this dispatch. 
It is pohte ; but it was considered by us at once as deci- 
sive of our course. We deemed it not compatible with 
the dignity of our Government to make a second effort, 
and took for granted that, having failed in obtaining an 
unofficial interview with the Secretary of State, we should 
equally fail with the President. Our only remaining 
course was plain, and we followed it at once in the prep- 
aration of a formal note to the State Department inform- 
ing the United States Government of our official presence 
here, the objects of our mission, and asking an early day 
to be appointed for an official interview. 

They then repeat the gossip of the day — what 
Mr. Lincoln was said to have told a gentleman 
from Louisiana, that " there would be no war and 
that he was determined to keep the peace"; and 
what Crittenden told Crawford, " that General 
Scott was also for peace and would sustain Mr. 
Seward's policy." Finally, showing in what com- 
plete ignorance they were of events happening 
about them, they ask with bewildered curiosity, 



THE IlEBEL GAME 403 

" Can it be that while tliey refuse to negotiate with ch. xxrv. 
us to keep the Republican party in heart, they 
mean to abandon both forts on military grounds 
and thus avoid the occasion of a collision, or do 
they mean to refer the questions raised by our 
note to the Senate? Time only can determine, 
and we await the result. We are still of the opin- 
ion that Fort Sumter will be evacuated. The The com- 
opinion gains ground here that Lieutenant Slemmer t" Tooini)8, 

, . .11 1 1 .,,1 ,. -n ^ Mar.l2,lHGl. 

and garrison will also be withdrawn irom. Jb ort ms. 
Pickens." 

Toombs was ready to sue or bluster as occasion 
demanded. " You have shown to the Government 
of the United States," he wrote back to the com- 
missioners, "with commendable promptness and 
becoming dignity that you were not supplicants 
for its grace and favor, and willing to loiter in the 
antechambers of officials to patiently await their 
answer to your petition ; but that you are the en- 
voys of a powerful confederacy of sovereignties, 
instructed to present and demand their rights." 

Nevertheless, instead of recalling these neglected 
envoys, he instructs them to " communicate freely 
and often," and to employ a secretary to assist Toombs to 
them, " at such monthly compensation as you may niission^rs, 
deem reasonable." The hint to remain was hardly ks. 
necessary. The commissioners apparently had no 
idea of abandoning their intrigues, unpromising as 
they were. 

Their secretary, John T. Pickett, now went to 
the State Department for an answer to the com- 
missioners' formal note. Seward replied (March 
15) in a lengthy and courteous but dignified mem- 
orandum that he did not perceive in the "Con- 



404 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cii. XXIV. federate States " a rightful and aceomplislied rev- 
olution or an independent nation ; that he could 
not act on the assumption or in any way admit 
that they constituted a foreign power with which 
Seward, diplomatic relations ought to be established : that 

Memoran- ^ '-' 

'^'if,'isli!'' 1^^ 1^^^ 110 authority, nor was he at liberty, to rec- 
" Rcbemon ogulzc the commissiouers as diplomatic agents, or 
vorrDoc- hold correspondence or other communication with 

uments, , , 

pp. 43, 44. them. 

This paper, if delivered, would have terminated 
the labors and functions of the commissiouers. 
But they were in no hurry to return empty-handed 
to Montgomery, and still fondly nursed the theory 
so elaborately described in their long dispatches. 
One of them repeated it with emphasis in a private 
letter to a member of the Montgomery cabinet. 

We are feeling our way here cautiously. We are play- 
ing a game in which time is our best advocate, and if our 
Government could afford the time I feel confident of 
Forsyth to winning. There is a terrific fight in the Cabinet. Our 
Walker, policy is to encourage the peace element in the fight, and 
MS. ■ at least blow up the Cabinet on the question. 

This dispatch is a frank confession that the 
rebel embassy was so far a failure, and that its 
future opportunity lay solely in the barren regions 
of hotel gossip and newspaper rumors. The com- 
missioners would merit no further historic mention 
had they not unexpectedly secured a most impor- 
tant ally — John A. Campbell, an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, ap- 
pointed from Alabama, and in the confidence and, 
as it soon turned out, in the secret interest of the 
South and the rebellion. 

Justice Campbell now made himself the volun- 



THE REBEL GAME 405 

tary intermediary between the commissioners and cu. xxiv. 
tlie Secretary of State. Owing to his station and 
professions, Seward gave him undue intimacy and 
confidence, enabUng Campbell, under guise of pro- 
moting peace, to give aid and comfort to the 
enemies of the United States, in violation of his 
oath and duty. The details of the intrigue rest 
entirely upon rebel statements, and mainly upon 
those of Campbell himself, who gave both a confi- 
dential and a semi-official version to Jefferson 
Davis ; the latter Davis transmitted in a special 
message to the Confederate Congress to " fire the 
Southern heart." Campbell having thus made his 
share of the transaction official, and having for a 
quarter of a century stood before the public accus- 
ing Seward and the Lincoln Administration of 
" equivocating conduct " and " systematic duplic- 
ity," history must adjudge the question as well as 
it may with the help of his own testimony. 

It has already been stated that Seward's official 
refusal to receive the commissioners was being pre- 
pared at the State Department. The Assistant 
Secretary had promised to send it to the commis- 
sioners' hotel. The commissioners thus relate the 
beginning of Campbell's intrigue : 

The interview between Colonel Pickett and the Assist- 
ant Secretary of State occurred on Friday morning, the 
14th 1 inst. Immediately thereafter, and within a brief 
space of time after Colonel Pickett's statement to us, the 
Hon. John A. Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, sought an interview with Mr. Crawford of 
this commission, and after stating what he knew to be 
the wish and desire of Mr. Seward to preserve the peace 

1 By the almanac Friday was the loth. There is, therefore, an 
error either in the day of the week or day of the month. 



406 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Cu. XXIV. 



The Coni- 

niiasioucrs 

to Tooinljs, 

Mar.2'2,18Gl. 

MS. 



1861. 



Campbell 

to Seward, 
April 13, 

1861. 
Moore, 

" Rebellion 
Record." 

Vol. I., Doc- 
uments, 

pp. 426-428. 



between the two Governments, asked if there could be 
no further delay for an answer to our note to the Gov- 
ernmeiit, stating at the same time that he had no doubt 
if it were pressed that a most positive though polite re- 
jection would be the result. 

Commissioner Crawford's official reply to this 
overture is best described by Toombs's formula 
that he should " pertinaciously demand" the evacu- 
ation of Sumter and maintenance of the " status " 
elsewhere ; the alternative and confidential reply 
we can only conjecture. But it may well be pre- 
sumed that Campbell fully revealed to Crawford 
his sympathy with the rebellion and his purpose 
to aid it, and that he was in return thoroughly in- 
structed in the game, which was " to encourage the 
peace element in the fight, and at least blow up the 
Cabinet on the question." 

Thus instructed and prepared. Justice Campbell 
on the same day (March 14 or 15) made a voluntary 
call on Mr. Seward, and in the general conversation 
which he induced evidently played his part of the 
game of peace and reconciliation with consummate 
ability. He probably painted the " dreams which 
we know are not to be realized " in such rosy colors 
as to call forth from Seward the hopeful observa- 
tion " that a civil war might be prevented by the 
success of my [Campbell's] mediation." The im- 
pression upon Seward that Campbell was laboring 
honestly for the preservation of the Union was also 
strengthened by his having brought wdth him Jus- 
tice Nelson, to whom the slightest suspicion of dis- 
loyalty has never attached. It seems clear that 
these i)rofessions of patriotic zeal threw Mr. Seward 
off his guard as to Campbell's motives, and that he 



THE REBEL GAME 407 

accepted his intervention as a Union peacemaker, cu. xxiv. 
not as a rebel emissary. 

Seward replied confidentially, "that it was im- 
possible to receive the commissioners in any diplo- 
matic capacity or character, or even to see them campbeii 
personally." Campbell adds that he said "it was "■jLvk'*" 
not desn-able to deny them or to answer tliem." As ms. 
part of a general policy of delay and avoidance of 
conflict he may have said and meant it ; as an im- 
mediate and urgent diplomatic step he certainly 
did not mean it, because his Assistant Secretary 
had already promised to send the answer to the 
commissioners' hotel, when for mere temporary 
delay some other expedient might have been used. 
Continuing his conversation and unguardedly en- 
larging his confidence, Seward, in answer to Camp- 
bell's direct inquiry, ventured the opinion that 
Sumter would be evacuated and collision avoided 
at Charleston. The idea was not new ; the rumor 
had been openly and half -officially printed in the 
newspapers nearly a whole week; the commis- 
sioners had telegraphed it to Montgomery. Camp- 
bell, however, caught eagerly at the suggestion, 
and proposed to write the peaceful news to Jeffer- 
son Davis ; and Seward, with a momentary excess 
of enthusiasm, authorized him (so Campbell re- 
lates) to write: "Before this letter reaches you 
Sumter will be evacuated, or the orders will have 
issued for that purpose — and no change is con- 
templated at i^resent in respect to Pickens." Camp- ajid 
bell rushed off in a fever of delight to tell the 
commissioners, and magnified the confidence to 
the proportions of a pledge. The incident began 
to grow more rapidly than the story of the three 



408 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXIV. 



The Com- 
missioners 
to Toonihs, 
Mar. 15. 1801. 
MS. 



Seward to 
Lincoln, 

Mar. 15, 1861. 

Opinion on 
Sumter. 



black crows. The commissioners, on their part, 
hurried a telegram to Montgomery : " By pressing 
we can get an answer to our official note to-mor- 
row. If we do, we believe it will be adverse to 
recognition and peace. We are sure that within 
five days Sumter will be evacuated. We are sure 
that no steps will be taken to change the military 
status. With a few days' delay a favorable answer 
may be had. Our personal interests command us 
to press. Duty to our country commands us to 
wait. What shall we do ? " To all of which Toombs 
answered laconically, " Wait a reasonable time and 
then ask for instructions." 

It is needless to point out the absurd variance 
of this announcement with Seward's alleged state- 
ment, which was simply an opinion that orders 
would be issued to evacuate Sumter within five 
days. He undoubtedly believed every word of this 
at the moment. Seward was then, as he declared 
to Lincoln in writing, in favor of evacuation ; and 
Scott's written draft of an order to that effect, 
under date of the 11th, was in the President's 
hands. The President had as yet announced no 
decision. On the 15th, for the first time, the Cab- 
inet voted — five to evacuate, two to attempt to 
supply. Seward had still every reason to suppose 
that the necessity, the Cabinet majority, General 
Scott's influence, and Lincoln's desire to avoid war 
would, acting together, verify his prediction. Pre- 
suming that he was talking to a friend and not an 
enemy, to a judge and not an advocate, to a union- 
ist and not a rebel, he undoubtedly and properly 
thought his words were received as a prediction, 
and not as a pledge. 



THE REBEL GAME 409 

The five days elapsed, but Lincoln sent no order en. xxiv. 
to Anderson, and announced no decision to the 
Cabinet. He was still patiently seeking, and had 
not found his way out of the dilemma. He had 
not yet beheld " the salvation of the Lord." Ho 
wished to decide, not upon impulse or even neces- 
sity, but upon judgment and advantage. If, Uke 
the farmer in his favorite illustration, he could 
not plow through the log, perhaps he might plow 
around it. He was meditating on the visit of Fox 
to Sumter, of Lamon and Hurlbut to Charleston ; 
he was dehberating about a diversion upon the 
Vii-ginia Convention ; above all, he was waiting 
to hear from his order to reenforce Fort Pickens, 
dispatched on the 12th of March. His Cabinet isei. 
ministers did not yet understand him. Seward 
on the one hand, and Blair on the other, unused 
to men of his fiber, began to fear this was vacilla- 
tion, indecision, executive incompetence. The at- 
mosphere of Washington had hitherto largely 
produced two classes of men — those who bluster 
and domineer, those who protest and yield. Lin- 
coln belonged to neither class ; and his persistent 
non-committal, his silent hopefulness, his patient 
and well-considered inaction, baffled their proph- 
ecy. Such tenacity of purpose, combined with such 
reticence of declaration, was an anomaly in recent 
Federal administration. 

The hopes of the rebels, so unexpectedly inflated, 
began once more to collapse. Glovernor Pickens Toomb>»to 
sent inquiries to the commissioners. Toombs tele- mission's, 

■■ // -m- ., T P •,•, n Mar. -20, 1861. 

graphed them, " We can't hear from you." Camp- ms. 
bell was summoned and dispatched to the State 
Department. He had interviews on March 21 and isei. 



410 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cii. XXIV. 22. But in reality Seward was no wiser than he 

had been in the previous interviews, and could 

The Com- ^^^Y I'epeat his beliefs and his predictions, and de- 

to Toombl, clare, in his philosophical vein, that " governments 
ks. ■ could not move with bank accuracy." 

to Seward, For a third time the conspirators grew impatient, 
1861. ' and again Campbell, on Saturday, March 30, and 

"■Record''^ Mouday, April 1, went to the State Department as 

^"ment^r ^^® mcsseugcr of rebellion. By this time Seward 
P* ^^^- had real information. A second Cabinet vote had 
been taken, on March 29, in which the majority 
was reversed. The President had ordered the 
preparation of the Sumter expedition ; and Seward 
himself, though still advising the abandonment of 
Sumter, was preparing an expedition to reenforce 
Fort Pickens. 

Seward at this point must have realized how in- 
judicious he had been to give Campbell any con- 
fidence whatever, since to preserve secrecy for his 
own project he must abruptly break off the inti- 
macy. Perhaps he had by this time divined that 
he was dealing with a public enemy. At all events, 
whatever may have been his reasons, he took occa- 
sion to correct any misunderstanding which might 
previously have sprung up by giving Campbell a 
written memorandum (April 1), as follows : " The 
President may desire to supply Sumter, but will 
not do so without giving notice to Governor 
Pickens"; adding verbally (Campbell says) that 
he still did not believe the attempt would be made, 
and that there was no design to reenforce Sumter. 
Campbell acknowledges that he took notice of this 
very important correction and definition. " There 
was a departure here from the pledges of the pre- 



THE KEBEL GAME 411 

vious month," ho writes ; " but with the verbal ex- cn. xxiv. 

pkuiation I did not consider it a matter then to ,^=^'"i'»><;ii 

complain of." '^im,;!.^^' 



The commissioners and their game here drop 



Moon 
'iM'lli 
litconl.' 



into the background, and Justice Campbell takes voi.'i'.'.'iJoc 
up the role of leadmg conspirator. Iwo days p. -la?. 
afterwards we find him making a confidential re- 
port to the insurrectionary chief at Montgomery, 
as follows : 

I do not doubt that Sumter will be evacuated shortly, 
without any effort to supply it ; but in respect to Pickens 
I do not think there is any settled plan, and it will not 
be abandoned spontaneously, and under any generous 
policy, though perhaps they may be quite willing to let 
it be beleaguered and reduced to extremities. I can only 
infer as to this. All that I have is a promise that the 
status will not be attempted to be changed prejudicially 
to the Confederate States without notice to me. It is 
known that I make these assurances on tmj own responsi- 
Ulity. I have no right to mention any name or to pledge 
any person. I am the only responsible person to you, I 
consenting to accept such assurances as are made to me 
and to say, " I have confidence that this will or will not 
be done." I have no expectation that there will be bad 
faith in the dealings with me. 

Now I do not see that I can do more. I have felt 
them in a variety of forms as to the practicabihty of 
some armistice or truce that should be durable and would 
relieve the anxiety of the country. But at present there 
can be no compact, treaty, or recognition of any kind. 
There wiQ be no objection to giving the commissioners 
their answer ; but if the answer is not called for it will 
not be sent, and it is intimated that it would be more 
agreeable to withhold it. So far as I can judge, the 
present desire is to let things remain as they are, without 
action of any kind. There is a strong indisposition for 
the call of Congress, and it will not be done except under 
necessity. The radi(?als of the Senate went off in anger, 
and Trumbull's coercion resolution was offered after a 



412 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Ch. XXIV, contumelious interview with the President. My own no- 
tion is that the inactive policy is as favorable to you as 
any that this Administration could adopt for you, and 
that I would not interrupt it. 

Here the learned judge might have stopped, and 
perhaps would have left posterity to question his 
method rather than his motives. But inexorable 
History demanded her tribute of truth : under her 
master-spell he went on, and in the concluding 
paragraph of the letter his own hand recorded a 
confession little to have been expected from an 
ofScer whose duty it was to expound and to ad- 
minister the law of treason as written in the Con- 
stitution of the United States and the acts of 
Congress. 

The great want of the Confederate States is peace, I 
shall remain here some ten or fifteen days. My own 
future course is in some manner depending upon circum- 
stances and the opinions of friends. At present I have 
access to the Administration I could not have except 
under my present relations to the Government, and I do 
not know who could have the same freedom, I have 
therefore deferred any settlement on the subject until 
Campbell ^j^g chaucc of bciuff of Service at this critical period 

to Jefferson . », . . r. t • i 

Davis, has termmated. This letter is strictly confidential and 

Aprils, 1861. . , '' 

MS. private. 

There is no need of comment on this " aid and 
comfort " to the enemies of his Government by a 
member of the highest court of the United States. 
It only remains to note the acknowledgment and 
estimate of it by Jefferson Davis, replying from 
Montgomery under date of April 6 : 

Accept my thanks for your kind and valuable services 
to the cause of the Confederacy and of peace between 
those who, though separated, have many reasons to feel 



THE llEBEL GAME 413 

towards each other more than the friendships common <'"• xxiv. 

among nations. Our polic^y is, as you say, peace. . . In 

any event 1 will gratefully remember your zealous labor 

in a sacred cause, and hope your fellow-citizens may at 

some time give you acceptable recognition of your serv- "V);uTh to 

ice, and appreciate the heroism with which you havi; en- ^.Ijl-jl/'igei 

countered a hazard fnmi which most men would have mb. 

shrunk. 

While this direct correspondence between Davis 
and Campbell was being carried on, the commis- 
sioners, to whom A. B. Roman had been sent 
as a reenforcement, were, partly as a matter of 
form, partly for ulterior purposes, kept in Wash- 
ington by the Montgomery cabinet to "loiter in 
the ante-chambers of ofScials." The occupation 
seems to have grown irksome to them ; for, no- 
wise deceived or even encouraged by Campbell's 
pretended " pledges," they asked, under date of 
March 26, " whether we shall dally longer with a The com- 

.. Tiij- i_ • i_ niissiouers 

Government hesitatmg and doubtmg as to its own to Toombs, 

^ ^ Mar. 26, 1861. 

course, or shall we demand our answer at once I " ms. 
On April 2, Toombs gave them Jefferson Davis's 
views at length. He thought the policy of Mr. 
Seward would prevail. He cared nothing for Sew- 
ard's motives or calculations. So long as the 
United States neither declare war nor establish 
peace, " it affords the Confederate States the ad- 
vantages of both conditions, and enables them to 
make all the necessary arrangements for the public 
defense, and the solidifying of their Government, 
more safely, cheaply, and expeditiously than they rp„„^^gto 
could were the attitude of the United States more mlssioD^ra, 
definite and decided." The commissioners were, ^'ivis. 
therefore, to make no demand for their answer, 
but maintain their present position. In view of 



414 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXIV. this confident boast of the chief of the rebellion of 
"the advantages of both conditions," his subse- 
quent accusation of bad faith on the part of the 
Lincoln Administration is culminating proof of 
the insincerity and tortuous methods of the rebel 
game. 



CHAPTER XXV 

VIRGINIA 

CIVIL war, though possible, did not at the ch. xxv. 
moment seem imminent or necessary : Lin- 
coln had declared in his inaugural that he would isei. 
not begin it ; Jefferson Davis had wi'itten in his 
instructions to the commissioners that he did not 
desire it. This threw the immediate contest back 
upon the secondary question — the control and ad- 
hesion of the border slave States; and of these 
Virginia was the chief subject of solicitude. The 
condition of Virginia had Jbecopae anomalous ; it 
was little understood by the NortlL, and still less 
by her own citizens. She retained all the ideal 
sentiment growing out of her early devotion to and 
sacrifices for the Union ; but it was warped by her 
coarser and stronger material interest in slavery. 
She still deemed she was the mother of presidents ; 
whereas she had degenerated into being, like other 
border States, the mother of slave-breeders and of 
an annual crop of black-skinned human chattels to 
be sold to the cotton, rice, and sugar planters of 
her neighboring commonwealths. She thought her- 
seK the leader of the South ; whereas she was only 
a dependent of the Gulf States. She yet believed 
herself the teacher of original statesmanship; 

115 



416 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXV. whereas she had become the unreasoning follower 
of Calhoun's disciples — the Ruffins, the Rhetts, and 
the Yanceys of the ultra South. 

The political demoralization of Virginia was 
completed by the John Brown raid. From that 
time she dragged her anchors of state ; her faith in 
both Constitution and liberty was gone. The true 
lesson of that affair was indeed the very reverse. 
The overwhelming popular sentiment of the North 
denounced the outrage ; the national arms defended 
Virginia and suppressed the invasion ; the State 
vindicated her local authority by hanging the 
captured offenders. Thus public opinion, Federal 
power, and State right united in a precedent amount- 
ing of itself to an absolute guaranty, but which 
might have been easily crystallized into statute or 
even constitutional law. 

Sagacious statesmanship would have plucked 
this flower of safety. On the contrary, her blind 
partisanship spurned the opportunity, distrusted 
government, and sought refuge in force. Her 
then Governor confesses that from that period " we 
began to prepare for the worst. We looked care- 
fully to the State armory ; and whilst we had the 
selection of the State quota of arms we were par- 
ticular to take field ordnance instead of altered 
muskets, and when we left the gubernatorial chair 
there were in the State armory at Richmond 85,000 
stands of infantiy arms and 130 field-pieces of 
artillery, besides $30,000 worth of new revolving 
arms purchased from Colt. Our decided opinion 
Henry A. was that a preparation of the Southern States in 
"Seven full pauoply of arms, and prompt action, would 
p.' 250.' have prevented civil war." 




,)oii\ i.i:t('I1i:i:. 



VIKGINIA 417 

Many strong external signs indicated the per- cn. xxv. 
sistent adherence of Virginia to the Union. Her 
Legislature refused the proposition of South Caro- 
lina for a conference of the Southern States, made 
in the winter of 1859-60. In the Presidential elec- 
tion her citizens voted, by a slight plurality, for 
Bell and Everett and their platform of " The 
Union, the Constitution, and the enforcement of 
the laws," while the votes cast for Douglas after his 
strong coercion declaration at Norfolk and the votes 
cast for Lincoln, added to the Bell and Everett 
vote, appeared to indicate a decided Union pre- 
ponderance.^ Notwithstanding these manifesta- 
tions of allegiance, public sentiment took on a 
tone and a determination which, paradoxical as it 
may seem, was rebellion in guise of loyalty. It is 
perhaps best illustrated by the declaration of ex- 
Governor Wise that he meant to fight in the Union,^ 

1 "The vote was so close that ever I leave this confederacy, this 
Governor Letehei-, who had sup- north star confederacy, which 
ported Douglas, issued certifi- makes the needle tremble north- 
cates of election to nine Bell and ward, sir, I shall carry the old flag 
Everett electors and six Breckin- of the Union out with me ; and if 
ridge and Lane electors. The ever I have to fight, — so help me 
highest vote polled for a Bell God! — I will fight with the star- 
elector was 74,524, and the spangled banner still in one hand 
highest for a Breckinridge elector and my musket in the other. I 
74,306, only 218 majority. The will never take any Southern cross 
Douglas electors received 10,223 or any palmetto for my flag. I 
votes [the Lincoln electors 1929 will never admit that a Yankee 
votes]. As Mr. Lincoln was can drive me from the Union and 
elected and the vote of Virginia take from me our capital. I will 
was of no consequence, the take from him forts ; I will take 
Breckinridge electors, for differ- from him flags ; I will take from 
ent reasons, did not qualify, and him our capital ; I will take from 
fifteen votes were cast for Bell him, if I can, my whole country, 
and Everett." — William Lamb, and save the whole. Will that 
to the authors, Feb. 21, 1S88. satisfy the gentleman as to fight- 

2 "As to parting from the Union ing in the Union ? " — Speech of 
in my affections, I shall never do H. A. Wise in the Virginia Con- 
that, As to leaving its flag, when- veution, April 10, 1861. 

Vol. III.— 27 



418 



ABKAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXV. 



Report, 
Adjutant- 
General of 
Virginia, 
Feb. 27, 1861. 



Letcher, 

Inaugural 

Message, 

Jan. 7, 1860. 



not out of it. To the nation at large the phrase 
had a pretty and patriotic sound ; but when ex- 
plained to be a determination to fight the Fed- 
eral Government " in the Union," it became as rank 
treason as secession itself. 

However counterfeit logic or mental reservations 
concealed it, the underlying feeling was to fight, no 
matter whom, and little matter how, for the pro- 
tection of slavery and slave property. In this spirit 
Virginia continued her military preparations. To 
this end half a million dollars was voted in the 
winter of 1859-60, and a million more in that of 
1860-61. Commissioners were appointed to pur- 
chase arms ; companies were raised, ofiicers ap- 
pointed, regiments organized, camps of instruction 
formed. It was one of these that Floyd sent Hardee 
to inspect and di'ill in November, 1860. Before the 
end of January, this appeal to military strength by 
Virginia was paraded in the United States Senate 
as a menace, to extort a compromise and constitu- 
tional guarantees for slavery. Nor did the threat 
seem an empty one. The State professed to have 
an actual army of 62 troops of cavalry, numbering 
2547 men ; 14 companies of artillery, numbering 820 
men; and 149 companies of infantry, numbering 
7180 men. All these were uniformed and armed ; 
while 6000 men additional were formed into com- 
panies, ready to have arms put into their hands. 

Governor Letcher, the successor of Wise, had 
begun his administration with the announced 
belief that disunion was " not only a possible but 
a highly probable event." The defeat of his 
favorite, Douglas, and the success of Lincoln, 
served, therefore, as a pretended justification of 



VIRGINIA 419 

his fears, if not can actual stimulant of his hopes, cn. xxv. 
The Presidential election was scarcely over when 
he called an extra session of the Legislature, 
to " take into consideration the condition of 
public affairs " consequent on the oxciteniont oovemor 
produced by " the election of sectional candi- Prociam^r 
dates for President and Vice-President." That le.iseo. 
body met January 7, 1861; the doctrine of non- 
coercion. South Carolina secession, and the Fort 
Sumter affair had become every-day topics. On 
Federal affairs Governor Letcher's message was a 
medley of heterogeneous and contradictory argu- 
ments and recommendations. He declared a dis- 
ruption of the Union inevitable. He desired a 
national convention. He thought that four re- 
publics might be formed. He scolded South Caro- 
lina for her precipitate action. He joined a correct 
and a false quotation of Lincoln's sentiments. He 
opposed a State convention. He recommended 
sending commissioners to other slave States. He 
proposed terms to the North, and thought they 
would be "freely, cheerfully, and promptly assented 
to." He said, " Let the New England States and 
western New York be sloughed off." He wanted 
railroads to Kansas and direct trade to Europe. 
And finally he summed up : " Events crowd upon 
each other with astonishing rapidity. The scenes 
of to-day are dissolved by the developments of 
to-morrow. The opinions now entertained may be 
totally revolutionized by unforeseen and unantici- 
pated occurrences that an horn- or a day may 
bring forth." The truth was, that in Governor 
Letcher's hands the " Old Dominion " was adrift 
towards rebellion without rudder or compass. 



4'2a 



ABEAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXV. 



Governor 
Gist, Mes- 
sage, Nov. 
27, 1860. 



His quarrel with South Carolina turned upon an 
important point. The irascible Palmetto State was 
offended that Virginia had a year before rejected 
her proposal for a Southern conference. In retali- 
ation she now intimated that she would help to 
destroy Virginia's slave-market. " The introduc- 
tion of slaves from other States," said her Governor, 
" which may not become members of the Southern 
Confederacy, and particularly the border States, 
should be prohibited by legislative enactment, and 
by this means they will be brought to see that 
their safety depends upon a withdrawal from their 
enemies, and a union with their friends and natural 
allies." Mississippi made a similar threat. "As 
it is more than probable," said her executive, " that 
many of the citizens of the border States may seek 
a market for their slaves in the Cotton States, I 
recommend the passage of an act prohibiting the 
introduction of slaves into this State unless their 
owners come with them and become citizens, and 
prohibiting the introduction of slaves for sale by 
all persons whomsoever." Governor Letcher grew 
very indignant over these declarations. "These 
references to the border States," said he, "are 
pregnant with meaning, and no one can be at a 
loss to understand what that meaning is. While 
disavowing any unkind feeling towards South 
Carolina and Mississippi, I must still say that I 
will resist the coercion of Virginia into the adop- 
tion of a line of policy whenever the attempt is 
jaif.Tfsei. made by Northern or Southern States." 

Incensed against the North and distrustful of 
the South, the Governor pushed forward his 
military preparations. Especially did he cast a 



Governor 
Letcher, 

Message, 



VIRGINIA 421 

longing eye at Fort Monroe. "As far back as cn.xxv. 
January 8" (18G1), says he, "I consulted witli a 
gentleman whose position enabled him to know 
the strength of that fortress, and whose experience 
in military matters enabled him to form an opinion 
as to the number of men that would be required 
to captm-e it. He represented it to be one of the 
strongest fortifications in the world, and expressed 
his doubts whether it could be taken unless as- 
sailed bv water as well as by land, and simultane- Letcher, 
ously." Since Governor Letcher had neither a fleet Dec.^/rsei. 
nor a properly equipped army, he did not follow 
up this design. The discussion of the project, 
however, illustrates the condition of his allegiance 
to the flag of his country, and the Constitution he 
was then under oath to uphold. 

Like the Governor, the Legislature at once put 
itself in an attitude of quasi-rebellion, by resolving 
on the second day of the session, that it would 
resist any attempt of the Federal Government to 
coerce a seceding State. It soon passed an act to 
assemble a convention ; and by a large appropria- 
tion for defense, already mentioned, by issuing 
treasury notes, by amending the militia laws, and 
by authorizing counties to borrow money to pur- 
chase arms, and especially by its debates, fui'ther 
increased the prevailing secession undertow during 
the whole of its extra session, from January 7 to 
April 4. 

The election for a convention was held February 
4, and provoked a stirring contest. Its result was isei. 
apparently for union ; the Union members claimed 
a majority of three to one. But this was evidently 
an exaggerated estimate. The precise result could 



422 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXV. not be well defined. Politics had become a Babel. 
Discussion was a mere confusion of tongues. Party 
organization was swallowed up in intrigue; and 
conspiracy, not constitutional majorities, became 
the basis and impulse of legislation. 
1861. The Virginia Convention met February 13, and 

its proceedings reflect a maze of loose declamation 
and purposeless resolves. It had no fixed mind, 
and could, therefore, form no permanent conclu- 
sion. The prevailing idea of the majority seemed 
to be expressed in a single phrase of one of its 
members, that " he would neither be driven by the 
North nor dragged by the Cotton States." It was 
virtually a mere committee of observation, waiting 
the turn of political winds and tides. It gave two 
encouraging though negative signs of promise; 
the first, that it had undoubtedly been chosen by 
a majority of voters really attached to the Union 
and desiring to remain in it ; the second, that dur- 
ing a session of well-nigh a month it had not as 
yet passed an ordinance of secession, which had so 
far been a quick result in other State conventions. 
As said at the beginning of this chapter, the 
course of the border States, and especially of Vir- 
ginia, was on all hands the subject of chief solici- 
tude. Her cooperation was absolutely essential to 
the secession government at Montgomery. This 
point, though not proclaimed, was understood by 
Jefferson Davis, and to powerful intrigues from 
that quarter many otherwise unaccountable move- 
ments may doubtless be ascribed. Neither was 
her adherence to the Union undervalued by Lin- 
coln. Seward was deeply impressed both with the 
necessity and the possibility of saving her from 



VIRGINIA 



423 



secession " as a brand from the burning." He re- ch. xxv. 
lied (too confidently, as the event proved) on the 
significance of the late popular vote. He sent an 
agent to Richmond, who brought him hopeful 
news. He had already proposed to strengthen the 
hands of the Virginia unionists by advising Lin- 
coln to nominate George W. Summers to fill the 
existing vacancy on the bench ot the United btates j^j!^'j."c'>in.^ 
Supreme Court. Under his prompting, perhaps, ' m«- 
Lincoln now thought it possible to bring his per- 
sonal influence to bear on the Virginia Convention. 
He authorized Seward to invite Summers, or some 
equally influential and determined Union leader, 
to come to Washington. It is not likely that he 
had any great faith in such an effort ; for the re- 
fusal or neglect of Scott, Gilmer, and Hunt to 
accept a Cabinet appointment, offered to each of 
them with more or less distinctness, had proved 
that Southern Unionism of this type was mere lip- 
service and not a living principle. It so turned 
out in this instance. Summers, pleading impor- 
tant business in the convention, excused himself 
from coming. It would appear, however, that he 
and others selected <?ne John B. Baldwin as a 
proper representative, who came to Washington 
and had an interview with the President on the 
morning of April 4, 1861. There is a direct conflict 
of evidence as to what occurred at this interview. 
The witnesses are Mr. Baldwin himself and John 
Minor Botts, both of whom gave their testimony 
under oath before the Reconstruction Committee 
of Congress in 1866, after the close of the war. 

Mr. Botts testifies that on the 7th of April he 
called upon the President, who related to him, in 



424 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

ch.xxv. confidence, that a week or ten days previously 
he had written to Summers to come to Washing- 
ton, and he, instead of obejing the summons, had, 
after that long delay, sent Baldwin. On Baldwin's 
1861. arrival (on the 5th of April, as Botts relates the 
story) Lincoln took him into a private room in the 
Executive Mansion, and said to him in substance : 

Mr. Baldwin, why did you not come here sooner? I 
have been waiting and expecting some of you gentlemen 
of that convention to come to me for more than a week 
past. I had a most important proposition to make to 
you. But I am afraid you have come too late. How- 
ever, I wiU make the proposition now. We have in Fort 
Sumter, with Major Anderson, about eighty men. Their 
provisions are nearly exhausted. I have not only written 
to Governor Pickens, but I have sent a special messenger^ 
to him to say that I will not permit these people to 
starve ; that I shall send them provisions. If he fires on 
that vessel, he will fire upon an unarmed vessel loaded 
with bread. But I shall at the same time send a fleet 
along with her, with instructions not to enter the harbor 
of Charleston unless that vessel is fired into ; and if she 
is, then the fleet is to enter the harbor and protect her. 
Now, Mr. Baldwin, that fleet is now lying in the harbor 
of New York, and will be ready to sail this afternoon at 
5 o'clock ; and although I fear it is almost too late, yet I 
will submit the proposition which I intended when I sent 
for Mr. Summers. Your convention in Richmond has 
been sitting now nearly two months, and all that they 
have done has been to shake the rod over my head. You 
have recently taken a vote in the Virginia Convention on 
the right of secession, which was rejected by ninety to 
forty-five, a majority of two-thirds, showing the strength 
of the Union party in that convention. If you will go 
back to Richmond, and get that Union majority to ad 
journ and go home without passing the ordinance of se 
cession, so anxious am I for the preservation of the peace 
of this country, and to save Virginia and the other 

1 This messenger was not sent until the evening of April 6. 



VIRGINIA 



425 



border States from going out, that I will take the respoii- cn. xxv, 
sibility of evacuating Fort Sumter, and take the chance 
of negotiating with the Cotton States. 

Mr. Botts here asked how Baldwin received that 
proposition. 

Sir (replied Lincoln, with a gesture of impatience), he 
would not Msten to it for a moment; he hardly treated 
me with civility. He asked me what I meant by an ad- 
journment; did I mean an adjournment sine rf/e f Why, 
of course, Mr. Baldwin, said I, I mean an adjournment 
sine die. I do not mean to assume such a responsibility 
as that of surrendering that fort to the people of Charles- 
ton upon yom- adjournment, and then for you to return 
in a week or ten days and pass your ordinance of secession. 

Mr. Botts relates that he asked permission of the 
President to go himself and submit that proposi- 
tion to the Union members of the convention, but 
that Lincoln replied it was too late, the fleet had 
sailed. Further, that Baldwin returned to Rich- 
mond without even disclosing the President's offer ; 
and that he eventually became an active seces- 
sionist, and held a commission in the rebel army.^ 

On the material point Baldwin's testimony is 
directly to the contrary. He states that Seward's 
messenger reached Richmond April 3 ; that at the mi 
request of Summers he immediately retm-ned with 
him to Washington and called on the President on 
the morning of April 4 ; that Lincoln took him 
into a private room and said, in substance : " 1 am 
afraid you have come too late ; I wish you could 
have been here three or four days ago. Why do 
you not adjourn the Virginia Convention ? " "Ad- 

1 Testimony of John Minor Botts, Report of the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction, 1st Sess., Thii'ty-ninth Congress. 



426 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXV. jom-n it how 1 " asked Baldwin. " Do you mean 
sine die f " " Yes," said Lincoln ; " sine die. Why do 
you not adjourn it? It is a standing menace to 
me which embarrasses me very much." 

Baldwin then relates how he made a gi-andilo- 
quent speech to the President about the balance of 
power, the safeguards of the Constitution, and the 
self-respect of the convention; that the Union 
members had a clear majority of nearly three to 
one ; they were controlling it for conservative re- 
sults, and desired to have their hands upheld by a 
conciliatory policy ; that if he had the control of 
the President's thumb and finger for five minutes 
he could settle the whole question. He would 
issue a proclamation, call a national conven- 
tion, and withdraw the forces from Sumter and 
Pickens. But Mr. Baldwin declares and reiterates 
that he received from Mr. Lincoln " no pledge, no 
undertaking, no offer, no promise of any sort." " I 
am as clear in my recollections," he says, " as it is 
possible to be under the circumstances, that he 
made no such suggestion as I understood it, and 
said nothing from which I could infer it." ^ 

A careful analysis and comparison with estab- 
lished data show many discrepancies and errors in 
the testimony of both of these witnesses. Making 
due allowances for the ordinary defects of memory, 
and especially for the strong personal and political 
bias and prejudice under which they both received 
their impressions, the truth probably lies midway 

1 Testimony of John B. Bald- History," in the "Atlantic 
win. Eeport of the Joint Com- Monthly" foi' April, 1875, eon- 
mittee on Eeconstriietion, 1st tains only the substance of Bald- 
Session, Thirty-ninth Congress. win's testimony before the Re- 

The article, "A Piece of Secret construction Committee. 



VIKGINIA 427 

between their extreme contradictory statements, cn. xxv. 
The actual occurrence may therefore be summed 
up about as follows: 

Mr. Seward had an abiding faith in the Union- 
ism and latent loyalty of Virginia and the border 
States. He wished by conciliation to re-awaken 
and build them up ; and thereljy not merely retain 
these States, but make them the instruments, and 
this feeling the agency, to undermine rebellion and 
finally reclaim the Cotton States. Lincoln did not 
fully share this optimism ; nevertheless, he desired 
to avoid actual conflict, and was willing to make 
any exj)erimental concession which would not in- 
volve the actual loss or abandonment of military or 
political advantage. The acts of the previous Ad- 
ministration had placed Fort Sumter in a peril 
from which, so the military authorities declared, 
he could not extricate it. His Cabinet advised its 
evacuation. Public opinion would justify him in 
sacrificing the fort to save the garrison. He had 
ordered Fort Pickens reenforced; he was daily 
awaiting news of the execution of his announced 
policy to " hold, occupy, and possess " the Govern- 
ment posts. Pickens once triumphantly secured, the 
loss of Sumter could be borne. But might not the 
loss of Sumter be compensated? Might he not 
utilize that severe necessity, and make it the lever 
to procure the adjournment of the Virginia Conven- 
tion, which, to use his own figure, was daily shak- 
ing the rod over his head ? This we may assume 
was his reasoning and purpose when about March 
20, either directly or through Seward, he invited 
Summers, the acknowledged leader of the Union 
members of the convention, to Washington. 



428 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXV. Summers, however, hesitated, delayed, and finally 
refused to come. The anxiously-looked-for news of 
the reenforcement of Fort Pickens did not arrive. 
The Cabinet once more voted, and changed its 
advice. The President ordered the preparation of 
the Sumter expedition. A second expedition to 
Fort Pickens had been begun. Another perplexing 
complication, to be described in the next chapter, 
had occurred. At this juncture Baldwin made 
his appearance, but clearly he had come too late. 
By this time (April 4, 1861) his presence was an 
embarrassment, and not a relief. Fully to inform 
him of the situation was hazardous, impossible ; 
to send him back without explanation was im- 
polite and would give alarm at Richmond. Lin- 
coln, therefore, opened conversation with him, 
manifesting sufficient personal trust to explain 
what he intended to have told Summers. This 
called forth Baldwin's dogmatic and dictatorial 
rejoinder, from which Lincoln discovered two 
things: first, that Baldwin was only an embryo 
secessionist ; and, second, that the Virginia Con- 
vention was little else than a council of rebellion. 
Hence the abrupt termination of the interview, 
and the unexplained silence at Richmond. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

PREMIER OR PRESIDENT? 

AT noon on the 29th of March the Cabinet ch. xxvi. 
JTjL assembled and once more took up the ab- 
sorbing question of Sumter. All the elements of 
the problem were now before them — Anderson's 
condition and the prospects of relief as newly 
reported by Fox; the state of public opinion in 
Charleston as described by Hurlbut ; the Attorney- 
General's presentation of the legal aspects of an 
attempt at collecting the customs on shipboard; 
the Secretary of the Treasury's statement of the 
condition and resources of the revenue service ; 
the report of the Secretary of the Navy as to what 
ships of war he could supply to blockade the port of 
Charleston ; and, finally, the unexpected attitude of 
General Scott in advising the evacuation of Fort 
Pickens. All these features called out so much 
and such varied discussion, that at length the 
Attorney-General, taking up a pen, rapidly wi'ote 
on a slip of paper a short summing-up of his own 
conclusions. This he read aloud to the President, 
who thereupon asked the other members of the 

Bates 

Cabinet to do the same. They all complied, and Diary, ms. 
we have therefore the exact record of the matured 



430 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



ch. XXVI. opinions of the Cabinet members then present. 
The importance of the occasion renders these mem- 
oranda of enduring interest. Mr. Seward wrote : 

First. The dispatch of an expedition to supply or reen- 
force Sumter would provoke an attack, and so involve a 
war at that point. 

The fact of preparation for such an expedition would 
inevitably transpire and would therefore precipitate the 
war — and probably defeat the object. I do not think it 
wise to provoke a civil war beginning at Charleston and 
in rescue of an untenable position. 

Therefore I advise against the expedition in every view. 

Second. I would call in Captain M. C. Meigs forthwith. 
Aided by his counsel, I would at once, and at every cost, 
prepare for a war at Peusacola and Texas, to be taken, 
however, only as a consequence of maintaining the pos- 
sessions and authority of the United States. 

Third. I would instruct Major Anderson to retire from 
Sumter forthwith. 



Seward, 
Memoran- 
dum. MS. 



Chase, 
Memoran- 
dum. MS. 



Mr. Chase wrote : 

If war is to be the consequence of an attempt to provi- 
sion Fort Sumter, war will just as certainly result from 
the attempt to maintai i possession of Fort Pickens. 

I am clearly in favor of maintaining Fort Pickens, and 
just as clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter. 

If that attempt be resisted by military force Fort Sum- 
ter should, in my judgment, be reenforced. 

If war is to be the result, I perceive no reason why it 
may not be best begun in consequence of military resist- 
ance to the efforts of the Administration to sustain troops 
of the Union, stationed under the authority of the Gov- 
ernment, in a fort of the Union, in the ordinary course of 
service. 

Mr. Welles wrote : 

I concur in the proposition to send an armed force off 
Charleston, with supplies of provisions and reenforce- 
ments for the garrison at Fort Sumter, and of communi- 
cating at the proper time the intentions of the Government 




■I' HIV MINOU Kolif 



PREMIER OR PRESIDENT? 431 

to provision the fort, peaceably if unmolested. There is cn. xxvi. 
little probability that this will be permitted, if the op- 
posing forces can prevent it. An attempt to force in 
provisions without reenforcing the garrison at the same 
time might not be advisable ; but armed resistauee to a 
peaceable attempt to send provisions to one of our own 
forts will justify the Government in using all the power 
at its command to reenforce the garrison and furnish the 
necessary supplies. 

Fort Pickens and other places retained should be 
strengthened by additional troops, and, if possible, made 
impregnable. 

The naval force in the GuK and on the Southern coast 
should be increased. Accounts are published that vessels 
having on board marketable products for the crews of the 
squadron at Pensacola are seized — the inhabitants we 
know are prohibited from furnishing the ships with pro- 
visions or water: and the time has arrived when it is -,^y/;"':«- 

' T • J. • i'lrlllUl till* 

the duty of the Government to assert and maintain dum. ms 
its authority. 

Mr. Smith wrote : 

Viewing the question whether Fort Sumter shall be 
evacuated as a political one, I remark that the effect of 
its evacuation upon the public mind will depend upon 
the concurrent and subsequent action of the Government. 
If it shall be understood that by its evacuation we intend 
to acknowledge our inability to enforce the laws, and our 
intention to allow treason and rebellion to run their course, 
the measure will be extremely disastrous and the Admin- 
istration v/ill become very unpopular. If, however, the 
country can be made to understand that the fort is aban- 
doned from necessity, and at the same time Fort Pickens 
and other forts in our possession shall be defended, and 
the power of the Government vindicated, the measure 
wiU be popular and the country will sustain the Admin- 
istration. 

Believing that Fort Sumter cannot be successfully de- 
fended, I regard its evacuation as a necessity, and I advise 
that Major Anderson's command shall be unconditionally 
withdrawn. 



432 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 



Ch. XXVI. 



Smith, 
Memoran- 
dum. MS. 



Blair, 
Memoran- 
dum. MS. 



Bates, 
Memoran- 
dum. MS. 



At the same time I would adopt the most vigorous 
measures for the defense of the other forts, and if we 
have the power I would blockade the Southern ports, 
and enforce the collection of the revenue with all the 
power of the Government. 

Mr. Blair wi'ote : 

First, As regards General Scott, I have no confidence 
in his judgment on the questions of the day. His politi- 
cal views control his judgment, and his course as re- 
marked on by the President shows that, whilst no one 
will question his patriotism, the results are the same as 
if he was in fact traitorous. 

Second. It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve 
Fort Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference 
to Pickens or any other possession. South Carolina is 
the head and front of this rebellion, and when that State 
is safely delivered from the authority of the United States 
it will strike a blow against our authority from which it 
will take us years of bloody strife to recover. 

Third. For my own part, I am unwilling to share in 
the responsibility of such a policy. 

Ml'. Bates wrote : 

It IS my decided opinion that Fort Pickens and Key 
West ought to be reenforced and supplied, so as to look 
down opposition at all hazards — and this whether Fort 
Sumter be or be not evacuated. 

It is also my opinion that there ought to be a naval 
force kept upon the Southern coast sufficient to command 
it, and if need be actually close any port that practically 
ought to be closed, whatever other station is left unoc- 
cupied. 

It is also my opinion that there ought to be imme- 
diately established a line of light, fast-running vessels, 
to pass as rapidly as possible between New York or Nor- 
folk at the North and Key West or other point in the 
Gulf at the South. 

As to Fort Sumter — I think the time is come either to 
evacuate or relieve it. 



PKEMIEK OR PRESIDENT? 433 

The majority opinion of tlic (labiiicj on tlic ir)ih en. x.wi. 
of March had been against the cxi)e(lit.'n('y <>l" an 
attempt to provision Fort Sumter; but now, artcr 
a lapse of two weeks, the feeling was changcil in 
favor of the proposed measure. Irrespocthc of 
this fresh advice, however, the President's opinion 
was ah-eady made up. On the day previous ho 
had instructed Captain Fox to prepare him a short 
order for the ships, men, and supplies he would 
need for his expedition, and that officer complied i,'in.'^..hi. 

. , , . . ' . . 1 ., Miir.JM.i8Cl. 

with characteristic and promising brevity: ms. 

Steamers Pocahonfas at Norfolk, Pawnee at Washing- 
ton, Harriet Lane at New York, to be under sailing orders 
for sea, with stores, etc., for one month. Three hundred 
men to he kept ready for departure from on board the 
receiving ships at New York. Two hundred men to be 
ready to leave Governor's Island in New York. Supplies 
for twelve months for one hundred men to be put in p,,^. Me^. 
portable shape, ready for instant shipping. A large {;rii^<i*\'.»^^ 
steamer and three tugs conditionally engaged. i.'.p! 227. 

The Cabinet meeting over, the President wrote 
at the bottom of this preliminary requisition the 
following order to the Secretary of War : " Sir : I 
desire that an expedition, to move by sea, be got 
ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the 
whole according to memorandum attached, and tiio*secre- 
that you cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy Mur|'j.i.%i: 
for that obiect." This order and its duplicate to r"..p.20G. ' 

<,i-v-r ni- -I ii Lincoln to 

the Secretary of the Navy, duly signed and trans- th;;^;;;^[;^^ 
mitted to the two departments, Captain Fox hur- ^"^^;5'-,;^J';'"- 
ried to New York to superintend the details of "-^^^f^^^l^^ 

. . • p. 619. 

preparation m person. 

It will be observed that the President's order is 
simply to prepare the expedition ; " which expedi- 

VoL. III.— 28 



434 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

cii. XXVI. tion," in his own language, was " intended to be 
MessasJ^to ultimately used or not, according to circumstances." 
Sf,Tm. But he was by this time convinced that the neces- 
sity would arise. Nothing had yet been heard from 
the oi'der to reenforce Fort Pickens sent two weeks 
previously; on the contrary, there were rumors 
through the Southern newspapers that the Brook- 
lyn, containing the troops, had left her anchorage 
off Pensacola and gone to Key West. As a matter 
of fact, she had fii'st transferred her troops to the 
Sabine ; but this was not and could not be known, 
and the necessary inference was that the Brooklyn 
had carried them away with her. The direction to 
land them would therefore unavoidably fail, and 
the fort remain liable to be carried by an assault ; 
and both Sumter and Pickens be thus left within 
the grasp of the secessionists. Such was the contiu- 
ibid. gency which had decided the President to prepare 
the Sumter expedition. 

The logic of daily events had by this time also 
wrought a change in the mind of Seward. In his 
written opinion of March 15 he had declared, "I 
would not provoke war in any way now " ; but on 
the 29th, apparently alarmed, like the rest, at the 
advice of General Scott to make further concession 
to the rebels, he wrote, "I woiild at once, and at 
every cost, prepare for a war at Pensacola and 
Texas." That very afternoon, as he had suggested 
in this same paper, he brought Captain Mont- 
gomery C. Meigs, the engineer officer in charge 
of the work on the new wings of the Capitol build- 
ing, to the President. One reason for selecting 
him, in addition to his special training and ac- 
knowledged merit, was that he had in January 



PREMIER OR PRESIDENT? 4;{r> 

personally accompanied the rcenforceniontH tht'n in. xwi. 
sent to Key West and Tortugas. 

On the way to and from the Presidcnrs, Scnvurd 
explained to Meigs that he wished the President to 
see some military man who would not talk politics ; 
that they had Scott and Totten, Init no on«; would 
think of putting either of those old men on horse- 
back. They were in a difficulty. Scott had ad- 
vised giving up both Sumter and Pickens. For 
his part, his policy had been to give up Sumter; 
but he wished to hold Pickens, making the tight 
there and in Texas, throwing the burden of the 
war, which all men of sense saw must come, upon 
those who, by revolting, had provoked it. pmry. ms. 

The President talked freely with Captain Meigs, 
and after some inquiries about Sumter asked him 
whether Fort Pickens could be held. Meigs re- 
pUed, " Certainly, if the navy would do its duty." 
The President then asked him whether he could 
go down there again and take general command of 
those three gi-eat fortresses, Taylor, Jefferson, and 
Pickens, and keep them safe. Meigs answered 
that he was only a captain, and could not com- 
mand the majors who were there. Here Seward 
broke in with : " I understand how that is ; Cap- 
tain Meigs must be promoted." " But there is no 
vacancy," answered the modest captain. 

Mr. Seward, however, made light of all difficul- 
ties, and told the President if he wanted this thing 
done to put it in Meigs's charge. When Pitt wished 
to conquer Canada, Seward said, he sent for a young 
man whom he had noticed in the society of Lon- 
don, and told him to take Quebec,— to ask for the 
necessary means and do it,— and it was done. 



436 ABEAHA3I LINCOLN 

ch. XXVI. Would the President do this now ? Lincoln re- 
plied he would consider it, and let him know in a 
day or two. 

Two days afterwards (Sunday, March 31) Meigs 
was about starting for church when Colonel Eras- 
mus D. Keyes, General Scott's military secretary, 
called and took him to Mr. Seward, who requested 
them to go forthwith and in consultation with 
General Scott to put upon paper an estimate and 
project for reheving and holding Fort Pickens, 
and to bring it to the President before four o'clock 
that afternoon. The two officers went directly to the 
engineer's bureau to inspect the necessary charts of 
Peusacola harbor and drawings of the fortifica- 
tions, and over these they matui'ed their plans. The 
rapid lapse of the few hours allowed compelled 
them to report to the President before seeing Gen- 
eral Scott. Lincoln heard them read their paper, 
and then dii*ected them to submit it to the general. 
" Tell him," said he, " that I wish this thing done, 
and not to let it fail unless he can show that I have 

Diary.^Ms. rcfuscd Mm Something he asked for as necessary." 
The officers obeyed, and on the way encountered 
Mr. Seward, who went with them. " General 
Scott," said he, on entering the old soldier's pres- 
ence, "you have formally reported to the President 
your advice to evacuate Port Pickens; notwith- 
standing this, I now come to bring you his order, 
as Commander-in-Cliief of the Army and Navy, to 
reenforce and hold it to the last extremity." The 
old general had his poHtical crotchets, but he was 
a soldier and a disciplinarian. " Sir," replied he, 
drawing himself up to his full height, "the great 
Frederick used to say, ' When the king commands, 



PREMIER OR PRESIDENT? 4:>7 

all things are possible.' It shall bo done.'' Meigs cn. xxvi. 
and Keyes submitted their plan, which ho approved 
in the main, adding a few details they had in tlicir 
haste overlooked ; the project was further discussed 
and definitely adopted. 

Fort Pickens stands on the western extremity of 
Santa Rosa Island, and servos, in connection with 
its twin fort, McRae, on the mainland opposite, 
to guard the entrance to Pensacola harbor. But 
in this case the two forts intended to render assist- 
ance to each other were held by opposing forces, 
bent not upon protecting but upon destroying each 
other, and restrained only by the existence of the 
" Sumter and Pickens truce," described in a pre- 
vious chapter. So far as a mere cannonade might 
go, Pickens was perhaps as strong as McRae ; but 
Lieutenant Slemmer in Pickens had only a hand- 
ful of Union men, forty-six soldiers and thirty or- 
dinary seamen all told, while some thousands of 
rebels were either encamped near or within reach 
of the secession general Braxton Bragg, himself a 
trained and skillful soldier. The chief danger was 
that Bragg might organize a large body of men, and 
by means of boats, crossing the bay at night or in 
a fog, carry Fort Pickens by a sudden assault be- 
fore the reenforcements in the Union fleet could 
be landed, as they were by the terms of the truce 
authorized to do in such an emergency. 

The substance of Meigs's plan was, that while a 
transport vessel bearing troops and stores landed 
them at Fort Pickens, outside the harbor, a ship-of- 
war, arriving simultaneously, should boldly steam 
past the hostile batteries of Fort McRae, enter the 
harbor, and take up such a position within as to be 

Vol. III.— 29 



438 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. a:xvl able to prevent any crossing or landing by the 
rebels. The ship destined to run the batteries 
would necessarily encounter considerable peril, not 
only from the guns of MeRae, but also from those 
of Fort Barrancas and supposed batteries at the 
navy yard — all, like McRae, on the mainland, and 
forming part of the harbor defenses. 

For such cooperation Meigs needed a young, tal- 
ented, and daring naval officer, and accordingly he 
made choice of Lieutenant David D. Porter, a com- 
panion and intimate friend, who, as he believed, 
combined the requisite qualities. 

One important characteristic of this Pickens ex- 
pedition was to be its secrecy. Seward in his argu- 
ment on Sumter had much insisted that preparation 
for reenforcement would unavoidably come to the 
knowledge of the rebels, and enable them to find 
means to oppose it. This argument applied with 
even gi-eater force to Fort Pickens ; the rebels con- 
trolled both the post and the telegraph throughout 
the South, and it was thought that upon the first 
notice of hostile design Bragg would assault and 
overwhelm the fort. Besides, the orders transmitted 
through regular channels two weeks before had ap- 
parently failed. But now that the ships to supply 
Sumter were being got ready, it was doubtless 
thought that under this guise the Pickens relief 
could be prepared without suspicion. 

On Monday, April 1, 1861, Captain Meigs, Colonel 
Keyes, and Lieutenant Porter were busy, under the 
occasional advice of Seward and General Scott, in 
perfecting the details of their plans and in drawing 
up the formal orders required. These were in due 
time signed by the President himself, it being part 



PEEMIER OR PRESIDENT? -4:')!) 

of the plan that no one but the officers named, not m. xxvr. 
even the Secretaries of War or Navy, should have M"1k". I" 

. *" "Niitlomil 

knowled£?e ot them. This was an error which onlv ""';!'''f<n- 
the anomalous condition and extreme peril of tli<! i'^. i««6- 
Government would have drawn Lincohi into, and 
it was never repeated. He doubtless supposed they 
were entirely consistent with the Sumter plans, 
especially as General Scott's written request for his 
signatm*e accompanied the papers — the general 
being perfectly cognizant of both expeditions. 

The immediate departure of a war steamer, with in- 
structions to enter Peusacola harbor and use all measures 
in its power to prevent any attack from the mainland 
upon Fort Pickens, is of prime importance. If the Presi- ^^^j g^^^ 
dent, as Commander-in-Chief, will issue the order of which Y* ^K'^'^l^}: 

T • 1 -, , ■ T 1 • April 1,186L 

I niclose a draft, an important step towards the security ms. 
of Fort Pickens wiU be taken. 

But although useful to secrecy, this course was 
bound to produce confusion and bad discipline; 
and such was its immediate result. That afternoon 
the commandant of the Brooklyn navy yard re- 
ceived two telegrams, in very similar language, 
directing him to " fit out the Powhatan to go to sea 
at the earliest possible moment." One was signed 
by the Secretary of the Navy, the other by the 
President ; the former intending the ship to go to 
Sumter, the latter to Pickens, and neither being 
aware of the other's action. Neither had reason to 
anticipate any such conflict of orders : the Powha- 
tan was not included in Fox's original requisition, 
and Meigs did not even know that the Sumter ex- 
pedition was being prepared. 

On the same afternoon several additional orders, 
made out under Seward's supervision, were brought 



440 ABKAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXVI. to Lincoln. Supposing they all related to this en- 
terprise, he signed them without reading; but it 
soon turned out that two of them related to a mat- 
ter altogether different. These orders changed the 
duty of several naval officers: Captain Garrett J. 
Pendergrast was to be sent to Vera Cruz on account 
of "important complications in our foreign rela- 
tions " ; and Captain Silas H. Stringham was to go 
to Pensacola. 

When these last-mentioned orders reached the 
hands of the Secretary of the Navy, to whom they 
were addressed and immediately transmitted, that 
official was not only greatly mystified but very seri- 
ously troubled in mind. He hastened to the Presi- 
dent, whom he found alone in the executive office, 
wiiting. "AVhat have I done wrong?" Lincoln 
inquired playfully, as he raised his head, and with 
his ever-accurate intuition read trouble in the 
countenance of his Secretary. Mr. Welles pre- 
sented the anomalous papers and asked what they 
meant; he had heard of no "foreign complica- 
tions," and he preferred Stringham in his present 
duty. Mr. Welles says : 

The President expressed as much surprise as I felt, 
that he had signed and sent me such a document. He 
said Mr. Seward, with two or three young men, had been 
there through the day on a matter which Mr. Seward had 
much at heart ; that he had yielded to the project of Mr. 
Seward, but as it involved considerable detail, and he 
had his hands full, and more too, he had left Mr. Seward 
to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had 
signed, some of them without reading, trusting enthely 
to Mr. Seward, for he could not undertake to read all 
papers presented to him; and if he could not trust the 
Secretary of State, whom could he rely upon in a pubhc 
matter that concerned us all ? He seemed disinchned to 



PREMIEK OR PRESIDENT? 441 

disclose or dwell on the project, but assured me he never cn. xxvr. 
would have signed that paper had he Imm aware of its 
contents, much of which had no eonncctitm with Mr. 
Seward's scheme. . The President reiterated they were 
not his instructions, and wished me distinctly to under- 
stand they were not, though his name was appended to 
them — said the paper was an improper one — that he ^.g,,^^ ,jj 
wished me to give it no more consideration than I "'iaiaxy,- 
thought proper — treat it as canceled — as if it had pp!V24,m5. 
never been written. 

Mr. Welles acted upon this verbal assurance, 
and was highly gratified that the President thus 
corrected what he felt to be an encroachment upon 
the duties and powers of the Navy Department. 
Nevertheless it is apparent that he had his doubts 
whether Lincoln had fully and unreservedly given 
him his confidence in this affair. In these sur- 
mises he was correct ; a circumstance had occurred 
between the President and Seward which the 
former could not communicate, and so far as is 
known never did communicate to any person but 
his private secretary, and of which the President's 
private papers have preserved the interesting rec- 
ord. In order to understand it rightly, a brief 
glance at contemporary affairs is needful. 

It will hardly be possible for the readers of his- 
tory in our day to comprehend the state of public 
sentiment in the United States during the month 
of March, 1861. The desire for peace; the hope 
of compromise ; the persistent disbelief in the 
extreme pm*poses of the South ; and, strangest of 
all, a certain national lethargy, utterly impossible 
to account for — all seemed to mark a decadence 
in patriotic feeling. The phenomenon is attested 
not only in the records of many public men willing 



442 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXVI. to abandon constitutional landmarks and to sacri- 
fice elementary rights of mankind, but also shown 
in the words and example of military officers in 
their consenting to shut theii' eyes to the truths 
and principles of their own profession — that it is 
the right of the Government to repel menaces as 
well as blows, and that building batteries is as 
effective and aggressive war as firing cannon- 
balls. 

This perversion of public opinion in fact ex- 
tended back to the meeting of Congress in Decem- 
ber. Under the spell of such a political nightmare 
the revolution had been half accomplished. The 
Union flag had been fired upon, the Federal laws 
defied, the Secession Government organized and 
inaugurated. The work of the consj^irators was 
done, but the popular movement had not yet fully 
ratified it. The difficult problem was presented to 
the Lincoln Administration, not alone whether it 
should endeavor to knock down the revolutionary 
edifice half built, but also whether such an effort 
might not excite the whole Southern people to rise 
en masse to complete it. 

From our point of view the answer is easy ; but 
it was not of so ready solution in March, 1861. 
Lincoln in his hesitation to provision Sumter at 
all hazards was not executing his own inclinations, 
but merely submitting to what for the time seemed 
the military and, more than all, the political neces- 
sities of the hour. The Buchanan Administration 
had first refused and then postponed succor to the 
fort. Congress had neglected to provide measures 
and means for coercion. The conservative senti- 
ment of the country protested loudly against 



PREMIER OR PRESIDENT? 443 

everytlimg but concession. His own Cabinet cn. xxvi. 
was divided in council. The times were " out of 
joint." Public opinion was awry. Treason was 
applauded and patriotism rebuked. Laws were 
held to be offenses, and officials branded as male- 
factors. In Lincoln's own forcible simile, sinners 
were " calling the righteous to repentance." 

It must be remembered, too, that dui'ing the 
month of March, 1861, Lincoln did not know the 
men who composed his Cabinet. Neither, on the 
other hand, did they know him. He recognized 
them as governors, senators, and statesmen, while 
they yet looked upon him as a simple frontier 
lawyer at most, and a rival to whom chance had 
transferred the honor they felt to be due to them- 
selves. The recognition and establishment of in- 
tellectual rank is difficult and slow. Perhaps the 
first real question of the Lincoln Cabinet was, 
" Who is the greatest man ? " It is pretty safe to 
assert that no one — not even he himself — believed 
it was Abraham Lincoln. Bearing this in mind, 
we shall be better able to understand and explain 
acts done and acts omitted during that memorable 
month. 

In this state of affairs the policy of the new 
Administration was necessarily passive, expectant, 
cautious, and tentative. Other causes contributed 
to its embarrassments. The change from a long 
Democratic to a Republican regime involved a 
sweeping change of functionaries. The impending 
revolution made both sides suspicious and vindic- 
tive ; the new appointees could not, as in ordinary 
times, lean upon the experience and routine knowl- 
edge of the old. The new party was not yet homo- 



444 ABEAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXVI. geneous. A certain friction mutually irritated 
Eepublicans of Whig, of Democratic, or of Free- 
soil antecedents against each other. Douglas was 
artfully leading a Senate debate to foster and 
strengthen the anti-war feeling of the North. The 
Cabinet had not become a working unit. Each 
Secretary was beset by a horde of applicants, by 
over-officious friends, by pressing and most con- 
tradictory advice. 

Seward naturally took a leading part in the new 
Cabinet. This was largely warranted by his promi- 
nence as a party manager; his experience in the 
New York governorship and in the United States 
Senate; the quieting and mediating attitude he 
had maintained during the winter; the influence 
he was supposed to wield over the less violent 
Southerners ; the information he had gained from 
the Buchanan Cabinet ; his intimacy with General 
Scott; his acknowledged ability and talent; his 
optimism, which always breathed hope and im- 
parted confidence. During the whole of March he 
had been busy with various measures of adminis- 
tration. He had advised appointments, written 
diplomatic notes and circulars, carried on a run- 
ning negotiation with the rebel commissioners, 
sought to establish relations with the Virginia Con- 
vention, sent Lander to Texas to kindle a "back 
fire" against secession, elaborated his policy of 
evacuating Sumter, proposed a change of party 
name and organization, and set on foot the secret 
expedition to Fort Pickens. 

All this activity, however, did not appear to 
satisfy his desires and ambition. His philosophic 
vision took a yet wider range. He was eager to 



PREMIER OR PRESIDENT? 445 

enlarge the field of his diplomacy beyond the cm. xxvi. 
boundaries of the republic. Regarding niei'c par- 
tisanship as a secondary motive, he was ready to 
grapple with international politics. Ho would heal 
a provincial quarrel in the zeal and fervor of a 
continental crusade. He would smother a domestic 
insurrection in the blaze and glory of a war which 
must logically be a war of conquest. He would 
supplant the slavery question by the Monroe Doo 
trine. And who shall say that these imperial 
dreams did not contemplate the possibility of 
changing a threatened dismemberment of the 
Union into the triumphant annexation of Canada, 
Mexico, and the West Indies ? 

On this same first day of April, while Meigs and 
Porter were busy with plans and orders about Fort 
Pickens, Seward submitted to Lincoln the follow- 
ing extraordinary state paper, unlike anything to 
be found in the political history of the United 
States : 



Some thoughts for the President's consideration, 
April 1, 1861. 

First We are at the end of a month's administration, 
and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign. 

Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even 
been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the 
need to meet apphcations for patronage, have prevented 
attention to other and more grave matters. 

Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our 
policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not 
only bring scandal on the Administration, but danger 
upon the country. 

Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for 
ofSce. But how? I suggest that we make the local 



446 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Oh. XXVI. appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones 
for ulterior and occasional action. 

Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware tliat my views 
are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My 
system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely, 
that we must 

Change the question before the public from one 
UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon 
union or disunion. 

In other words, from what would be regarded as a 
pai'ty question, to one of Patriotism or Union. 

The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although 
not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. 
"Witness the teinper manifested by the Republicans in 
the free States, and even by the Union men in the 
South. 

I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for 
changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last 
Administration created the necessity. 

For the rest I would simultaneously defend and reen- 
force all the forts in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled 
from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put 
the island of Key West under martial law. 

This will raise distinctly the question of Union or Dis- 
union. I would maintain every fort and possession in 
the South. 

FOR FOREIGN NATIONS. 

I would demand explanations from Spain and France, 
categorically, at once. 

I would seek explanations from Great Britain and 
Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central 
America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of inde- 
pendence on this continent against European intervention. 

And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from 
Spain and France, 

Would convene Congress and declare war against them. 

But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an ener- 
getic prosecution of it. 

For this purpose it must be somebody's business to 
pursue and dii-ect it incessantly. 



PREiHER OR PRESIDENT T 447 

Either the President must do it himself, and hr ull the ch. xxvi. 
while active in it, or 

Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once 
adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. 

It is not in my especial province. 

But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility. ms. 

It is a little difficult to imagine what must have 
been the feelings of a President, and particularly of 
a frank, loyal, and generous nature like that of 
Lincoln, on receiving from his principal councilor 
and anticipated mainstay of his Administration 
such a series of proposals. That he should dele- 
gate his Presidential functions and authority ; that 
he should turn his back upon the party which 
elected him; that he should ignore the political 
battle which had been fought and the victory for 
moral government which had been won; that he 
should by an arbitrary act plunge the nation into 
foreign war ; that he should ask his rival to rule in 
his stead — all this might be romantic statesman- 
ship, but to the cool, logical mind of the President 
it must have brought thoughts excited by no 
other event of his most eventful life. What was 
to be said in answer 1 The tender of a grave issue 
like this presupposed grave purposes and determi- 
nations. Should he by a fitting rebuke break up 
his scarcely formed Cabinet and alienate the most 
powerful leader after himself, who might perhaps 
carry with him the organized support of all the 
Northern States which had voted for this rival at 
Chicago ? 

The President sent his reply the same day. He 
armed himself with his irresistible logic, his fault- 
less tact, his limitless patience, his kindest but 



448 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

ch. XXVI. most imperturbable fii-mness. Only the "hand of 
iron in the glove of velvet " could have written the 
following answer : 

Executive Mansion, April 1, 1861. 
Hon. W. H. Seward. 

My Dear Sir: Since parting with you I have been 
considering your paper dated this day, and entitled " Some 
thoughts for the President's consideration." The first 
proposition in it is, "First, We are at the end of a 
month's administration, and yet without a policy, either 
domestic or foreign." 

At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I 
said, "The power confided to me will be used to hold, 
occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to 
the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts." 
This had your distinct approval at the time ; and, taken 
in connection with the order I immediately gave General 
Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power 
to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact do- 
mestic policy you now urge, with the single exception 
that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter. 

Again, I do not perceive how the reenforcement of 
Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue, 
while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national 
and patriotic one. 

The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo 
certainly brings a new item within the range of our for- 
eign policy ; but up to that time we have been preparing 
circulars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in 
perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had 
no foreign policy. 

Upon your closing propositions, that " whatever policy 
we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it, 

" For this purpose it must be somebody's business to 
pursue and direct it incessantly, 

"Either the President must do it himself, and be all 
the while active in it, or 

"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once 
adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide," 
I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When 



PREMIER OR PRESIDEN r i 449 

a general line of policy is adopted, I ai)])i-('li('iid thvrv is en. xxvi. 
no danger of its being changed without good reason or 
continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, 
upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose 1 
am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet. 

Your ob't serv't, 

A. Lincoln. ms. 

In this reply not a word is omitted which was 
necessary, and not a hint or allusion is contained 
that could be dispensed with. The answer was 
conclusive and ended the argument. So far as is 
known, the affair never reached the knowledge of 
any other member of the Cabinet, or even the most 
intimate of the President's friends; nor was it 
probably ever again alluded to by either Lincoln 
or Seward. Doubtless it needed only the Presi- 
dent's note to show the Secretary of State how 
serious a fault he had committed, for all his tii'e- 
less industry and undivided influence continued to 
be given for four long years to his chief, not only 
without reserve, but with a sincere and devoted 
personal attachment. Lincoln, on his part, easily 
dismissed tbe incident from his thought with that 
grand and characteristic charity which sought only 
to cherish the virtues of men — which readily rec- 
ognized the strength and acknowledged the serv- 
ices of his Secretary, to whom he unselfishly gave, 
to his own last days, his generous and unwavering 
trust. 



END OF VOL. in. 



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